All California counties have a mandatory duty to provide medical care for their indigent residents.
After years of managing a medical center for this purpose, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors (Board of Supervisors) determined that transferring governance of the center to a hospital authority would “improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of the community health services provided” and would be “the best way to fulfill its commitment to the medically indigent, special needs, and general populations of” the county.
The Board of Supervisors sought the legislative authorization to do so. In 1996 the Legislature enacted Health and Safety Code, section 101850 which authorized the establishment of defendant Alameda Health System (AHS) as a “separate public agency” (Health & Saf. Code, § 101850, subd. (a)(2)(C); see id., subd. (a)(2)(D)) “strictly and exclusively dedicated to the management, administration, and control of the medical center.”
Plaintiffs worked at Highland Hospital, a facility operated by AHS. Tamelin Stone was a medical assistant and Amanda Kunwar was a licensed vocational nurse. In their wage and hour suit against AHS, plaintiffs alleged these positions were subject to requirements of the Labor Code and wage orders, in particular Industrial Wage Commission (IWC) wage order No. 5-2001 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050).
The operative complaint alleged that AHS frequently denied or discouraged the taking of meal and rest breaks and “automatically deducted ½ hour from each workday” even when meal periods were not taken.
AHS demurred on the ground that it was a public entity not subject to suit for the Labor Code violations asserted. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.
The Court of Appeal reversed in part, reasoning that construing the enabling statute, rather than the Labor Code provisions themselves, the court discerned no legislative intent to exempt AHS from the meal and rest period and payroll requirements underlying plaintiffs’ first three causes of action. (Stone v. Alameda Health System (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 84, 93-94 (Stone).)
The California Supreme Court reversed in Stone v. Alameda Health System -S279137 (August 2024).
The Labor Code and wage order impose meal and rest break obligations on “employers,” and, under the relevant wage order, an “employer” must be a “person as defined in Section 18 of the Labor Code.” (Wage Order No. 5, subd. 2(H).) Accordingly, section 18’s definition of the term “person” is central to resolving the issues here.
However the Supreme Court went on to say “While section 18’s definition of ‘person’ is central to our interpretation of the relevant Labor Code and wage order provisions, this definition by itself is not dispositive.”
Wage Order No. 5, which covers hospital workers, states that, unless specifically noted otherwise, “the provisions of this order shall not apply to any employees directly employed by the State or any political subdivision thereof, including any city, county, or special district.” (Wage Order No. 5, subd. 1(C).) The plain language of the governing wage order thus expressly excludes public employers from most of the wage and hour obligations it places on private employers, including meal and rest break obligations.
“Relevant history of the statutes and wage orders also supports a conclusion that the Legislature did not intend for meal and rest break requirements to apply to public employers.”
“Plaintiffs largely concede that the Labor Code provisions at issue are generally not applicable to public employers. Their primary argument is that the provisions apply to AHS because AHS is not a public entity.”
The enabling statute repeatedly describes AHS as a public agency. In a subdivision devoted to definitions, it states that – Hospital Authority means the separate public agency established pursuant to the enabling legislation.
“Accordingly, as a public employer, AHS is not a ‘person’ subject to liability for the meal and rest break and associated payroll records violations alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint.” In addition “based on the statutory text, legislative history, and public policy, we conclude public entity employers are not subject to PAGA suits for civil penalties.”