On June 16, 2009, fire destroyed the building in which defendant Cory Michael Hoehn and his roommate, Forest Kroll, had leased an apartment.
An investigator for the building’s insurer, plaintiff California Capital Insurance Company determined that “careless smoking” on the patio caused the fire. Although the investigator reached no conclusion about who started the fire or who was present when it began, California Capital sued Hoehn and Kroll in March 2010 for “general negligence,” alleging that they caused the fire due to “improperly discarded smoking materials.” The company asked for $472,326 in damages.
In March 2010, the company attempted to serve Hoehn with a complaint and summons in the lawsuit. The affidavit supporting the return of service stated that the summons and complaint were left with Shannon Smith and identified Smith as “Girlfriend,” “Co-Occupant,” and “a competent member of the household.” A copy of the summons and complaint was also mailed to Hoehn’s address. California Capital was unable to serve Kroll and dismissed him from the lawsuit.
In April 2011, approximately a year after attempting to serve Hoehn, California Capital requested and obtained a default judgment against Hoehn for $486,528, based on an investigator’s declaration that careless smoking habits caused the fire.
In March 2018, California Capital assigned its rights to the default judgment to Sequoia Concepts, Inc. Based on a May 2018 writ of execution, the sheriff of Placer County, in January 2020, served on Hoehn’s employer an earnings withholding order, placing a lien on Hoehn’s wages in order to begin payment of the default judgment.
In March 2020, Hoehn filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. In a supporting declaration, he stated as follows: He did “not recall receiving or seeing the Summons or Complaint at any time.” Shannon Smith “did not live with” him at the apartment and he “never received a summons or complaint or any legal paperwork from [her] at any time. He “did not receive any request for judgment or notice of a default judgment hearing” in the case. He learned that there had been a default judgment against him in January 2020, when his employer informed him that a lien had been placed on his wages. He promptly contacted an attorney who filed the motion to set aside the default judgment.
Hoehn’s motion sought relief on two theories: (1) the court should exercise its power under section 473(d) to vacate the judgment; and (2) the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud or mistake. The trial court, following a long line of appellate court opinions, held that relief under section 473(d) was not available because Hoehn made the motion more than two years after entry of the default judgment. Regarding Hoehn’s second asserted ground for relief, the court concluded that “the fact that the proof of service of summons misidentifies Shannon Smith as a co-occupant” did not “demonstrate that the statement constitutes extrinsic fraud.”
The Court of Appeal affirmed. Relying on Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 175 (Trackman) and Rogers v. Silverman (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1114 (Rogers) – and rejecting Hoehn’s criticisms of those decisions – the court concluded that relief under section 473(d) was time-barred. It further concluded, like the trial court, that the mistake in service was insufficient to make out a claim of extrinsic fraud that would support equitable relief from a default judgment.
The California Supreme Court reversed in the case of California Capital Insurance Co. v. Hoehn -S277510 (November 2024)
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) provides in relevant part that a court “may . . . on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” Under this provision, a party may move to vacate a judgment on the ground of improper service of process.
A line of decisions, followed by the Court of Appeal has held that such motions must be made within a “reasonable time” if the challenged judgment is not void on its face and its invalidity must be established by extrinsic evidence. To set the outer limit for what constitutes a reasonable time, courts have borrowed the two-year time limit of section 473.5, which applies where proper constructive service was given but the defendant did not receive actual notice.
The California Supreme Court granted review in this case to decide whether these decisions are correct. It held that they are not, and said that this judicially created rule finds no footing in the statute’s text, has not been adopted by the Legislature, and lacks any sound justification.
The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment.