- Court Sets Rules for Use of Strict Liability in FEHA Caseson October 6, 2026 at 10:00 AM
A California Court of Appeal has held, in an opinion certified for publication, that an employer is not strictly liable under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for sexual harassment by an employee who supervises other workers but has no supervisory authority over the plaintiff. In that situation the employer answers only under the negligence standard. The court described the question as one no California appellate case had directly decided.
The plaintiff in this case, Jane Doe, returned to Wells Fargo in 2018 as a wealth advisor in its private bank division, where advisors assemble teams of specialists to serve high-net-worth clients. Eric Pagel was an investment strategist who handled portfolios for many of her clients and was one of the bank's top producers nationally. He was not her supervisor. Wells Fargo had not designated him a supervisor of anyone, and he could not hire, fire, or approve expenses or time off, although he gave input on the performance of the support associates who executed his trades and handled his scheduling.
In January 2020, Doe, Pagel and several coworkers traveled to Bakersfield for client meetings and had dinner and drinks afterward. Doe says she blacked out that night, that Pagel later came to her hotel room, and that she was too intoxicated to consent to the sex that followed. Pagel maintains that she invited him and consented. About a month later Doe told a colleague who had been on the trip that Pagel had been harassing her, without mentioning an assault. That complaint was not escalated or investigated.
On November 9, 2020, Doe reported harassment and assault to the bank's ethics hotline, to her direct supervisor and to law enforcement. Wells Fargo flagged the complaint for expedited investigation eight days later and placed Pagel on paid administrative leave. After a ten-month inquiry, the internal investigator issued a 28-page report finding the harassment and assault allegations unsubstantiated, but concluding that everyone at the dinner had violated the workplace conduct policy and that Pagel had violated the professionalism policy. Pagel received a final notice warning that further violations could lead to immediate termination.
Doe sued Wells Fargo, Pagel and three other employees in Los Angeles County Superior Court in February 2023, alleging sexual harassment under FEHA and, against the bank, failure to prevent harassment and retaliation. Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be strictly liable because Pagel never supervised Doe, and that it could not be liable in negligence because it responded promptly and appropriately once she complained. Doe's opposition argued that strict liability attaches to harassment by any supervisor, whoever that person supervises, and did not address the negligence standard. Judge Tony L. Richardson granted the motion on both grounds and entered judgment for the bank.
In the published case of Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. B344642 (October 2026), the Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the judgment on Doe's appeal. Justice Tamzarian, as acting presiding justice, wrote for a unanimous panel. Only the harassment claim against Wells Fargo was before the court, because Doe's briefs did not address her other causes of action.
The court began with the statute. Government Code § 12940, subdivision (j)(1) expressly sets a negligence standard for harassment by an employee other than an agent or supervisor, and the California Supreme Court inferred from that wording, in State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, that employers are strictly liable when a supervisor is the harasser. The statute never uses the words strict liability, and the panel found that its text does not plainly answer whether "supervisor" means any supervisor or the plaintiff's supervisor. Because the definition in Government Code § 12926, subdivision (t) turns on a person's authority over other employees, the court reasoned that someone with no authority over the plaintiff is, as to her, simply a coworker.
With no helpful legislative history, the court looked to the purpose of the rule. Strict liability exists because a supervisor wields employer-conferred power over the victim, which makes harassment harder to resist and report and justifies imputing the conduct to the employer. None of that is present when the harasser's authority runs only to other people. The panel also found that Doe's reading would produce arbitrary results: an employer would be strictly liable when a shop foreman harasses an executive, or when a mid-level manager harasses her own boss, but liable only in negligence when a senior non-supervisory employee harasses a junior one.
The court read Health Services as consistent with this view. That opinion spoke of "the victim's supervisor" and cautioned that the supervisor must be acting in a supervisory capacity when the harassment occurs. Later Court of Appeal decisions said the same, including Chapman v. Enos (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 920, Atalla v. Rite Aid Corp. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 294, and Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 200. A person who does not supervise the plaintiff at all, the panel concluded, cannot be acting as her supervisor.
Doe's contrary authorities did not persuade the court. Two Fair Employment and Housing Commission decisions from the 1980s (Dept. of Fair Employment and Housing v. Hart & Starkey, Inc., FEHC Dec. No. 84-23, and Dept. of Fair Employment and Housing v. Community Hospital of San Gabriel, FEHC Dec. No. 86-08) predated both Health Services and the statutory definition of supervisor, and the court declined to follow them. Massachusetts cases she cited involved harassers with authority over, or clearly senior to, the victim. To the extent the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept. v. Illinois Human Rights Com. (2009) 233 Ill.2d 125, 908 N.E.2d 39 treats direct supervisory authority as irrelevant under an analogous statute, the panel respectfully disagreed.
The holding has stated limits. The court assumed, without deciding, that Pagel supervised the associates, so it did not resolve whether giving input on reviews and directing support staff makes someone a FEHA supervisor. It emphasized that strict liability is not confined to a plaintiff's direct boss or those above that boss in the reporting chain, since the broad statutory definition can make others the plaintiff's supervisor as well. It also did not address liability for harassment by an employer's agent, a theory Doe did not raise.
Finally, the court held that Doe forfeited her remaining theories. She did not argue on appeal that a triable issue existed on negligence, and her contention that Wells Fargo ratified Pagel's conduct was raised for the first time in her opening appellate brief. The panel declined to exercise its discretion to reach it. As a result, the opinion does not review whether the bank's handling of the February 2020 complaint or the length of its investigation met the negligence standard.
- Waiver of Right to Avoid Arbitration in Sexual Harassment Claimson October 6, 2026 at 10:00 AM
A divided California Court of Appeal has held, in an opinion certified for publication, that an employee can waive the right to avoid arbitration under the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402. The majority found waiver where the employee knew of a sex-based harassment claim, held it back for tactical reasons while opposing arbitration on other grounds, and raised it only after the trial court had sent the case to arbitration. One justice dissented.
In this case DoorDash hired Andrew Chin in 2020. He took nine weeks of parental bonding leave in early 2023 and alleges that the company then retaliated against him: it denied him the same or a comparable position on his return, interfered with three further weeks of leave, and terminated him at the end of 2023. He also alleged that a superior repeatedly asked when he would take the rest of his leave. In February 2024 he sued in Los Angeles County Superior Court for violation of the California Family Rights Act, whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination and unfair competition. The complaint contained no harassment claim.
DoorDash moved to compel arbitration under an agreement covering any dispute arising from Chin's employment. Chin's written opposition argued only that no valid agreement existed. It did not mention sexual harassment, an amended complaint, or the EFAA. At the May 28, 2024 hearing, after a tentative ruling against him, his counsel said that if arbitration were ordered Chin would ask for leave to add a sexual harassment claim to avoid arbitration under federal law. The court ordered the whole action to arbitration, stayed the suit, and declined to allow an amendment at that time. Chin's writ petition was denied. In it he stated that he had left the harassment claim out of his complaint "for strategic purposes."
Chin filed an arbitration demand in August 2024 and amended it in December 2024 to add a sex-based harassment claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). He alleged that DoorDash encouraged women to take full parental leave while discouraging men through intimidation, ridicule and insults. The only specific incident alleged was the superior's repeated questioning already described in the 2024 complaint. He then asked the arbitrator to return the matter to court under the EFAA, missed a ten-day window the arbitrator gave him to petition the superior court, and in April 2025 filed a second lawsuit pleading the harassment claim and seeking a declaration that the arbitration agreement was invalid as to both suits.
Three motions were heard in July 2025: Chin's motion to consolidate the two suits, his motion to invalidate the arbitration agreement under the EFAA, and DoorDash's motion to compel arbitration of the second suit. Judge Jon R. Takasugi said he was "not happy with the way this has gone" but believed the law required a ruling for Chin. He found that Chin had plausibly pleaded a sex-based harassment claim and had not waived the EFAA by asserting that claim in arbitration. He granted both of Chin's motions, denied DoorDash's, and so undid the earlier order compelling arbitration. The court did not address DoorDash's argument that Chin's conduct before that earlier order amounted to waiver. DoorDash appealed.
In the published case of Chin v. DoorDash, Inc., No. B348844 (October 2026), the Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed all three orders and remanded with instructions to grant DoorDash's motion to compel arbitration. Justice Scherb wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice Viramontes. Acting Presiding Justice Wiley dissented and would have affirmed. DoorDash was awarded its costs on appeal.
The majority started from the statutory text. The EFAA does not void arbitration agreements automatically. It applies at the election of the person alleging harassment, and nothing in it displaces the ordinary rule that statutory rights can be waived. Chin did not argue otherwise. Reviewing an undisputed record de novo, the court assumed that waiver had to be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, and the majority explained that it can be implied from deliberate, tactical litigation conduct as well as from express words. It relied on California authority that grounds for resisting arbitration must be raised in court before the arbitration goes forward, citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1 and Cummings v. Future Nissan (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 321. A party who knows of such a ground and keeps it in reserve loses it.
Applying those principles, the majority found waiver on four points. Chin knew of the harassment claim in 2024, since the one specific incident he later relied on was already in his first complaint. He withheld it by his own account for strategic reasons, and conceded at oral argument that the fair inference was a plan to defeat the agreement entirely before turning to the EFAA. He opposed arbitration vigorously without invoking the statute, and his reference to "federal law" at the hearing came too late and explained nothing. He then waited almost a year to file the second suit. The majority also noted the cost of sending the parties back and forth between court and arbitration.
The majority treated the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc. (9th Cir., Aug. 19, 2026, No. 25-1532) as supporting its result. Ding confirmed that EFAA rights may be waived under ordinary principles, but found no waiver where the plaintiff discovered her harassment claim during arbitration and invoked the statute as soon as she faced a motion to compel. The majority distinguished Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 75, where the complaint already pleaded harassment and the trial court raised the EFAA itself.
Chin's remaining arguments were rejected. He could not avoid waiver by pointing out that no harassment claim had been pleaded before arbitration began, because withholding the claim was the deliberate choice that produced the waiver. His contention that trial counsel believed an amendment was barred once the motion to compel was filed had no support in the record. The court also declined to read the EFAA as a right to move between forums at will. Because the EFAA applies to an entire case, the waiver reached both the claims Chin pleaded and the one he withheld. The majority did not decide whether his allegations stated a harassment claim sufficient to trigger the statute.
In dissent, Justice Wiley agreed that the delay and expense were regrettable and said he would be sympathetic to sanctions requiring plaintiff's counsel to reimburse the fees wasted. But he concluded that Chin never purposely gave up a court forum, since escaping arbitration was his aim throughout. In his words, "It looks more like a blunder," and a miscalculation is not a waiver.
- Civil Litigation Limited While Employer Negligence a WCAB Issueon October 5, 2026 at 1:24 PM
Guadalupe Reyes-Cano was driving his employer’s tomato truck in the course of his employment when a vehicle driven by a Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) employee struck him. He received workers’ compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier, Federal Insurance Company (FIC). In April 2021, he sued PG&E and its driver for negligence. Their answer asserted, as an affirmative defense, that the negligence of others caused the crash. Separately, Reyes-Cano pursued his workers’ compensation claim before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB), where he alleged his employer was negligent.
FIC served a notice of lien for $208,778.08 in May 2023. Before mediation of the civil case, the PG&E defendants argued in their mediation brief that the employer was partly to blame, because the truck was 5,000 pounds over the legal weight limit and Reyes-Cano could not stop in time. FIC received that brief, and its attorney attended the mediation. The civil case settled in August 2023, but FIC’s lien was not resolved. At FIC’s request, Reyes-Cano’s attorney set aside $125,000 of the settlement in a client trust account, pending final resolution of the lien. The attorney later told FIC that the employer negligence issue would have to be litigated to determine the lien’s value. The money has stayed in the trust account ever since, and the employer negligence issue is still pending before the WCAB.
FIC then sued Reyes-Cano in Sacramento County Superior Court for conversion, imposition of a constructive trust, money had and received, and money paid. It also sought punitive damages.
The trial court granted summary adjudication on every cause of action and entered judgment for Reyes-Cano. It reasoned that because the WCAB had not yet decided whether the employer’s negligence contributed to the injuries, the amount FIC was owed was not yet a specific, identifiable sum. A specific, identifiable sum is required for a conversion claim, and FIC’s other claims rested on the same premise. The court also overruled FIC’s evidentiary objections because they were not filed in the required format.
In the unpublished case of Federal Insurance Co. v. Reyes-Cano, No. C103530 (September 2026). The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment in full and awarded Reyes-Cano his costs on appeal.
The panel rejected each of FIC’s four arguments. First, the court found no abuse of discretion in overruling FIC’s evidentiary objections. FIC did not dispute that it failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354, which requires objections to be filed separately and to identify and quote the material objected to. On appeal, FIC also failed to identify which objections were at issue or explain why they had merit, so the court treated the argument as forfeited.
Second, and most significant for carriers, the court rejected FIC’s argument that the possibility of employer negligence was irrelevant. FIC’s position was that the PG&E defendants never properly pleaded employer negligence as an affirmative defense, so its lien was protected and the WCAB’s eventual negligence finding would affect only its credit against future benefits. The court agreed that the PG&E defendants had not specifically pleaded employer negligence, citing Difko Admin. (US) Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 126. It noted, however, that FIC had actual knowledge of the issue from the mediation. Because the issue was never resolved in the civil case, the court held, FIC could rely on its lien rather than intervene.
But the defective pleading did not protect the lien from reduction. It simply meant the third-party defendants settled without seeking to offset their own liability against the employer’s share of fault. Under Roe v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 884, when employer negligence has not been decided in the third-party action, the employee may have it decided by the WCAB. The court rejected FIC’s attempt to confine that determination to future credits. The WCAB’s authority under Labor Code § 3861 reaches the employer’s compensation liability as a whole, including reimbursement. The court also relied on Hone v. Climatrol Industries, Inc. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 513, which holds that the WCAB has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the validity of an employer’s lien when it is the employee, not the third party, who seeks to prove employer negligence.
Under Associated Construction & Engineering Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 829, a concurrently negligent employer recovers only to the extent its compensation outlay exceeds its proportionate share of the employee’s total damages. Allowing FIC to collect its full lien without first resolving the employer’s fault, the court said, would let it recover all benefits paid regardless of that fault. That would conflict with the policy that a negligent employer should not profit from its own wrong. The court called the outcome equitable as well. If the employer is found free of fault, FIC can recover what it paid and seek credit against future benefits; if the employer is found negligent, FIC’s recovery will be reduced accordingly.
Third and fourth, the court agreed that FIC could not establish a triable issue on any of its claims. Under Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, money can be the subject of a conversion claim only when a specific sum capable of identification is involved. FIC’s constructive trust and common count claims likewise depended on its right to a specific sum. FIC argued that Labor Code § 3860(b) makes a settlement subject to the employer’s full reimbursement claim. It also argued that the agreed $125,000 set-aside was, by definition, identifiable. The court disagreed on both points. Sections 3860 and 3856 give the employer a first lien, but they do not guarantee full reimbursement when the employer may share fault. Until the WCAB rules on employer negligence, the $125,000 does not represent a specific sum that FIC owns or has a right to possess.
The punitive damages claim failed for the same reason. A simple failure to pay money owed is not conversion. And because FIC could not yet show it was entitled to the money, it could not show malice in Reyes-Cano’s position that the funds would be released only after the employer negligence issue was decided.
- School District Ordered to Classify Temporary Teacher as Permanenton October 5, 2026 at 1:24 PM
Melissa Washington began teaching first grade at the Alta Loma School District’s Stork Elementary on August 2, 2019. She was told in her interview that she was filling a new position created by a last-minute jump in enrollment, and the principal later testified to the same thing. When she arrived to sign her contract, however, it classified her as a temporary employee who could be terminated at any time. The human resources director told her that was just part of the process and that she would be reclassified as probationary later.
That did not happen. In each of the next two years, the principal told her that, because of uncertainty created by the COVID-19 pandemic, all returning temporary teachers would again receive only temporary contracts, with no exceptions. He apologized, and she was told she might even receive tenure the following year. Washington signed temporary contracts for the 2020–2021 and 2021–2022 school years. In March 2022, the District told her it would not offer her, or any of its temporary teachers, a contract for 2022–2023, citing lost pandemic-related funding and low enrollment. She applied for temporary positions the District advertised for the next year but was not hired.
In February 2023, Washington petitioned for a writ of mandate ordering the District to reinstate her as a permanent employee with an August 2, 2019 seniority date and to compensate her for lost pay and benefits. She argued she should have been classified as probationary for her first two years, which would have made her permanent by operation of law in her third.
The District defended the temporary classification on a single theory. It said Washington had been hired to fill in for two permanent teachers who shared one full-time position under a voluntary job-sharing arrangement, and that the job share was a grant of leave under Education Code § 44920. That section allows a district to hire a temporary teacher for up to a year when a certificated employee has been granted leave for a semester or year or is experiencing long-term illness.
The trial court found that Washington was not in fact hired to fill a vacancy created by the job share; she was hired because of increased enrollment. It nonetheless denied the petition. It agreed with the District that one of the job-sharing teachers was effectively on leave at any given time. Relying on District spreadsheets, it also found that the number of temporary teachers did not exceed the number of teachers on leave, counting job shares as leave. The court added that if it reached the issue, the District’s laches defense would be persuasive, because Washington waited until after her third year to sue.
In the published case of Washington v. Alta Loma School District, No. D088028 (October 2026). The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with directions. The trial court must issue a writ of mandate ordering the District to reinstate Washington as a permanent employee with a seniority date of August 2, 2019. It must also hold further proceedings to determine her lost compensation. Washington recovers her costs on appeal.
The Court of Appeal began with the Education Code’s classification scheme. Certificated teachers fall into four categories: permanent, probationary, substitute, or temporary. Unless the Code specifically requires another classification, a teacher must be classified as probationary. That rule appears in Education Code § 44915 and was applied in Stockton Teachers Assn. CTA/NEA v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 446. Under Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 821, the temporary and substitute classifications carry no statutory due process protections, so they must be strictly construed. Districts have no discretion to deviate from the statutory scheme.
Applying that strict construction, the court held for the first time that leave in § 44920 means a leave of absence, and that a voluntary job-sharing arrangement is not one. Because § 44920 does not define leave, the court read it together with related sections of the Education Code. Leaves of absence are addressed at length in the Code’s article on resignations, dismissals and leaves of absence. That article covers medical, parental, workers’ compensation, study, bereavement, and other leaves, but not job sharing. Reduced workloads instead fall under the separate employment article, where Education Code § 44922 lets districts allow teachers to reduce their workload from full-time to part-time.
The court found that the plain meaning of leave of absence points the same way. It implies a temporary absence with an intention to return to the same position. The District’s own collective bargaining agreement treats leaves of absence as holding the teacher’s place. Job-sharing teachers, by contrast, have no right to return to their prior position; they are restored to full-time work only if a position becomes available and no probationary or permanent teacher would be laid off. The court also rejected the District’s reliance on American Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d 100. That case dealt with a teacher reassigned to a categorically funded program, not a job share. The Legislature later addressed that situation separately. And the American Federation court did not apply the strict construction Balen requires.
Because job shares do not count as leave, the trial court’s spreadsheet comparison also failed, since it treated job-share vacancies as leave. The appellate court therefore did not need to decide whether Washington was actually hired as the job-share placeholder.
The consequences followed directly from the Code. Washington defaulted to probationary status for her first two school years. The District never notified her by March 15 of her second year that she would not be reelected; instead, it rehired her. Under Education Code § 44929.21(b), she therefore became a permanent employee at the start of her third year. A permanent teacher can be dismissed only on statutory grounds and after an opportunity for a hearing, and the District followed none of those procedures. It thus had a clear, ministerial duty to reelect her for 2022–2023, which supports mandate relief and lost compensation under Code of Civil Procedure § 1095.
- San Mateo County Deputy Sheriff to Serve 5 Months for Comp Fraudon October 1, 2026 at 8:22 AM
A former San Mateo County sheriff’s deputy who collected more than $61,000 in workers’ compensation benefits for an elbow injury has been sentenced to five months in county jail. Surveillance video showed him lifting, driving, and working out hard at the gym. Jorden Tuiveta Faatiga, 35, of Patterson, was sentenced on Tuesday, September 29, 2026, according to the San Mateo County District Attorney’s Office, as reported by KRON4 and by Bay City News in the Redwood City Pulse.
Faatiga pleaded no contest on April 30 to felony charges of workers’ compensation fraud and filing a false document. San Mateo County Superior Court Judge Jeffrey Jackson placed him on two years of supervised probation, conditioned on serving five months in the county jail. He was also ordered to pay $61,534.02 in restitution to the County of San Mateo. According to KRON4, the District Attorney’s Office said he has already repaid $40,000 of that amount. Faatiga remains out of custody and has been ordered to surrender at the county jail on January 9, 2027.
According to the prosecutors’ account, the case began in October 2024, when Faatiga reported an on-duty injury to his right elbow and filed a workers’ compensation claim. He then worked in a modified-duty assignment through February 2025 while receiving benefits. Investigators from the District Attorney’s Workers’ Compensation Fraud Unit reviewed surveillance video that, prosecutors said, showed him using the supposedly injured elbow in ways that contradicted the restrictions he had described to his treating physician. The activities included lifting, driving, and intense gym workouts. Prosecutors also said he regularly misrepresented his symptoms to doctors in order to keep receiving benefits.
The conviction also ended Faatiga’s law enforcement career. The California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) disqualified his peace officer certification in August 2026. That makes him ineligible to serve as a peace officer anywhere in California, according to KRON4 and the Redwood City Pulse.
The case drew wide attention when the plea was first announced. The National Insurance Crime Bureau highlighted it in its regional news roundup, citing earlier reporting by KTVU. The same Bay City News account of the sentencing also ran in The Almanac.
For public employers and claims administrators, the case is a familiar pattern with a notable twist. Surveillance that contradicts reported work restrictions is a common basis for claimant fraud prosecutions. Here, though, the claimant kept working in a modified role and still faced felony charges, apparently based on how he described his condition to his doctors. The case also shows the collateral consequences a fraud conviction can carry for public safety employees: apart from jail and restitution, Faatiga lost his peace officer certification.
All descriptions of Faatiga’s conduct come from the District Attorney’s Office as relayed in news coverage. His defense attorney was not available for comment, according to the Redwood City Pulse. The District Attorney’s original announcement could not be located on the office’s website, so this account relies on news outlets that reported from it. The sources do not specify the exact statutes charged.
- Pakistani Nationals Indicted for DME Health Care Fraudon October 1, 2026 at 8:22 AM
On Sept. 17, a grand jury indicted Nouman Mustafa, 36, of Torrance, and Mohsin Khan, 40, of Bakersfield, on multiple counts of health care fraud and aggravated identity theft for submitting millions of dollars in fraudulent claims for durable medical equipment to Medicare, U.S. Attorney Eric Grant announced today.
On Feb. 11, 2026, Mustafa was arrested on a criminal complaint at the Los Angeles International Airport while trying to board a one-way flight to Pakistan. Khan was arrested at his home in Bakersfield and will make his initial court appearance today.
According to court records, Mustafa and Khan are Pakistani nationals with dual United States citizenship who have worked in the United States as security guards, warehouse managers, and licensed insurance agents.
From January 2025 through January 2026, they created a series of shell companies designed to look like legitimate durable medical equipment (DME) companies. In reality, none of the companies had physical storefronts, warehouses, or any locations where legitimate business could have been conducted. Mustafa and Khan then used these companies to quickly submit more than $3.5 million in fraudulent claims to Medicare. They typically relied on one company for only a few weeks or months until its claims began getting denied for suspected fraud, at which point they shifted to the next company.
Mustafa and Khan got the information to file the fraudulent claims from their contacts in Pakistan and elsewhere. This information included details about real Medicare beneficiaries and their doctors. The defendants kept approximately 30% of the proceeds and sent the remainder back to their contacts.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General conducted the investigation with assistance from the Bakersfield Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Arelis Clemente and Joseph Barton are prosecuting the case.
If convicted, Mustafa and Khan face up to 10 years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000 for each of the health care fraud counts and a mandatory minimum of two years in prison, consecutive to the sentences they receive for any other counts, for each of the aggravated identity theft counts. Any sentence, however, would be determined at the discretion of the court after consideration of any applicable statutory factors and the federal Sentencing Guidelines, which take into account a number of variables. The charges are only allegations; the defendants are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Supervisors Not Personally Liable for Whistleblower Retaliationon September 30, 2026 at 8:41 AM
Farzana Chaudhry worked for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) beginning in 2007. Most recently she was a dental assistant at the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, which provides dental care to inmates. Starting in April 2018, she raised safety concerns about contaminated protective equipment and sterilization practices, both internally and in a series of complaints to Cal/OSHA. One of those complaints led to a Cal/OSHA inspection and a $450 fine.
Chaudhry alleged that management retaliated against her over the next several years. According to her complaint, a supervisor gave her a critical letter of instruction in July 2018, and she was passed over for an acting supervisory role. She was suspended without pay for a month from December 2019 to January 2020. In 2020, she received a counseling record over her sterilization practices, was twice asked for doctor’s notes for sick days, and was accused of wearing a mask incorrectly.
In September 2020, Chaudhry presented a claim to the State under the Government Claims Act, and the State rejected it. CDCR fired her in November 2020, and she sued in April 2021. The State Personnel Board (SPB) overturned the firing, and she returned to work in January 2022. Chaudhry alleged that after her return, her supervisor obstructed her work. CDCR then fired her again in February 2022, withdrew that dismissal, and reinstated her effective August 29, 2022. She resigned on her first day back. She presented a second government claim covering the resignation in January 2023 and amended her lawsuit in May 2023.
Separately, in the fall of 2021, Chaudhry filed a retaliation complaint with the SPB under the California Whistleblower Protection Act (Gov. Code, § 8547 et seq.). She exhausted that administrative process in March 2022. She then added a Whistleblower Protection Act claim to her lawsuit in May 2022.
Chaudhry sued the State, CDCR, and three individual supervisors. Her operative complaint alleged retaliation under Labor Code § 1102.5, retaliation under the Whistleblower Protection Act, and constructive discharge in violation of public policy. In December 2024, weeks before the scheduled trial, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The Solano County Superior Court granted the motion in full, dismissed every claim without leave to amend, and entered judgment for all defendants.
In the published case of Chaudhry v. State of California, No. A173501 (September 2026). The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the judgment in favor of the three individual supervisors on every claim. As to the State and CDCR, it affirmed the dismissal of the Whistleblower Protection Act claim and the constructive discharge claim, which Chaudhry did not challenge on appeal. It reversed the judgment on the § 1102.5 retaliation claim against the State and CDCR, which will go forward on a constructive discharge theory.
The court first addressed whether Chaudhry had met the claim presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act. The court held that her September 2020 claim was untimely as to the conduct it described. The acts within the six-month window before that claim were too minor to count as adverse employment actions. These included the doctor’s note requests, the mask accusation, and a counseling record with no alleged consequences.
The court also rejected Chaudhry’s argument that the earlier conduct formed a continuing violation extending into that window. Applying the test from Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, the court found two problems. First, the acts were not reasonably frequent: more than a year passed between July 2018 and October 2019 with no alleged retaliation. Second, the unpaid suspension, which ended in January 2020, was a permanent, completed act. It should have made clear that informal efforts to stop the retaliation were futile. Her claim accrued at that point, so a claim presented in September 2020 came too late. The court rejected her argument that a temporary suspension lacks permanence. It reasoned that on that view, only outright termination would ever qualify.
Her January 2023 claim was a different matter. The court held that Chaudhry adequately alleged a constructive discharge in August 2022, within six months of that claim. A jury could find that the sequence of events would compel a reasonable employee to resign. That sequence was the November 2020 firing, obstruction after her reinstatement, a second firing less than a month later, and a later rescission of that firing. The court observed that no employee should have to endure repeated baseless retaliatory terminations combined with efforts to sabotage her work.
The court rejected the defendants’ argument that constructive discharge was a backdoor way to revive time-barred terminations. A constructive discharge is the employer’s own act, and it occurs when the employee resigns, even if the conditions that caused it began earlier. The theory also does not strip employers of their defense under Labor Code § 1102.6. On remand, the State and CDCR can still try to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they had legitimate, independent reasons for the firings and other actions.
Next, the court resolved the open question of individual liability. Section 1102.5(b) bars retaliation by an employer “or any person acting on behalf of the employer.” That language was added in 2013. Chaudhry argued that it reaches individual supervisors. The court agreed that the words alone could support her reading. But it found the statute ambiguous when read alongside related provisions. Section 1104 makes the employer responsible for its managers’ acts. Section 1105 speaks of recovering damages from the employer. Section 1102.6 gives the burden-shifting defense only to employers, which would make little sense if supervisors could be sued too.
To resolve the ambiguity, the court looked to legislative history. The 2013 amendments were aimed at employers and their attorneys who threatened to report workers to immigration authorities, and nothing in the history mentions suing supervisors personally. The court then relied on Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158. There, the Supreme Court held that similar “person” language in FEHA’s anti-retaliation provision does not create individual liability. Jones built on Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, which reached the same result for discrimination claims.
The panel found most of those decisions’ policy concerns equally applicable to § 1102.5. Supervisors must make personnel decisions as part of their jobs, and personal liability would add little to plaintiffs’ recovery. It would also chill management and create conflicts between supervisors and employers. The panel noted that its holding matches the view of more than 30 federal district court decisions. It declined to follow the two federal cases that went the other way.
On the Whistleblower Protection Act claim, the court held that Chaudhry had not properly exhausted her administrative remedies. Under Government Code § 8547.8(c), a damages action is not available unless the employee has first filed a complaint with the SPB. Chaudhry filed her lawsuit in April 2021, based on the same facts, before she went to the SPB. She could not satisfy the requirement by filing what the court called a placeholder complaint, going to the SPB, and then amending to add the claim. Relying on Bjorndal v. Superior Court (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1100, the court explained that allowing this would defeat the point of the administrative process. That process exists to resolve disputes before litigation begins. The court noted that employees can avoid this trap by filing with the SPB at the same time as, or promptly after, presenting their Government Claims Act claim. Because Chaudhry identified no facts that could cure the defect, the court denied leave to amend.
- Rotator Cuff Repair Technology Reducing a Major Failure Pointon September 30, 2026 at 8:41 AM
Rotator cuff tears rank among the most common and most expensive shoulder injuries workers' compensation claims professionals see, and the surgery used to fix them fails at a surprisingly high rate — published estimates range from roughly 11 percent to as high as 94 percent depending on tear size, tissue quality, and patient age. On August 31, 2026, medical device giant Stryker announced a definitive agreement to acquire ZuriMED, a Zurich-based company whose FiberLocker System is designed to directly address one of the most common reasons those repairs fail.
A rotator cuff tear occurs when one or more of the tendons connecting the shoulder muscles to the upper arm bone tears away from its attachment point, often from a fall, a sudden overhead strain, or cumulative wear from repetitive overhead work — all common workers' compensation injury mechanisms. Surgical repair typically involves reattaching the torn tendon to bone using suture anchors, small devices implanted in the bone that hold stitches passed through the tendon.
The problem is that the tendon tissue itself is often the weak link. In many patients, particularly those with larger or more chronic tears, degenerated or poor-quality tendon tissue cannot hold sutures securely, and the repair can pull through or re-tear before the tendon has had time to biologically heal back to bone. This failure mode — suture pull-through in weakened tissue — is distinct from anchor failure or surgical technique error, and it has proven difficult to solve through suture or anchor design alone.
ZuriMED's FiberLocker System, which received FDA 510(k) clearance in late 2024, is a soft-tissue augmentation technology in which a polyester patch is applied over the repaired tendon during or after surgery and secured to the surrounding tissue. The device is designed to reinforce the connection between the sutures and the tendon, distributing mechanical load across a broader area of tissue rather than concentrating stress at the suture points, with the goal of reducing the specific failure mode of sutures cutting through weakened tendon.
According to Stryker's announcement, the company will add the commercialized FiberLocker System to its existing shoulder portfolio, supporting both sports medicine and arthroplasty applications. Financial terms were not disclosed, and the deal remains subject to customary closing conditions, with ZuriMED continuing to operate as a separate entity until closing. Andy Pierce, Stryker's Group President of MedSurg and Neurotechnology, said the technology "addresses an important clinical need within shoulder care," and the company has characterized rotator cuff augmentation as one of the fastest-growing segments within sports medicine.
Rotator cuff injuries will remain a persistent and costly category of workers' compensation claims regardless of how this particular acquisition plays out, but the broader trend it reflects — device manufacturers investing specifically in technologies aimed at reducing surgical failure rates rather than only expanding surgical volume — is one claims professionals should continue to track.
As FiberLocker and similar augmentation technologies see wider adoption following Stryker's acquisition, expect more surgeons to raise augmentation as a treatment option, and expect the evidentiary record on its real-world effectiveness to grow correspondingly. Claims professionals reviewing shoulder treatment requests should ask what tear characteristics are driving a given surgical recommendation and whether augmentation, if proposed, is supported by the claimant's specific clinical picture rather than applied as a routine add-on.
- No Jurisdiction Over Subro Lien After Employee Dismisses Lawsuiton September 29, 2026 at 9:13 AM
In February 2016, Jennifer Slamer was working for Southern California Permanente Medical Group (SCPMG) when she suffered disabling respiratory injuries from exposure to a disinfectant made by Ecolab, Inc. SCPMG resolved her workers’ compensation claim in the administrative system. In May 2017, Slamer and her husband sued Ecolab, SCPMG, and related entities in San Bernardino County Superior Court. SCPMG and its affiliates were dismissed from the civil case with prejudice after a series of demurrers and summary judgment motions. The judgment dismissing SCPMG was entered on April 11, 2022.
The Slamers went to trial against Ecolab alone. Before the case went to the jury, they reached a confidential settlement with Ecolab on April 19, 2023. On June 1, 2023, they voluntarily dismissed the entire action with prejudice.
While the case was pending, SCPMG continued paying benefits. It filed several notices of lien against any recovery under Labor Code § 3856(b). After the settlement, the Slamers refused SCPMG’s requests for reimbursement, and mediation failed. On February 16, 2024, more than eight months after the dismissal, SCPMG filed a motion for reimbursement.
The Slamers opposed the motion on several grounds. They argued the lien had to be reduced by SCPMG’s comparative fault and by an equitable share of their attorney fees and costs. They declined to disclose the settlement amount, but they stipulated that it exceeded the lien plus their fees and costs. On April 18, 2025, the trial court granted SCPMG’s motion. It ordered the Slamers to reimburse the full lien amount plus interest.
In the unpublished case of Slamer v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, No. D086908 (September 2026) the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. It directed the trial court to enter a new order denying SCPMG’s reimbursement motion for lack of jurisdiction. The Slamers were awarded their costs on appeal.
The Slamers raised several challenges on appeal: that the motion came too late, that SCPMG’s comparative fault was never decided, that fees were not properly allocated, and that pre-order interest was awarded in error. While the appeal was pending, the panel identified a threshold problem on its own and asked the parties for supplemental briefing. The question was whether the trial court had any jurisdiction to act after the entire case had been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. The court concluded it did not. Because that answer resolved the appeal, the panel did not reach the other issues.
The court began with the statutory framework. An injured worker’s remedy against the employer is generally limited to workers’ compensation, but the worker may sue a third-party tortfeasor. To prevent double recovery, the employer may assert a lien on the worker’s judgment or settlement. That lien may be reduced for the employer’s own comparative negligence, and for a share of fees and costs under Labor Code § 3860(c) when the recovery was obtained solely through the employee’s attorney. The panel emphasized the timing requirement: the employer must apply for an order paying the lien before the judgment is satisfied or the action is dismissed. It cited Labor Code § 3857 and Abdala v. Aziz (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 369, among other authorities. SCPMG did not meet that deadline. Once the Slamers filed their dismissal, the action ended and the court lost jurisdiction, except for limited matters such as costs and statutory fees (Harris v. Billings (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1396). An order entered without jurisdiction is void.
The panel rejected each of SCPMG’s four counterarguments. First, SCPMG argued the Slamers forfeited the timeliness issue by not raising it in the trial court. The panel disagreed. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. SCPMG also pointed to a possible factual dispute over whether the settlement funds had been fully disbursed. The court found that dispute irrelevant, because no one disputed that the dismissal came first.
Second, SCPMG argued the Slamers had acknowledged its lien efforts and agreed the court could keep jurisdiction. The panel held that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel. It quoted Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200 for the rule that a court “cannot ‘retain’ jurisdiction it has lost.” SCPMG also relied on the lien-motion provision in Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6(f)(1). The court found that provision inapplicable for two reasons. It did not take effect until January 1, 2025, and it does not apply retroactively. And even if it did apply, it covers dismissals without prejudice, not dismissals with prejudice like this one.
Third, SCPMG argued the trial court had expressly retained jurisdiction under § 664.6 to enforce the settlement. Under Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, a request to retain jurisdiction must meet three conditions. It must be made while the case is pending. It must be in a signed writing or stated orally before the court. And it must be express, clear, and unambiguous. The courtroom exchanges and minute-order entry SCPMG cited did not meet that standard. Separately, SCPMG could not use § 664.6 in any event. It had been dismissed from the case in 2022, which made it a stranger to the action, and only a party to a settlement may invoke that statute.
Fourth, SCPMG argued that the Enforcement of Judgments Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.410 et seq.) applied through Labor Code § 3862. Under that law, a lienholder is treated as a party, and the debtor cannot dismiss without the creditor’s consent. The panel explained that § 3862 reaches only a lien that has been allowed and perfected. A lien is not “allowed” until the court grants the employer’s application, which may require deciding comparative fault and fee allocation first. Here, the order allowing the lien did not issue until April 2025, nearly two years after the dismissal. By then the action was no longer pending: the time to appeal the dismissal had expired in November 2023. The court cited Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2026) 20 Cal.5th 91 for the principle that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice terminates the action. Because SCPMG never perfected its lien before the dismissal, the Slamers did not need its consent to dismiss.
The panel expressly took no position on whether any other remedy remains available to SCPMG. For employers and carriers, the case is a reminder that a filed notice of lien is not enough. The employer must obtain a court order allowing the lien, or a properly made request for the court to retain jurisdiction, before the employee’s third-party action is dismissed. This is especially important once the employer has been dismissed from the case as a defendant.
This is an unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeal, under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), courts and parties generally may not cite it or rely on it. It is not a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. It is however relevant to the Worker's Compensation community as illustrative of existing law.
- Correctional Officer Pleads No Contest in SCIF WC Fraud Caseon September 29, 2026 at 9:13 AM
A former correctional officer at Salinas Valley State Prison has pleaded no contest to felony workers’ compensation insurance fraud and admitted the loss exceeded $100,000, the Monterey County District Attorney’s Office announced. The defendant, 43-year-old Lorena Hernandez Alvarado of King City, is scheduled for sentencing on October 22, 2026. District Attorney also reported that Alvarado pleaded guilty in two unrelated DUI cases.
According to the District Attorney’s press release, the case began with a workplace injury claim Alvarado filed in April 2021. She reported injuring her shoulder, neck, back, and knees while holding a heavy shield to protect herself from liquid an inmate had thrown at her. State Compensation Insurance Fund, which the release identifies as the prison’s insurer, accepted the claim. Alvarado never returned to work and collected well over $100,000 in wage-replacement and medical benefits.
Prosecutors say an Internal Affairs investigation by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation later found that Alvarado had not used a shield during the April 2021 incident. The same investigation concluded that she had fabricated an earlier workplace injury in 2019, which she attributed to a struggle with an inmate. That 2019 claim was denied. The District Attorney’s Workers’ Compensation Fraud Unit then charged her with two felony counts of insurance fraud. The release does not name the specific statutes charged or say whether the plea covered one count or both. CDCR Investigator Adam Jimenez and District Attorney Workers’ Compensation Insurance Fraud Investigator Jennifer Mendoza handled the investigation.
County fraud units like Monterey’s are largely funded by California employers themselves. The California Department of Insurance awards annual grants to district attorneys to investigate and prosecute workers’ compensation fraud, and those grants are paid for through assessments on employers. The department describes claimant fraud as one of several categories the grants target, along with medical provider fraud, employer premium fraud, and insider fraud.
The account of the underlying conduct comes from the District Attorney’s release and the CDCR investigation it describes; no court findings or defense statements were available. Sentencing has not yet occurred, and the release does not say whether prosecutors will seek restitution to State Fund or how much.
- Court Sets Rules for Use of Strict Liability in FEHA Caseson October 6, 2026 at 10:00 AM
A California Court of Appeal has held, in an opinion certified for publication, that an employer is not strictly liable under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for sexual harassment by an employee who supervises other workers but has no supervisory authority over the plaintiff. In that situation the employer answers only under the negligence standard. The court described the question as one no California appellate case had directly decided.
The plaintiff in this case, Jane Doe, returned to Wells Fargo in 2018 as a wealth advisor in its private bank division, where advisors assemble teams of specialists to serve high-net-worth clients. Eric Pagel was an investment strategist who handled portfolios for many of her clients and was one of the bank's top producers nationally. He was not her supervisor. Wells Fargo had not designated him a supervisor of anyone, and he could not hire, fire, or approve expenses or time off, although he gave input on the performance of the support associates who executed his trades and handled his scheduling.
In January 2020, Doe, Pagel and several coworkers traveled to Bakersfield for client meetings and had dinner and drinks afterward. Doe says she blacked out that night, that Pagel later came to her hotel room, and that she was too intoxicated to consent to the sex that followed. Pagel maintains that she invited him and consented. About a month later Doe told a colleague who had been on the trip that Pagel had been harassing her, without mentioning an assault. That complaint was not escalated or investigated.
On November 9, 2020, Doe reported harassment and assault to the bank's ethics hotline, to her direct supervisor and to law enforcement. Wells Fargo flagged the complaint for expedited investigation eight days later and placed Pagel on paid administrative leave. After a ten-month inquiry, the internal investigator issued a 28-page report finding the harassment and assault allegations unsubstantiated, but concluding that everyone at the dinner had violated the workplace conduct policy and that Pagel had violated the professionalism policy. Pagel received a final notice warning that further violations could lead to immediate termination.
Doe sued Wells Fargo, Pagel and three other employees in Los Angeles County Superior Court in February 2023, alleging sexual harassment under FEHA and, against the bank, failure to prevent harassment and retaliation. Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be strictly liable because Pagel never supervised Doe, and that it could not be liable in negligence because it responded promptly and appropriately once she complained. Doe's opposition argued that strict liability attaches to harassment by any supervisor, whoever that person supervises, and did not address the negligence standard. Judge Tony L. Richardson granted the motion on both grounds and entered judgment for the bank.
In the published case of Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. B344642 (October 2026), the Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the judgment on Doe's appeal. Justice Tamzarian, as acting presiding justice, wrote for a unanimous panel. Only the harassment claim against Wells Fargo was before the court, because Doe's briefs did not address her other causes of action.
The court began with the statute. Government Code § 12940, subdivision (j)(1) expressly sets a negligence standard for harassment by an employee other than an agent or supervisor, and the California Supreme Court inferred from that wording, in State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, that employers are strictly liable when a supervisor is the harasser. The statute never uses the words strict liability, and the panel found that its text does not plainly answer whether "supervisor" means any supervisor or the plaintiff's supervisor. Because the definition in Government Code § 12926, subdivision (t) turns on a person's authority over other employees, the court reasoned that someone with no authority over the plaintiff is, as to her, simply a coworker.
With no helpful legislative history, the court looked to the purpose of the rule. Strict liability exists because a supervisor wields employer-conferred power over the victim, which makes harassment harder to resist and report and justifies imputing the conduct to the employer. None of that is present when the harasser's authority runs only to other people. The panel also found that Doe's reading would produce arbitrary results: an employer would be strictly liable when a shop foreman harasses an executive, or when a mid-level manager harasses her own boss, but liable only in negligence when a senior non-supervisory employee harasses a junior one.
The court read Health Services as consistent with this view. That opinion spoke of "the victim's supervisor" and cautioned that the supervisor must be acting in a supervisory capacity when the harassment occurs. Later Court of Appeal decisions said the same, including Chapman v. Enos (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 920, Atalla v. Rite Aid Corp. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 294, and Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 200. A person who does not supervise the plaintiff at all, the panel concluded, cannot be acting as her supervisor.
Doe's contrary authorities did not persuade the court. Two Fair Employment and Housing Commission decisions from the 1980s (Dept. of Fair Employment and Housing v. Hart & Starkey, Inc., FEHC Dec. No. 84-23, and Dept. of Fair Employment and Housing v. Community Hospital of San Gabriel, FEHC Dec. No. 86-08) predated both Health Services and the statutory definition of supervisor, and the court declined to follow them. Massachusetts cases she cited involved harassers with authority over, or clearly senior to, the victim. To the extent the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept. v. Illinois Human Rights Com. (2009) 233 Ill.2d 125, 908 N.E.2d 39 treats direct supervisory authority as irrelevant under an analogous statute, the panel respectfully disagreed.
The holding has stated limits. The court assumed, without deciding, that Pagel supervised the associates, so it did not resolve whether giving input on reviews and directing support staff makes someone a FEHA supervisor. It emphasized that strict liability is not confined to a plaintiff's direct boss or those above that boss in the reporting chain, since the broad statutory definition can make others the plaintiff's supervisor as well. It also did not address liability for harassment by an employer's agent, a theory Doe did not raise.
Finally, the court held that Doe forfeited her remaining theories. She did not argue on appeal that a triable issue existed on negligence, and her contention that Wells Fargo ratified Pagel's conduct was raised for the first time in her opening appellate brief. The panel declined to exercise its discretion to reach it. As a result, the opinion does not review whether the bank's handling of the February 2020 complaint or the length of its investigation met the negligence standard. - Waiver of Right to Avoid Arbitration in Sexual Harassment Claimson October 6, 2026 at 10:00 AM
A divided California Court of Appeal has held, in an opinion certified for publication, that an employee can waive the right to avoid arbitration under the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402. The majority found waiver where the employee knew of a sex-based harassment claim, held it back for tactical reasons while opposing arbitration on other grounds, and raised it only after the trial court had sent the case to arbitration. One justice dissented.
In this case DoorDash hired Andrew Chin in 2020. He took nine weeks of parental bonding leave in early 2023 and alleges that the company then retaliated against him: it denied him the same or a comparable position on his return, interfered with three further weeks of leave, and terminated him at the end of 2023. He also alleged that a superior repeatedly asked when he would take the rest of his leave. In February 2024 he sued in Los Angeles County Superior Court for violation of the California Family Rights Act, whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination and unfair competition. The complaint contained no harassment claim.
DoorDash moved to compel arbitration under an agreement covering any dispute arising from Chin's employment. Chin's written opposition argued only that no valid agreement existed. It did not mention sexual harassment, an amended complaint, or the EFAA. At the May 28, 2024 hearing, after a tentative ruling against him, his counsel said that if arbitration were ordered Chin would ask for leave to add a sexual harassment claim to avoid arbitration under federal law. The court ordered the whole action to arbitration, stayed the suit, and declined to allow an amendment at that time. Chin's writ petition was denied. In it he stated that he had left the harassment claim out of his complaint "for strategic purposes."
Chin filed an arbitration demand in August 2024 and amended it in December 2024 to add a sex-based harassment claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). He alleged that DoorDash encouraged women to take full parental leave while discouraging men through intimidation, ridicule and insults. The only specific incident alleged was the superior's repeated questioning already described in the 2024 complaint. He then asked the arbitrator to return the matter to court under the EFAA, missed a ten-day window the arbitrator gave him to petition the superior court, and in April 2025 filed a second lawsuit pleading the harassment claim and seeking a declaration that the arbitration agreement was invalid as to both suits.
Three motions were heard in July 2025: Chin's motion to consolidate the two suits, his motion to invalidate the arbitration agreement under the EFAA, and DoorDash's motion to compel arbitration of the second suit. Judge Jon R. Takasugi said he was "not happy with the way this has gone" but believed the law required a ruling for Chin. He found that Chin had plausibly pleaded a sex-based harassment claim and had not waived the EFAA by asserting that claim in arbitration. He granted both of Chin's motions, denied DoorDash's, and so undid the earlier order compelling arbitration. The court did not address DoorDash's argument that Chin's conduct before that earlier order amounted to waiver. DoorDash appealed.
In the published case of Chin v. DoorDash, Inc., No. B348844 (October 2026), the Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed all three orders and remanded with instructions to grant DoorDash's motion to compel arbitration. Justice Scherb wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice Viramontes. Acting Presiding Justice Wiley dissented and would have affirmed. DoorDash was awarded its costs on appeal.
The majority started from the statutory text. The EFAA does not void arbitration agreements automatically. It applies at the election of the person alleging harassment, and nothing in it displaces the ordinary rule that statutory rights can be waived. Chin did not argue otherwise. Reviewing an undisputed record de novo, the court assumed that waiver had to be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, and the majority explained that it can be implied from deliberate, tactical litigation conduct as well as from express words. It relied on California authority that grounds for resisting arbitration must be raised in court before the arbitration goes forward, citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1 and Cummings v. Future Nissan (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 321. A party who knows of such a ground and keeps it in reserve loses it.
Applying those principles, the majority found waiver on four points. Chin knew of the harassment claim in 2024, since the one specific incident he later relied on was already in his first complaint. He withheld it by his own account for strategic reasons, and conceded at oral argument that the fair inference was a plan to defeat the agreement entirely before turning to the EFAA. He opposed arbitration vigorously without invoking the statute, and his reference to "federal law" at the hearing came too late and explained nothing. He then waited almost a year to file the second suit. The majority also noted the cost of sending the parties back and forth between court and arbitration.
The majority treated the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc. (9th Cir., Aug. 19, 2026, No. 25-1532) as supporting its result. Ding confirmed that EFAA rights may be waived under ordinary principles, but found no waiver where the plaintiff discovered her harassment claim during arbitration and invoked the statute as soon as she faced a motion to compel. The majority distinguished Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 75, where the complaint already pleaded harassment and the trial court raised the EFAA itself.
Chin's remaining arguments were rejected. He could not avoid waiver by pointing out that no harassment claim had been pleaded before arbitration began, because withholding the claim was the deliberate choice that produced the waiver. His contention that trial counsel believed an amendment was barred once the motion to compel was filed had no support in the record. The court also declined to read the EFAA as a right to move between forums at will. Because the EFAA applies to an entire case, the waiver reached both the claims Chin pleaded and the one he withheld. The majority did not decide whether his allegations stated a harassment claim sufficient to trigger the statute.
In dissent, Justice Wiley agreed that the delay and expense were regrettable and said he would be sympathetic to sanctions requiring plaintiff's counsel to reimburse the fees wasted. But he concluded that Chin never purposely gave up a court forum, since escaping arbitration was his aim throughout. In his words, "It looks more like a blunder," and a miscalculation is not a waiver. - Civil Litigation Limited While Employer Negligence a WCAB Issueon October 5, 2026 at 1:24 PM
Guadalupe Reyes-Cano was driving his employer’s tomato truck in the course of his employment when a vehicle driven by a Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) employee struck him. He received workers’ compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier, Federal Insurance Company (FIC). In April 2021, he sued PG&E and its driver for negligence. Their answer asserted, as an affirmative defense, that the negligence of others caused the crash. Separately, Reyes-Cano pursued his workers’ compensation claim before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB), where he alleged his employer was negligent.
FIC served a notice of lien for $208,778.08 in May 2023. Before mediation of the civil case, the PG&E defendants argued in their mediation brief that the employer was partly to blame, because the truck was 5,000 pounds over the legal weight limit and Reyes-Cano could not stop in time. FIC received that brief, and its attorney attended the mediation. The civil case settled in August 2023, but FIC’s lien was not resolved. At FIC’s request, Reyes-Cano’s attorney set aside $125,000 of the settlement in a client trust account, pending final resolution of the lien. The attorney later told FIC that the employer negligence issue would have to be litigated to determine the lien’s value. The money has stayed in the trust account ever since, and the employer negligence issue is still pending before the WCAB.
FIC then sued Reyes-Cano in Sacramento County Superior Court for conversion, imposition of a constructive trust, money had and received, and money paid. It also sought punitive damages.
The trial court granted summary adjudication on every cause of action and entered judgment for Reyes-Cano. It reasoned that because the WCAB had not yet decided whether the employer’s negligence contributed to the injuries, the amount FIC was owed was not yet a specific, identifiable sum. A specific, identifiable sum is required for a conversion claim, and FIC’s other claims rested on the same premise. The court also overruled FIC’s evidentiary objections because they were not filed in the required format.
In the unpublished case of Federal Insurance Co. v. Reyes-Cano, No. C103530 (September 2026). The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment in full and awarded Reyes-Cano his costs on appeal.
The panel rejected each of FIC’s four arguments. First, the court found no abuse of discretion in overruling FIC’s evidentiary objections. FIC did not dispute that it failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354, which requires objections to be filed separately and to identify and quote the material objected to. On appeal, FIC also failed to identify which objections were at issue or explain why they had merit, so the court treated the argument as forfeited.
Second, and most significant for carriers, the court rejected FIC’s argument that the possibility of employer negligence was irrelevant. FIC’s position was that the PG&E defendants never properly pleaded employer negligence as an affirmative defense, so its lien was protected and the WCAB’s eventual negligence finding would affect only its credit against future benefits. The court agreed that the PG&E defendants had not specifically pleaded employer negligence, citing Difko Admin. (US) Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 126. It noted, however, that FIC had actual knowledge of the issue from the mediation. Because the issue was never resolved in the civil case, the court held, FIC could rely on its lien rather than intervene.
But the defective pleading did not protect the lien from reduction. It simply meant the third-party defendants settled without seeking to offset their own liability against the employer’s share of fault. Under Roe v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 884, when employer negligence has not been decided in the third-party action, the employee may have it decided by the WCAB. The court rejected FIC’s attempt to confine that determination to future credits. The WCAB’s authority under Labor Code § 3861 reaches the employer’s compensation liability as a whole, including reimbursement. The court also relied on Hone v. Climatrol Industries, Inc. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 513, which holds that the WCAB has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the validity of an employer’s lien when it is the employee, not the third party, who seeks to prove employer negligence.
Under Associated Construction & Engineering Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 829, a concurrently negligent employer recovers only to the extent its compensation outlay exceeds its proportionate share of the employee’s total damages. Allowing FIC to collect its full lien without first resolving the employer’s fault, the court said, would let it recover all benefits paid regardless of that fault. That would conflict with the policy that a negligent employer should not profit from its own wrong. The court called the outcome equitable as well. If the employer is found free of fault, FIC can recover what it paid and seek credit against future benefits; if the employer is found negligent, FIC’s recovery will be reduced accordingly.
Third and fourth, the court agreed that FIC could not establish a triable issue on any of its claims. Under Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, money can be the subject of a conversion claim only when a specific sum capable of identification is involved. FIC’s constructive trust and common count claims likewise depended on its right to a specific sum. FIC argued that Labor Code § 3860(b) makes a settlement subject to the employer’s full reimbursement claim. It also argued that the agreed $125,000 set-aside was, by definition, identifiable. The court disagreed on both points. Sections 3860 and 3856 give the employer a first lien, but they do not guarantee full reimbursement when the employer may share fault. Until the WCAB rules on employer negligence, the $125,000 does not represent a specific sum that FIC owns or has a right to possess.
The punitive damages claim failed for the same reason. A simple failure to pay money owed is not conversion. And because FIC could not yet show it was entitled to the money, it could not show malice in Reyes-Cano’s position that the funds would be released only after the employer negligence issue was decided. - School District Ordered to Classify Temporary Teacher as Permanenton October 5, 2026 at 1:24 PM
Melissa Washington began teaching first grade at the Alta Loma School District’s Stork Elementary on August 2, 2019. She was told in her interview that she was filling a new position created by a last-minute jump in enrollment, and the principal later testified to the same thing. When she arrived to sign her contract, however, it classified her as a temporary employee who could be terminated at any time. The human resources director told her that was just part of the process and that she would be reclassified as probationary later.
That did not happen. In each of the next two years, the principal told her that, because of uncertainty created by the COVID-19 pandemic, all returning temporary teachers would again receive only temporary contracts, with no exceptions. He apologized, and she was told she might even receive tenure the following year. Washington signed temporary contracts for the 2020–2021 and 2021–2022 school years. In March 2022, the District told her it would not offer her, or any of its temporary teachers, a contract for 2022–2023, citing lost pandemic-related funding and low enrollment. She applied for temporary positions the District advertised for the next year but was not hired.
In February 2023, Washington petitioned for a writ of mandate ordering the District to reinstate her as a permanent employee with an August 2, 2019 seniority date and to compensate her for lost pay and benefits. She argued she should have been classified as probationary for her first two years, which would have made her permanent by operation of law in her third.
The District defended the temporary classification on a single theory. It said Washington had been hired to fill in for two permanent teachers who shared one full-time position under a voluntary job-sharing arrangement, and that the job share was a grant of leave under Education Code § 44920. That section allows a district to hire a temporary teacher for up to a year when a certificated employee has been granted leave for a semester or year or is experiencing long-term illness.
The trial court found that Washington was not in fact hired to fill a vacancy created by the job share; she was hired because of increased enrollment. It nonetheless denied the petition. It agreed with the District that one of the job-sharing teachers was effectively on leave at any given time. Relying on District spreadsheets, it also found that the number of temporary teachers did not exceed the number of teachers on leave, counting job shares as leave. The court added that if it reached the issue, the District’s laches defense would be persuasive, because Washington waited until after her third year to sue.
In the published case of Washington v. Alta Loma School District, No. D088028 (October 2026). The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with directions. The trial court must issue a writ of mandate ordering the District to reinstate Washington as a permanent employee with a seniority date of August 2, 2019. It must also hold further proceedings to determine her lost compensation. Washington recovers her costs on appeal.
The Court of Appeal began with the Education Code’s classification scheme. Certificated teachers fall into four categories: permanent, probationary, substitute, or temporary. Unless the Code specifically requires another classification, a teacher must be classified as probationary. That rule appears in Education Code § 44915 and was applied in Stockton Teachers Assn. CTA/NEA v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 446. Under Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 821, the temporary and substitute classifications carry no statutory due process protections, so they must be strictly construed. Districts have no discretion to deviate from the statutory scheme.
Applying that strict construction, the court held for the first time that leave in § 44920 means a leave of absence, and that a voluntary job-sharing arrangement is not one. Because § 44920 does not define leave, the court read it together with related sections of the Education Code. Leaves of absence are addressed at length in the Code’s article on resignations, dismissals and leaves of absence. That article covers medical, parental, workers’ compensation, study, bereavement, and other leaves, but not job sharing. Reduced workloads instead fall under the separate employment article, where Education Code § 44922 lets districts allow teachers to reduce their workload from full-time to part-time.
The court found that the plain meaning of leave of absence points the same way. It implies a temporary absence with an intention to return to the same position. The District’s own collective bargaining agreement treats leaves of absence as holding the teacher’s place. Job-sharing teachers, by contrast, have no right to return to their prior position; they are restored to full-time work only if a position becomes available and no probationary or permanent teacher would be laid off. The court also rejected the District’s reliance on American Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d 100. That case dealt with a teacher reassigned to a categorically funded program, not a job share. The Legislature later addressed that situation separately. And the American Federation court did not apply the strict construction Balen requires.
Because job shares do not count as leave, the trial court’s spreadsheet comparison also failed, since it treated job-share vacancies as leave. The appellate court therefore did not need to decide whether Washington was actually hired as the job-share placeholder.
The consequences followed directly from the Code. Washington defaulted to probationary status for her first two school years. The District never notified her by March 15 of her second year that she would not be reelected; instead, it rehired her. Under Education Code § 44929.21(b), she therefore became a permanent employee at the start of her third year. A permanent teacher can be dismissed only on statutory grounds and after an opportunity for a hearing, and the District followed none of those procedures. It thus had a clear, ministerial duty to reelect her for 2022–2023, which supports mandate relief and lost compensation under Code of Civil Procedure § 1095. - San Mateo County Deputy Sheriff to Serve 5 Months for Comp Fraudon October 1, 2026 at 8:22 AM
A former San Mateo County sheriff’s deputy who collected more than $61,000 in workers’ compensation benefits for an elbow injury has been sentenced to five months in county jail. Surveillance video showed him lifting, driving, and working out hard at the gym. Jorden Tuiveta Faatiga, 35, of Patterson, was sentenced on Tuesday, September 29, 2026, according to the San Mateo County District Attorney’s Office, as reported by KRON4 and by Bay City News in the Redwood City Pulse.
Faatiga pleaded no contest on April 30 to felony charges of workers’ compensation fraud and filing a false document. San Mateo County Superior Court Judge Jeffrey Jackson placed him on two years of supervised probation, conditioned on serving five months in the county jail. He was also ordered to pay $61,534.02 in restitution to the County of San Mateo. According to KRON4, the District Attorney’s Office said he has already repaid $40,000 of that amount. Faatiga remains out of custody and has been ordered to surrender at the county jail on January 9, 2027.
According to the prosecutors’ account, the case began in October 2024, when Faatiga reported an on-duty injury to his right elbow and filed a workers’ compensation claim. He then worked in a modified-duty assignment through February 2025 while receiving benefits. Investigators from the District Attorney’s Workers’ Compensation Fraud Unit reviewed surveillance video that, prosecutors said, showed him using the supposedly injured elbow in ways that contradicted the restrictions he had described to his treating physician. The activities included lifting, driving, and intense gym workouts. Prosecutors also said he regularly misrepresented his symptoms to doctors in order to keep receiving benefits.
The conviction also ended Faatiga’s law enforcement career. The California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) disqualified his peace officer certification in August 2026. That makes him ineligible to serve as a peace officer anywhere in California, according to KRON4 and the Redwood City Pulse.
The case drew wide attention when the plea was first announced. The National Insurance Crime Bureau highlighted it in its regional news roundup, citing earlier reporting by KTVU. The same Bay City News account of the sentencing also ran in The Almanac.
For public employers and claims administrators, the case is a familiar pattern with a notable twist. Surveillance that contradicts reported work restrictions is a common basis for claimant fraud prosecutions. Here, though, the claimant kept working in a modified role and still faced felony charges, apparently based on how he described his condition to his doctors. The case also shows the collateral consequences a fraud conviction can carry for public safety employees: apart from jail and restitution, Faatiga lost his peace officer certification.
All descriptions of Faatiga’s conduct come from the District Attorney’s Office as relayed in news coverage. His defense attorney was not available for comment, according to the Redwood City Pulse. The District Attorney’s original announcement could not be located on the office’s website, so this account relies on news outlets that reported from it. The sources do not specify the exact statutes charged. - Pakistani Nationals Indicted for DME Health Care Fraudon October 1, 2026 at 8:22 AM
On Sept. 17, a grand jury indicted Nouman Mustafa, 36, of Torrance, and Mohsin Khan, 40, of Bakersfield, on multiple counts of health care fraud and aggravated identity theft for submitting millions of dollars in fraudulent claims for durable medical equipment to Medicare, U.S. Attorney Eric Grant announced today.
On Feb. 11, 2026, Mustafa was arrested on a criminal complaint at the Los Angeles International Airport while trying to board a one-way flight to Pakistan. Khan was arrested at his home in Bakersfield and will make his initial court appearance today.
According to court records, Mustafa and Khan are Pakistani nationals with dual United States citizenship who have worked in the United States as security guards, warehouse managers, and licensed insurance agents.
From January 2025 through January 2026, they created a series of shell companies designed to look like legitimate durable medical equipment (DME) companies. In reality, none of the companies had physical storefronts, warehouses, or any locations where legitimate business could have been conducted. Mustafa and Khan then used these companies to quickly submit more than $3.5 million in fraudulent claims to Medicare. They typically relied on one company for only a few weeks or months until its claims began getting denied for suspected fraud, at which point they shifted to the next company.
Mustafa and Khan got the information to file the fraudulent claims from their contacts in Pakistan and elsewhere. This information included details about real Medicare beneficiaries and their doctors. The defendants kept approximately 30% of the proceeds and sent the remainder back to their contacts.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General conducted the investigation with assistance from the Bakersfield Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Arelis Clemente and Joseph Barton are prosecuting the case.
If convicted, Mustafa and Khan face up to 10 years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000 for each of the health care fraud counts and a mandatory minimum of two years in prison, consecutive to the sentences they receive for any other counts, for each of the aggravated identity theft counts. Any sentence, however, would be determined at the discretion of the court after consideration of any applicable statutory factors and the federal Sentencing Guidelines, which take into account a number of variables. The charges are only allegations; the defendants are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. - Supervisors Not Personally Liable for Whistleblower Retaliationon September 30, 2026 at 8:41 AM
Farzana Chaudhry worked for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) beginning in 2007. Most recently she was a dental assistant at the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, which provides dental care to inmates. Starting in April 2018, she raised safety concerns about contaminated protective equipment and sterilization practices, both internally and in a series of complaints to Cal/OSHA. One of those complaints led to a Cal/OSHA inspection and a $450 fine.
Chaudhry alleged that management retaliated against her over the next several years. According to her complaint, a supervisor gave her a critical letter of instruction in July 2018, and she was passed over for an acting supervisory role. She was suspended without pay for a month from December 2019 to January 2020. In 2020, she received a counseling record over her sterilization practices, was twice asked for doctor’s notes for sick days, and was accused of wearing a mask incorrectly.
In September 2020, Chaudhry presented a claim to the State under the Government Claims Act, and the State rejected it. CDCR fired her in November 2020, and she sued in April 2021. The State Personnel Board (SPB) overturned the firing, and she returned to work in January 2022. Chaudhry alleged that after her return, her supervisor obstructed her work. CDCR then fired her again in February 2022, withdrew that dismissal, and reinstated her effective August 29, 2022. She resigned on her first day back. She presented a second government claim covering the resignation in January 2023 and amended her lawsuit in May 2023.
Separately, in the fall of 2021, Chaudhry filed a retaliation complaint with the SPB under the California Whistleblower Protection Act (Gov. Code, § 8547 et seq.). She exhausted that administrative process in March 2022. She then added a Whistleblower Protection Act claim to her lawsuit in May 2022.
Chaudhry sued the State, CDCR, and three individual supervisors. Her operative complaint alleged retaliation under Labor Code § 1102.5, retaliation under the Whistleblower Protection Act, and constructive discharge in violation of public policy. In December 2024, weeks before the scheduled trial, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The Solano County Superior Court granted the motion in full, dismissed every claim without leave to amend, and entered judgment for all defendants.
In the published case of Chaudhry v. State of California, No. A173501 (September 2026). The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the judgment in favor of the three individual supervisors on every claim. As to the State and CDCR, it affirmed the dismissal of the Whistleblower Protection Act claim and the constructive discharge claim, which Chaudhry did not challenge on appeal. It reversed the judgment on the § 1102.5 retaliation claim against the State and CDCR, which will go forward on a constructive discharge theory.
The court first addressed whether Chaudhry had met the claim presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act. The court held that her September 2020 claim was untimely as to the conduct it described. The acts within the six-month window before that claim were too minor to count as adverse employment actions. These included the doctor’s note requests, the mask accusation, and a counseling record with no alleged consequences.
The court also rejected Chaudhry’s argument that the earlier conduct formed a continuing violation extending into that window. Applying the test from Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, the court found two problems. First, the acts were not reasonably frequent: more than a year passed between July 2018 and October 2019 with no alleged retaliation. Second, the unpaid suspension, which ended in January 2020, was a permanent, completed act. It should have made clear that informal efforts to stop the retaliation were futile. Her claim accrued at that point, so a claim presented in September 2020 came too late. The court rejected her argument that a temporary suspension lacks permanence. It reasoned that on that view, only outright termination would ever qualify.
Her January 2023 claim was a different matter. The court held that Chaudhry adequately alleged a constructive discharge in August 2022, within six months of that claim. A jury could find that the sequence of events would compel a reasonable employee to resign. That sequence was the November 2020 firing, obstruction after her reinstatement, a second firing less than a month later, and a later rescission of that firing. The court observed that no employee should have to endure repeated baseless retaliatory terminations combined with efforts to sabotage her work.
The court rejected the defendants’ argument that constructive discharge was a backdoor way to revive time-barred terminations. A constructive discharge is the employer’s own act, and it occurs when the employee resigns, even if the conditions that caused it began earlier. The theory also does not strip employers of their defense under Labor Code § 1102.6. On remand, the State and CDCR can still try to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they had legitimate, independent reasons for the firings and other actions.
Next, the court resolved the open question of individual liability. Section 1102.5(b) bars retaliation by an employer “or any person acting on behalf of the employer.” That language was added in 2013. Chaudhry argued that it reaches individual supervisors. The court agreed that the words alone could support her reading. But it found the statute ambiguous when read alongside related provisions. Section 1104 makes the employer responsible for its managers’ acts. Section 1105 speaks of recovering damages from the employer. Section 1102.6 gives the burden-shifting defense only to employers, which would make little sense if supervisors could be sued too.
To resolve the ambiguity, the court looked to legislative history. The 2013 amendments were aimed at employers and their attorneys who threatened to report workers to immigration authorities, and nothing in the history mentions suing supervisors personally. The court then relied on Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158. There, the Supreme Court held that similar “person” language in FEHA’s anti-retaliation provision does not create individual liability. Jones built on Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, which reached the same result for discrimination claims.
The panel found most of those decisions’ policy concerns equally applicable to § 1102.5. Supervisors must make personnel decisions as part of their jobs, and personal liability would add little to plaintiffs’ recovery. It would also chill management and create conflicts between supervisors and employers. The panel noted that its holding matches the view of more than 30 federal district court decisions. It declined to follow the two federal cases that went the other way.
On the Whistleblower Protection Act claim, the court held that Chaudhry had not properly exhausted her administrative remedies. Under Government Code § 8547.8(c), a damages action is not available unless the employee has first filed a complaint with the SPB. Chaudhry filed her lawsuit in April 2021, based on the same facts, before she went to the SPB. She could not satisfy the requirement by filing what the court called a placeholder complaint, going to the SPB, and then amending to add the claim. Relying on Bjorndal v. Superior Court (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1100, the court explained that allowing this would defeat the point of the administrative process. That process exists to resolve disputes before litigation begins. The court noted that employees can avoid this trap by filing with the SPB at the same time as, or promptly after, presenting their Government Claims Act claim. Because Chaudhry identified no facts that could cure the defect, the court denied leave to amend. - Rotator Cuff Repair Technology Reducing a Major Failure Pointon September 30, 2026 at 8:41 AM
Rotator cuff tears rank among the most common and most expensive shoulder injuries workers' compensation claims professionals see, and the surgery used to fix them fails at a surprisingly high rate — published estimates range from roughly 11 percent to as high as 94 percent depending on tear size, tissue quality, and patient age. On August 31, 2026, medical device giant Stryker announced a definitive agreement to acquire ZuriMED, a Zurich-based company whose FiberLocker System is designed to directly address one of the most common reasons those repairs fail.
A rotator cuff tear occurs when one or more of the tendons connecting the shoulder muscles to the upper arm bone tears away from its attachment point, often from a fall, a sudden overhead strain, or cumulative wear from repetitive overhead work — all common workers' compensation injury mechanisms. Surgical repair typically involves reattaching the torn tendon to bone using suture anchors, small devices implanted in the bone that hold stitches passed through the tendon.
The problem is that the tendon tissue itself is often the weak link. In many patients, particularly those with larger or more chronic tears, degenerated or poor-quality tendon tissue cannot hold sutures securely, and the repair can pull through or re-tear before the tendon has had time to biologically heal back to bone. This failure mode — suture pull-through in weakened tissue — is distinct from anchor failure or surgical technique error, and it has proven difficult to solve through suture or anchor design alone.
ZuriMED's FiberLocker System, which received FDA 510(k) clearance in late 2024, is a soft-tissue augmentation technology in which a polyester patch is applied over the repaired tendon during or after surgery and secured to the surrounding tissue. The device is designed to reinforce the connection between the sutures and the tendon, distributing mechanical load across a broader area of tissue rather than concentrating stress at the suture points, with the goal of reducing the specific failure mode of sutures cutting through weakened tendon.
According to Stryker's announcement, the company will add the commercialized FiberLocker System to its existing shoulder portfolio, supporting both sports medicine and arthroplasty applications. Financial terms were not disclosed, and the deal remains subject to customary closing conditions, with ZuriMED continuing to operate as a separate entity until closing. Andy Pierce, Stryker's Group President of MedSurg and Neurotechnology, said the technology "addresses an important clinical need within shoulder care," and the company has characterized rotator cuff augmentation as one of the fastest-growing segments within sports medicine.
Rotator cuff injuries will remain a persistent and costly category of workers' compensation claims regardless of how this particular acquisition plays out, but the broader trend it reflects — device manufacturers investing specifically in technologies aimed at reducing surgical failure rates rather than only expanding surgical volume — is one claims professionals should continue to track.
As FiberLocker and similar augmentation technologies see wider adoption following Stryker's acquisition, expect more surgeons to raise augmentation as a treatment option, and expect the evidentiary record on its real-world effectiveness to grow correspondingly. Claims professionals reviewing shoulder treatment requests should ask what tear characteristics are driving a given surgical recommendation and whether augmentation, if proposed, is supported by the claimant's specific clinical picture rather than applied as a routine add-on. - No Jurisdiction Over Subro Lien After Employee Dismisses Lawsuiton September 29, 2026 at 9:13 AM
In February 2016, Jennifer Slamer was working for Southern California Permanente Medical Group (SCPMG) when she suffered disabling respiratory injuries from exposure to a disinfectant made by Ecolab, Inc. SCPMG resolved her workers’ compensation claim in the administrative system. In May 2017, Slamer and her husband sued Ecolab, SCPMG, and related entities in San Bernardino County Superior Court. SCPMG and its affiliates were dismissed from the civil case with prejudice after a series of demurrers and summary judgment motions. The judgment dismissing SCPMG was entered on April 11, 2022.
The Slamers went to trial against Ecolab alone. Before the case went to the jury, they reached a confidential settlement with Ecolab on April 19, 2023. On June 1, 2023, they voluntarily dismissed the entire action with prejudice.
While the case was pending, SCPMG continued paying benefits. It filed several notices of lien against any recovery under Labor Code § 3856(b). After the settlement, the Slamers refused SCPMG’s requests for reimbursement, and mediation failed. On February 16, 2024, more than eight months after the dismissal, SCPMG filed a motion for reimbursement.
The Slamers opposed the motion on several grounds. They argued the lien had to be reduced by SCPMG’s comparative fault and by an equitable share of their attorney fees and costs. They declined to disclose the settlement amount, but they stipulated that it exceeded the lien plus their fees and costs. On April 18, 2025, the trial court granted SCPMG’s motion. It ordered the Slamers to reimburse the full lien amount plus interest.
In the unpublished case of Slamer v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, No. D086908 (September 2026) the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. It directed the trial court to enter a new order denying SCPMG’s reimbursement motion for lack of jurisdiction. The Slamers were awarded their costs on appeal.
The Slamers raised several challenges on appeal: that the motion came too late, that SCPMG’s comparative fault was never decided, that fees were not properly allocated, and that pre-order interest was awarded in error. While the appeal was pending, the panel identified a threshold problem on its own and asked the parties for supplemental briefing. The question was whether the trial court had any jurisdiction to act after the entire case had been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. The court concluded it did not. Because that answer resolved the appeal, the panel did not reach the other issues.
The court began with the statutory framework. An injured worker’s remedy against the employer is generally limited to workers’ compensation, but the worker may sue a third-party tortfeasor. To prevent double recovery, the employer may assert a lien on the worker’s judgment or settlement. That lien may be reduced for the employer’s own comparative negligence, and for a share of fees and costs under Labor Code § 3860(c) when the recovery was obtained solely through the employee’s attorney. The panel emphasized the timing requirement: the employer must apply for an order paying the lien before the judgment is satisfied or the action is dismissed. It cited Labor Code § 3857 and Abdala v. Aziz (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 369, among other authorities. SCPMG did not meet that deadline. Once the Slamers filed their dismissal, the action ended and the court lost jurisdiction, except for limited matters such as costs and statutory fees (Harris v. Billings (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1396). An order entered without jurisdiction is void.
The panel rejected each of SCPMG’s four counterarguments. First, SCPMG argued the Slamers forfeited the timeliness issue by not raising it in the trial court. The panel disagreed. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. SCPMG also pointed to a possible factual dispute over whether the settlement funds had been fully disbursed. The court found that dispute irrelevant, because no one disputed that the dismissal came first.
Second, SCPMG argued the Slamers had acknowledged its lien efforts and agreed the court could keep jurisdiction. The panel held that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel. It quoted Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200 for the rule that a court “cannot ‘retain’ jurisdiction it has lost.” SCPMG also relied on the lien-motion provision in Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6(f)(1). The court found that provision inapplicable for two reasons. It did not take effect until January 1, 2025, and it does not apply retroactively. And even if it did apply, it covers dismissals without prejudice, not dismissals with prejudice like this one.
Third, SCPMG argued the trial court had expressly retained jurisdiction under § 664.6 to enforce the settlement. Under Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, a request to retain jurisdiction must meet three conditions. It must be made while the case is pending. It must be in a signed writing or stated orally before the court. And it must be express, clear, and unambiguous. The courtroom exchanges and minute-order entry SCPMG cited did not meet that standard. Separately, SCPMG could not use § 664.6 in any event. It had been dismissed from the case in 2022, which made it a stranger to the action, and only a party to a settlement may invoke that statute.
Fourth, SCPMG argued that the Enforcement of Judgments Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.410 et seq.) applied through Labor Code § 3862. Under that law, a lienholder is treated as a party, and the debtor cannot dismiss without the creditor’s consent. The panel explained that § 3862 reaches only a lien that has been allowed and perfected. A lien is not “allowed” until the court grants the employer’s application, which may require deciding comparative fault and fee allocation first. Here, the order allowing the lien did not issue until April 2025, nearly two years after the dismissal. By then the action was no longer pending: the time to appeal the dismissal had expired in November 2023. The court cited Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2026) 20 Cal.5th 91 for the principle that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice terminates the action. Because SCPMG never perfected its lien before the dismissal, the Slamers did not need its consent to dismiss.
The panel expressly took no position on whether any other remedy remains available to SCPMG. For employers and carriers, the case is a reminder that a filed notice of lien is not enough. The employer must obtain a court order allowing the lien, or a properly made request for the court to retain jurisdiction, before the employee’s third-party action is dismissed. This is especially important once the employer has been dismissed from the case as a defendant.
This is an unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeal, under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), courts and parties generally may not cite it or rely on it. It is not a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. It is however relevant to the Worker's Compensation community as illustrative of existing law. - Correctional Officer Pleads No Contest in SCIF WC Fraud Caseon September 29, 2026 at 9:13 AM
A former correctional officer at Salinas Valley State Prison has pleaded no contest to felony workers’ compensation insurance fraud and admitted the loss exceeded $100,000, the Monterey County District Attorney’s Office announced. The defendant, 43-year-old Lorena Hernandez Alvarado of King City, is scheduled for sentencing on October 22, 2026. District Attorney also reported that Alvarado pleaded guilty in two unrelated DUI cases.
According to the District Attorney’s press release, the case began with a workplace injury claim Alvarado filed in April 2021. She reported injuring her shoulder, neck, back, and knees while holding a heavy shield to protect herself from liquid an inmate had thrown at her. State Compensation Insurance Fund, which the release identifies as the prison’s insurer, accepted the claim. Alvarado never returned to work and collected well over $100,000 in wage-replacement and medical benefits.
Prosecutors say an Internal Affairs investigation by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation later found that Alvarado had not used a shield during the April 2021 incident. The same investigation concluded that she had fabricated an earlier workplace injury in 2019, which she attributed to a struggle with an inmate. That 2019 claim was denied. The District Attorney’s Workers’ Compensation Fraud Unit then charged her with two felony counts of insurance fraud. The release does not name the specific statutes charged or say whether the plea covered one count or both. CDCR Investigator Adam Jimenez and District Attorney Workers’ Compensation Insurance Fraud Investigator Jennifer Mendoza handled the investigation.
County fraud units like Monterey’s are largely funded by California employers themselves. The California Department of Insurance awards annual grants to district attorneys to investigate and prosecute workers’ compensation fraud, and those grants are paid for through assessments on employers. The department describes claimant fraud as one of several categories the grants target, along with medical provider fraud, employer premium fraud, and insider fraud.
The account of the underlying conduct comes from the District Attorney’s release and the CDCR investigation it describes; no court findings or defense statements were available. Sentencing has not yet occurred, and the release does not say whether prosecutors will seek restitution to State Fund or how much.