- 9th Circuit Reviews ADA Atty Fees in High Frequency Litigant Caseon July 14, 2026 at 7:20 AM
LaSandra Price has Parkinson's disease and uses a wheelchair for mobility. Between August and September 2021, she visited a Family Dollar store in Fontana, California, owned by Wael Diab, on four occasions and encountered accessibility barriers each time, including poorly marked disabled parking spaces, uneven walkways, and aisles that were too narrow. Price sued Diab and the store under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51. (The district court separately declined supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim after finding Price to be a "high-frequency litigant," a ruling not at issue on appeal.) Neither Diab nor the store responded to the complaint, and the clerk entered defaults against both.
Price moved for default judgment and a specific injunction requiring accessible paths of travel, accessible parking spaces, compliant signage, and an accessible entrance within 180 days. The district court granted the motion, observing that Price's proposed order was, if anything, narrower than what her complaint had sought, and entered the injunction essentially as requested. Price then moved for $9,364 in attorney's fees and costs ($8,872 for 31.2 hours of work, plus $492 in costs) under the ADA's fee-shifting provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, supporting the motion with billing records, a declaration from counsel, and a third-party survey of prevailing rates.
The district court denied Price's fee motion in full, holding she was not a "prevailing party" under section 12205 because the injunction required Diab and the store to do only what the ADA already required them to do. The court acknowledged that courts routinely treat ADA plaintiffs who obtain default judgment and injunctive relief as prevailing parties, and that Ninth Circuit precedent "appear[s] to presume prevailing-party status" in that situation, but concluded that none of those precedents had squarely analyzed the question. The court further found that even if Price were a prevailing party, her requested fees were unreasonable: her motion appeared to be recycled nearly whole-cloth from a different case, resulting in incorrect male pronouns for Price throughout, and the court questioned the hours billed. The court did not reach what a reasonable fee would be if Price prevailed.
In the published case of Price v. Diab, No. 25-713 (9th Cir., July 2026) — the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying Price's motion for attorney's fees and remanded for further proceedings on the fee motion.
The panel held, after reviewing the prevailing-party question de novo, that Price prevailed by virtue of the final injunctive relief she obtained. Under Farrar v. Hobby (1992) 506 U.S. 103, a plaintiff prevails when relief on the merits materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court has since confirmed in Lackey v. Stinnie (2025) 604 U.S. 192 that an enforceable court order conclusively resolving the parties' rights on the merits satisfies that test. Price's injunction, which forced Diab and the store to take specific, enforceable steps to improve accessibility, did exactly that.
The panel held the district court's contrary conclusion rested on a misreading of Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 1115. The district court had seized on language in Fischer stating that a plaintiff's legal relationship with a defendant changes because the plaintiff can force the defendant to do something it otherwise would not have to do, reading that to mean an injunction merely requiring compliance with preexisting law does not confer prevailing-party status. But the panel explained that sentence in Fischer referred back to the settled principle that a material alteration occurs when a plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment or settlement against a defendant — and Fischer itself rejected the same "the defendant already had to comply with the law" argument that the district court accepted here, holding that the Supreme Court has never framed the prevailing-party inquiry in terms of whether a defendant's underlying legal duty changed. The panel found this reasoning reinforced by the Supreme Court's per curiam decision in Lefemine v. Wideman (2012) 568 U.S. 1, which reversed a court of appeals that had denied fees on the theory that an injunction "merely ordered defendants to comply with the law."
The panel also rejected two narrower grounds the district court had invoked. First, relying on Fischer and on the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (2001) 532 U.S. 598, the panel confirmed that a plaintiff can be a prevailing party based exclusively on injunctive relief, without any award of money damages. Second, the panel held that a default judgment is itself an enforceable judgment on the merits sufficient to confer prevailing-party status, citing Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Center, LLC (9th Cir. 2018) 893 F.3d 1152, and that the relief Price obtained was not the kind of merely technical, insignificant victory that Farrar found insufficient.
On the amount of fees, the panel left that determination to the district court in the first instance but addressed one argument along the way. Price's counsel had not disputed reusing a fee-motion template from a different case, but argued on appeal that the resulting errors, including the incorrect pronouns, were "irrelevant editing mistakes." The panel rejected that characterization, explaining that such errors reflect a lack of diligence relevant to the quality of representation courts may weigh in setting a reasonable fee. The panel noted its own precedent allows a reduced fee award in a "straightforward" ADA case with boilerplate pleadings and little opposition, citing Shayler v. 1310 PCH, LLC (9th Cir. 2022) 51 F.4th 1015, and left it to the district court to weigh those concerns in calculating a reasonable award now that Price has been confirmed as the prevailing party.
- WCIRB Reports Carriers Slipped Into Underwriting Loss in 2025on July 14, 2026 at 7:20 AM
The WCIRB has released its 2025 California Workers' Compensation Losses and Expenses Report pursuant to Section 11759.1 of the California Insurance Code. The report is WCIRB's annual accounting of what insurers actually paid out in benefits and expenses during the 2025 calendar year, and it includes payments made by the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA) for calendar years 2013 through 2025.
The headline result is that California's workers' compensation insurers slipped into an underwriting loss for 2025. Direct earned premium totaled $15.4 billion, essentially flat with 2024's $15.6 billion. Against that premium, insurers' total incurred losses and expenses came to $15.7 billion, or 101.8% of earned premium, up from 98.6% in 2024. After accounting for an estimated 1.0% of premium in policyholder dividends, the report puts insurers' pretax underwriting result at a loss of $430 million, or 2.8% of premium — a reversal from 2024, when insurers posted a modest underwriting profit of $118 million, or 0.8% of premium. (These figures reflect underwriting results only; they exclude investment income and taxes, so they understate insurers' overall profitability.)
On the loss side, insurers' incurred losses (paid losses plus the change in reserves, excluding CIGA) were $9.5 billion, or 62.1% of earned premium, up from 60.9% in 2024. Loss adjustment expenses — the cost of investigating, defending and settling claims — rose more sharply, to $2.7 billion or 17.5% of premium, up from 15.7% in 2024. Of that, allocated loss adjustment expense (costs tied to specific claims, largely defense and litigation costs) was 12.7% of premium and unallocated loss adjustment expense (general claims-handling overhead) was 4.9%. Combined with commissions, other acquisition costs, general expenses and premium taxes, insurers' total expenses reached $6.1 billion, or 39.7% of premium, up from 37.7% in 2024.
Within total loss payments, the split between medical and indemnity benefits continued to shift toward indemnity. Medical benefits accounted for $5.2 billion, or 52% of total loss payments in 2025, versus $5.2 billion and 54% in 2024 — a flat dollar figure but a shrinking share. Indemnity (wage-replacement) benefits were $4.7 billion, or 48% of total loss payments, up from $4.4 billion and 46% in 2024; the 2025 indemnity figure includes $36 million in payments on COVID-19 claims.
Within the $5.2 billion in medical payments, physician services remained the largest component at $1.37 billion, though down slightly from $1.39 billion in 2024. Payments made directly to injured workers were essentially flat at $1.69 billion. Hospital payments (inpatient and outpatient combined) slipped to $0.55 billion from $0.57 billion. The standout mover was medical-legal evaluations, which rose to $0.48 billion from $0.45 billion, continuing a multi-year climb: medical-legal payments have grown from 6.4% of total medical payments in 2020 to 9.3% in 2025. The average cost of a medical-legal evaluation was $2,220 in 2025, up modestly from $2,219 in 2024 but well above the $2,037 average in 2022. Orthopedic evaluations make up roughly half of all medical-legal costs, but psychiatric and psychological/behavioral health evaluations remain the most expensive on a per-evaluation basis, averaging $3,778 in 2025. Pharmaceutical costs continued their long decline, falling to $0.05 billion, while medical cost containment program costs reported as medical loss held at $0.11 billion — though the report notes that a much larger and growing share of those program costs, $347 million in 2025, is now reported as loss adjustment expense rather than medical loss, up from $305 million in 2019.
On the provider side, the report's medical transaction data shows hospital-based providers' share of medical service payments continuing to shrink, from 19.6% in 2024 to 18.5% in 2025 (and from 21.7% as recently as 2020), while physical therapists, MD general practitioners and psychology/psychiatry/neurology providers each gained share. Among physician services specifically, evaluation and management services held steady at just over a third of physician payments, while physical medicine's share continued to ease down, from 28.5% in 2024 to 27.3% in 2025.
On the indemnity side, $4.7 billion was paid out in 2025, dominated by temporary disability benefits (59.2% of indemnity paid) and permanent partial disability benefits (31.6%, split across the 0.25%–24.75%, 25%–69.75% and 70%–99.75% disability rating bands). Permanent total disability, death benefits, life pensions and vocational rehabilitation/education vouchers each accounted for roughly 2% or less of total indemnity. Vocational rehabilitation-related payments totaled $88 million, or 1.9% of all indemnity paid, essentially unchanged from 2024's $85 million and 1.9% share, with about 90% of that spending going toward education-related benefits.
One figure likely to draw attention from claims and defense professionals: fees paid to applicant attorneys jumped to $506 million in 2025 from $420 million in 2024, an increase of roughly 20%. The report notes these fees are typically embedded within indemnity awards or settlements and cannot always be broken out separately, so this figure is derived from a subset of insurers able to report a comprehensive breakdown.
The report's injury-detail exhibits, based on 2023 policy year data, reinforce a theme WCIRB has flagged in its other recent publications: cumulative trauma claims are disproportionately costly. Claims coded as cumulative injury, not otherwise classified, made up just 6.9% of claims by cause of injury but 9.9% of total incurred losses. Among permanent disability claims specifically, slip-and-fall injuries were both the most frequent and the most expensive injury category, accounting for 27.9% of total incurred losses on permanent disability claims and averaging $105,965 per claim — well above back injuries ($64,506 average) and other cumulative trauma categories such as carpal tunnel and repetitive motion injuries ($41,501 average) or other cumulative injuries generally ($34,757 average). By nature of injury, strains and tears remained the single largest category, accounting for 26.7% of total incurred losses, and by body part, injuries involving multiple body parts (15.7%) and the lower back (11.1%) topped the list.
Taken as a whole, the 2025 report depicts a system where premium has plateaued but claim costs have not: rising loss adjustment expenses, a growing medical-legal cost component, a sharp jump in applicant attorney fees, and continued indemnity severity growth combined to push insurers into their first underwriting loss in several years. That trajectory is consistent with the rate increases the California Department of Insurance has approved and WCIRB has since proposed for the September 2026 filing.
This summary is provided for general informational purposes only. Readers should consult the full WCIRB report for complete data, methodology and the standard conditions and limitations that accompany all WCIRB publications; the WCIRB cautions that the report reflects only the experience of insured employers and cannot guarantee the accuracy of underlying data submitted by individual insurers.
- WCAB Seeks Sanctions For Use of Legal Treatise Publisher's AIon July 13, 2026 at 9:34 AM
Gilberto Lopez Mendoza worked as a prepper/painter for SWI Finishing, Inc. He alleged a cumulative trauma injury to his neck, upper extremities, back, lower extremities, legs, feet, and psyche, pled for the period from August 1, 1998 through October 1, 2017. In April 2017, Mendoza sought treatment after removing wet socks pulled a scab off a preexisting wound on his foot; the wound worsened, and by February 2018 he was hospitalized with a rapidly progressing infection that led to a below-the-knee amputation. None of his 2017 or 2018 medical records addressed whether his condition was related to his work. Mendoza did not file a claim for workers' compensation benefits until June 29, 2023, and SWI Finishing denied the claim as untimely.
At trial, the parties disputed whether Mendoza's claim was barred by the statute of limitations and whether he had failed to timely report his injury under Labor Code sections 5400 and 5403. Mendoza testified that he had reported his symptoms to Alex Mendez, a coworker he believed to be his supervisor because Mendez served as the "right hand man" of the actual supervisor and was the only one at the worksite who spoke Spanish with him. Mendez testified that he was not a supervisor, that it would not have been proper for other employees to report injuries to him, and that he did not recognize or recall Mendoza. Panel qualified medical evaluators in internal medicine and orthopedics both later opined that Mendoza's foot infection and resulting amputation were work-related, with the internist assigning a 28% whole-person impairment, 35% of which was apportioned to the industrial cumulative trauma.
The workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) found that Mendoza did not have notice of a cumulative trauma work injury in 2017, and that although he had reported his symptoms to Mendez, whom he believed to be his supervisor, neither Mendez nor the actual supervisor ever provided him a claim form or notice of how to report a workplace injury. On that basis, the WCJ found the statute of limitations was tolled and the claim was not time-barred, and issued Findings of Fact including a finding that Mendoza had sustained an industrial injury through the cumulative period ending October 1, 2017.
SWI Finishing petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration, arguing the WCJ erred in finding the statute of limitations tolled because Mendoza's subjective belief that Mendez was a supervisor could not toll the statute where that belief was contradicted by substantial evidence. In support, the petition cited two cases for the proposition that a worker's subjective belief about a coworker's supervisory status cannot toll the statute of limitations when contradicted by substantial evidence, repeating the citations a second time later in the same petition.
In the panel decision of Gilberto Lopez Mendoza v. SWI Finishing, Inc., ADJ17889413 (Cal. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., Dec. 2025) — the WCAB granted SWI Finishing's petition for reconsideration and vacated the WCJ's Findings of Fact in their entirety, but deferred a final decision on the merits pending further proceedings and issued a Notice of Intention to impose sanctions of up to $2,500 against SWI Finishing, its insurer, its claims administrator, and its attorneys.
Before reaching the merits, the WCAB addressed a threshold problem with the Petition for Reconsideration itself. In a Report and Recommendation, the WCJ identified that one of the two cases SWI Finishing cited for its subjective-belief argument, described as "Olson v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1997) 62 Cal.Comp.Cases 334," does not exist at that citation; a real case bearing a similar name exists, but at a different citation and addressing unrelated issues of permanent disability and apportionment. The WCJ further found that the second citation, Reynolds v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 726, is a real decision but does not support the proposition SWI Finishing attributed to it; in fact, Reynolds held the opposite, ruling that an employer with a duty to notify an injured worker of his rights cannot invoke the statute of limitations as a defense if it fails to do so. In a supplemental petition, SWI Finishing's counsel admitted that he had used an artificial-intelligence legal research tool called ChatSOC, offered by a legal treatise publisher, and that the tool had generated the fabricated case and the mischaracterized holding, which counsel then included in the petition without independently verifying them.
The WCAB held this conduct sanctionable under Labor Code section 5813, which authorizes sanctions of up to $2,500 for bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or intended to cause delay, and under WCAB Rule 10421, which lists filing a document misstating the law or presenting a position not warranted by existing law as sanctionable conduct. The Board emphasized that an attorney who delegates legal research to a non-attorney tool, including an AI program, remains responsible for supervising that work and verifying its accuracy before filing, citing its own en banc decision in Ledezma v. Kareem Cart Commissary and Mfg. (2024) 89 Cal.Comp.Cases 462, as well as an attorney's duties of candor and competence under Business and Professions Code section 6068 and rules 3.3 and 5.3 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. The Board found no excuse for filing a petition containing fabricated citations and misrepresented holdings, regardless of the tool's own limitations, and directed that the sanctions run jointly and severally against the employer, its insurer, its administrator, and its attorneys, with a separate response due from the firm's managing partner describing any firmwide policies on the use of AI research tools.
Turning to the merits, the WCAB agreed with the WCJ's recommendation that the finding of industrial injury should be vacated because the issue of injury itself, as opposed to the timeliness of the claim, had never been raised as a triable issue at trial. But the Board went further, vacating the entire Findings of Fact, explaining that a statute-of-limitations analysis must begin with a finding of the date of cumulative injury under Labor Code section 5412, and that the WCJ's decision never made that finding. The Board reiterated the settled framework for cumulative-trauma date-of-injury disputes: the employer bears the burden of proving the claim is untimely, medical treatment alone does not establish disability under section 5412, and a worker generally will not be charged with knowledge that a disability is job-related absent medical advice to that effect, citing City of Fresno v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 467 and State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 998. Only after a date of injury is established, and only if the employer shows the claim was filed outside the resulting limitations period, does the burden shift to the worker to establish tolling. Because that sequence was never completed below, the Board returned the matter to the trial level, suggesting the WCJ may wish to consider bifurcating the statute-of-limitations issue, and invited the parties to meet and confer on a stipulated date of injury. The Board stated it would issue its decision on the merits together with its ruling on sanctions once the sanctions process concludes.
- Remaining Defendants Settle Health Coverage Fraud Caseon July 13, 2026 at 9:34 AM
The California Attorney General announced that the Los Angeles Superior Court approved a settlement with Shelley Steele, Timothy Candace “Tim” Moses, Chase Moses (collectively, the Moses family), and First Call Telemedicine, LLC (First Call), the remaining defendants in a matter involving the alleged sale of sham health coverage to California consumers.
The case began in January 2022, when the Attorney General filed a lawsuit against The Aliera Companies, Inc. (Aliera), Trinity HealthShare (Trinity), and other defendants, including those who are the subject of this settlement.
The lawsuit alleged that the Moses family created and controlled Trinity, falsely presenting it as a legitimate health care sharing ministry (HCSM), and used Aliera, a for-profit company they also controlled, to market and administer the health plans to consumers.
HCSMs are 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations historically comprised of members of a particular religious community who contribute money to share catastrophic or unexpected healthcare costs. HCSMs are often marketed as lower-cost alternatives to traditional health insurance, but they generally do not pay for all essential health benefits such as prescriptions, preexisting conditions, birth control, or mental healthcare, and do not guarantee payment for medical expenses.
According to the complaint, Trinity was not a legitimate HCSM, and Aliera retained a significant portion of members’ contributions rather than using those funds to pay healthcare costs, leaving many consumers with unpaid medical bills. The lawsuit also alleged that, after the collapse of Aliera, Shelley Steele continued selling health plans in California through First Call without the required state authorization and directed millions of dollars from Trinity membership funds to First Call.
In 2025, the Attorney General reached a settlement with Aliera, Trinity, and additional defendants. This new settlement resolves the matter with the remaining defendants: the Moses family and First Call.
“Californians deserve honest information when making decisions about their health coverage,” said the Attorney General. “More than 14,000 Californians were allegedly misled into paying for health plans that did not provide the protection they expected, while those behind the scheme profited from their trust. After holding other defendants accountable last year, this settlement finishes the job by securing penalties against the remaining defendants and barring them from doing business in California.”
Consumers were allegedly led to believe their monthly payments were being used to pay healthcare expenses, but Aliera retained nearly 84% of those funds and routinely rejected requests for payment of medical expenses. Under the settlement:
- - Shelley Steele, Tim Moses, and First Call Telemedicine are permanently barred from conducting business in California, directing business toward California residents, serving in leadership positions at companies doing business in California, or owning more than a 25% interest in businesses operating in California.
- - Chase Moses is prohibited from conducting business in California for 10 years and is permanently barred from marketing, selling, administering, or otherwise operating any HCSM in California.
- - These remaining defendants must pay more than $5.1 million in civil penalties. Portions of those penalties are suspended based on the defendants’ sworn financial disclosures and continued compliance with the judgment and may be reinstated if the defendants are found to have materially misrepresented their financial condition or violate the settlement.
Californians who believe an HCSM used deceptive marketing or misrepresented its services are encouraged to file a complaint at oag.ca.gov/report.
- Lawyers Held to State Bar Ethics Civility Provisions in Pro-Per Caseson July 9, 2026 at 10:12 AM
Aziz Damak, representing himself, sued Satraj Hospitality LLC and Sangita and Sanjeev Khanna, who own and operate the Cozy Inn motel in Costa Mesa, alleging wage and hour, meal and rest period, retaliation, and wrongful discharge claims arising from his employment as a receptionist.
In July 2024, Damak served extensive discovery on each defendant, including interrogatories, requests for admission, and document production requests. After receiving no responses and no communication from defendants' attorney, Hitendra Bhakta, despite repeated calls and a written 21-day notice warning that he would seek sanctions, Damak filed fifteen motions to compel in November 2024, each requesting monetary sanctions of "at least $1,000." Defendants never opposed any of the motions, and neither Bhakta nor anyone from the defense side communicated with Damak about the outstanding discovery during the roughly ten months before the motions were heard.
The Court granted all of Damak's motions to compel and the nonmonetary relief he requested, but denied monetary sanctions. The court recognized that the applicable Civil Discovery Act provisions made some sanction mandatory, but explained that such sanctions are limited to a party's "reasonable expenses actually incurred."
Because Damak was self-represented, had a fee waiver, and did not claim he had incurred any out-of-pocket expenses in bringing the motions, the court concluded it could not award any sanctions and denied that portion of his requests outright. Damak petitioned for a writ of mandate challenging that denial, arguing the court was required to award at least a nominal sanction and that the ruling undercut the deterrent purpose of the discovery sanctions scheme by letting represented parties stonewall self-represented opponents without consequence.
In the published case Damak v. Superior Court, No. G065583 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist., Div. 3, July 2026) — the Court of Appeal granted Damak's petition for writ of mandate in part and denied it in part, directing the trial court to vacate the portion of its order denying monetary sanctions and to reconsider that request.
The panel first agreed with the trial court that the Civil Discovery Act's method-specific sanctions provisions — covering interrogatories, document production, and requests for admission — direct that sanctions be imposed under a companion provision authorizing "reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result" of the discovery misuse. Relying on the California Supreme Court's decisions in Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274 and Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, and the Court of Appeal's own decision in Argaman v. Rutan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1173, the court explained that a self-represented litigant, including a self-represented attorney, cannot "incur" attorney fees for his own time, and so cannot recover compensation for the hours he personally spent preparing the motions or for business opportunities forgone.
The court found Kravitz v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1015 persuasive on this point, and acknowledged that court's own description of the resulting rule as "wholly inadequate" for self-represented litigants facing discovery abuse, since a represented opponent who never incurs identifiable costs effectively gets, in that court's words, one free bite at ignoring discovery obligations. Damak's reliance on Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632 did not change this outcome, the panel explained, because that case addressed only whether a sanction was mandatory in amount, not what the sanction could permissibly compensate.
The panel found, however, that the trial court's analysis stopped short. A separate, more recently enacted provision of the Civil Discovery Act, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.050, requires a court to impose a flat $1,000 sanction against a party or attorney — regardless of any expenses incurred by the other side — if it finds the party or attorney failed to respond in good faith to a document production request or failed to confer in a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute informally. The court explained that this provision, drawing on legislative history describing it as a "stronger . . . hammer on discovery abuse," is aimed at deterring the offending party's conduct rather than merely compensating the other side, and applies "notwithstanding any other law."
Because Damak's motions concerning document production requests were governed by a Discovery Act provision that in turn incorporates section 2023.050, and because the trial court's order never mentioned that section or made any finding on whether defendants had responded in good faith or conferred with Damak, the panel held the trial court's failure to even consider it was an abuse of discretion, citing City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46. The panel emphasized that nothing in the record suggested defendants had responded in good faith or conferred with Damak about the document requests, but declined to make those factual findings itself, remanding for the trial court to consider in the first instance whether a section 2023.050 sanction was warranted.
The court closed with an extended discussion of civility, noting that attorneys owe self-represented litigants the same dignity, courtesy, and integrity due to opposing counsel and the court itself, an obligation reflected in the civility oath every California attorney must now take and annually reaffirm under California Rules of Court, rule 9.7. Citing recent decisions admonishing incivility in litigation, including Masimo Corp. v. The Vanderpool Law Firm, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 902 and Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, the panel described defendants' ten months of silence in response to Damak's repeated, documented attempts to follow up on outstanding discovery as falling far short of that standard, regardless of any underlying intent. The court also noted, in a footnote, that defendants' counsel made an unsupported factual assertion at oral argument about the record that the court could not verify, and reminded counsel of an attorney's duty of candor to the court.
- 9th Circuit Interprets the EFAA's Application Timing Provisionson July 9, 2026 at 10:12 AM
Jessica Combs began working at Netflix, Inc. in May 2017 under an employment agreement containing a broad arbitration clause covering all employment-related disputes. She alleges that soon after starting, Netflix fostered a sexualized office culture, including one-on-one meetings that took on a flirtatious, dating-like tone and encouraged unwanted advances from male colleagues. At a September 2018 company offsite, Combs was required to participate in team-building exercises she considered sexualized, including exercises resembling "forced speed dating," and she says a stairwell was used by male employees to look under female colleagues' dresses. During an October 2018 work trip to Singapore, a male colleague made unwanted sexual advances toward her. Combs alleges that between 2017 and 2021 she repeatedly complained to her supervisors and to Netflix management about this sexually charged environment and about specific incidents, but that Netflix ignored her complaints and took no corrective action. In December 2021, Netflix fired Combs; the company cited her noncompliance with its COVID-19 vaccination policy, but Combs alleges the real reason was retaliation for her complaints.
In August 2023, Combs filed an administrative complaint with California's Department of Fair Employment and Housing and received an immediate right-to-sue letter. In July 2024, she sued Netflix in California state court on various state-law discrimination, harassment, and hostile-work-environment theories. Netflix removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship and moved to compel arbitration under the parties' agreement. Combs did not dispute that a valid arbitration agreement existed or that her claims fell within it; instead, she argued that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA; 9 U.S.C. §401–402), which lets a person alleging sexual harassment elect to proceed in court despite a predispute arbitration agreement, exempted her case from arbitration.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted Netflix's motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that, even though Combs's complaint alleged conduct constituting sexual harassment, her claims accrued and her dispute with Netflix arose before the EFAA's March 3, 2022 effective date, so the statute's timing provision took her case outside the Act's reach and the parties' arbitration agreement controlled.
In the published case of Combs v. Netflix, Inc., No. 25-3164 (9th Cir., July 2026) — the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration.
The panel first agreed that Combs's complaint alleged conduct constituting unlawful sexual harassment, so her claims presumptively fell within the EFAA. The dispositive question, one of first impression in the circuit, was how to interpret the EFAA's timing provision, a statutory note stating that the Act applies to any "dispute or claim that arises or accrues" on or after its March 3, 2022 enactment date. The court held that this phrase describes two distinct concepts — "claims that accrue" and "disputes that arise" — agreeing with the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Memmer v. United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC (2025) 135 F.4th 398 that Congress used the disjunctive "or" to differentiate them.
On claim accrual, the court applied the settled common-law rule, drawn from Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2024) 603 U.S. 799, which in turn cited Green v. Brennan (2016) 578 U.S. 547, that a claim accrues when a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action allowing her to file suit and obtain relief. Under that standard, Combs's claims accrued well before March 3, 2022, since she alleges harassment and a termination that occurred between 2017 and 2021.
The harder question was when a "dispute" arises. The court rejected Combs's argument that no dispute arises until a formal external complaint is filed with a court or administrative agency, finding that reading too narrow. It also rejected the opposite extreme, urged in similar cases by other employers, that a dispute arises whenever the underlying harassing conduct occurs, since that would collapse the distinct concepts of "dispute" and "claim" into one and render Congress's use of both terms superfluous. Instead, following the Third Circuit's decision in Cornelius v. CVS Pharmacy Inc. (2025) 133 F.4th 240 and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Famuyide v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2024) 111 F.4th 895, the panel held that a dispute arises under the EFAA when an employee registers disagreement with her employer, through an internal complaint, an external complaint, or otherwise, and the employer expressly or constructively opposes that position. The court noted this same formulation had already been adopted by a California appellate court applying the EFAA, in Kader v. Southern California Medical Center, Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 214.
Applying that standard, the panel held that a dispute arose between Combs and Netflix well before the EFAA's effective date. By the complaint's own allegations, Combs repeatedly complained to Netflix between 2017 and 2021 about the sexualized culture and specific incidents, and Netflix consistently ignored those complaints and took no corrective action; that pattern of complaint met with inaction showed Netflix had, at minimum, constructively opposed her position. The court found the case closely analogous to Cornelius, where an employee's repeated written complaints that her employer dismissed and failed to remedy were likewise sufficient to show a pre-2022 dispute. The panel further noted that Netflix's alleged decision to fire Combs in December 2021 in retaliation for her complaints put the point beyond doubt, since firing an employee for raising a complaint is itself a clear act of opposition to her position. Because both Combs's claims and her dispute with Netflix arose before March 3, 2022, the EFAA did not apply, and the panel affirmed the order compelling her case to arbitration.
- Federal Anti-Arbitration Law Applies to FEHA Sexual Orientation Caseon July 8, 2026 at 11:17 AM
Trevor Joseph Decloedt worked for Radnet Management, Inc. and related entities (collectively, Radnet) alongside supervisor Joe Zambrano and coworker Susana Ceballos. According to Decloedt's complaint, beginning in early 2022 Ceballos subjected him to repeated derogatory comments about his sexual orientation, telling him he "shouldn't be gay" and that it was "sinning." Decloedt alleged Ceballos also grew aggressive toward him at work, at one point saying she was so angry she could kill him and, on more than one occasion, pulling his hair — including a November 2022 incident in which she grabbed his hair with enough force that he fled to the restroom. Decloedt alleged he repeatedly reported Ceballos's conduct to Zambrano and another lead employee, but no action was taken; when Ceballos later complained about him to human resources, he told HR about the harassment and said it had led him to contemplate suicide, but HR again took no action. Decloedt was terminated in February 2023.
In October 2024, Decloedt sued Radnet, Zambrano, and Ceballos, alleging eleven causes of action, including hostile work environment and sexual harassment under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, §12900 et seq.). Radnet moved to compel arbitration under an agreement Decloedt had signed at the start of his employment. The trial court denied the motion, holding that Decloedt had adequately pleaded a FEHA sexual harassment claim, which triggered an exemption from arbitration under the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA; 9 U.S.C. §401–402), a 2022 amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. §1 et seq.) that lets a person alleging sexual harassment opt their entire case out of a predispute arbitration agreement. Radnet appealed.
The trial court found Decloedt had alleged a viable FEHA sexual harassment claim and, on that basis, held the EFAA exempted his case from arbitration under the FAA. It did not resolve any disputed facts in reaching that conclusion, and it did not reach Decloedt's separate argument that the arbitration agreement was independently unconscionable.
In the published case of Decloedt v. Radnet Management, Inc., No. B343963 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 1, July 2026) — the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying Radnet's motion to compel arbitration.
Reviewing the question de novo because no disputed facts were before it, the panel first addressed whether harassment based on sexual orientation qualifies as sexual harassment under FEHA at all. Radnet argued that FEHA treats sexual orientation harassment as a separate category from sexual harassment, pointing to statutory language that defines "harassment because of sex" to include sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment related to pregnancy or childbirth, without separately listing sexual orientation.
The court rejected that reading, explaining that the word "include" in the statute is a term of enlargement, not an exhaustive list, and it declined to infer that omitting sexual orientation from that illustrative list meant harassment based on sexual orientation falls outside FEHA's prohibition on harassment "because of sex." Drawing on the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) 590 U.S. 644, which held that firing someone for being gay or transgender necessarily involves discrimination based on sex under Title VII, the court held that the same logic applies to FEHA's parallel "because of . . . sex" language, since California courts routinely look to federal Title VII case law when interpreting FEHA's antidiscrimination provisions, citing Hall v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 318. The court found this conclusion reinforced by a recent sister-panel decision, Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 75, which had treated a plaintiff's allegations of harassment based on his perceived sexual orientation as stating a sexual harassment claim under FEHA.
The court then considered whether Decloedt's specific allegations were severe or pervasive enough to state a hostile work environment claim, assuming without deciding that the federal pleading standard governing motions to dismiss applied. The panel rejected Radnet's argument that Decloedt's complaint drew a sharp line between Ceballos's verbal comments about his sexual orientation and her separate outbursts of anger and hair-pulling, holding that the complaint could reasonably be read as alleging both forms of conduct were part of the same pattern of harassment motivated by her disapproval of his sexual orientation.
The court explained that a hostile work environment claim does not require every incident to include an explicit anti-gay remark, citing Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, and that Decloedt's allegation that Ceballos "continually" made such comments was a factual assertion the court had to accept as true at the pleading stage, not an impermissible legal conclusion. Because Decloedt alleged the harassment caused him to flee for his safety and to contemplate suicide, the court held these allegations plausibly showed conduct that disrupted his emotional tranquility and interfered with his ability to do his job.
Having concluded Decloedt adequately alleged a FEHA sexual harassment claim, the panel held the EFAA's exemption applied and affirmed the order denying arbitration, following the reasoning of Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791 that the statute's plain language exempts a plaintiff's entire case, not just the individual harassment claim. The court did not reach Decloedt's alternative argument that the arbitration agreement was independently unconscionable.
- Intense Opposition Kills Proposed Law Limiting Athletes' Claimson July 8, 2026 at 11:17 AM
California Senate Bill (SB) 795, introduced by Senator Laura Richardson, was a 2026 legislative proposal aimed at restricting professional athletes' access to workers' compensation benefits in the state.
Proposed SB 795 would have revised the Labor Code to state that the workers’ compensation system does not apply to the claim of a professional athlete involving occupational disease or cumulative trauma if that athlete was exempt, as specified, and, during the last 365 days of their career as a professional athlete, was not hired as a professional athlete in California, unless over the course of their entire career as a professional athlete, (1) the athlete worked for 2 or more seasons for a California-based team or teams, as defined, or worked 20% or more of their duty days in California or for a California-based team, and (2) worked for fewer than 7 seasons for any team other than a California-based team during their professional athletic career. The bill would state that the team’s principal place of business is not relevant to whether a team is based in California. As most recently amended, the proposed law would provide that these changes apply to claims for benefits filed on or after September 30, 2026.
Reports indicated the push came largely from the business/team side rather than a broad public concern: the NFL teams headquartered in California - the Rams, Chargers, and 49ers - reportedly supported the bill, with Richardson indicating in a bill summary that the NFL and these three California teams back it, though none of them confirmed this in public statements.
Issues related to workers' compensation costs reportedly have historically influenced league and team decisions about where to locate - for example, the UFL has no California teams, and workers' comp costs contributed to the end of one iteration of the Arena Football League. This suggests part of the impetus was making California a more attractive/affordable state for professional athletic franchises relative to others with less generous athlete workers' comp exposure.
The legislation immediately faced fierce pushback from major sports organizations, including the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) and the San Francisco 49ers players who publicly argued the bill unfairly singled out high-risk jobs.
NFLPA, the lead opponent, called it "anti-player legislation," stating it strips players of "the constitutional rights and legal protections afforded to every other worker in the state" and accused California's pro sports teams of "seeking to evade that system for financial gain, denying injured athletes the care they are owed." They closed with a call to "reject SB 795 and stand with the players who make the game possible."
The National Hockey League Players' Association - NHLPA - joining in solidarity: posted that "All workers deserve workers' compensation protection," joining the NFLPA "and other players' associations in asking lawmakers to reject this bill."
The Major League Soccer Players Association - MLSPA - stated it stands with the NFLPA in strongly opposing SB 795, calling workers' compensation "a critically important and hard-earned protection for all workers who take part in high-risk jobs," and urged lawmakers to reject the bill.
The 49ers players - the full 90-man roster - signed a joint statement with the NFLPA, saying "Football takes a real toll on our bodies, and workers' compensation was built for high-risk jobs like ours." They added that the bill "singles out professional athletes and tells us we deserve fewer protections than every other worker in the state."
The bill passed the State Senate in January 2026 but underwent major amendments in the Assembly by May. Following intense union opposition, the bill died in late June 2026 when its first Assembly Insurance Committee hearing was canceled at the author's request, entirely pulling the bill from consideration.
"California SB 795, a bill that would have significantly restricted professional athletes' access to workers' compensation benefits, has been pulled from consideration and will not move forward for a vote," the NFLPA said in an email to agents. "This is a meaningful win for your clients and helps keep critical protections in place for injuries sustained during their careers. Protecting the health, safety and legal rights of active and former players remains a top priority, and we will continue to fight against efforts that threaten those protections."
- Workplace Restraining Order Affirmed Against School Board Memberon July 7, 2026 at 10:08 AM
Michael Krause served as Chief Business Officer and then superintendent of the Adelanto Elementary School District (District) from 2022 until his June 2024 termination. Over roughly two years, three of his subordinates — executive assistants identified as S.A., X.L., and I.P. — experienced what the trial court later found to be a course of harassing conduct. Krause was prone to angry outbursts at meetings, including one in which he slammed his fists on a table and screamed at staff until several people cried. He also sent the three women a steady stream of unsettling text messages and photos: pictures he had secretly taken of them at a Chipotle, outside their homes at night, and near a family member's workplace; comments suggesting he was watching them on office cameras or following them around town; and after-hours messages with a romantic or proprietary tone, such as telling one assistant he did not "love her anymore" when she was slow to reply.
On separate occasions he physically poked two of the women hard enough to startle and hurt them. After the women reported his conduct in 2024, Krause was placed on leave, filed an unsubstantiated sexual harassment complaint against one of them, and was later seen parked outside a coffee shop watching two of the women through his car window. The District terminated him and the parties signed a separation agreement releasing the District's claims against Krause arising from his employment. Krause was then elected to the District's own Board of Trustees, and during the campaign each woman found one of his yard signs planted near her home.
In October 2024, the District petitioned for a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) against Krause on behalf of the three women under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8, and the San Bernardino County Superior Court issued a temporary restraining order. Following a four-day evidentiary hearing spread across January and March 2025, at which the three women and Krause testified at length, the trial court granted a permanent WVRO. The court found Krause's course of conduct met the statutory definition of harassment, rejected his shifting and sometimes "strained" explanations for the texts and photos, and found his lack of remorse supported a reasonable probability that the harassment would continue, particularly given that his election to the Board placed him back in regular contact with the women. The order barred Krause from contacting the women, required him to stay 100 yards from them and their workplace (five yards during Board meetings, where a District-funded security guard was required), barred him from commenting on the WVRO or the underlying proceedings at any regular Board meeting, and ran for four years.
In the published opinion in Adelanto Elementary School District v. Krause, No. D086337 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist., Div. 1, July 2026) — the Court of Appeal affirmed the WVRO as modified, striking the provision barring Krause from commenting on the order at Board meetings and shortening the order's duration from four years to the statutory maximum of three.
Writing for a unanimous panel, Justice Buchanan first rejected Krause's argument that the District had waived its right to seek a WVRO by signing a separation agreement releasing claims against him. The court held that an employer's statutory right to prosecute a WVRO on an employee's behalf is unwaivable under Civil Code section 3513, which bars private contracts from contravening a law enacted for a public reason. Drawing on Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 and Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, the court reasoned that section 527.8 was enacted to combat workplace violence and harassment as a matter of public concern, not solely for individual employers' benefit, citing legislative history describing rising threats against school employees, health workers, and election workers. Because the public benefit of the WVRO statute is a primary purpose rather than a merely incidental one — a policy the court traced through Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324 and a case it referred to as Franklin v. The Monadnock Co. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 252 — the release could not extinguish the District's right to seek the order.
Second, the court found sufficient evidence of a future threat to support the WVRO. It held that the older "reasonable probability of future unlawful violence" standard from Scripps Health no longer controls, because the Legislature amended section 527.8 in 2023 to reach harassment as well as violence, effective January 2025, precisely so employers would not have to wait until a threat escalated into violence. Under the amended statute, a reasonable probability of continued harassment suffices, and the panel found that standard met given the two-year pattern of conduct, Krause's continued contact after being placed on leave, and his consistent refusal to acknowledge that any of it was inappropriate.
Third, the court held Krause forfeited his argument that the WVRO improperly burdened his parental rights, since he raised no evidence or objection on that point below despite adequate notice of the order's terms.
Fourth, the court agreed with Krause that the provision barring him from commenting on the WVRO or its proceedings at Board meetings was an overbroad restriction on his First Amendment rights as an elected official. Applying Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141 and Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. (1994) 512 U.S. 753, the court explained that an injunction touching speech must be no broader than necessary to serve its purpose, and this provision swept in legitimate Board business — such as evaluating the performance of the law firm that handled the case — that had nothing to do with harassing the protected women. The panel struck that provision alone, while leaving intact the WVRO's other bars on harassment or contact during Board meetings.
Finally, the court held the trial court exceeded its authority by setting the WVRO's duration at four years, since section 527.8, subdivision (l)(1), caps such orders at three years subject to early termination. The panel modified the order accordingly and affirmed it as modified.
- OSHA Citation Extends to Hospital's Management Companyon July 7, 2026 at 10:08 AM
Cedar Springs Hospital, Inc. operates a psychiatric hospital in Colorado. UHS of Delaware, Inc. is a management company that, under a services agreement with Cedar Springs, agreed to assign several of its own employees to serve as the hospital's top executives and to provide oversight on workplace safety matters. Both Cedar Springs and UHS of Delaware are wholly owned, through an intermediary holding company, by the same ultimate parent, Universal Health Services, Inc.
Following an OSHA investigation into patient-on-staff violence at the hospital, the Secretary of Labor cited both Cedar Springs and UHS of Delaware for violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act's general duty clause (29 U.S.C. section 654(a)(1)) by failing to provide adequate safety measures against workplace violence. UHS of Delaware contested the citation, arguing it was merely a management company for Cedar Springs and should not itself be treated as an employer subject to OSHA liability at the hospital.
An administrative law judge upheld the citations, and UHS of Delaware sought discretionary review before the full Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Review Commission). Applying a three-part test the parties agreed governed the analysis, the Review Commission asked whether Cedar Springs and UHS of Delaware (1) shared a common worksite, (2) had integrated operations on matters of safety and health, and (3) shared a common president, management, supervision, or ownership. The Review Commission answered yes to all three questions and found that UHS of Delaware had acted as an employer for some of the employees working at the hospital, making it independently liable alongside Cedar Springs.
UHS of Delaware then petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of that order under 29 U.S.C. section 660(a), which required the court to treat the Review Commission's factual findings as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Cedar Springs joined UHS of Delaware's arguments in a companion petition. In the published case of UHS of Delaware, Inc. v. Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission, No. 24-9521 (10th Cir., Feb. 2026) — the Tenth Circuit denied UHS of Delaware's petition for review, upholding the Review Commission's order.
The panel,addressed each of the three questions in turn, in each instance asking only whether the record could reasonably support the Review Commission's finding, not whether the court would have weighed the evidence the same way in the first instance.
On the worksite question, the court rejected UHS of Delaware's argument that the psychiatric hospital was solely a worksite of Cedar Springs because UHS of Delaware's headquarters were in Pennsylvania. The proper focus, the court explained, is where employees face workplace hazards, not where the employer's headquarters sit — a principle it drew from the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in a closely related dispute involving the same management company and a different psychiatric hospital, UHS of Delaware, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor (2025) 140 F.4th 1329, as well as the First Circuit's decision in A.C. Castle Construction Co. v. Acosta (2018) 882 F.3d 34. The parties had stipulated that UHS of Delaware's employees were exposed to the hazard of workplace violence at the hospital, and the court held it could not disregard a stipulated fact, citing the ordinary meaning of "worksite" as the place where an employee works under Harbert v. Healthcare Services Group, Inc. (2004) 391 F.3d 1140. Testimony that UHS of Delaware's chief financial officer regularly interacted with patients, along with evidence that other UHS of Delaware employees made repeated visits to the hospital, further supported the finding.
On the integration question, the court held that sharing resources and providing oversight of safety matters — including requiring workplace-violence training, supplying incident-report forms, compiling injury data, and reviewing the hospital's violence-prevention plan — was sufficient evidence of integrated safety operations, even though UHS of Delaware itself did not provide direct patient care. The court found this consistent with both the Eleventh Circuit's 2025 decision and A.C. Castle, which had found integration based on similar funding of training and preparation of safety policies for another company.
On the common-ownership question, the court found it unnecessary to resolve whether the companies shared a president, management, or supervision, since the statutory test is disjunctive and common ownership alone suffices. Both companies acknowledged they were wholly owned subsidiaries of the same ultimate parent, Universal Health Services, Inc., with an intermediary holding company sitting between the parent and Cedar Springs. The court held that an intervening tier in the ownership chain does not defeat common ownership so long as the companies share the same ultimate parent, again following the Eleventh Circuit's 2025 decision, which had reached the identical conclusion on a nearly identical corporate structure involving the same intermediary entities.
Because substantial evidence supported the Review Commission's findings on all three questions, the court denied UHS of Delaware's petition for review without reaching whether the three-question test itself was the correct legal standard, noting the parties' agreement on that point and the court's practice of assuming without deciding a test's correctness when it is not contested.
- 9th Circuit Reviews ADA Atty Fees in High Frequency Litigant Caseon July 14, 2026 at 7:20 AM
LaSandra Price has Parkinson's disease and uses a wheelchair for mobility. Between August and September 2021, she visited a Family Dollar store in Fontana, California, owned by Wael Diab, on four occasions and encountered accessibility barriers each time, including poorly marked disabled parking spaces, uneven walkways, and aisles that were too narrow. Price sued Diab and the store under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51. (The district court separately declined supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim after finding Price to be a "high-frequency litigant," a ruling not at issue on appeal.) Neither Diab nor the store responded to the complaint, and the clerk entered defaults against both.
Price moved for default judgment and a specific injunction requiring accessible paths of travel, accessible parking spaces, compliant signage, and an accessible entrance within 180 days. The district court granted the motion, observing that Price's proposed order was, if anything, narrower than what her complaint had sought, and entered the injunction essentially as requested. Price then moved for $9,364 in attorney's fees and costs ($8,872 for 31.2 hours of work, plus $492 in costs) under the ADA's fee-shifting provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, supporting the motion with billing records, a declaration from counsel, and a third-party survey of prevailing rates.
The district court denied Price's fee motion in full, holding she was not a "prevailing party" under section 12205 because the injunction required Diab and the store to do only what the ADA already required them to do. The court acknowledged that courts routinely treat ADA plaintiffs who obtain default judgment and injunctive relief as prevailing parties, and that Ninth Circuit precedent "appear[s] to presume prevailing-party status" in that situation, but concluded that none of those precedents had squarely analyzed the question. The court further found that even if Price were a prevailing party, her requested fees were unreasonable: her motion appeared to be recycled nearly whole-cloth from a different case, resulting in incorrect male pronouns for Price throughout, and the court questioned the hours billed. The court did not reach what a reasonable fee would be if Price prevailed.
In the published case of Price v. Diab, No. 25-713 (9th Cir., July 2026) — the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying Price's motion for attorney's fees and remanded for further proceedings on the fee motion.
The panel held, after reviewing the prevailing-party question de novo, that Price prevailed by virtue of the final injunctive relief she obtained. Under Farrar v. Hobby (1992) 506 U.S. 103, a plaintiff prevails when relief on the merits materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court has since confirmed in Lackey v. Stinnie (2025) 604 U.S. 192 that an enforceable court order conclusively resolving the parties' rights on the merits satisfies that test. Price's injunction, which forced Diab and the store to take specific, enforceable steps to improve accessibility, did exactly that.
The panel held the district court's contrary conclusion rested on a misreading of Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 1115. The district court had seized on language in Fischer stating that a plaintiff's legal relationship with a defendant changes because the plaintiff can force the defendant to do something it otherwise would not have to do, reading that to mean an injunction merely requiring compliance with preexisting law does not confer prevailing-party status. But the panel explained that sentence in Fischer referred back to the settled principle that a material alteration occurs when a plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment or settlement against a defendant — and Fischer itself rejected the same "the defendant already had to comply with the law" argument that the district court accepted here, holding that the Supreme Court has never framed the prevailing-party inquiry in terms of whether a defendant's underlying legal duty changed. The panel found this reasoning reinforced by the Supreme Court's per curiam decision in Lefemine v. Wideman (2012) 568 U.S. 1, which reversed a court of appeals that had denied fees on the theory that an injunction "merely ordered defendants to comply with the law."
The panel also rejected two narrower grounds the district court had invoked. First, relying on Fischer and on the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (2001) 532 U.S. 598, the panel confirmed that a plaintiff can be a prevailing party based exclusively on injunctive relief, without any award of money damages. Second, the panel held that a default judgment is itself an enforceable judgment on the merits sufficient to confer prevailing-party status, citing Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Center, LLC (9th Cir. 2018) 893 F.3d 1152, and that the relief Price obtained was not the kind of merely technical, insignificant victory that Farrar found insufficient.
On the amount of fees, the panel left that determination to the district court in the first instance but addressed one argument along the way. Price's counsel had not disputed reusing a fee-motion template from a different case, but argued on appeal that the resulting errors, including the incorrect pronouns, were "irrelevant editing mistakes." The panel rejected that characterization, explaining that such errors reflect a lack of diligence relevant to the quality of representation courts may weigh in setting a reasonable fee. The panel noted its own precedent allows a reduced fee award in a "straightforward" ADA case with boilerplate pleadings and little opposition, citing Shayler v. 1310 PCH, LLC (9th Cir. 2022) 51 F.4th 1015, and left it to the district court to weigh those concerns in calculating a reasonable award now that Price has been confirmed as the prevailing party. - WCIRB Reports Carriers Slipped Into Underwriting Loss in 2025on July 14, 2026 at 7:20 AM
The WCIRB has released its 2025 California Workers' Compensation Losses and Expenses Report pursuant to Section 11759.1 of the California Insurance Code. The report is WCIRB's annual accounting of what insurers actually paid out in benefits and expenses during the 2025 calendar year, and it includes payments made by the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA) for calendar years 2013 through 2025.
The headline result is that California's workers' compensation insurers slipped into an underwriting loss for 2025. Direct earned premium totaled $15.4 billion, essentially flat with 2024's $15.6 billion. Against that premium, insurers' total incurred losses and expenses came to $15.7 billion, or 101.8% of earned premium, up from 98.6% in 2024. After accounting for an estimated 1.0% of premium in policyholder dividends, the report puts insurers' pretax underwriting result at a loss of $430 million, or 2.8% of premium — a reversal from 2024, when insurers posted a modest underwriting profit of $118 million, or 0.8% of premium. (These figures reflect underwriting results only; they exclude investment income and taxes, so they understate insurers' overall profitability.)
On the loss side, insurers' incurred losses (paid losses plus the change in reserves, excluding CIGA) were $9.5 billion, or 62.1% of earned premium, up from 60.9% in 2024. Loss adjustment expenses — the cost of investigating, defending and settling claims — rose more sharply, to $2.7 billion or 17.5% of premium, up from 15.7% in 2024. Of that, allocated loss adjustment expense (costs tied to specific claims, largely defense and litigation costs) was 12.7% of premium and unallocated loss adjustment expense (general claims-handling overhead) was 4.9%. Combined with commissions, other acquisition costs, general expenses and premium taxes, insurers' total expenses reached $6.1 billion, or 39.7% of premium, up from 37.7% in 2024.
Within total loss payments, the split between medical and indemnity benefits continued to shift toward indemnity. Medical benefits accounted for $5.2 billion, or 52% of total loss payments in 2025, versus $5.2 billion and 54% in 2024 — a flat dollar figure but a shrinking share. Indemnity (wage-replacement) benefits were $4.7 billion, or 48% of total loss payments, up from $4.4 billion and 46% in 2024; the 2025 indemnity figure includes $36 million in payments on COVID-19 claims.
Within the $5.2 billion in medical payments, physician services remained the largest component at $1.37 billion, though down slightly from $1.39 billion in 2024. Payments made directly to injured workers were essentially flat at $1.69 billion. Hospital payments (inpatient and outpatient combined) slipped to $0.55 billion from $0.57 billion. The standout mover was medical-legal evaluations, which rose to $0.48 billion from $0.45 billion, continuing a multi-year climb: medical-legal payments have grown from 6.4% of total medical payments in 2020 to 9.3% in 2025. The average cost of a medical-legal evaluation was $2,220 in 2025, up modestly from $2,219 in 2024 but well above the $2,037 average in 2022. Orthopedic evaluations make up roughly half of all medical-legal costs, but psychiatric and psychological/behavioral health evaluations remain the most expensive on a per-evaluation basis, averaging $3,778 in 2025. Pharmaceutical costs continued their long decline, falling to $0.05 billion, while medical cost containment program costs reported as medical loss held at $0.11 billion — though the report notes that a much larger and growing share of those program costs, $347 million in 2025, is now reported as loss adjustment expense rather than medical loss, up from $305 million in 2019.
On the provider side, the report's medical transaction data shows hospital-based providers' share of medical service payments continuing to shrink, from 19.6% in 2024 to 18.5% in 2025 (and from 21.7% as recently as 2020), while physical therapists, MD general practitioners and psychology/psychiatry/neurology providers each gained share. Among physician services specifically, evaluation and management services held steady at just over a third of physician payments, while physical medicine's share continued to ease down, from 28.5% in 2024 to 27.3% in 2025.
On the indemnity side, $4.7 billion was paid out in 2025, dominated by temporary disability benefits (59.2% of indemnity paid) and permanent partial disability benefits (31.6%, split across the 0.25%–24.75%, 25%–69.75% and 70%–99.75% disability rating bands). Permanent total disability, death benefits, life pensions and vocational rehabilitation/education vouchers each accounted for roughly 2% or less of total indemnity. Vocational rehabilitation-related payments totaled $88 million, or 1.9% of all indemnity paid, essentially unchanged from 2024's $85 million and 1.9% share, with about 90% of that spending going toward education-related benefits.
One figure likely to draw attention from claims and defense professionals: fees paid to applicant attorneys jumped to $506 million in 2025 from $420 million in 2024, an increase of roughly 20%. The report notes these fees are typically embedded within indemnity awards or settlements and cannot always be broken out separately, so this figure is derived from a subset of insurers able to report a comprehensive breakdown.
The report's injury-detail exhibits, based on 2023 policy year data, reinforce a theme WCIRB has flagged in its other recent publications: cumulative trauma claims are disproportionately costly. Claims coded as cumulative injury, not otherwise classified, made up just 6.9% of claims by cause of injury but 9.9% of total incurred losses. Among permanent disability claims specifically, slip-and-fall injuries were both the most frequent and the most expensive injury category, accounting for 27.9% of total incurred losses on permanent disability claims and averaging $105,965 per claim — well above back injuries ($64,506 average) and other cumulative trauma categories such as carpal tunnel and repetitive motion injuries ($41,501 average) or other cumulative injuries generally ($34,757 average). By nature of injury, strains and tears remained the single largest category, accounting for 26.7% of total incurred losses, and by body part, injuries involving multiple body parts (15.7%) and the lower back (11.1%) topped the list.
Taken as a whole, the 2025 report depicts a system where premium has plateaued but claim costs have not: rising loss adjustment expenses, a growing medical-legal cost component, a sharp jump in applicant attorney fees, and continued indemnity severity growth combined to push insurers into their first underwriting loss in several years. That trajectory is consistent with the rate increases the California Department of Insurance has approved and WCIRB has since proposed for the September 2026 filing.
This summary is provided for general informational purposes only. Readers should consult the full WCIRB report for complete data, methodology and the standard conditions and limitations that accompany all WCIRB publications; the WCIRB cautions that the report reflects only the experience of insured employers and cannot guarantee the accuracy of underlying data submitted by individual insurers. - WCAB Seeks Sanctions For Use of Legal Treatise Publisher's AIon July 13, 2026 at 9:34 AM
Gilberto Lopez Mendoza worked as a prepper/painter for SWI Finishing, Inc. He alleged a cumulative trauma injury to his neck, upper extremities, back, lower extremities, legs, feet, and psyche, pled for the period from August 1, 1998 through October 1, 2017. In April 2017, Mendoza sought treatment after removing wet socks pulled a scab off a preexisting wound on his foot; the wound worsened, and by February 2018 he was hospitalized with a rapidly progressing infection that led to a below-the-knee amputation. None of his 2017 or 2018 medical records addressed whether his condition was related to his work. Mendoza did not file a claim for workers' compensation benefits until June 29, 2023, and SWI Finishing denied the claim as untimely.
At trial, the parties disputed whether Mendoza's claim was barred by the statute of limitations and whether he had failed to timely report his injury under Labor Code sections 5400 and 5403. Mendoza testified that he had reported his symptoms to Alex Mendez, a coworker he believed to be his supervisor because Mendez served as the "right hand man" of the actual supervisor and was the only one at the worksite who spoke Spanish with him. Mendez testified that he was not a supervisor, that it would not have been proper for other employees to report injuries to him, and that he did not recognize or recall Mendoza. Panel qualified medical evaluators in internal medicine and orthopedics both later opined that Mendoza's foot infection and resulting amputation were work-related, with the internist assigning a 28% whole-person impairment, 35% of which was apportioned to the industrial cumulative trauma.
The workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) found that Mendoza did not have notice of a cumulative trauma work injury in 2017, and that although he had reported his symptoms to Mendez, whom he believed to be his supervisor, neither Mendez nor the actual supervisor ever provided him a claim form or notice of how to report a workplace injury. On that basis, the WCJ found the statute of limitations was tolled and the claim was not time-barred, and issued Findings of Fact including a finding that Mendoza had sustained an industrial injury through the cumulative period ending October 1, 2017.
SWI Finishing petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration, arguing the WCJ erred in finding the statute of limitations tolled because Mendoza's subjective belief that Mendez was a supervisor could not toll the statute where that belief was contradicted by substantial evidence. In support, the petition cited two cases for the proposition that a worker's subjective belief about a coworker's supervisory status cannot toll the statute of limitations when contradicted by substantial evidence, repeating the citations a second time later in the same petition.
In the panel decision of Gilberto Lopez Mendoza v. SWI Finishing, Inc., ADJ17889413 (Cal. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., Dec. 2025) — the WCAB granted SWI Finishing's petition for reconsideration and vacated the WCJ's Findings of Fact in their entirety, but deferred a final decision on the merits pending further proceedings and issued a Notice of Intention to impose sanctions of up to $2,500 against SWI Finishing, its insurer, its claims administrator, and its attorneys.
Before reaching the merits, the WCAB addressed a threshold problem with the Petition for Reconsideration itself. In a Report and Recommendation, the WCJ identified that one of the two cases SWI Finishing cited for its subjective-belief argument, described as "Olson v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1997) 62 Cal.Comp.Cases 334," does not exist at that citation; a real case bearing a similar name exists, but at a different citation and addressing unrelated issues of permanent disability and apportionment. The WCJ further found that the second citation, Reynolds v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 726, is a real decision but does not support the proposition SWI Finishing attributed to it; in fact, Reynolds held the opposite, ruling that an employer with a duty to notify an injured worker of his rights cannot invoke the statute of limitations as a defense if it fails to do so. In a supplemental petition, SWI Finishing's counsel admitted that he had used an artificial-intelligence legal research tool called ChatSOC, offered by a legal treatise publisher, and that the tool had generated the fabricated case and the mischaracterized holding, which counsel then included in the petition without independently verifying them.
The WCAB held this conduct sanctionable under Labor Code section 5813, which authorizes sanctions of up to $2,500 for bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or intended to cause delay, and under WCAB Rule 10421, which lists filing a document misstating the law or presenting a position not warranted by existing law as sanctionable conduct. The Board emphasized that an attorney who delegates legal research to a non-attorney tool, including an AI program, remains responsible for supervising that work and verifying its accuracy before filing, citing its own en banc decision in Ledezma v. Kareem Cart Commissary and Mfg. (2024) 89 Cal.Comp.Cases 462, as well as an attorney's duties of candor and competence under Business and Professions Code section 6068 and rules 3.3 and 5.3 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. The Board found no excuse for filing a petition containing fabricated citations and misrepresented holdings, regardless of the tool's own limitations, and directed that the sanctions run jointly and severally against the employer, its insurer, its administrator, and its attorneys, with a separate response due from the firm's managing partner describing any firmwide policies on the use of AI research tools.
Turning to the merits, the WCAB agreed with the WCJ's recommendation that the finding of industrial injury should be vacated because the issue of injury itself, as opposed to the timeliness of the claim, had never been raised as a triable issue at trial. But the Board went further, vacating the entire Findings of Fact, explaining that a statute-of-limitations analysis must begin with a finding of the date of cumulative injury under Labor Code section 5412, and that the WCJ's decision never made that finding. The Board reiterated the settled framework for cumulative-trauma date-of-injury disputes: the employer bears the burden of proving the claim is untimely, medical treatment alone does not establish disability under section 5412, and a worker generally will not be charged with knowledge that a disability is job-related absent medical advice to that effect, citing City of Fresno v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 467 and State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 998. Only after a date of injury is established, and only if the employer shows the claim was filed outside the resulting limitations period, does the burden shift to the worker to establish tolling. Because that sequence was never completed below, the Board returned the matter to the trial level, suggesting the WCJ may wish to consider bifurcating the statute-of-limitations issue, and invited the parties to meet and confer on a stipulated date of injury. The Board stated it would issue its decision on the merits together with its ruling on sanctions once the sanctions process concludes. - Remaining Defendants Settle Health Coverage Fraud Caseon July 13, 2026 at 9:34 AM
The California Attorney General announced that the Los Angeles Superior Court approved a settlement with Shelley Steele, Timothy Candace “Tim” Moses, Chase Moses (collectively, the Moses family), and First Call Telemedicine, LLC (First Call), the remaining defendants in a matter involving the alleged sale of sham health coverage to California consumers.
The case began in January 2022, when the Attorney General filed a lawsuit against The Aliera Companies, Inc. (Aliera), Trinity HealthShare (Trinity), and other defendants, including those who are the subject of this settlement.
The lawsuit alleged that the Moses family created and controlled Trinity, falsely presenting it as a legitimate health care sharing ministry (HCSM), and used Aliera, a for-profit company they also controlled, to market and administer the health plans to consumers.
HCSMs are 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations historically comprised of members of a particular religious community who contribute money to share catastrophic or unexpected healthcare costs. HCSMs are often marketed as lower-cost alternatives to traditional health insurance, but they generally do not pay for all essential health benefits such as prescriptions, preexisting conditions, birth control, or mental healthcare, and do not guarantee payment for medical expenses.
According to the complaint, Trinity was not a legitimate HCSM, and Aliera retained a significant portion of members’ contributions rather than using those funds to pay healthcare costs, leaving many consumers with unpaid medical bills. The lawsuit also alleged that, after the collapse of Aliera, Shelley Steele continued selling health plans in California through First Call without the required state authorization and directed millions of dollars from Trinity membership funds to First Call.
In 2025, the Attorney General reached a settlement with Aliera, Trinity, and additional defendants. This new settlement resolves the matter with the remaining defendants: the Moses family and First Call.
“Californians deserve honest information when making decisions about their health coverage,” said the Attorney General. “More than 14,000 Californians were allegedly misled into paying for health plans that did not provide the protection they expected, while those behind the scheme profited from their trust. After holding other defendants accountable last year, this settlement finishes the job by securing penalties against the remaining defendants and barring them from doing business in California.”
Consumers were allegedly led to believe their monthly payments were being used to pay healthcare expenses, but Aliera retained nearly 84% of those funds and routinely rejected requests for payment of medical expenses. Under the settlement:
- - Shelley Steele, Tim Moses, and First Call Telemedicine are permanently barred from conducting business in California, directing business toward California residents, serving in leadership positions at companies doing business in California, or owning more than a 25% interest in businesses operating in California.
- - Chase Moses is prohibited from conducting business in California for 10 years and is permanently barred from marketing, selling, administering, or otherwise operating any HCSM in California.
- - These remaining defendants must pay more than $5.1 million in civil penalties. Portions of those penalties are suspended based on the defendants’ sworn financial disclosures and continued compliance with the judgment and may be reinstated if the defendants are found to have materially misrepresented their financial condition or violate the settlement.
Californians who believe an HCSM used deceptive marketing or misrepresented its services are encouraged to file a complaint at oag.ca.gov/report. - Lawyers Held to State Bar Ethics Civility Provisions in Pro-Per Caseson July 9, 2026 at 10:12 AM
Aziz Damak, representing himself, sued Satraj Hospitality LLC and Sangita and Sanjeev Khanna, who own and operate the Cozy Inn motel in Costa Mesa, alleging wage and hour, meal and rest period, retaliation, and wrongful discharge claims arising from his employment as a receptionist.
In July 2024, Damak served extensive discovery on each defendant, including interrogatories, requests for admission, and document production requests. After receiving no responses and no communication from defendants' attorney, Hitendra Bhakta, despite repeated calls and a written 21-day notice warning that he would seek sanctions, Damak filed fifteen motions to compel in November 2024, each requesting monetary sanctions of "at least $1,000." Defendants never opposed any of the motions, and neither Bhakta nor anyone from the defense side communicated with Damak about the outstanding discovery during the roughly ten months before the motions were heard.
The Court granted all of Damak's motions to compel and the nonmonetary relief he requested, but denied monetary sanctions. The court recognized that the applicable Civil Discovery Act provisions made some sanction mandatory, but explained that such sanctions are limited to a party's "reasonable expenses actually incurred."
Because Damak was self-represented, had a fee waiver, and did not claim he had incurred any out-of-pocket expenses in bringing the motions, the court concluded it could not award any sanctions and denied that portion of his requests outright. Damak petitioned for a writ of mandate challenging that denial, arguing the court was required to award at least a nominal sanction and that the ruling undercut the deterrent purpose of the discovery sanctions scheme by letting represented parties stonewall self-represented opponents without consequence.
In the published case Damak v. Superior Court, No. G065583 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist., Div. 3, July 2026) — the Court of Appeal granted Damak's petition for writ of mandate in part and denied it in part, directing the trial court to vacate the portion of its order denying monetary sanctions and to reconsider that request.
The panel first agreed with the trial court that the Civil Discovery Act's method-specific sanctions provisions — covering interrogatories, document production, and requests for admission — direct that sanctions be imposed under a companion provision authorizing "reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result" of the discovery misuse. Relying on the California Supreme Court's decisions in Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274 and Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, and the Court of Appeal's own decision in Argaman v. Rutan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1173, the court explained that a self-represented litigant, including a self-represented attorney, cannot "incur" attorney fees for his own time, and so cannot recover compensation for the hours he personally spent preparing the motions or for business opportunities forgone.
The court found Kravitz v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1015 persuasive on this point, and acknowledged that court's own description of the resulting rule as "wholly inadequate" for self-represented litigants facing discovery abuse, since a represented opponent who never incurs identifiable costs effectively gets, in that court's words, one free bite at ignoring discovery obligations. Damak's reliance on Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632 did not change this outcome, the panel explained, because that case addressed only whether a sanction was mandatory in amount, not what the sanction could permissibly compensate.
The panel found, however, that the trial court's analysis stopped short. A separate, more recently enacted provision of the Civil Discovery Act, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.050, requires a court to impose a flat $1,000 sanction against a party or attorney — regardless of any expenses incurred by the other side — if it finds the party or attorney failed to respond in good faith to a document production request or failed to confer in a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute informally. The court explained that this provision, drawing on legislative history describing it as a "stronger . . . hammer on discovery abuse," is aimed at deterring the offending party's conduct rather than merely compensating the other side, and applies "notwithstanding any other law."
Because Damak's motions concerning document production requests were governed by a Discovery Act provision that in turn incorporates section 2023.050, and because the trial court's order never mentioned that section or made any finding on whether defendants had responded in good faith or conferred with Damak, the panel held the trial court's failure to even consider it was an abuse of discretion, citing City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46. The panel emphasized that nothing in the record suggested defendants had responded in good faith or conferred with Damak about the document requests, but declined to make those factual findings itself, remanding for the trial court to consider in the first instance whether a section 2023.050 sanction was warranted.
The court closed with an extended discussion of civility, noting that attorneys owe self-represented litigants the same dignity, courtesy, and integrity due to opposing counsel and the court itself, an obligation reflected in the civility oath every California attorney must now take and annually reaffirm under California Rules of Court, rule 9.7. Citing recent decisions admonishing incivility in litigation, including Masimo Corp. v. The Vanderpool Law Firm, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 902 and Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, the panel described defendants' ten months of silence in response to Damak's repeated, documented attempts to follow up on outstanding discovery as falling far short of that standard, regardless of any underlying intent. The court also noted, in a footnote, that defendants' counsel made an unsupported factual assertion at oral argument about the record that the court could not verify, and reminded counsel of an attorney's duty of candor to the court. - 9th Circuit Interprets the EFAA's Application Timing Provisionson July 9, 2026 at 10:12 AM
Jessica Combs began working at Netflix, Inc. in May 2017 under an employment agreement containing a broad arbitration clause covering all employment-related disputes. She alleges that soon after starting, Netflix fostered a sexualized office culture, including one-on-one meetings that took on a flirtatious, dating-like tone and encouraged unwanted advances from male colleagues. At a September 2018 company offsite, Combs was required to participate in team-building exercises she considered sexualized, including exercises resembling "forced speed dating," and she says a stairwell was used by male employees to look under female colleagues' dresses. During an October 2018 work trip to Singapore, a male colleague made unwanted sexual advances toward her. Combs alleges that between 2017 and 2021 she repeatedly complained to her supervisors and to Netflix management about this sexually charged environment and about specific incidents, but that Netflix ignored her complaints and took no corrective action. In December 2021, Netflix fired Combs; the company cited her noncompliance with its COVID-19 vaccination policy, but Combs alleges the real reason was retaliation for her complaints.
In August 2023, Combs filed an administrative complaint with California's Department of Fair Employment and Housing and received an immediate right-to-sue letter. In July 2024, she sued Netflix in California state court on various state-law discrimination, harassment, and hostile-work-environment theories. Netflix removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship and moved to compel arbitration under the parties' agreement. Combs did not dispute that a valid arbitration agreement existed or that her claims fell within it; instead, she argued that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA; 9 U.S.C. §401–402), which lets a person alleging sexual harassment elect to proceed in court despite a predispute arbitration agreement, exempted her case from arbitration.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted Netflix's motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that, even though Combs's complaint alleged conduct constituting sexual harassment, her claims accrued and her dispute with Netflix arose before the EFAA's March 3, 2022 effective date, so the statute's timing provision took her case outside the Act's reach and the parties' arbitration agreement controlled.
In the published case of Combs v. Netflix, Inc., No. 25-3164 (9th Cir., July 2026) — the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration.
The panel first agreed that Combs's complaint alleged conduct constituting unlawful sexual harassment, so her claims presumptively fell within the EFAA. The dispositive question, one of first impression in the circuit, was how to interpret the EFAA's timing provision, a statutory note stating that the Act applies to any "dispute or claim that arises or accrues" on or after its March 3, 2022 enactment date. The court held that this phrase describes two distinct concepts — "claims that accrue" and "disputes that arise" — agreeing with the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Memmer v. United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC (2025) 135 F.4th 398 that Congress used the disjunctive "or" to differentiate them.
On claim accrual, the court applied the settled common-law rule, drawn from Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2024) 603 U.S. 799, which in turn cited Green v. Brennan (2016) 578 U.S. 547, that a claim accrues when a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action allowing her to file suit and obtain relief. Under that standard, Combs's claims accrued well before March 3, 2022, since she alleges harassment and a termination that occurred between 2017 and 2021.
The harder question was when a "dispute" arises. The court rejected Combs's argument that no dispute arises until a formal external complaint is filed with a court or administrative agency, finding that reading too narrow. It also rejected the opposite extreme, urged in similar cases by other employers, that a dispute arises whenever the underlying harassing conduct occurs, since that would collapse the distinct concepts of "dispute" and "claim" into one and render Congress's use of both terms superfluous. Instead, following the Third Circuit's decision in Cornelius v. CVS Pharmacy Inc. (2025) 133 F.4th 240 and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Famuyide v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2024) 111 F.4th 895, the panel held that a dispute arises under the EFAA when an employee registers disagreement with her employer, through an internal complaint, an external complaint, or otherwise, and the employer expressly or constructively opposes that position. The court noted this same formulation had already been adopted by a California appellate court applying the EFAA, in Kader v. Southern California Medical Center, Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 214.
Applying that standard, the panel held that a dispute arose between Combs and Netflix well before the EFAA's effective date. By the complaint's own allegations, Combs repeatedly complained to Netflix between 2017 and 2021 about the sexualized culture and specific incidents, and Netflix consistently ignored those complaints and took no corrective action; that pattern of complaint met with inaction showed Netflix had, at minimum, constructively opposed her position. The court found the case closely analogous to Cornelius, where an employee's repeated written complaints that her employer dismissed and failed to remedy were likewise sufficient to show a pre-2022 dispute. The panel further noted that Netflix's alleged decision to fire Combs in December 2021 in retaliation for her complaints put the point beyond doubt, since firing an employee for raising a complaint is itself a clear act of opposition to her position. Because both Combs's claims and her dispute with Netflix arose before March 3, 2022, the EFAA did not apply, and the panel affirmed the order compelling her case to arbitration.
- Federal Anti-Arbitration Law Applies to FEHA Sexual Orientation Caseon July 8, 2026 at 11:17 AM
Trevor Joseph Decloedt worked for Radnet Management, Inc. and related entities (collectively, Radnet) alongside supervisor Joe Zambrano and coworker Susana Ceballos. According to Decloedt's complaint, beginning in early 2022 Ceballos subjected him to repeated derogatory comments about his sexual orientation, telling him he "shouldn't be gay" and that it was "sinning." Decloedt alleged Ceballos also grew aggressive toward him at work, at one point saying she was so angry she could kill him and, on more than one occasion, pulling his hair — including a November 2022 incident in which she grabbed his hair with enough force that he fled to the restroom. Decloedt alleged he repeatedly reported Ceballos's conduct to Zambrano and another lead employee, but no action was taken; when Ceballos later complained about him to human resources, he told HR about the harassment and said it had led him to contemplate suicide, but HR again took no action. Decloedt was terminated in February 2023.
In October 2024, Decloedt sued Radnet, Zambrano, and Ceballos, alleging eleven causes of action, including hostile work environment and sexual harassment under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, §12900 et seq.). Radnet moved to compel arbitration under an agreement Decloedt had signed at the start of his employment. The trial court denied the motion, holding that Decloedt had adequately pleaded a FEHA sexual harassment claim, which triggered an exemption from arbitration under the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA; 9 U.S.C. §401–402), a 2022 amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. §1 et seq.) that lets a person alleging sexual harassment opt their entire case out of a predispute arbitration agreement. Radnet appealed.
The trial court found Decloedt had alleged a viable FEHA sexual harassment claim and, on that basis, held the EFAA exempted his case from arbitration under the FAA. It did not resolve any disputed facts in reaching that conclusion, and it did not reach Decloedt's separate argument that the arbitration agreement was independently unconscionable.
In the published case of Decloedt v. Radnet Management, Inc., No. B343963 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 1, July 2026) — the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying Radnet's motion to compel arbitration.
Reviewing the question de novo because no disputed facts were before it, the panel first addressed whether harassment based on sexual orientation qualifies as sexual harassment under FEHA at all. Radnet argued that FEHA treats sexual orientation harassment as a separate category from sexual harassment, pointing to statutory language that defines "harassment because of sex" to include sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment related to pregnancy or childbirth, without separately listing sexual orientation.
The court rejected that reading, explaining that the word "include" in the statute is a term of enlargement, not an exhaustive list, and it declined to infer that omitting sexual orientation from that illustrative list meant harassment based on sexual orientation falls outside FEHA's prohibition on harassment "because of sex." Drawing on the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) 590 U.S. 644, which held that firing someone for being gay or transgender necessarily involves discrimination based on sex under Title VII, the court held that the same logic applies to FEHA's parallel "because of . . . sex" language, since California courts routinely look to federal Title VII case law when interpreting FEHA's antidiscrimination provisions, citing Hall v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 318. The court found this conclusion reinforced by a recent sister-panel decision, Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 75, which had treated a plaintiff's allegations of harassment based on his perceived sexual orientation as stating a sexual harassment claim under FEHA.
The court then considered whether Decloedt's specific allegations were severe or pervasive enough to state a hostile work environment claim, assuming without deciding that the federal pleading standard governing motions to dismiss applied. The panel rejected Radnet's argument that Decloedt's complaint drew a sharp line between Ceballos's verbal comments about his sexual orientation and her separate outbursts of anger and hair-pulling, holding that the complaint could reasonably be read as alleging both forms of conduct were part of the same pattern of harassment motivated by her disapproval of his sexual orientation.
The court explained that a hostile work environment claim does not require every incident to include an explicit anti-gay remark, citing Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, and that Decloedt's allegation that Ceballos "continually" made such comments was a factual assertion the court had to accept as true at the pleading stage, not an impermissible legal conclusion. Because Decloedt alleged the harassment caused him to flee for his safety and to contemplate suicide, the court held these allegations plausibly showed conduct that disrupted his emotional tranquility and interfered with his ability to do his job.
Having concluded Decloedt adequately alleged a FEHA sexual harassment claim, the panel held the EFAA's exemption applied and affirmed the order denying arbitration, following the reasoning of Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791 that the statute's plain language exempts a plaintiff's entire case, not just the individual harassment claim. The court did not reach Decloedt's alternative argument that the arbitration agreement was independently unconscionable.
- Intense Opposition Kills Proposed Law Limiting Athletes' Claimson July 8, 2026 at 11:17 AM
California Senate Bill (SB) 795, introduced by Senator Laura Richardson, was a 2026 legislative proposal aimed at restricting professional athletes' access to workers' compensation benefits in the state.
Proposed SB 795 would have revised the Labor Code to state that the workers’ compensation system does not apply to the claim of a professional athlete involving occupational disease or cumulative trauma if that athlete was exempt, as specified, and, during the last 365 days of their career as a professional athlete, was not hired as a professional athlete in California, unless over the course of their entire career as a professional athlete, (1) the athlete worked for 2 or more seasons for a California-based team or teams, as defined, or worked 20% or more of their duty days in California or for a California-based team, and (2) worked for fewer than 7 seasons for any team other than a California-based team during their professional athletic career. The bill would state that the team’s principal place of business is not relevant to whether a team is based in California. As most recently amended, the proposed law would provide that these changes apply to claims for benefits filed on or after September 30, 2026.
Reports indicated the push came largely from the business/team side rather than a broad public concern: the NFL teams headquartered in California - the Rams, Chargers, and 49ers - reportedly supported the bill, with Richardson indicating in a bill summary that the NFL and these three California teams back it, though none of them confirmed this in public statements.
Issues related to workers' compensation costs reportedly have historically influenced league and team decisions about where to locate - for example, the UFL has no California teams, and workers' comp costs contributed to the end of one iteration of the Arena Football League. This suggests part of the impetus was making California a more attractive/affordable state for professional athletic franchises relative to others with less generous athlete workers' comp exposure.
The legislation immediately faced fierce pushback from major sports organizations, including the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) and the San Francisco 49ers players who publicly argued the bill unfairly singled out high-risk jobs.
NFLPA, the lead opponent, called it "anti-player legislation," stating it strips players of "the constitutional rights and legal protections afforded to every other worker in the state" and accused California's pro sports teams of "seeking to evade that system for financial gain, denying injured athletes the care they are owed." They closed with a call to "reject SB 795 and stand with the players who make the game possible."
The National Hockey League Players' Association - NHLPA - joining in solidarity: posted that "All workers deserve workers' compensation protection," joining the NFLPA "and other players' associations in asking lawmakers to reject this bill."
The Major League Soccer Players Association - MLSPA - stated it stands with the NFLPA in strongly opposing SB 795, calling workers' compensation "a critically important and hard-earned protection for all workers who take part in high-risk jobs," and urged lawmakers to reject the bill.
The 49ers players - the full 90-man roster - signed a joint statement with the NFLPA, saying "Football takes a real toll on our bodies, and workers' compensation was built for high-risk jobs like ours." They added that the bill "singles out professional athletes and tells us we deserve fewer protections than every other worker in the state."
The bill passed the State Senate in January 2026 but underwent major amendments in the Assembly by May. Following intense union opposition, the bill died in late June 2026 when its first Assembly Insurance Committee hearing was canceled at the author's request, entirely pulling the bill from consideration.
"California SB 795, a bill that would have significantly restricted professional athletes' access to workers' compensation benefits, has been pulled from consideration and will not move forward for a vote," the NFLPA said in an email to agents. "This is a meaningful win for your clients and helps keep critical protections in place for injuries sustained during their careers. Protecting the health, safety and legal rights of active and former players remains a top priority, and we will continue to fight against efforts that threaten those protections." - Workplace Restraining Order Affirmed Against School Board Memberon July 7, 2026 at 10:08 AM
Michael Krause served as Chief Business Officer and then superintendent of the Adelanto Elementary School District (District) from 2022 until his June 2024 termination. Over roughly two years, three of his subordinates — executive assistants identified as S.A., X.L., and I.P. — experienced what the trial court later found to be a course of harassing conduct. Krause was prone to angry outbursts at meetings, including one in which he slammed his fists on a table and screamed at staff until several people cried. He also sent the three women a steady stream of unsettling text messages and photos: pictures he had secretly taken of them at a Chipotle, outside their homes at night, and near a family member's workplace; comments suggesting he was watching them on office cameras or following them around town; and after-hours messages with a romantic or proprietary tone, such as telling one assistant he did not "love her anymore" when she was slow to reply.
On separate occasions he physically poked two of the women hard enough to startle and hurt them. After the women reported his conduct in 2024, Krause was placed on leave, filed an unsubstantiated sexual harassment complaint against one of them, and was later seen parked outside a coffee shop watching two of the women through his car window. The District terminated him and the parties signed a separation agreement releasing the District's claims against Krause arising from his employment. Krause was then elected to the District's own Board of Trustees, and during the campaign each woman found one of his yard signs planted near her home.
In October 2024, the District petitioned for a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) against Krause on behalf of the three women under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8, and the San Bernardino County Superior Court issued a temporary restraining order. Following a four-day evidentiary hearing spread across January and March 2025, at which the three women and Krause testified at length, the trial court granted a permanent WVRO. The court found Krause's course of conduct met the statutory definition of harassment, rejected his shifting and sometimes "strained" explanations for the texts and photos, and found his lack of remorse supported a reasonable probability that the harassment would continue, particularly given that his election to the Board placed him back in regular contact with the women. The order barred Krause from contacting the women, required him to stay 100 yards from them and their workplace (five yards during Board meetings, where a District-funded security guard was required), barred him from commenting on the WVRO or the underlying proceedings at any regular Board meeting, and ran for four years.
In the published opinion in Adelanto Elementary School District v. Krause, No. D086337 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist., Div. 1, July 2026) — the Court of Appeal affirmed the WVRO as modified, striking the provision barring Krause from commenting on the order at Board meetings and shortening the order's duration from four years to the statutory maximum of three.
Writing for a unanimous panel, Justice Buchanan first rejected Krause's argument that the District had waived its right to seek a WVRO by signing a separation agreement releasing claims against him. The court held that an employer's statutory right to prosecute a WVRO on an employee's behalf is unwaivable under Civil Code section 3513, which bars private contracts from contravening a law enacted for a public reason. Drawing on Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 and Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, the court reasoned that section 527.8 was enacted to combat workplace violence and harassment as a matter of public concern, not solely for individual employers' benefit, citing legislative history describing rising threats against school employees, health workers, and election workers. Because the public benefit of the WVRO statute is a primary purpose rather than a merely incidental one — a policy the court traced through Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324 and a case it referred to as Franklin v. The Monadnock Co. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 252 — the release could not extinguish the District's right to seek the order.
Second, the court found sufficient evidence of a future threat to support the WVRO. It held that the older "reasonable probability of future unlawful violence" standard from Scripps Health no longer controls, because the Legislature amended section 527.8 in 2023 to reach harassment as well as violence, effective January 2025, precisely so employers would not have to wait until a threat escalated into violence. Under the amended statute, a reasonable probability of continued harassment suffices, and the panel found that standard met given the two-year pattern of conduct, Krause's continued contact after being placed on leave, and his consistent refusal to acknowledge that any of it was inappropriate.
Third, the court held Krause forfeited his argument that the WVRO improperly burdened his parental rights, since he raised no evidence or objection on that point below despite adequate notice of the order's terms.
Fourth, the court agreed with Krause that the provision barring him from commenting on the WVRO or its proceedings at Board meetings was an overbroad restriction on his First Amendment rights as an elected official. Applying Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141 and Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. (1994) 512 U.S. 753, the court explained that an injunction touching speech must be no broader than necessary to serve its purpose, and this provision swept in legitimate Board business — such as evaluating the performance of the law firm that handled the case — that had nothing to do with harassing the protected women. The panel struck that provision alone, while leaving intact the WVRO's other bars on harassment or contact during Board meetings.
Finally, the court held the trial court exceeded its authority by setting the WVRO's duration at four years, since section 527.8, subdivision (l)(1), caps such orders at three years subject to early termination. The panel modified the order accordingly and affirmed it as modified. - OSHA Citation Extends to Hospital's Management Companyon July 7, 2026 at 10:08 AM
Cedar Springs Hospital, Inc. operates a psychiatric hospital in Colorado. UHS of Delaware, Inc. is a management company that, under a services agreement with Cedar Springs, agreed to assign several of its own employees to serve as the hospital's top executives and to provide oversight on workplace safety matters. Both Cedar Springs and UHS of Delaware are wholly owned, through an intermediary holding company, by the same ultimate parent, Universal Health Services, Inc.
Following an OSHA investigation into patient-on-staff violence at the hospital, the Secretary of Labor cited both Cedar Springs and UHS of Delaware for violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act's general duty clause (29 U.S.C. section 654(a)(1)) by failing to provide adequate safety measures against workplace violence. UHS of Delaware contested the citation, arguing it was merely a management company for Cedar Springs and should not itself be treated as an employer subject to OSHA liability at the hospital.
An administrative law judge upheld the citations, and UHS of Delaware sought discretionary review before the full Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Review Commission). Applying a three-part test the parties agreed governed the analysis, the Review Commission asked whether Cedar Springs and UHS of Delaware (1) shared a common worksite, (2) had integrated operations on matters of safety and health, and (3) shared a common president, management, supervision, or ownership. The Review Commission answered yes to all three questions and found that UHS of Delaware had acted as an employer for some of the employees working at the hospital, making it independently liable alongside Cedar Springs.
UHS of Delaware then petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of that order under 29 U.S.C. section 660(a), which required the court to treat the Review Commission's factual findings as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Cedar Springs joined UHS of Delaware's arguments in a companion petition. In the published case of UHS of Delaware, Inc. v. Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission, No. 24-9521 (10th Cir., Feb. 2026) — the Tenth Circuit denied UHS of Delaware's petition for review, upholding the Review Commission's order.
The panel,addressed each of the three questions in turn, in each instance asking only whether the record could reasonably support the Review Commission's finding, not whether the court would have weighed the evidence the same way in the first instance.
On the worksite question, the court rejected UHS of Delaware's argument that the psychiatric hospital was solely a worksite of Cedar Springs because UHS of Delaware's headquarters were in Pennsylvania. The proper focus, the court explained, is where employees face workplace hazards, not where the employer's headquarters sit — a principle it drew from the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in a closely related dispute involving the same management company and a different psychiatric hospital, UHS of Delaware, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor (2025) 140 F.4th 1329, as well as the First Circuit's decision in A.C. Castle Construction Co. v. Acosta (2018) 882 F.3d 34. The parties had stipulated that UHS of Delaware's employees were exposed to the hazard of workplace violence at the hospital, and the court held it could not disregard a stipulated fact, citing the ordinary meaning of "worksite" as the place where an employee works under Harbert v. Healthcare Services Group, Inc. (2004) 391 F.3d 1140. Testimony that UHS of Delaware's chief financial officer regularly interacted with patients, along with evidence that other UHS of Delaware employees made repeated visits to the hospital, further supported the finding.
On the integration question, the court held that sharing resources and providing oversight of safety matters — including requiring workplace-violence training, supplying incident-report forms, compiling injury data, and reviewing the hospital's violence-prevention plan — was sufficient evidence of integrated safety operations, even though UHS of Delaware itself did not provide direct patient care. The court found this consistent with both the Eleventh Circuit's 2025 decision and A.C. Castle, which had found integration based on similar funding of training and preparation of safety policies for another company.
On the common-ownership question, the court found it unnecessary to resolve whether the companies shared a president, management, or supervision, since the statutory test is disjunctive and common ownership alone suffices. Both companies acknowledged they were wholly owned subsidiaries of the same ultimate parent, Universal Health Services, Inc., with an intermediary holding company sitting between the parent and Cedar Springs. The court held that an intervening tier in the ownership chain does not defeat common ownership so long as the companies share the same ultimate parent, again following the Eleventh Circuit's 2025 decision, which had reached the identical conclusion on a nearly identical corporate structure involving the same intermediary entities.
Because substantial evidence supported the Review Commission's findings on all three questions, the court denied UHS of Delaware's petition for review without reaching whether the three-question test itself was the correct legal standard, noting the parties' agreement on that point and the court's practice of assuming without deciding a test's correctness when it is not contested.