- WCAB Affirms Take Nothing Based on Worker Credibility Issueson March 3, 2026 at 11:33 AM
John Sarviss worked as a helicopter pilot for the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. He filed a workers' compensation claim alleging cumulative trauma injuries to his back and bilateral lower extremities during the period from July 21, 2008 to July 9, 2012. In May 2013, the parties entered a stipulation in which the employer accepted the claim as an industrial injury, with all further issues - including the nature and extent of disability - to be determined by medical evaluators.
The case was complicated by serious credibility problems that emerged over the course of multiple medical evaluations. Dr. Steven Silbart, an Agreed Medical Evaluator, issued a supplemental report in March 2022 after reviewing Sarviss's deposition transcript and full medical file. Dr. Silbart identified significant credibility concerns. Sarviss had completely failed to disclose to a prior medical examiner a nonindustrial incident in 2011 involving a herniated disc that required surgery. Additionally, Sarviss had testified that his treating physician linked his herniated disc to something other than lifting a heavy object, when in fact the physician's own reports attributed the injury specifically to lifting a heavy cabinet. Sarviss also recanted a prior history he had given of injuring his low back in a service-connected helicopter crash in the Army in 1971.
A second evaluator, Dr. Kenneth Sabbag, was appointed under Labor Code section 5701 after the parties lost confidence in Dr. Silbart and other prior evaluators. Dr. Sabbag examined Sarviss in August 2023 and encountered similar problems. He could not reconcile multiple discrepancies in the applicant's account - including conflicting stories about the 2011 injury, the absence of any documented work-related injury before July 2012, and the fact that Sarviss claimed he needed a cane but did not bring one to the exam, offering the false explanation that TSA prohibits canes on airplanes. Dr. Sabbag also noted that Sarviss had an extensive prior career as a freelance helicopter pilot for the film industry involving physically arduous work, yet denied any prior injuries. Dr. Sabbag deferred the credibility question to the trier of fact but acknowledged in his March 2024 deposition that conflicting data existed and he had been unable to resolve it.
At trial on September 15, 2025, Sarviss testified under oath - three separate times - that he was never injured before working for the Department of Water and Power, despite extensive medical records documenting a 1993 helicopter crash causing a severe thoracic compression fracture and lower extremity injuries requiring approximately 20 reconstructive surgeries.
The workers' compensation administrative law judge issued Findings of Fact and an Order on November 24, 2025. While the WCJ found, based on the parties' stipulations, that Sarviss did sustain industrial injury to his lumbar spine, cervical spine, and lower extremities, the WCJ concluded there was no substantial evidence to establish periods of temporary disability, permanent disability, the nature and extent of the injuries, or any need for further medical treatment. The WCJ reasoned that because Sarviss had never provided a complete and honest medical history to any of the evaluating physicians, none of their medical reports constituted substantial medical evidence. As a result, the WCJ found Sarviss failed to meet his burden of proof and ordered the matter off calendar with no award of benefits or attorney fees.
The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board denied Sarviss's Petition for Reconsideration, affirming the WCJ's decision in full in the panel decision of Sarviss v City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. -ADJ8666280 (February 2026)
The WCAB grounded its analysis in the well-established principle that all decisions must be supported by substantial evidence. Citing Lamb v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310], Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500], and LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16], the Board reaffirmed that substantial evidence requires more than speculation or conjecture. Relying on Escobedo v. Marshalls (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604 (Appeals Board en banc), the Board noted that a medical opinion must be based on pertinent facts, an adequate examination and history, and must set forth its reasoning. The Board further cited Hegglin v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 162 [36 Cal.Comp.Cases 93] for the proposition that medical opinions based on inadequate histories fail to constitute substantial evidence.
Applying these standards, the Board agreed with the WCJ that every medical report in the record was undermined by Sarviss's failure to provide a complete and truthful history. Because none of the medical evaluations rested on an accurate factual foundation, none could serve as substantial evidence to support an award of benefits.
The Board also rejected Sarviss's argument that the 2013 stipulation accepting his injury as industrial entitled him to ongoing benefits. Citing Labor Code section 4909, the Board noted that payments made during a disputed period do not constitute an admission of liability, and the stipulation itself reserved all further issues for medical determination - the very determination that could not be made due to the incomplete histories.
Finally, the Board gave great weight to the WCJ's credibility findings, citing Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 318–319 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500], which holds that a trial judge who observes a witness's demeanor is entitled to deference on credibility unless there is evidence of considerable substantiality to the contrary. The Board found no such contrary evidence and concluded that Sarviss had failed to meet his burden of proof on all issues.
- FSML Annual Employment Law Conference Set for June 5, 2026on March 3, 2026 at 11:33 AM
Floyd Skeren Manukian Langevin is pleased to announce that in partnership with Fisher Phillips, the firm’s annual Employment Law Conference will return on June 5, 2026, at the Disneyland Hotel. The conference will feature keynote speakers, and the latest hot topics in employment law, workers’ compensation, and HR.
Conference sessions include:
- - Employment Law: Case and Legislative Update
- - What’s New from the California Civil Rights Department and EEOC
- - Wage and Hour Update (Including the PAGA Reform and Latest on Meal and Rest Break Requirements)
- - Key Compliance Considerations and Risks Associated with AI
- - Spotting and Preventing Employment Law Exposure in WC Claims
- - The Challenges of Accommodating Work Restrictions, Medical Conditions, and Disabilities
- - Substance Abuse in the Workplace: The Challenges of Managing Risk, Compliance, and Employee Support
- - California Leave Law Update: Best Practices for HR Professionals, with a Focus on the Overlap Between FMLA, CFRA, and PDL
- - Ethical Dilemmas in Employment Law, Work Comp and General Liability Cases
- - Effective Workplace Investigations: Best Practices for HR
- - Key Strategies for Defending Complex Stress Claims
- - Work Comp Caselaw Update/Key Defense Strategies in 2026 for Complex Litigation
More details about these topics, and more, can be found by viewing the Agenda. The day will end with a cocktail reception where attendees can connect with conference presenters.
Rene Thomas Folse, JD, PhD., is the MCLE sponsor for this event and has sole responsibility for the MCLE content – California State Bar Sponsor #11240. Attorneys can earn up to 6.5 hours for courses that meet the California State Bar criteria.
Fisher Phillips will be providing 6.0 hours of SHRM/HRCI credit.
WorkCompAcademy will issue Continuing Education Certificates of Completion for courses meeting the California Department of Insurance criteria. Adjusters can earn up to 6.5 hours of Continuing Education credits.
Discount Hotel Room Reservations are available upon registration.
DATE AND TIME: June 5, 2026 from 7:45 am PDT until 6:00 pm PDT
LOCATION: Disneyland Hotel, 1150 West Magic Way, Anaheim, CA 90802
Price:Early Bird (until 3/31/2026): $395 - General Entry Fee (after 3/31/2026): $450
To register for this event, please visit the registration page where you may register online. Exhibitors may also register to reserve space in the event Exhibitor Area.
- LAPD Officer Seen Skydiving Charged with Exaggerating Comp Injuryon March 2, 2026 at 11:32 AM
A Los Angeles police officer was charged with two counts of felony insurance fraud for allegedly exaggerating an on-duty injury to collect disability benefits while participating in recreational skydiving and other physical activity.
Christopher Brandon Carnahan (dob 6/30/82) of Norwalk is charged in case 26CJCF01236 with two counts of felony insurance fraud. His arraignment will be scheduled for a later date. He is being held on $100,000 bail. If convicted as charged, Carnahan faces up to six years state prison to be served in county jail.
He's a 43-year-old LAPD veteran with 18 years of service, residing in Norwalk, California. He holds the rank of Police Officer II and is assigned to the 77th Division, with serial number 39135 and badge number 20710.
On May 22, 2023, Officer Carnahan purportedly injured his left elbow while on duty and was subsequently placed on Temporary Totally Disabled (TTD) status. Officers with this status are entitled to receive 100% of their base salary tax-free for up to one year, and then two-thirds thereafter if the injury persists.
Prosecutors allege that while on TTD status, Carnahan completed many skydives at Skydive Elsinore in Lake Elsinore, California and worked out at a fitness center, contrary to his claims of being temporarily totally disabled. The DA's office released photos showing what appears to be Carnahan skydiving and exercising, including one image dated May 23, 2024, showing him holding dumbbells
The case is being prosecuted by Deputy District Attorney Arunas Sodonis of the Healthcare Fraud Division and investigated by the Los Angeles Police Department.
“This case is about honesty and accountability,” Los Angeles County District Attorney Nathan J. Hochman said. “Claiming to be temporarily totally disabled and collecting disability benefits intended for injured workers while engaging in physically demanding activities like skydiving is a crime. This is an officer who knows the law and understands the standards he is sworn to uphold.”
- Multiple Family Members Arraigned for Auto Insurance Fraudon March 2, 2026 at 11:31 AM
Sarkis Dishchyan, 47, of Pasadena, Ani Suzie Labbad, 47, of Pasadena, and Violett Lara Labbad, 44, of Pasadena, were arraigned last week, on multiple counts of felony insurance fraud, for allegedly staging a vehicle accident involving their Porsche Cayenne, in order to collect nearly $39,000 in undeserved insurance payouts.
An investigation was launched after a suspected fraudulent claim referral was received by investigators at the California Department of Insurance. According to the referral, an individual allegedly admitted to unwittingly being involved in a staged collision involving the claimant, Ani Labbad and her husband Dishchyan.
This individual claimed that Dishchyan, whom they know through their sibling who was formerly incarcerated with Dishchyan, reached out with an opportunity to make $5,000. Dishchyan covered the cost of airfare and hotel from Illinois to California and asked the individual to rent a vehicle from a rental car company.
An investigation revealed that once this individual arrived in California, they were riding in the rental car as a passenger while Dishchya drove and intentionally rear-ended a Porsche, causing the rental car to flip and land on its roof.
The Porsche was being driven by a person who claimed to be Ani Labbad, Dishchyan’s wife. A witness at the scene claimed they saw a man crawl out of the overturned rental car and flee on foot before Pasadena Police Department arrived on scene.
Further investigation and body camera footage found that the driver of the Porsche was actually Violett Labbad, Ani Labbad’s sister, who gave Pasadena police Ani’s driver’s license and identified herself as Ani at the scene of the collision.
According to the passenger in the rental car, they were not aware that Dishchyan was planning to rear-end the Porsche until just prior to the collision.
Cell phone data was used to confirm both Dishchyan and Violett Labbad’s cell phones were in the vicinity at the time of the collision, while Ani Labbad’s location was at her home address. Cell phone data also confirmed on the day of the collision, Dishchyan sent a text to Violett Labbad requesting her help that night, and additional text messages from Ani Labbad to Dishchyan stating Violett was “on her way”. These texts were time-stamped minutes before the collision.
After the staged collision, Ani Labbad filed a claim with her insurance company, and with the insurance carrier for the car rental company and received $38,932.21. The third-party-administer for the car rental company then filed a claim with the individual’s insurance policy due to lack of liability coverage and non-cooperation from the individual.
Dishchyan, Ani Labbad, and Violett Labbad were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. This case is being prosecuted by the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office.
- New "Smart Knee" Implant Helps Post-Operative Recoveryon February 26, 2026 at 8:34 AM
For those of us who handle workers' compensation claims involving knee injuries, there's a new medical technology we need to know about - because it's going to start showing up in our cases if it hasn't already.
It's called the "smart knee" implant, and the leading device right now is the Zimmer Biomet Persona IQ - the first and currently only FDA-approved knee replacement with built-in sensor technology. From the outside, it looks and functions like any standard total knee replacement. But embedded inside the tibial stem is a tiny wireless sensor that continuously tracks the patient's recovery in real time.
The implant measures range of motion, step count, walking speed, stride length, and pressure distribution across the joint. That data is wirelessly transmitted to a small base station plugged into the patient's home Wi-Fi, and from there it uploads to a secure, HIPAA-compliant cloud platform. The treating surgeon can log in and review the data remotely. The patient can see their own progress through a smartphone app, and even compare their recovery metrics against national benchmarks for patients of the same age and stage of recovery.
This isn't experimental. It's being used right now at major orthopedic centers across the country, including Mayo Clinic, the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York, UChicago Medicine, and Lee Health in Florida. And adoption is expanding rapidly into smaller community hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers. As recently as June 2025, UP Health System in Michigan's Upper Peninsula began offering the device for the first time.
So why should workers' comp practitioners care? Several reasons.
First, this technology replaces subjective recovery assessments with objective data. Historically, post-operative knee recovery has been tracked through periodic office visits and patient self-reports - the surgeon asks patients how they feel, watches them walk across the room, and measures their range of motion with a goniometer. One Mayo Clinic surgeon described the traditional approach as "very, very subjective."
The smart knee changes that equation entirely. Now the surgeon has daily biomechanical data showing exactly how the knee is performing between visits. For attorneys and adjusters, this means disputes about whether a claimant has reached maximum medical improvement, whether recovery is progressing on schedule, or whether functional limitations are consistent with the objective findings could increasingly be resolved by implant data rather than dueling medical opinions.
Second, the technology enables earlier intervention when recovery stalls. Orthopedic surgeons at UChicago Medicine have emphasized that the first three months after knee replacement are critical - if patients don't regain adequate strength and range of motion during that window, those losses can be very difficult to make up later. With the smart implant, a surgeon who sees a sudden drop in step count or a plateau in range of motion can reach out to the patient immediately and adjust the rehabilitation plan. That kind of early intervention could shorten disability durations and reduce overall claim costs.
Third, smart implants reduce the need for frequent in-person follow-up visits. The remote monitoring capability means patients who live far from their treating surgeon may not need to travel as often for routine post-operative checks - a meaningful consideration in workers' comp, where mileage reimbursement, time off work for medical appointments, and delays in scheduling all add friction and cost to the system.
Fourth, consider the long-term implications. The sensor battery is designed to last at least 10 years, and the device can help detect early signs of implant loosening, abnormal wear patterns, or biomechanical changes that might signal a problem before the patient even notices symptoms. Since workers' comp carriers often remain responsible for future medical treatment related to the original injury - including revision surgery - early detection of developing problems could mean smaller, less invasive, and less expensive interventions down the road.
Finally - and perhaps most significantly for litigators - think about the evidentiary implications. These implants generate a continuous, objective record of the patient's functional capacity. Daily step counts. Walking speed. Stride length. Range of motion trends over weeks and months. That data could become powerful evidence in disputes over functional limitations, compliance with prescribed physical therapy, and readiness to return to work. It cuts both ways: it could support a claimant who is doing everything right but still struggling, or it could undermine a claim where the reported limitations don't match the biomechanical data.
The smart knee is not yet the standard of care for every total knee replacement — cost, patient comfort with the technology, and the need for home Wi-Fi are still limiting factors. But adoption is growing quickly, and as it does, workers' comp professionals on both sides of the aisle will need to understand what this data means, how to obtain it, and how to use it.
This is one worth watching.
- DOJ Sues UCLA for Hostile Work Environmenton February 26, 2026 at 8:34 AM
The United States Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division filed an 81 page lawsuit against the University of California alleging it engaged in a hostile work environment against Jewish and Israeli faculty and staff at its University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
According to the complaint, after the Hamas-led massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023, antisemitic acts pervaded UCLA. The suit alleges the university engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII against Jewish and Israeli employees at UCLA by failing to prevent and correct discriminatory and harassing conduct. The lawsuit further alleges the university negligently permitted a hostile work environment against two charging parties and other aggrieved Jewish and Israeli employees.
In 2024, the university allowed antisemitic harassment to continue unabated for days in front of its iconic Royce Hall: among other acts, Jews were not permitted on portions of the main quad, Jewish professors were assaulted, and swastikas were graffitied on university buildings.
The university has ignored, and continues to ignore, gross and repeated violations of viewpoint-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions involving these and other actions directed against Jewish and Israeli employees. Jewish and Israeli faculty have been physically threatened, had their classrooms disrupted, and had their workplaces papered with disturbing images.
Jewish professors have been, and continue to be, subjected to ostracism and harassment by their colleagues and students, while their colleagues and supervisors not only have failed to report those acts as required but have even participated in them. Numerous Jewish and Israeli employees have been forced to take leave, work from home, and even leave their jobs to avoid the hostile work environment.
“UCLA failed to live up to its systemwide commitment to diversity and equal opportunity when it stood by as Jewish employees were subjected to harassment,” said First Assistant United States Attorney Bill Essayli. “The federal government has an obligation to step in and ensure a discrimination-free environment at our universities.”
“Based on our investigation, UCLA administrators allegedly allowed virulent anti-Semitism to flourish on campus, harming students and staff alike,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Today’s lawsuit underscores that this Department of Justice stands strong against hate and anti-Semitism in all its vile forms.”
“The litany of vile acts of antisemitism that allegedly took place, and continue to take place, at UCLA are, if found to be true, a mark of shame against the University of California,” said Assistant Attorney General Harmeet K. Dhillon of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. “The Justice Department will ensure that UCLA maintains an environment for its employees free from antisemitic harassment.”
The lawsuit stems from a Commissioner’s Charge filed by then-Commissioner Andrea Lucas of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in June 2024. The EEOC was instrumental in investigating the allegations of harassment at UCLA and in identifying the university’s poor complaint system. “The EEOC is committed to eradicating antisemitism at work,” said EEOC Chair Andrea Lucas. “If a university will not investigate and remedy repeated allegations of antisemitism against its employees, then EEOC will.”
DOJ attorneys allege "Until the United States Department of Justice issued its notice of investigation letter to UCLA in March 2025, not a single one of the dozens of civil rights complaints filed by Jewish and Israeli employees since October 7 was properly investigated. UCLA’s Office of Equity, Diversity, & Inclusion (EDI Office), tasked with oversight of all discrimination complaints, routinely ignored complaints of antisemitism. And UCLA continues to mishandle them. Then-interim Chancellor Darnell Hunt testified to the Regents of the University of California (Regents or UC) that UCLA received “hundreds” of antisemitism complaints after October 7 and that “all those cases were taken up” for investigation. Yet not a single student, staff member, or faculty member was ultimately formally disciplined for antisemitic behavior - including those who were arrested for illegal conduct."
- City of Los Angeles Prevails in City Attorney Discrimination Caseon February 25, 2026 at 1:36 PM
Karen Majovski is a deputy city attorney (DCA) in the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office. The office uses a classification system - DCA-I through DCA-IV - with pay steps within each classification, all governed by memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the City and DCA labor unions. Within each classification, DCAs automatically advance one step per year. Promotions from DCA-I to DCA-II and from DCA-II to DCA-III could be automatic under certain conditions, but promotions from DCA-III upward were never automatic and were typically granted through competitive Performance Recognition Programs (PRPs) or, more rarely, by discretionary action.
Majovski obtained her law degree in 2013 and was admitted to the State Bar in December 2013. In May 2014, with only five months of legal experience and no employment litigation background, the City hired her as a DCA-I in the Workers' Compensation Division (WCD). She advanced through automatic pay steps over the next two years.
In November 2016, Majovski transferred to the Employment Litigation Division (ELD). At the time of the transfer, she asked Chief Assistant City Attorney Thom Peters to promote her to DCA-III, pointing to another female attorney who had been hired at that level. Peters escalated the request to Chief of Staff Leela Kapur, who declined, explaining that Majovski had come in with no experience and that her workers' compensation background was not comparable to employment litigation. Kapur noted that both Majovski and male DCA-I George Sami were in similar positions and should be treated similarly. Majovski did not allege gender discrimination at that time.
Majovski was not provided parking at City Hall East (CHE), the ELD workplace. Under a Special Parking MOU, parking priority was given to "Upper Management" (DCA-IIIs and above), electric vehicle owners, and employees with seniority. As a DCA-I without an electric vehicle and without sufficient seniority, Majovski did not qualify. All female attorneys in ELD at that time had parking because they were DCA-IIIs. Male DCA-I George Sami was seen parking at CHE, but undisputed evidence showed he had an electric vehicle, which gave him priority. Female DCA-II Susan Rim, hired in July 2017, was also not provided parking.
In spring 2018, Majovski first complained that she and Rim were underpaid compared to others in ELD - both male and female - and requested promotions to DCA-III for both of them. In July 2018, the City promoted Rim from DCA-II to DCA-III but promoted Majovski only from DCA-I to DCA-II. Kapur explained that promoting an attorney with only about four years of practice and a year and a half of civil litigation experience from DCA-I directly to DCA-III would have been "highly irregular." No evidence in the record identified any employee who had ever received a DCA-I to DCA-III promotion. Majovski then asked to keep her original salary anniversary date rather than resetting it to the promotion date, but Kapur denied that request as contrary to standard practice. Peters forwarded Majovski's request to Kapur with the comment "Chutzpah," to which Kapur responded, "Yup there is a word for it."
In September 2018, before Majovski's voluntary transfer from ELD to the Los Angeles World Airports Division (LAWA), Peters initially told her she would be promoted to DCA-III regardless of whether she transferred. After discussing with Kapur, Peters reversed himself and said she would be promoted only if she stayed in ELD. Chief Assistant City Attorney Jim Clark then told Majovski she would be promoted regardless of her decision. Majovski chose to transfer to LAWA in November 2018. She was not promoted at that time.
In October 2019, Majovski applied for a promotion through an office-wide PRP. Of 364 applicants (190 female, 174 male), 93 received promotions or step advancements. Female applicants were selected at a slightly higher rate (26.3%) than male applicants (24.7%). Majovski was among 271 applicants who were not selected. Kapur, whose recommendations the City Attorney always followed, testified that she did not recommend Majovski for several reasons: Majovski had received recent promotion, had relatively short tenure, her division had received a fair number of promotions, and her promotion would not necessarily have advanced the office's goals for racial and ethnic diversity.
In January 2020, a DCA-III in LAWA resigned, and Majovski took over most of her duties. In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a hiring and promotion freeze. LAWA's CFO, Tatiana Starostina, determined that LAWA would not fund the vacant DCA-III position because of the freeze. In September 2020, Majovski again requested the promotion, but Kapur declined to seek an exception to the freeze, explaining that the office's limited exceptions were prioritized for new hires rather than promotions. Majovski then emailed her supervisors stating she believed the front office was intentionally declining to adjust her pay for "personal, retaliatory, and gender related reasons." An HR investigation found no evidence supporting her complaint.
In March 2021, Majovski filed suit against the City, alleging gender discrimination, associational discrimination, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination under FEHA, as well as claims under the Equal Pay Act (Lab. Code, § 1197.5) and the whistleblower protection statute (Lab. Code, § 1102.5). In August 2021, after the hiring freeze was lifted, the City granted Majovski a discretionary step advancement to bring her into pay parity with a similarly experienced individual being brought into the office (whose gender was not identified in the record). In June 2022, through a second PRP, Majovski was promoted to DCA-III.
Between 2016 and 2022, the City's statistical evidence showed that of 240 discretionary promotions, 52.5% went to women and 47.5% to men. For promotions specifically from DCA-II to DCA-III, 55.5% went to women. The City moved for summary judgment. The trial court sustained 31 of the City's 55 evidentiary objections, including an objection to an undated draft gender equity report by the former City Controller. After a hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on all claims.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment in its entirety in the unpublished case Majovski v. City of Los Angeles, No. B335739 (February 2026).
The court held that Majovski forfeited her challenge to the trial court's evidentiary rulings by raising it for the first time in her reply brief without adequate citations or argument, relying on High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, 111, fn. 2, and Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721. This meant that key evidence, including the former City Controller's draft gender equity report, was properly excluded from consideration.
The court applied the framework from Hall v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 318, 324–325, which requires a plaintiff to show she was paid less than a male comparator for substantially similar work. Majovski failed to identify any proper male comparator with less experience who was promoted or classified higher. The court found that George Sami's parking at CHE was explained by his electric vehicle priority under the Special Parking MOU, not gender. The court also found that the City's 2021 discretionary step advancement did not constitute an admission of gender-based pay disparity, as there was no evidence the individual with whom Majovski was brought into parity was male. Three comparators raised for the first time in the reply brief were rejected as forfeited and, in any event, insufficient - one was female, and the other two had demonstrably more experience.
With regard to her FEHA discrimination claims the court applied the three-stage burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, as applied in California under Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334, and Arnold v. Dignity Health (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 424–425. The City met its second-stage burden by producing evidence that Majovski's level of experience explained the promotion decisions, and that women received discretionary promotions at equal or higher rates than men. Majovski failed to meet her third-stage burden to show pretext.
Because all underlying discrimination and retaliation claims failed, the derivative failure-to-prevent claim under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k) necessarily failed as well, consistent with Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. M&N Financing Corp. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 434, 444.
- Supreme Court Hohenshelt Ruling Gains Traction in Pending Caseson February 25, 2026 at 1:36 PM
In April 2021, John Goshorn hired Aqua Blue Construction, Inc. to build a swimming pool, spa, and barbeque at his home for $109,475. Aqua Blue drafted the contract, which included an arbitration clause stating that any disputes would be resolved through arbitration and that Goshorn's agreement to arbitrate was "voluntary." Aqua Blue's owner, Julien Britton, signed the contract on behalf of the company.
A dispute arose over unpaid balances and alleged construction defects. In May 2022, Aqua Blue sued Goshorn for breach of contract, seeking $32,305 in damages and alleging fraud related to change orders. Goshorn denied the allegations and filed a cross-complaint raising claims including breach of contract, fraud, negligence, and contracting without a license, asserting that Aqua Blue had deviated from the agreed plans and produced defective, unfinished work.
In September 2022, Goshorn moved to compel arbitration based on the contract's arbitration clause. Aqua Blue filed limited opposition but the trial court granted the motion. The parties then agreed to arbitrate before retired Justice Richard Aldrich of JAMS, whose rate was $9,000 per day - an arbitrator Aqua Blue itself had suggested.
In April 2023, JAMS designated the case a "consumer arbitration" under its rules, which meant Aqua Blue, as the drafting party, would bear all arbitration fees. Aqua Blue's counsel acknowledged JAMS's determination and indicated the issue could be raised with the arbitrator. JAMS issued an initial invoice of $9,000, which Aqua Blue paid late but did pay. A preliminary conference set a ten-day hearing, and JAMS then issued retainer invoices totaling approximately $174,700. Aqua Blue protested the fees as unconscionable for a $32,305 dispute, questioned the ten-day estimate, and asked JAMS for guidance on how to challenge the consumer designation. No hearing on the challenge was ever set. By September 2023, Aqua Blue had not paid the retainer invoices, and JAMS administratively stayed the arbitration.
In March 2024, Goshorn filed a motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which allows a consumer to withdraw from arbitration and recover fees and costs when the drafting party fails to timely pay arbitration fees. Aqua Blue opposed the motion, arguing that this was not a consumer arbitration and that it should not be solely responsible for the fees.
In April 2024, the trial court granted Goshorn's motion. Relying on Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1319 and Williams v. West Coast Hospitals, Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1054 - both of which were later overruled - the court held that once Aqua Blue was more than 30 days past due on the JAMS invoices, it was in material breach regardless of any good-faith basis for disputing the fees. The court lifted the arbitration stay, ordered the matter to proceed in the trial court, and awarded Goshorn $36,974.79 in sanctions. However, the court declined to impose evidentiary or terminating sanctions, finding that the law was unclear on how to challenge a consumer arbitration designation and that such harsher sanctions would be unjust. The court also denied Aqua Blue's cross-motions for contempt and sanctions against Goshorn.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded in the unpublished case of Aqua Blue Construction, Inc. v. Goshorn, No. B338632 (February 2026).
While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, which fundamentally changed the arbitration legal framework. The Supreme Court held that under section 1281.98, a drafting party's nonpayment of arbitration fees results in forfeiture of arbitral rights only when the nonpayment was "willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent." This interpretation was adopted to avoid preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act and was grounded in the long-standing contract principle that one party's nonperformance automatically extinguishes the other's duties only when culpability is present. The Hohenshelt court overruled the Court of Appeal decisions the trial court had relied upon.
On the threshold question of whether this was a consumer arbitration at all, the appellate court held that it was. Goshorn fit the statutory definition of a "consumer" under section 1280, subdivision (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure because he hired Aqua Blue for personal, household purposes. The court noted that although Williams was overruled by Hohenshelt on the culpability issue, the Supreme Court did not disturb Williams's analysis on this particular point.
Turning to the central issue, the appellate court found clear error in the trial court's failure to evaluate Aqua Blue's culpability. The record contained competing evidence: Aqua Blue argued it could not afford the fees, had actively sought review of JAMS's consumer designation, and that paying $164,000 to arbitrate a $32,305 dispute was unreasonable. Goshorn countered that Aqua Blue had itself chosen the expensive arbitrator, had agreed to JAMS's rules, and should have foreseen the costs. Because the trial court made no factual findings on whether the nonpayment was willful, strategic, grossly negligent, or excusable, the appellate court remanded for a new determination under the Hohenshelt standard. The court distinguished Wilson v. Tap Worldwide, LLC (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1077, where remand was unnecessary because the trial court had already made findings establishing that the late payment was not culpable.
- Employers Should Address New Postal Service "Postmark" Ruleon February 24, 2026 at 1:20 PM
The Postal Service added a new section (DMM 608.11) to the Domestic Mail Manual that formally defines the postmark for the first time in a regulation and explains what information it does and doesn't convey. It took effect December 24, 2025.
A postmark confirms USPS had possession of a mailpiece on the stamped date, but the postmark date does not necessarily match the date USPS first received the mailpiece. Most postmarks are applied by automated machines at processing facilities, and the date reflects when the mail was processed at that facility - not when it was initially deposited. This discrepancy has grown more common under USPS's Regional Transportation Optimization (RTO) initiative, which adds flexibility between collection and processing schedules.
This is a significant practical problem with perhaps significant legal consequences, even though USPS insists the rule is "just clarification." For example Internal Revenue Code § 7502, also known as the “mailbox rule.” IRC § 7502 says that if a tax return or payment arrives at the IRS after the deadline, it's still considered timely if the USPS postmark date is on or before the due date. Courts interpret this strictly - the postmark date controls, regardless of when the taxpayer actually deposited the document.
The problem is that § 7502 and its regulations never actually defined "postmark." As a result, the USPS's new DMM 608.11 effectively supplies the operative definition for § 7502 purposes. And that definition now makes clear that a machine-applied postmark reflects the date of first automated processing at a regional facility - not when you dropped it in the mailbox or handed it to a postal carrier. Tax professionals have been calling for the IRS to address this, but nothing had been issued as of the most recent reporting.
And it's just now getting attention from employment and benefits lawyers. Here's how the new postmark rule ripples into employer notice obligations. Under federal laws like ERISA, COBRA, HIPAA, and the ACA, employers are required to send a variety of notices to employees concerning health insurance coverage, retirement benefits, and other employee benefits.
Some key examples of these deadlines:
- - General COBRA notices must be sent to new plan participants within 90 days of health coverage starting. COBRA election notices must be sent within 14 days after an employer notifies the plan administrator about a qualifying event, such as a layoff, discharge, divorce, or reduction in hours.
- - Health plans must send HIPAA notices of privacy practices to enrollees within 60 days of any substantial change.
- - HIPAA-covered entities must notify affected individuals without unreasonable delay, or no later than 60 calendar days after discovering a security breach.
- - Other ERISA-required communications include summary plan descriptions (SPDs), summaries of benefits and coverage (SBCs), formulary notices, and annual disclosures - all with their own timing requirements.
- - COBRA regulations specifically say that the initial notice, election notice, and notice of unavailability are considered "provided" on the date they are postmarked. So if the postmark date is delayed by a day or two at a regional processing center, a notice that was mailed on time could be deemed late
Some options to avoid this problem include requesting a free manual (local) postmark at any Post Office retail counter. This stamp will align with the date the customer hands over the mail. Registered Mail and Certified Mail also provide mailing receipts.
The Postal Service claims this rule does not change any actual postmarking operations or procedures. USPS says it's purely an educational/transparency measure codifying longstanding practices. The era of dropping a deadline-sensitive document in a blue mailbox on the last day and trusting the postmark is effectively over. It would be wise for employers to take affirmative steps to secure proof of the actual mailing date.
- AI Is Not A Lawyer - and No Attorney-Client Privilege Applieson February 24, 2026 at 1:20 PM
Generative artificial intelligence tools have become increasingly prevalent across various domains of human activity. It has reliably been estimated, for instance that more than half of United States households have adapted AI in some form. Only three years after its release, one prominent AI platform is being used by more than 800 million people worldwide every week. Yet the implications of AI for the law are only beginning to be explored.
A ruling by Judge Jed S. Rakoff in United States v. Heppner (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 2026) appears to be the first federal decision addressing whether a criminal defendant's conversations with a generative AI platform are protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. The answer on both counts according to this ruling was "no." Most published decisions involving generative artificial intelligence have had to do with attorneys' misuse of that technology. That set of concerns is plainly net present here.
Bradley Heppner was indicted on securities fraud and related charges stemming from an alleged $150+ million scheme involving GWG Holdings. After receiving a grand jury subpoena and learning he was a target, Heppner - on his own initiative, without his lawyer's direction - used Claude to prepare roughly 31 documents outlining potential defense strategies and legal arguments. The FBI seized these "AI Documents" during a search of his home. Heppner's counsel claimed privilege over them.
Heppner, through his counsel asserted privilege over these documents arguing that (1) Heppner had inputted into Claude, among other things,information that Heppner had learned from counsel; (2) Heppner had created the AI Documents for the purpose of speaking with counsel to obtain legal advice; and (3) Heppner had subsequently shared the contents of the AI Documents with counsel. Heppner' s counsel conceded, however, that counsel "did net direct [Heppner] to run Claude searches."
The trial court noted that it is well established that the attorney-client privilege attaches to, and protects from disclosure, "communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice." United States V. Mejia 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011). Courts construe the attorney-client privilege narrowly because it operates as an exception to the rule that "all relevant proof is essential" for a complete record and for "confidence in the fair administration of justice."
On attorney-client privilege, the court found the documents failed on multiple independent grounds. First, Claude is not an attorney, so there was no attorney-client relationship. Second, the communications were not confidential — Anthropic's privacy policy explicitly permits collecting user inputs and outputs, using them for training, and disclosing data to third parties including government authorities. Third, Heppner was not seeking legal advice from Claude; Claude itself disclaims the ability to give legal advice. The court noted that even though Heppner later shared the outputs with his lawyer, non-privileged communications don't become privileged simply by being passed along to counsel.
On work product doctrine, the court held that even assuming the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation, they were not prepared "by or at the behest of counsel." Heppner acted entirely on his own. The documents didn't reflect defense counsel's strategy at the time they were created. The court distinguished a prior S.D.N.Y. magistrate decision (Shih v. Petal Card) that took a broader view, respectfully disagreeing and emphasizing that the doctrine's core purpose is protecting lawyers' mental processes, not a client's independent research with an AI tool.
"Thus, the communications between Heppner and Claude were not privileged at the time they took place. Moreover, even assuming that Heppner intended to share these communications with his counsel and eventually did so, it is black-letter law that non-privileged communications are not somehow alchemically changed into privileged ones upon being shared with counsel. Thus, because the AI Documents would not be privileged if they remained in [Heppner's] hands they did not acquire protection merely because they were transferred to counsel." The court concluded that AI's novelty doesn't exempt it from longstanding legal principles.
The ruling has obvious implications for the millions of people using AI platforms to think through legal problems - those conversations are likely discoverable.
- WCAB Affirms Take Nothing Based on Worker Credibility Issueson March 3, 2026 at 11:33 AM
John Sarviss worked as a helicopter pilot for the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. He filed a workers' compensation claim alleging cumulative trauma injuries to his back and bilateral lower extremities during the period from July 21, 2008 to July 9, 2012. In May 2013, the parties entered a stipulation in which the employer accepted the claim as an industrial injury, with all further issues - including the nature and extent of disability - to be determined by medical evaluators.
The case was complicated by serious credibility problems that emerged over the course of multiple medical evaluations. Dr. Steven Silbart, an Agreed Medical Evaluator, issued a supplemental report in March 2022 after reviewing Sarviss's deposition transcript and full medical file. Dr. Silbart identified significant credibility concerns. Sarviss had completely failed to disclose to a prior medical examiner a nonindustrial incident in 2011 involving a herniated disc that required surgery. Additionally, Sarviss had testified that his treating physician linked his herniated disc to something other than lifting a heavy object, when in fact the physician's own reports attributed the injury specifically to lifting a heavy cabinet. Sarviss also recanted a prior history he had given of injuring his low back in a service-connected helicopter crash in the Army in 1971.
A second evaluator, Dr. Kenneth Sabbag, was appointed under Labor Code section 5701 after the parties lost confidence in Dr. Silbart and other prior evaluators. Dr. Sabbag examined Sarviss in August 2023 and encountered similar problems. He could not reconcile multiple discrepancies in the applicant's account - including conflicting stories about the 2011 injury, the absence of any documented work-related injury before July 2012, and the fact that Sarviss claimed he needed a cane but did not bring one to the exam, offering the false explanation that TSA prohibits canes on airplanes. Dr. Sabbag also noted that Sarviss had an extensive prior career as a freelance helicopter pilot for the film industry involving physically arduous work, yet denied any prior injuries. Dr. Sabbag deferred the credibility question to the trier of fact but acknowledged in his March 2024 deposition that conflicting data existed and he had been unable to resolve it.
At trial on September 15, 2025, Sarviss testified under oath - three separate times - that he was never injured before working for the Department of Water and Power, despite extensive medical records documenting a 1993 helicopter crash causing a severe thoracic compression fracture and lower extremity injuries requiring approximately 20 reconstructive surgeries.
The workers' compensation administrative law judge issued Findings of Fact and an Order on November 24, 2025. While the WCJ found, based on the parties' stipulations, that Sarviss did sustain industrial injury to his lumbar spine, cervical spine, and lower extremities, the WCJ concluded there was no substantial evidence to establish periods of temporary disability, permanent disability, the nature and extent of the injuries, or any need for further medical treatment. The WCJ reasoned that because Sarviss had never provided a complete and honest medical history to any of the evaluating physicians, none of their medical reports constituted substantial medical evidence. As a result, the WCJ found Sarviss failed to meet his burden of proof and ordered the matter off calendar with no award of benefits or attorney fees.
The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board denied Sarviss's Petition for Reconsideration, affirming the WCJ's decision in full in the panel decision of Sarviss v City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. -ADJ8666280 (February 2026)
The WCAB grounded its analysis in the well-established principle that all decisions must be supported by substantial evidence. Citing Lamb v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310], Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500], and LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16], the Board reaffirmed that substantial evidence requires more than speculation or conjecture. Relying on Escobedo v. Marshalls (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604 (Appeals Board en banc), the Board noted that a medical opinion must be based on pertinent facts, an adequate examination and history, and must set forth its reasoning. The Board further cited Hegglin v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 162 [36 Cal.Comp.Cases 93] for the proposition that medical opinions based on inadequate histories fail to constitute substantial evidence.
Applying these standards, the Board agreed with the WCJ that every medical report in the record was undermined by Sarviss's failure to provide a complete and truthful history. Because none of the medical evaluations rested on an accurate factual foundation, none could serve as substantial evidence to support an award of benefits.
The Board also rejected Sarviss's argument that the 2013 stipulation accepting his injury as industrial entitled him to ongoing benefits. Citing Labor Code section 4909, the Board noted that payments made during a disputed period do not constitute an admission of liability, and the stipulation itself reserved all further issues for medical determination - the very determination that could not be made due to the incomplete histories.
Finally, the Board gave great weight to the WCJ's credibility findings, citing Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 318–319 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500], which holds that a trial judge who observes a witness's demeanor is entitled to deference on credibility unless there is evidence of considerable substantiality to the contrary. The Board found no such contrary evidence and concluded that Sarviss had failed to meet his burden of proof on all issues. - FSML Annual Employment Law Conference Set for June 5, 2026on March 3, 2026 at 11:33 AM
Floyd Skeren Manukian Langevin is pleased to announce that in partnership with Fisher Phillips, the firm’s annual Employment Law Conference will return on June 5, 2026, at the Disneyland Hotel. The conference will feature keynote speakers, and the latest hot topics in employment law, workers’ compensation, and HR.
Conference sessions include:
- - Employment Law: Case and Legislative Update
- - What’s New from the California Civil Rights Department and EEOC
- - Wage and Hour Update (Including the PAGA Reform and Latest on Meal and Rest Break Requirements)
- - Key Compliance Considerations and Risks Associated with AI
- - Spotting and Preventing Employment Law Exposure in WC Claims
- - The Challenges of Accommodating Work Restrictions, Medical Conditions, and Disabilities
- - Substance Abuse in the Workplace: The Challenges of Managing Risk, Compliance, and Employee Support
- - California Leave Law Update: Best Practices for HR Professionals, with a Focus on the Overlap Between FMLA, CFRA, and PDL
- - Ethical Dilemmas in Employment Law, Work Comp and General Liability Cases
- - Effective Workplace Investigations: Best Practices for HR
- - Key Strategies for Defending Complex Stress Claims
- - Work Comp Caselaw Update/Key Defense Strategies in 2026 for Complex Litigation
More details about these topics, and more, can be found by viewing the Agenda. The day will end with a cocktail reception where attendees can connect with conference presenters.
Rene Thomas Folse, JD, PhD., is the MCLE sponsor for this event and has sole responsibility for the MCLE content – California State Bar Sponsor #11240. Attorneys can earn up to 6.5 hours for courses that meet the California State Bar criteria.
Fisher Phillips will be providing 6.0 hours of SHRM/HRCI credit.
WorkCompAcademy will issue Continuing Education Certificates of Completion for courses meeting the California Department of Insurance criteria. Adjusters can earn up to 6.5 hours of Continuing Education credits.
Discount Hotel Room Reservations are available upon registration.
DATE AND TIME: June 5, 2026 from 7:45 am PDT until 6:00 pm PDT
LOCATION: Disneyland Hotel, 1150 West Magic Way, Anaheim, CA 90802
Price:Early Bird (until 3/31/2026): $395 - General Entry Fee (after 3/31/2026): $450
To register for this event, please visit the registration page where you may register online. Exhibitors may also register to reserve space in the event Exhibitor Area. - LAPD Officer Seen Skydiving Charged with Exaggerating Comp Injuryon March 2, 2026 at 11:32 AM
A Los Angeles police officer was charged with two counts of felony insurance fraud for allegedly exaggerating an on-duty injury to collect disability benefits while participating in recreational skydiving and other physical activity.
Christopher Brandon Carnahan (dob 6/30/82) of Norwalk is charged in case 26CJCF01236 with two counts of felony insurance fraud. His arraignment will be scheduled for a later date. He is being held on $100,000 bail. If convicted as charged, Carnahan faces up to six years state prison to be served in county jail.
He's a 43-year-old LAPD veteran with 18 years of service, residing in Norwalk, California. He holds the rank of Police Officer II and is assigned to the 77th Division, with serial number 39135 and badge number 20710.
On May 22, 2023, Officer Carnahan purportedly injured his left elbow while on duty and was subsequently placed on Temporary Totally Disabled (TTD) status. Officers with this status are entitled to receive 100% of their base salary tax-free for up to one year, and then two-thirds thereafter if the injury persists.
Prosecutors allege that while on TTD status, Carnahan completed many skydives at Skydive Elsinore in Lake Elsinore, California and worked out at a fitness center, contrary to his claims of being temporarily totally disabled. The DA's office released photos showing what appears to be Carnahan skydiving and exercising, including one image dated May 23, 2024, showing him holding dumbbells
The case is being prosecuted by Deputy District Attorney Arunas Sodonis of the Healthcare Fraud Division and investigated by the Los Angeles Police Department.
“This case is about honesty and accountability,” Los Angeles County District Attorney Nathan J. Hochman said. “Claiming to be temporarily totally disabled and collecting disability benefits intended for injured workers while engaging in physically demanding activities like skydiving is a crime. This is an officer who knows the law and understands the standards he is sworn to uphold.” - Multiple Family Members Arraigned for Auto Insurance Fraudon March 2, 2026 at 11:31 AM
Sarkis Dishchyan, 47, of Pasadena, Ani Suzie Labbad, 47, of Pasadena, and Violett Lara Labbad, 44, of Pasadena, were arraigned last week, on multiple counts of felony insurance fraud, for allegedly staging a vehicle accident involving their Porsche Cayenne, in order to collect nearly $39,000 in undeserved insurance payouts.
An investigation was launched after a suspected fraudulent claim referral was received by investigators at the California Department of Insurance. According to the referral, an individual allegedly admitted to unwittingly being involved in a staged collision involving the claimant, Ani Labbad and her husband Dishchyan.
This individual claimed that Dishchyan, whom they know through their sibling who was formerly incarcerated with Dishchyan, reached out with an opportunity to make $5,000. Dishchyan covered the cost of airfare and hotel from Illinois to California and asked the individual to rent a vehicle from a rental car company.
An investigation revealed that once this individual arrived in California, they were riding in the rental car as a passenger while Dishchya drove and intentionally rear-ended a Porsche, causing the rental car to flip and land on its roof.
The Porsche was being driven by a person who claimed to be Ani Labbad, Dishchyan’s wife. A witness at the scene claimed they saw a man crawl out of the overturned rental car and flee on foot before Pasadena Police Department arrived on scene.
Further investigation and body camera footage found that the driver of the Porsche was actually Violett Labbad, Ani Labbad’s sister, who gave Pasadena police Ani’s driver’s license and identified herself as Ani at the scene of the collision.
According to the passenger in the rental car, they were not aware that Dishchyan was planning to rear-end the Porsche until just prior to the collision.
Cell phone data was used to confirm both Dishchyan and Violett Labbad’s cell phones were in the vicinity at the time of the collision, while Ani Labbad’s location was at her home address. Cell phone data also confirmed on the day of the collision, Dishchyan sent a text to Violett Labbad requesting her help that night, and additional text messages from Ani Labbad to Dishchyan stating Violett was “on her way”. These texts were time-stamped minutes before the collision.
After the staged collision, Ani Labbad filed a claim with her insurance company, and with the insurance carrier for the car rental company and received $38,932.21. The third-party-administer for the car rental company then filed a claim with the individual’s insurance policy due to lack of liability coverage and non-cooperation from the individual.
Dishchyan, Ani Labbad, and Violett Labbad were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. This case is being prosecuted by the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office. - New "Smart Knee" Implant Helps Post-Operative Recoveryon February 26, 2026 at 8:34 AM
For those of us who handle workers' compensation claims involving knee injuries, there's a new medical technology we need to know about - because it's going to start showing up in our cases if it hasn't already.
It's called the "smart knee" implant, and the leading device right now is the Zimmer Biomet Persona IQ - the first and currently only FDA-approved knee replacement with built-in sensor technology. From the outside, it looks and functions like any standard total knee replacement. But embedded inside the tibial stem is a tiny wireless sensor that continuously tracks the patient's recovery in real time.
The implant measures range of motion, step count, walking speed, stride length, and pressure distribution across the joint. That data is wirelessly transmitted to a small base station plugged into the patient's home Wi-Fi, and from there it uploads to a secure, HIPAA-compliant cloud platform. The treating surgeon can log in and review the data remotely. The patient can see their own progress through a smartphone app, and even compare their recovery metrics against national benchmarks for patients of the same age and stage of recovery.
This isn't experimental. It's being used right now at major orthopedic centers across the country, including Mayo Clinic, the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York, UChicago Medicine, and Lee Health in Florida. And adoption is expanding rapidly into smaller community hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers. As recently as June 2025, UP Health System in Michigan's Upper Peninsula began offering the device for the first time.
So why should workers' comp practitioners care? Several reasons.
First, this technology replaces subjective recovery assessments with objective data. Historically, post-operative knee recovery has been tracked through periodic office visits and patient self-reports - the surgeon asks patients how they feel, watches them walk across the room, and measures their range of motion with a goniometer. One Mayo Clinic surgeon described the traditional approach as "very, very subjective."
The smart knee changes that equation entirely. Now the surgeon has daily biomechanical data showing exactly how the knee is performing between visits. For attorneys and adjusters, this means disputes about whether a claimant has reached maximum medical improvement, whether recovery is progressing on schedule, or whether functional limitations are consistent with the objective findings could increasingly be resolved by implant data rather than dueling medical opinions.
Second, the technology enables earlier intervention when recovery stalls. Orthopedic surgeons at UChicago Medicine have emphasized that the first three months after knee replacement are critical - if patients don't regain adequate strength and range of motion during that window, those losses can be very difficult to make up later. With the smart implant, a surgeon who sees a sudden drop in step count or a plateau in range of motion can reach out to the patient immediately and adjust the rehabilitation plan. That kind of early intervention could shorten disability durations and reduce overall claim costs.
Third, smart implants reduce the need for frequent in-person follow-up visits. The remote monitoring capability means patients who live far from their treating surgeon may not need to travel as often for routine post-operative checks - a meaningful consideration in workers' comp, where mileage reimbursement, time off work for medical appointments, and delays in scheduling all add friction and cost to the system.
Fourth, consider the long-term implications. The sensor battery is designed to last at least 10 years, and the device can help detect early signs of implant loosening, abnormal wear patterns, or biomechanical changes that might signal a problem before the patient even notices symptoms. Since workers' comp carriers often remain responsible for future medical treatment related to the original injury - including revision surgery - early detection of developing problems could mean smaller, less invasive, and less expensive interventions down the road.
Finally - and perhaps most significantly for litigators - think about the evidentiary implications. These implants generate a continuous, objective record of the patient's functional capacity. Daily step counts. Walking speed. Stride length. Range of motion trends over weeks and months. That data could become powerful evidence in disputes over functional limitations, compliance with prescribed physical therapy, and readiness to return to work. It cuts both ways: it could support a claimant who is doing everything right but still struggling, or it could undermine a claim where the reported limitations don't match the biomechanical data.
The smart knee is not yet the standard of care for every total knee replacement — cost, patient comfort with the technology, and the need for home Wi-Fi are still limiting factors. But adoption is growing quickly, and as it does, workers' comp professionals on both sides of the aisle will need to understand what this data means, how to obtain it, and how to use it.
This is one worth watching. - DOJ Sues UCLA for Hostile Work Environmenton February 26, 2026 at 8:34 AM
The United States Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division filed an 81 page lawsuit against the University of California alleging it engaged in a hostile work environment against Jewish and Israeli faculty and staff at its University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
According to the complaint, after the Hamas-led massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023, antisemitic acts pervaded UCLA. The suit alleges the university engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII against Jewish and Israeli employees at UCLA by failing to prevent and correct discriminatory and harassing conduct. The lawsuit further alleges the university negligently permitted a hostile work environment against two charging parties and other aggrieved Jewish and Israeli employees.
In 2024, the university allowed antisemitic harassment to continue unabated for days in front of its iconic Royce Hall: among other acts, Jews were not permitted on portions of the main quad, Jewish professors were assaulted, and swastikas were graffitied on university buildings.
The university has ignored, and continues to ignore, gross and repeated violations of viewpoint-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions involving these and other actions directed against Jewish and Israeli employees. Jewish and Israeli faculty have been physically threatened, had their classrooms disrupted, and had their workplaces papered with disturbing images.
Jewish professors have been, and continue to be, subjected to ostracism and harassment by their colleagues and students, while their colleagues and supervisors not only have failed to report those acts as required but have even participated in them. Numerous Jewish and Israeli employees have been forced to take leave, work from home, and even leave their jobs to avoid the hostile work environment.
“UCLA failed to live up to its systemwide commitment to diversity and equal opportunity when it stood by as Jewish employees were subjected to harassment,” said First Assistant United States Attorney Bill Essayli. “The federal government has an obligation to step in and ensure a discrimination-free environment at our universities.”
“Based on our investigation, UCLA administrators allegedly allowed virulent anti-Semitism to flourish on campus, harming students and staff alike,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Today’s lawsuit underscores that this Department of Justice stands strong against hate and anti-Semitism in all its vile forms.”
“The litany of vile acts of antisemitism that allegedly took place, and continue to take place, at UCLA are, if found to be true, a mark of shame against the University of California,” said Assistant Attorney General Harmeet K. Dhillon of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. “The Justice Department will ensure that UCLA maintains an environment for its employees free from antisemitic harassment.”
The lawsuit stems from a Commissioner’s Charge filed by then-Commissioner Andrea Lucas of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in June 2024. The EEOC was instrumental in investigating the allegations of harassment at UCLA and in identifying the university’s poor complaint system. “The EEOC is committed to eradicating antisemitism at work,” said EEOC Chair Andrea Lucas. “If a university will not investigate and remedy repeated allegations of antisemitism against its employees, then EEOC will.”
DOJ attorneys allege "Until the United States Department of Justice issued its notice of investigation letter to UCLA in March 2025, not a single one of the dozens of civil rights complaints filed by Jewish and Israeli employees since October 7 was properly investigated. UCLA’s Office of Equity, Diversity, & Inclusion (EDI Office), tasked with oversight of all discrimination complaints, routinely ignored complaints of antisemitism. And UCLA continues to mishandle them. Then-interim Chancellor Darnell Hunt testified to the Regents of the University of California (Regents or UC) that UCLA received “hundreds” of antisemitism complaints after October 7 and that “all those cases were taken up” for investigation. Yet not a single student, staff member, or faculty member was ultimately formally disciplined for antisemitic behavior - including those who were arrested for illegal conduct." - City of Los Angeles Prevails in City Attorney Discrimination Caseon February 25, 2026 at 1:36 PM
Karen Majovski is a deputy city attorney (DCA) in the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office. The office uses a classification system - DCA-I through DCA-IV - with pay steps within each classification, all governed by memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the City and DCA labor unions. Within each classification, DCAs automatically advance one step per year. Promotions from DCA-I to DCA-II and from DCA-II to DCA-III could be automatic under certain conditions, but promotions from DCA-III upward were never automatic and were typically granted through competitive Performance Recognition Programs (PRPs) or, more rarely, by discretionary action.
Majovski obtained her law degree in 2013 and was admitted to the State Bar in December 2013. In May 2014, with only five months of legal experience and no employment litigation background, the City hired her as a DCA-I in the Workers' Compensation Division (WCD). She advanced through automatic pay steps over the next two years.
In November 2016, Majovski transferred to the Employment Litigation Division (ELD). At the time of the transfer, she asked Chief Assistant City Attorney Thom Peters to promote her to DCA-III, pointing to another female attorney who had been hired at that level. Peters escalated the request to Chief of Staff Leela Kapur, who declined, explaining that Majovski had come in with no experience and that her workers' compensation background was not comparable to employment litigation. Kapur noted that both Majovski and male DCA-I George Sami were in similar positions and should be treated similarly. Majovski did not allege gender discrimination at that time.
Majovski was not provided parking at City Hall East (CHE), the ELD workplace. Under a Special Parking MOU, parking priority was given to "Upper Management" (DCA-IIIs and above), electric vehicle owners, and employees with seniority. As a DCA-I without an electric vehicle and without sufficient seniority, Majovski did not qualify. All female attorneys in ELD at that time had parking because they were DCA-IIIs. Male DCA-I George Sami was seen parking at CHE, but undisputed evidence showed he had an electric vehicle, which gave him priority. Female DCA-II Susan Rim, hired in July 2017, was also not provided parking.
In spring 2018, Majovski first complained that she and Rim were underpaid compared to others in ELD - both male and female - and requested promotions to DCA-III for both of them. In July 2018, the City promoted Rim from DCA-II to DCA-III but promoted Majovski only from DCA-I to DCA-II. Kapur explained that promoting an attorney with only about four years of practice and a year and a half of civil litigation experience from DCA-I directly to DCA-III would have been "highly irregular." No evidence in the record identified any employee who had ever received a DCA-I to DCA-III promotion. Majovski then asked to keep her original salary anniversary date rather than resetting it to the promotion date, but Kapur denied that request as contrary to standard practice. Peters forwarded Majovski's request to Kapur with the comment "Chutzpah," to which Kapur responded, "Yup there is a word for it."
In September 2018, before Majovski's voluntary transfer from ELD to the Los Angeles World Airports Division (LAWA), Peters initially told her she would be promoted to DCA-III regardless of whether she transferred. After discussing with Kapur, Peters reversed himself and said she would be promoted only if she stayed in ELD. Chief Assistant City Attorney Jim Clark then told Majovski she would be promoted regardless of her decision. Majovski chose to transfer to LAWA in November 2018. She was not promoted at that time.
In October 2019, Majovski applied for a promotion through an office-wide PRP. Of 364 applicants (190 female, 174 male), 93 received promotions or step advancements. Female applicants were selected at a slightly higher rate (26.3%) than male applicants (24.7%). Majovski was among 271 applicants who were not selected. Kapur, whose recommendations the City Attorney always followed, testified that she did not recommend Majovski for several reasons: Majovski had received recent promotion, had relatively short tenure, her division had received a fair number of promotions, and her promotion would not necessarily have advanced the office's goals for racial and ethnic diversity.
In January 2020, a DCA-III in LAWA resigned, and Majovski took over most of her duties. In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a hiring and promotion freeze. LAWA's CFO, Tatiana Starostina, determined that LAWA would not fund the vacant DCA-III position because of the freeze. In September 2020, Majovski again requested the promotion, but Kapur declined to seek an exception to the freeze, explaining that the office's limited exceptions were prioritized for new hires rather than promotions. Majovski then emailed her supervisors stating she believed the front office was intentionally declining to adjust her pay for "personal, retaliatory, and gender related reasons." An HR investigation found no evidence supporting her complaint.
In March 2021, Majovski filed suit against the City, alleging gender discrimination, associational discrimination, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination under FEHA, as well as claims under the Equal Pay Act (Lab. Code, § 1197.5) and the whistleblower protection statute (Lab. Code, § 1102.5). In August 2021, after the hiring freeze was lifted, the City granted Majovski a discretionary step advancement to bring her into pay parity with a similarly experienced individual being brought into the office (whose gender was not identified in the record). In June 2022, through a second PRP, Majovski was promoted to DCA-III.
Between 2016 and 2022, the City's statistical evidence showed that of 240 discretionary promotions, 52.5% went to women and 47.5% to men. For promotions specifically from DCA-II to DCA-III, 55.5% went to women. The City moved for summary judgment. The trial court sustained 31 of the City's 55 evidentiary objections, including an objection to an undated draft gender equity report by the former City Controller. After a hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on all claims.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment in its entirety in the unpublished case Majovski v. City of Los Angeles, No. B335739 (February 2026).
The court held that Majovski forfeited her challenge to the trial court's evidentiary rulings by raising it for the first time in her reply brief without adequate citations or argument, relying on High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, 111, fn. 2, and Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721. This meant that key evidence, including the former City Controller's draft gender equity report, was properly excluded from consideration.
The court applied the framework from Hall v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 318, 324–325, which requires a plaintiff to show she was paid less than a male comparator for substantially similar work. Majovski failed to identify any proper male comparator with less experience who was promoted or classified higher. The court found that George Sami's parking at CHE was explained by his electric vehicle priority under the Special Parking MOU, not gender. The court also found that the City's 2021 discretionary step advancement did not constitute an admission of gender-based pay disparity, as there was no evidence the individual with whom Majovski was brought into parity was male. Three comparators raised for the first time in the reply brief were rejected as forfeited and, in any event, insufficient - one was female, and the other two had demonstrably more experience.
With regard to her FEHA discrimination claims the court applied the three-stage burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, as applied in California under Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334, and Arnold v. Dignity Health (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 424–425. The City met its second-stage burden by producing evidence that Majovski's level of experience explained the promotion decisions, and that women received discretionary promotions at equal or higher rates than men. Majovski failed to meet her third-stage burden to show pretext.
Because all underlying discrimination and retaliation claims failed, the derivative failure-to-prevent claim under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k) necessarily failed as well, consistent with Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. M&N Financing Corp. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 434, 444. - Supreme Court Hohenshelt Ruling Gains Traction in Pending Caseson February 25, 2026 at 1:36 PM
In April 2021, John Goshorn hired Aqua Blue Construction, Inc. to build a swimming pool, spa, and barbeque at his home for $109,475. Aqua Blue drafted the contract, which included an arbitration clause stating that any disputes would be resolved through arbitration and that Goshorn's agreement to arbitrate was "voluntary." Aqua Blue's owner, Julien Britton, signed the contract on behalf of the company.
A dispute arose over unpaid balances and alleged construction defects. In May 2022, Aqua Blue sued Goshorn for breach of contract, seeking $32,305 in damages and alleging fraud related to change orders. Goshorn denied the allegations and filed a cross-complaint raising claims including breach of contract, fraud, negligence, and contracting without a license, asserting that Aqua Blue had deviated from the agreed plans and produced defective, unfinished work.
In September 2022, Goshorn moved to compel arbitration based on the contract's arbitration clause. Aqua Blue filed limited opposition but the trial court granted the motion. The parties then agreed to arbitrate before retired Justice Richard Aldrich of JAMS, whose rate was $9,000 per day - an arbitrator Aqua Blue itself had suggested.
In April 2023, JAMS designated the case a "consumer arbitration" under its rules, which meant Aqua Blue, as the drafting party, would bear all arbitration fees. Aqua Blue's counsel acknowledged JAMS's determination and indicated the issue could be raised with the arbitrator. JAMS issued an initial invoice of $9,000, which Aqua Blue paid late but did pay. A preliminary conference set a ten-day hearing, and JAMS then issued retainer invoices totaling approximately $174,700. Aqua Blue protested the fees as unconscionable for a $32,305 dispute, questioned the ten-day estimate, and asked JAMS for guidance on how to challenge the consumer designation. No hearing on the challenge was ever set. By September 2023, Aqua Blue had not paid the retainer invoices, and JAMS administratively stayed the arbitration.
In March 2024, Goshorn filed a motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which allows a consumer to withdraw from arbitration and recover fees and costs when the drafting party fails to timely pay arbitration fees. Aqua Blue opposed the motion, arguing that this was not a consumer arbitration and that it should not be solely responsible for the fees.
In April 2024, the trial court granted Goshorn's motion. Relying on Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1319 and Williams v. West Coast Hospitals, Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1054 - both of which were later overruled - the court held that once Aqua Blue was more than 30 days past due on the JAMS invoices, it was in material breach regardless of any good-faith basis for disputing the fees. The court lifted the arbitration stay, ordered the matter to proceed in the trial court, and awarded Goshorn $36,974.79 in sanctions. However, the court declined to impose evidentiary or terminating sanctions, finding that the law was unclear on how to challenge a consumer arbitration designation and that such harsher sanctions would be unjust. The court also denied Aqua Blue's cross-motions for contempt and sanctions against Goshorn.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded in the unpublished case of Aqua Blue Construction, Inc. v. Goshorn, No. B338632 (February 2026).
While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, which fundamentally changed the arbitration legal framework. The Supreme Court held that under section 1281.98, a drafting party's nonpayment of arbitration fees results in forfeiture of arbitral rights only when the nonpayment was "willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent." This interpretation was adopted to avoid preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act and was grounded in the long-standing contract principle that one party's nonperformance automatically extinguishes the other's duties only when culpability is present. The Hohenshelt court overruled the Court of Appeal decisions the trial court had relied upon.
On the threshold question of whether this was a consumer arbitration at all, the appellate court held that it was. Goshorn fit the statutory definition of a "consumer" under section 1280, subdivision (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure because he hired Aqua Blue for personal, household purposes. The court noted that although Williams was overruled by Hohenshelt on the culpability issue, the Supreme Court did not disturb Williams's analysis on this particular point.
Turning to the central issue, the appellate court found clear error in the trial court's failure to evaluate Aqua Blue's culpability. The record contained competing evidence: Aqua Blue argued it could not afford the fees, had actively sought review of JAMS's consumer designation, and that paying $164,000 to arbitrate a $32,305 dispute was unreasonable. Goshorn countered that Aqua Blue had itself chosen the expensive arbitrator, had agreed to JAMS's rules, and should have foreseen the costs. Because the trial court made no factual findings on whether the nonpayment was willful, strategic, grossly negligent, or excusable, the appellate court remanded for a new determination under the Hohenshelt standard. The court distinguished Wilson v. Tap Worldwide, LLC (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1077, where remand was unnecessary because the trial court had already made findings establishing that the late payment was not culpable. - Employers Should Address New Postal Service "Postmark" Ruleon February 24, 2026 at 1:20 PM
The Postal Service added a new section (DMM 608.11) to the Domestic Mail Manual that formally defines the postmark for the first time in a regulation and explains what information it does and doesn't convey. It took effect December 24, 2025.
A postmark confirms USPS had possession of a mailpiece on the stamped date, but the postmark date does not necessarily match the date USPS first received the mailpiece. Most postmarks are applied by automated machines at processing facilities, and the date reflects when the mail was processed at that facility - not when it was initially deposited. This discrepancy has grown more common under USPS's Regional Transportation Optimization (RTO) initiative, which adds flexibility between collection and processing schedules.
This is a significant practical problem with perhaps significant legal consequences, even though USPS insists the rule is "just clarification." For example Internal Revenue Code § 7502, also known as the “mailbox rule.” IRC § 7502 says that if a tax return or payment arrives at the IRS after the deadline, it's still considered timely if the USPS postmark date is on or before the due date. Courts interpret this strictly - the postmark date controls, regardless of when the taxpayer actually deposited the document.
The problem is that § 7502 and its regulations never actually defined "postmark." As a result, the USPS's new DMM 608.11 effectively supplies the operative definition for § 7502 purposes. And that definition now makes clear that a machine-applied postmark reflects the date of first automated processing at a regional facility - not when you dropped it in the mailbox or handed it to a postal carrier. Tax professionals have been calling for the IRS to address this, but nothing had been issued as of the most recent reporting.
And it's just now getting attention from employment and benefits lawyers. Here's how the new postmark rule ripples into employer notice obligations. Under federal laws like ERISA, COBRA, HIPAA, and the ACA, employers are required to send a variety of notices to employees concerning health insurance coverage, retirement benefits, and other employee benefits.
Some key examples of these deadlines:
- - General COBRA notices must be sent to new plan participants within 90 days of health coverage starting. COBRA election notices must be sent within 14 days after an employer notifies the plan administrator about a qualifying event, such as a layoff, discharge, divorce, or reduction in hours.
- - Health plans must send HIPAA notices of privacy practices to enrollees within 60 days of any substantial change.
- - HIPAA-covered entities must notify affected individuals without unreasonable delay, or no later than 60 calendar days after discovering a security breach.
- - Other ERISA-required communications include summary plan descriptions (SPDs), summaries of benefits and coverage (SBCs), formulary notices, and annual disclosures - all with their own timing requirements.
- - COBRA regulations specifically say that the initial notice, election notice, and notice of unavailability are considered "provided" on the date they are postmarked. So if the postmark date is delayed by a day or two at a regional processing center, a notice that was mailed on time could be deemed late
Some options to avoid this problem include requesting a free manual (local) postmark at any Post Office retail counter. This stamp will align with the date the customer hands over the mail. Registered Mail and Certified Mail also provide mailing receipts.
The Postal Service claims this rule does not change any actual postmarking operations or procedures. USPS says it's purely an educational/transparency measure codifying longstanding practices. The era of dropping a deadline-sensitive document in a blue mailbox on the last day and trusting the postmark is effectively over. It would be wise for employers to take affirmative steps to secure proof of the actual mailing date. - AI Is Not A Lawyer - and No Attorney-Client Privilege Applieson February 24, 2026 at 1:20 PM
Generative artificial intelligence tools have become increasingly prevalent across various domains of human activity. It has reliably been estimated, for instance that more than half of United States households have adapted AI in some form. Only three years after its release, one prominent AI platform is being used by more than 800 million people worldwide every week. Yet the implications of AI for the law are only beginning to be explored.
A ruling by Judge Jed S. Rakoff in United States v. Heppner (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 2026) appears to be the first federal decision addressing whether a criminal defendant's conversations with a generative AI platform are protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. The answer on both counts according to this ruling was "no." Most published decisions involving generative artificial intelligence have had to do with attorneys' misuse of that technology. That set of concerns is plainly net present here.
Bradley Heppner was indicted on securities fraud and related charges stemming from an alleged $150+ million scheme involving GWG Holdings. After receiving a grand jury subpoena and learning he was a target, Heppner - on his own initiative, without his lawyer's direction - used Claude to prepare roughly 31 documents outlining potential defense strategies and legal arguments. The FBI seized these "AI Documents" during a search of his home. Heppner's counsel claimed privilege over them.
Heppner, through his counsel asserted privilege over these documents arguing that (1) Heppner had inputted into Claude, among other things,information that Heppner had learned from counsel; (2) Heppner had created the AI Documents for the purpose of speaking with counsel to obtain legal advice; and (3) Heppner had subsequently shared the contents of the AI Documents with counsel. Heppner' s counsel conceded, however, that counsel "did net direct [Heppner] to run Claude searches."
The trial court noted that it is well established that the attorney-client privilege attaches to, and protects from disclosure, "communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice." United States V. Mejia 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011). Courts construe the attorney-client privilege narrowly because it operates as an exception to the rule that "all relevant proof is essential" for a complete record and for "confidence in the fair administration of justice."
On attorney-client privilege, the court found the documents failed on multiple independent grounds. First, Claude is not an attorney, so there was no attorney-client relationship. Second, the communications were not confidential — Anthropic's privacy policy explicitly permits collecting user inputs and outputs, using them for training, and disclosing data to third parties including government authorities. Third, Heppner was not seeking legal advice from Claude; Claude itself disclaims the ability to give legal advice. The court noted that even though Heppner later shared the outputs with his lawyer, non-privileged communications don't become privileged simply by being passed along to counsel.
On work product doctrine, the court held that even assuming the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation, they were not prepared "by or at the behest of counsel." Heppner acted entirely on his own. The documents didn't reflect defense counsel's strategy at the time they were created. The court distinguished a prior S.D.N.Y. magistrate decision (Shih v. Petal Card) that took a broader view, respectfully disagreeing and emphasizing that the doctrine's core purpose is protecting lawyers' mental processes, not a client's independent research with an AI tool.
"Thus, the communications between Heppner and Claude were not privileged at the time they took place. Moreover, even assuming that Heppner intended to share these communications with his counsel and eventually did so, it is black-letter law that non-privileged communications are not somehow alchemically changed into privileged ones upon being shared with counsel. Thus, because the AI Documents would not be privileged if they remained in [Heppner's] hands they did not acquire protection merely because they were transferred to counsel." The court concluded that AI's novelty doesn't exempt it from longstanding legal principles.
The ruling has obvious implications for the millions of people using AI platforms to think through legal problems - those conversations are likely discoverable.