Menu Close

Daily News for November 18th, 2026

  • Lascivious Conduct Not Required to Trigger Ban on Forced Arbitration
    on November 18, 2026 at 10:07 AM

    Jane Doe worked as a guest reception manager at The Maybourne Beverly Hills hotel from May 2015 until January 2024. In June 2020, she signed an arbitration agreement requiring that employment-related disputes be arbitrated under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

    According to her complaint, after she disclosed her first pregnancy in October 2020, she heard comments that she could not keep working after having a baby, or remain a “career woman” once she had children. In November 2021, after returning from maternity leave, she applied for a director position but was never interviewed; the position was closed and later filled by a man. After a second maternity leave ended in May 2023, she was told there was no room for her to grow professionally. In December 2023, a regional director told her that her children would always be her first priority and suggested she stop seeking promotions or raises.

    Doe alleges that the hotel’s human resources director then accused her, falsely, of having a sexual relationship with a coworker. She was suspended without pay and fired five days later. She contends the termination was retaliation for her requests for pay equity.

    In March 2024, Doe sued Maybourne and related entities in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Her claims included hostile work environment harassment based on sex, gender, and pregnancy; sex discrimination and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Maybourne moved to compel arbitration. Doe opposed the motion, invoking the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), Pub. L. No. 117-90, 136 Stat. 26.

    Judge Lynne M. Hobbs denied the motion as to Maybourne. The court concluded that Doe’s claims amounted to sexual harassment under California law, which covers harassment based on pregnancy and does not require sexual desire. Maybourne appealed the order denying arbitration.

    In the published case of Doe v. The Maybourne Beverly Hills Operator, LLC, No. B341400 (November 2026), the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Seven, affirmed the trial court’s order denying Maybourne’s motion to compel arbitration. The court held that a “sexual harassment dispute” under the EFAA is not limited to sexual misconduct and can include a FEHA hostile work environment claim based on gender or pregnancy, even without any lascivious conduct. It further held that Doe’s complaint adequately alleged such a dispute, so the entire case may proceed in court. Justice Stone wrote the opinion, joined by Presiding Justice Martinez and Justice Feuer. Doe was awarded her costs on appeal.

    The parties agreed the FAA governed the arbitration agreement. Section 2 of the FAA (9 U.S.C. § 2) makes arbitration agreements enforceable except as provided in “chapter 4,” which is the EFAA. Under 9 U.S.C. § 402, a predispute arbitration agreement is unenforceable, at the plaintiff’s election, in a case relating to a sexual assault or sexual harassment dispute. Reviewing that question of statutory interpretation de novo, the court noted that no California court had yet decided it.

    The court began with the text. The EFAA defines a sexual harassment dispute as one relating to conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment “under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law” (9 U.S.C. § 401(4)). The statute therefore borrows the definition of sexual harassment from whatever law the plaintiff invokes. Because the text is clear, the court found no need to rely on legislative history or the #MeToo context in which Congress acted. Citing Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) 590 U.S. 644, the court observed that statutory text controls even when its drafters may not have anticipated a particular application.

    Turning to California law, the court explained that FEHA prohibits harassment because of sex, which includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy. FEHA expressly provides that sexually harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire (Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C)), and “sex” and “gender” are used interchangeably. Courts have long recognized that hostility toward women, not sexual attraction, can drive a sexual harassment claim. A FEHA hostile work environment claim based on gender or pregnancy is therefore a sexual harassment dispute within the meaning of the EFAA.

    The court next addressed what a plaintiff must plead to invoke the EFAA. Federal courts have split on the question, with standards ranging from the plausibility test of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662 to a more lenient “nonfrivolous” standard. A divided Ninth Circuit panel in Holland-Thielen v. SpaceX (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2026, No. 25-4811) recently adopted a looser standard under which the conduct need only be asserted, but the state court noted it is not bound by that decision. The court concluded that California’s own pleading rules do not apply, because the EFAA directs that federal law determines its applicability and because state rules could undermine uniform application of federal law. It ultimately found it unnecessary to choose a standard, because Doe’s complaint satisfies even the demanding Twombly/Iqbal test.

    Doe alleged unwelcome comments based on her gender and pregnancy, a false accusation of sexual misconduct, and a broad pattern of excluding women from advancement. Relying on Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, the court explained that personnel decisions can themselves communicate a hostile message when they form a widespread pattern. Read together and in Doe’s favor, the allegations plausibly describe an objectively hostile work environment. The court cautioned that a trier of fact may ultimately find the conduct was not severe or pervasive, but that question does not prevent the claim from triggering the EFAA at this stage. Because the EFAA applies to the “case,” the denial of arbitration extends to all of Doe’s claims.

  • IMR Volume Dips for First Time Since 2022
    on November 18, 2026 at 10:07 AM

    After three straight years of growth, independent medical review (IMR) activity in California workers’ compensation has finally leveled off. Volume slipped slightly in the first nine months of 2026, while the share of disputes in which IMR physicians side with the original utilization review decision stayed above 90%, according to a November 9, 2026 release from the California Workers’ Compensation Institute (CWCI).

    CWCI counted 110,965 IMR decision letters issued from January through September 2026, down 3.1% from the same period in 2025. That is the first decline since IMR volume began climbing back from a historic low in 2022. Even so, this year’s nine-month total remains higher than the comparable totals for every year from 2020 through 2024, so the dip leaves volume well above where it stood just a few years ago. The Institute’s analysis draws on state data covering roughly 1.8 million IMR decision letters issued from 2015 through September 2026.

    IMR is the final step for resolving disputes over whether a treatment requested by an injured worker’s doctor is medically necessary. The process was created by Senate Bill 863, the 2012 reform package that overhauled California’s system for resolving medical treatment disputes. When a claims administrator’s utilization review denies or modifies a treatment request under Labor Code § 4610, the worker or the worker’s representative may ask for IMR under Labor Code § 4610.5. The Division of Workers’ Compensation contracts with an independent medical review organization, currently Maximus Federal Services, to conduct the reviews. State regulations (8 CCR § 9792.10.6) generally require a final determination within 30 days of receiving the application and supporting records. Under Labor Code § 4610.6, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board may overturn an IMR determination only on narrow grounds, which makes IMR outcomes effectively final in most disputes.

    Those outcomes continue to strongly favor the original review decision. CWCI reports that IMR physicians upheld utilization review denials and modifications in 90.2% of 2026 decisions, up slightly from 89.8% in 2025 and consistent with the narrow range seen since 2015. Uphold rates varied by type of service, from a low of 80.8% for evaluation and management services to a high of 95.2% for acupuncture. The uphold rate rose from 86.1% to 88.8% for surgery requests and from 81.3% to 83.1% for psychiatric services.

    Prescription drugs remain the largest source of IMR disputes, at 30.8% of decisions, up from 30.5% in 2025. Physical therapy ranked second at 13.2% and injections third at 12.8%.

    Within the drug category, the data shows a continued move away from opioid disputes. Opioids fell to 16.7% of prescription drug IMRs, and the share of opioid denials upheld reached an all-time high of 95.7%. Dermatological drugs, the topical creams and similar products often prescribed for pain, rose to a record 25.9% of pharmaceutical IMRs. That is more than double their 12.3% share in 2018, making them the most frequently disputed drug category. Musculoskeletal drugs ranked second at 20.0% and had the highest uphold rate of any drug group, at 98.5%. Anticonvulsants, some of which are prescribed for nerve pain, also hit a record at 10.6% of drug IMRs.

    The drug findings come on the heels of other CWCI research tracking prescription cost drivers. Earlier this month, the Institute reported that meloxicam has become the largest source of anti-inflammatory drug spending in California workers’ comp, driven largely by high-cost capsule formulations.

    As in prior years, a small group of physicians generates most of the IMR caseload. In the 12 months ending September 2026, the top 10% of requesting physicians, 789 providers, accounted for 84.5% of disputed service requests. The top 1%, just 79 providers, accounted for 41.9%. Ten individual physicians alone accounted for 10.4% of disputed requests decided through IMR, and their requests were upheld at a 90.3% rate, almost exactly the system-wide average. This concentration has been a recurring theme of CWCI’s IMR research and has long fueled debate over whether a relatively small number of high-volume prescribers drives a disproportionate share of medical disputes and the costs of administering them.

    The release does not offer an explanation for this year’s decline, and the figures cover only three quarters. CWCI says it will publish full-year 2026 results later, and the more detailed statistics behind the release are available only to CWCI members through the Independent Medical Review section of the Research tab on the CWCI website. Readers looking for longer-term context can consult CWCI’s earlier research update on IMR trends and outcomes from 2015 through 2025.

  • Medi-Cal Patient’s Injury Settlement Exempt from Hospital Lien Act
    on November 17, 2026 at 1:44 PM

    Sunfa Reneau was injured in a car accident caused by Andre Hernandez on June 3, 2020. Two days later she was treated at Long Beach Memorial Medical Center. She presented her Medi-Cal card, and the hospital’s admissions manager confirmed her eligibility. The hospital billed Medi-Cal for some of the services it provided, but $7,683 in charges for other services were never submitted to Medi-Cal and reportedly remain unpaid.

    On July 24, 2020, the hospital’s attorneys, Yoshida & Garcia, Inc., wrote to Hernandez’s auto insurer, Alliance United, giving notice of a hospital lien under Civil Code § 3045.5 of the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) and threatening suit over the unpaid $7,683. In March 2021, Reneau settled her claim against Hernandez for $7,500, to be paid by Alliance United. The law firm continued to pursue the lien, and the insurer withheld Reneau’s settlement funds.

    Reneau filed suit in June 2021, and the defendants removed the case to federal court. Her operative third amended complaint asserted putative class claims under federal and California debt collection law and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. In May 2024, the federal court dismissed the federal debt collection claim and remanded the remaining claims to the Los Angeles County Superior Court.

    Judge Kenneth R. Freeman then sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the state debt collection and UCL claims without leave to amend. The court reasoned that the HLA and the Medi-Cal Act could be harmonized to permit the lien, and that the UCL could not be used to attack the HLA’s “safe harbor.” Judgment was entered, and Reneau appealed, challenging only the dismissal of her UCL claim.

    In the published case of Reneau v. Yoshida & Garcia, Inc., No. B345787 (November 2026), the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Five, reversed the judgment and the order sustaining the demurrer to the UCL claim, and remanded for the case to proceed on that claim alone. The court held that a hospital may not assert an HLA lien for services provided to a Medi-Cal beneficiary, that the lien here was therefore invalid, and that the invalid lien can support a UCL claim.

    Reviewing the demurrer de novo and accepting the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, the court began with the HLA, Civil Code § 3045.1 et seq., which gives hospitals a lien against a patient’s recovery from a third-party tortfeasor. In Parnell v. Adventist Health System/West (2005) 35 Cal.4th 595, the California Supreme Court held that the lien “requires the existence of an underlying debt owed by the patient to the hospital.” If the patient owes nothing, no lien attaches. (Parnell also disapproved Swanson v. St. John’s Regional Medical Center (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 245 to the extent it conflicted.)

    The court then turned to the Medi-Cal framework. Federal Medicaid law, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, strictly limits how providers are reimbursed. The Medi-Cal Act requires providers to bill Medi-Cal and bars them from seeking payment from beneficiaries or from anyone other than the state or a qualifying third-party payor (Welfare and Institutions Code § 14019.4). The right to recover from liable third parties belongs to the state agency, not the provider, and beneficiaries assign their recovery rights to the state rather than to providers (Welfare and Institutions Code § 14124.71). As the Supreme Court noted in Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003) 30 Cal.4th 798, Medicaid beneficiaries need not assign to providers their right to recover from third parties.

    Putting the two together, the court found that the defendants offered no reason why Parnell’s debt requirement should not apply in the Medi-Cal setting. Reneau owed the hospital nothing, and a settling tortfeasor is not a “third-party payor” within the meaning of section 14019.4. The HLA lien therefore conflicted with the Medi-Cal Act and was invalid.

    On the UCL claim, the court acknowledged that the statute’s reach over unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent practices is broad but cannot be used to attack a legislative safe harbor. Under Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, plaintiffs “may not use the general unfair competition law to assault that harbor.” But the HLA provides no safe harbor here, the court explained, because the defendants had no authority under the HLA to assert the lien in the first place.

    The court also rejected the argument that its holding should apply only prospectively. Because the governing statutes and cases are long-standing, the ruling simply applies existing law to new facts. The court distinguished Olszewski, which involved a statute that was itself preempted; here, the HLA is facially valid and only its use against a Medi-Cal beneficiary was improper. The court further held that Reneau did not need a separate declaratory relief cause of action, since her complaint already sought a judicial declaration that the practices were prohibited, and it deemed the defendants’ litigation privilege argument forfeited because it was not presented under a proper heading.

    For hospitals, lien claimants, and liability and auto insurers handling settlements with Medi-Cal patients, the published ruling makes clear that a provider who accepts a Medi-Cal patient cannot sidestep Medi-Cal billing rules by asserting an HLA lien against the patient’s third-party recovery, and that doing so may expose the provider and its collection counsel to UCL liability.

  • GLP-1 Drugs a Minor Cost Problem in Comp Medical
    on November 17, 2026 at 1:44 PM

    GLP-1 weight-loss and diabetes drugs may dominate headlines and group health budgets, but they barely register in workers’ compensation costs, according to new data from the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI). In the latest installment of its “Asked & Answered” series, published November 10, 2026, NCCI reports that GLP-1 drugs accounted for only about 0.02% of workers’ compensation medical spending in 2025, and the bureau says it does not expect them to become a significant loss driver.

    The “Asked & Answered” series responds to questions submitted by stakeholders, using NCCI data to explain what trends mean for the workers’ compensation system. This edition, written by Geena Baldi, takes on two questions: how much GLP-1 medications are showing up in comp claims, and where the medical share of total losses stands today.

    On the first question, NCCI’s Medical Data Call shows roughly $1.9 million paid for GLP-1 drugs in 2025, against about $9.3 billion in total workers’ compensation medical payments. Claims involving GLP-1s likewise made up about 0.02% of claim counts.

    That small number has been growing. NCCI dates the starting point to 2021, when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration first approved semaglutide for chronic weight management. Since then, GLP-1 payments in workers’ compensation have grown at an average annual rate of nearly 40%, rising from 0.01% of medical spend in 2021 to 0.02% in 2025. According to NCCI, that growth reflects more claims involving the drugs rather than higher prices: the average amount paid per transaction has held steady at roughly $1,200 to $1,300.

    NCCI cautions that with use this limited, broad generalizations about GLP-1 claims are difficult. The bureau classified diagnoses and body systems using the top two ICD-10 codes on each medical bill, and it examined whether the drugs were being used to help injured workers lose weight before surgery (defining major surgery as a non-injection service with a 90-day global follow-up period under CMS rules, or a procedure involving spinal neurostimulators). Its key finding: the data shows no meaningful use of GLP-1s for pre-surgical weight loss.

    Looking ahead, NCCI says it does not anticipate GLP-1s becoming a significant cost driver, largely because obesity is typically not a compensable injury. The bureau says it will keep monitoring the drugs and report further insights as warranted.

    The second part of the article updates a metric NCCI first presented at its Annual Insights Symposium in 2024 and 2025: the share of workers’ compensation losses attributable to medical costs. NCCI’s preliminary estimate puts the medical share for Accident Year 2025 at 53%, unchanged from Accident Year 2024. The share has been roughly flat for at least two decades, peaking at 56.6% in Accident Year 2016 and drifting down since.

    NCCI attributes the recent decline to indemnity losses growing faster than medical losses, consistent with its finding that wage growth has recently outpaced medical inflation as measured by its Workers Compensation Weighted Medical Price Index (see NCCI’s Medical Inflation Insights). Because indemnity benefits are tied to wages, faster wage growth pushes up the indemnity side of the ledger. NCCI notes that wage projections from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and medical price projections from CMS suggest the pattern will continue. Accident Year 2026 estimates are still developing, but if wages keep outpacing medical prices, NCCI says the medical share could remain near 2024–2025 levels or decline.

    NCCI flags several caveats for the medical-share figures. They are based on NCCI Financial Call data developed to ultimate, covering data through December 31, 2024, with 2025 figures preliminary and valued as of December 31, 2025. The data excludes large-deductible policies and COVID-19 claims through July 1, 2023, and covers all states where NCCI provides ratemaking services, with Texas excluded through 2010 and West Virginia through 2014. The methodology mirrors the approach in NCCI’s most recent rate and loss cost filings.

    For employers and insurers, the takeaway is twofold: the GLP-1 boom that is straining group health plans has so far had a negligible effect on comp medical costs, and the long-standing medical-versus-indemnity split remains stable, with wage growth, not medical inflation, currently doing more to move the needle. Stakeholders can submit questions for future installments to NCCI at INSIGHTS@ncci.com.

  • Overbroad Arbitration Clause Trimmed and Case Sent to Arbitration
    on November 16, 2026 at 9:16 AM

    CN Motor Company LLC, doing business as Santa Monica Lincoln, is an automobile dealership. Luis Antonio Salazar filled out an employment application on June 6, 2022, listing a start date of June 20, 2022, and on June 8 he signed a two-page “Applicant Statement and Agreement” containing an arbitration provision. He completed other hiring paperwork, including a W-4, about a week later, and worked as an hourly employee from June 2022 to March 2024. Salazar is primarily a Spanish speaker; his declaration, translated for him, stated he cannot read English documents unless they are translated.

    The agreement bore a capitalized title warning that it contained a binding arbitration agreement, and a second capitalized warning appeared above the signature block. The body was single-spaced, 11-point type across 15 paragraphs. Paragraph 4 required individual arbitration of “all disputes of any nature” arising out of or related in any way to the employee’s job application, employment, or “any other relationship/interaction” with the company and its “Affiliates.” Affiliates were defined to include owners, managers, employees, agents, attorneys, sister and parent companies, joint venturers, alleged joint employers, independent contractors and benefit-plan parties. Paragraph 5 listed exceptions for certain NLRB, workers’ compensation, EDD and Labor Commissioner wage claims and stated the agreement was not revocable. Paragraph 11 required a party starting a claim to deliver a dated letter to the general manager and the controller or business manager, while providing only that the company “may similarly commence claims” by letter to the employee.

    In June 2024 Salazar filed a putative class action in Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging ten Labor Code and unfair competition claims. CN Motor moved to compel arbitration. On December 16, 2024, Judge Lawrence P. Riff found that CN Motor had proven an agreement to arbitrate existed but held it unenforceable. The court found a moderate-to-high degree of procedural unconscionability, based on the adhesive form, time pressure, the English-only presentation to a Spanish speaker, and surprise from the dense format. It found moderate substantive unconscionability based on Paragraph 4’s overbreadth, a lack of mutuality regarding Affiliates and who was bound, infinite duration under Paragraph 5’s “not revocable” language, and Paragraph 11’s one-sided procedure for starting arbitration. Because the defects went to the core of the agreement, the court declined to sever them and denied the motion. CN Motor appealed.

    In the published case of Salazar v. CN Motor Company LLC, No. B344433 (October 2026), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed the order denying the employer’s motion to compel arbitration, with directions to grant the motion as to Salazar’s individual claims under the agreement after striking the unconscionable terms, and to decide his challenge to the class action waiver on remand. The opinion was filed October 19, 2026, as unpublished; on November 12, 2026, the court certified it for publication with no change in the judgment.

    The court cut the procedural unconscionability finding down to a low level. It found no substantial evidence of oppression: any pressure to sign other forms at the worksite came after the arbitration agreement was signed, and Salazar signed it two weeks before starting work. On the language issue, the court stressed that Salazar offered no evidence that he asked for a translation, told management before signing that he was not fluent in English, or met with anyone at the dealership before signing. He first raised his difficulty reading English after he signed, and the cases finding oppression on this basis involved employers who knew of a worker’s limited English. The court also found no surprise, given the conspicuous capitalized warnings and readable 11-point font. That left only the agreement’s adhesive nature, which supports a low degree of procedural unconscionability.

    On substance, the court agreed with the trial court that the agreement was overbroad and lacked mutuality, and it rated the substantive unconscionability as high. Covering disputes of any nature with the company and its sprawling list of Affiliates, including matters unrelated to employment, showed an intent to use arbitration to shield the employer and its affiliates from unrelated claims. Paragraph 11 was one-sided because only the employee faced a mandatory, specific notice requirement. The court disagreed with the trial court on duration, however, reading the “not revocable” language as modifying only the agency-proceedings exception in Paragraph 5, and noting that a contract with no stated term ends after a reasonable time. Drawing on Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, among other cases, the court treated the agreement as unenforceable in its present form.

    The decisive question was severance. Under Civil Code § 1670.5, a trial court’s choice to refuse enforcement rather than sever is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Applying the framework of Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, the court asked first whether the contract’s central purpose was tainted with illegality, and then whether striking or limiting the offending terms would cure the problem without rewriting the contract. Ramirez rejects any bright-line rule that multiple unconscionable terms require refusing enforcement. Here, the central purpose of arbitrating employment disputes was not tainted, and the offending language could be removed cleanly. The court struck “of any nature,” “or any other relationship/interaction with,” and “Affiliates” from Paragraph 4, removed the illustrative list of covered claims, and severed Paragraph 11 entirely. The remaining agreement is enforceable only as to claims arising from or connected to Salazar’s employment with CN Motor. Because removing these terms narrowed arbitration only between employer and employee, the court held the refusal to sever was error. Since the trial court never ruled on Salazar’s attack on the class action waiver, the appellate court ordered only his individual claims to arbitration for now and sent the waiver question back for decision.

  • Panel Refuses to Enforce Lifetime Arbitration Agreement
    on November 16, 2026 at 9:16 AM

    VXI Global Solutions, LLC operates customer service call centers nationwide. In February 2023 it hired Tracie Bennett, who has a high school education, as an account associate; she left the job in April 2023. Her new-hire packet ran roughly 100 pages and included an arbitration agreement and a separate confidentiality agreement, both signed the same day. Bennett did not consult a lawyer, though Global’s corporate counsel testified she had the opportunity to review the packet during orientation.

    The arbitration agreement, drafted by Global and written in the employee’s voice, required arbitration of all individual claims involving the “Company” and its past or present partners, officers, employees or agents, “whether or not those claims or controversies arise out of my employment.” It defined “Company” broadly to reach partners, officers, directors, employees, affiliates, benefit plans and successors. It survived termination of employment, could be modified or revoked only by a writing signed by all of Global’s partners and the employee, and contained a severability clause. The companion confidentiality agreement barred Bennett from soliciting Global employees for a competing business during her employment and for one year afterward, and entitled Global to injunctive relief without proof of actual damages and without prior actual notice.

    In October 2023, Bennett filed a putative class action in Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging 10 causes of action, including unpaid minimum wages and overtime and missed meal and rest breaks. Global moved to compel arbitration.

    Judge David S. Cunningham III held that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) governed the agreement and found a low degree of procedural unconscionability because it was a contract of adhesion. Relying on Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, the court found substantive unconscionability in two respects: the agreement reached claims unrelated to employment, and its duration was unreasonable because it outlived the job and could be ended only by mutual agreement. The court rejected Bennett’s other arguments, including challenges to the attorney fee terms, the waiver of public injunctive relief, and the handling of PAGA representative claims, and it did not reach her attacks on the confidentiality agreement. Concluding the defects could not be severed without rewriting the contract, the court denied the motion. Global appealed, as an order denying arbitration is immediately appealable under Code of Civil Procedure § 1294, subdivision (a).

    In the published case of Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions, LLC, No. B346763 (November 2026), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order denying the employer’s motion to compel arbitration and awarded Bennett her costs on appeal. The opinion, filed November 13, 2026, is certified for publication. Justice Viramontes wrote for the majority, with Presiding Justice Stratton concurring; Justice Wiley filed an extensive dissent.

    The majority first held that, under Civil Code § 1642, the arbitration and confidentiality agreements must be read together as a single contract, because they were signed in the same transaction and address related subject matter. Unfair terms in the confidentiality agreement therefore count against the arbitration agreement. On procedural unconscionability, the court agreed the degree was low. Global did not dispute that the agreement was adhesive, but there was no evidence of pressure or a rushed signing, Bennett had a reasonable chance to review the documents and consult counsel, and the language, while sometimes lengthy, was not unduly complex. Her education level and unfamiliarity with arbitration did not show she could not understand the terms.

    Substantive unconscionability, however, was high. Read as a whole, the agreement would force Bennett to arbitrate nearly any claim involving Global, related to her job or not, for the rest of her life unless both sides agreed otherwise. The court rejected Global’s narrower reading because it would render the “whether or not” language meaningless. The expansive definition of “Company” made a large group of employees, officers, agents and affiliates third-party beneficiaries who could compel Bennett to arbitrate, while she had no reciprocal right to force their claims against her into arbitration, a one-sided arrangement Global did not justify. The injunctive relief clause let Global obtain injunctions without proving the usual elements, including irreparable harm. And the nonsolicitation clause, which was not limited to unlawful means of solicitation, was void under Business and Professions Code § 16600.

    Turning to remedy, the court explained that Civil Code § 1670.5, subdivision (a), lets a court refuse enforcement, sever an offending term, or limit it, but not rewrite the parties’ bargain. Because the agreement contained multiple unconscionable terms and its overbroad scope went to its central purpose, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sever. Global’s proposed fix of striking two phrases would not work, the majority said, because the remaining text would still cover all claims involving Global, and adding limiting language would amount to rewriting the contract. Striking the confidentiality agreement’s injunctive and nonsolicitation terms would not cure the arbitration agreement’s own defects.

    Finally, the majority rejected the dissent’s position that the FAA preempts California’s unconscionability analysis here. It relied on Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, and Ninth Circuit decisions applying California law. It distinguished U.S. Supreme Court rulings such as AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 as striking down rules that barred arbitration outright or imposed procedures at odds with its basic features. Unconscionability findings arise more often in adhesive contracts, the majority reasoned, and such contracts frequently contain arbitration clauses, so arbitration is not being singled out.

  • HHS Opens the Door to Compounded "Healing" Peptides
    on November 12, 2026 at 10:15 AM

    Some of those who are recovering from torn tendons, strained muscles and orthopedic surgery are increasingly turning to injectable compounds called peptides that promise faster healing, and a new federal policy is about to make them easier to get. On October 30, 2026, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services published a Federal Register notice announcing that it will not take enforcement action against licensed pharmacies and physicians that compound six unapproved peptides, provided they meet ten conditions. The most popular of the six, BPC-157, has never been approved by the FDA for any use and has almost no human research behind it.

    Peptides are short chains of amino acids, the building blocks of proteins. Some are well established medicines; insulin and the GLP-1 weight-loss drugs are peptides. The compounds covered by the new policy are different. They have been sold for years online as "research chemicals not for human use," and they have built a following among athletes, fitness enthusiasts and wellness clinics on the strength of animal studies and social media testimonials. BPC-157 is promoted as the "Wolverine peptide" for tendon, ligament and muscle repair. TB-500 (spoken "T-B five hundred"), a fragment related to a natural protein called thymosin beta-4 (THY-moh-sin BAY-tuh four), is marketed for wound and tissue healing.

    The HHS policy, signed by Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., covers BPC-157, TB-500, epitalon, KPV, MOTS-c and semax. It applies to compounding under Section 503A of the federal drug law, the provision that lets state-licensed pharmacies and physicians prepare customized medications for individual patients with a prescription. According to The American Journal of Managed Care, the conditions require that the raw ingredient come from an FDA-registered manufacturer with a certificate of analysis showing identity, purity and potency, that each product contain only one active ingredient, that it be labeled as a compounded drug, and that serious adverse events be reported to the FDA. Each peptide is limited to particular routes; BPC-157, for example, may be compounded for injection under the skin or into muscle, by mouth or for topical use.

    It is important to be precise about what the policy does. It is not FDA approval, and it does not add the peptides to the official list of ingredients that pharmacies may lawfully use in compounding. It is a statement that HHS does not intend to enforce the law against compounders who follow its conditions while the FDA decides, through rulemaking whether each substance belongs on that list. HHS says the goal is to steer users away from gray-market products made overseas toward a more controlled source. The policy is labeled a draft, HHS may revisit it if safety or quality problems emerge, and comments were due two weeks after publication.

    The decision overrode the agency's own scientists. In July, the FDA's Pharmacy Compounding Advisory Committee voted 8 to 6, with one abstention, to recommend BPC-157, KPV and TB-500 for the compounding list, and ultimately recommended six of the seven peptides it reviewed, after career FDA reviewers had recommended against all seven. CNN reported that FDA officials warned their scientific staff would not support a regulation deeming the peptides safe, and that Kennedy has called himself a fan of peptides and has described using BPC-157 for a muscle injury.

    The clinical evidence is thin. FDA briefing materials found the available studies, including five on BPC-157, too short and small to establish safety or effectiveness. In a November 5 commentary in Healio's Orthopedics Today, the authors noted that most BPC-157 animal research comes from a single laboratory, none of it has examined healing after surgical repair, and the human evidence consists of a single case series. The first randomized, placebo-controlled pilot study, in patients after rotator cuff repair, is not scheduled to begin until January 2027. In a separate Healio feature, sports medicine surgeon Jason Dragoo said there is really no human clinical data showing BPC-157 improves healing or performance. Researchers have also debated whether the peptide's tendency to stimulate new blood vessel growth, called angiogenesis could carry long-term risks.

    Use is climbing regardless. A preprint analysis of clinical notes found newly confirmed BPC-157 users rose about 33-fold between early 2020 and early 2026, and about a third of those who documented a source obtained it from gray-market vendors. Product quality is a real concern: an obesity medicine specialist told AJMC that gray-market peptides often contain 5 to 75 percent of the labeled amount, and some carry contaminants. The FDA's adverse event database has logged 10 serious reports tied to BPC-157 since 2021, eight of them in 2026, though such reports do not prove the drug caused the problem. BPC-157 and TB-500 are also on the World Anti-Doping Agency's prohibited list.

    The workers' compensation implications start with treatment requests. Some treating physicians, particularly in sports medicine and wellness-oriented practices, may now request authorization for compounded BPC-157 or TB-500 after tendon and soft-tissue injuries. Utilization reviewers will be weighing products that are not FDA approved for any indication and lack published human trials in musculoskeletal healing, against evidence-based treatment standards such as California's Medical Treatment Utilization Schedule. The workers' compensation system has a long history of disputes over compounded medications, and payers will want to know the dispensing pharmacy, the source of the raw ingredient and whether the product meets the policy's conditions. The federal policy does not require any payer to cover these drugs, and AJMC notes that compounded drugs generally fall outside standard pharmacy benefits.

    The second issue is undisclosed self-treatment. Because BPC-157 has no national drug code, it never appears on a structured medication list or a pharmacy claim. Many injured users are buying peptides on their own. and may not mention them to a surgeon or a claims examiner. Surgeons are now being urged to ask about peptide use before operating, and claims professionals reviewing pre-operative records may want to see whether that question was asked.

    The policy remains in effect until the FDA finishes rulemaking on each peptide, a process AJMC says can take 12 to 24 months, and it could be revised sooner if safety signals emerge. The rotator cuff pilot trial in 2027 may offer the first controlled human data relevant to work injuries. Until then, claims professionals should treat peptides as an unproven, self-directed treatment that is becoming easier to obtain, and ask about it early when soft-tissue injuries and orthopedic surgery are involved.

  • DOI Issues Non-Renewal Moratorium for 50,000 Policyholders
    on November 12, 2026 at 10:15 AM

    The California Insurance Commissioner has ordered insurers to preserve residential property coverage for about 50,000 policyholders in Tuolumne, Stanislaus and Calaveras counties, imposing a one-year moratorium on cancellations and non-renewals after Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency for the Dove Fire, the California Department of Insurance announced this week.

    The Dove Fire was a comparatively small blaze. According to the Governor's Office of Emergency Services, it started July 26 near Highway 108 and Stockton Street in Tuolumne County, burned 226 acres, destroyed 12 structures and was fully contained August 1. The Governor's emergency proclamation did not come until October 15, 2026, and was aimed at speeding the removal of hazardous debris from affected properties. Because the moratorium runs for one year from the date of the Governor's declaration, not the date of the fire, the protection runs from October 15, 2026, about two and a half months after the fire was contained.

    The order rests on Insurance Code § 675.1, enacted in 2018 through Senate Bill 824, which Lara authored as a state senator. Under the statute, insurers may not cancel or refuse to renew a residential policy for property in a ZIP code within or adjacent to a fire perimeter for one year after an emergency declaration, when the action is based solely on the property's location in a wildfire area. CAL FIRE and Cal OES identify the perimeter, and the Commissioner then issues a bulletin listing the covered ZIP codes. According to the Department, the protection applies whether or not a policyholder suffered a loss. Homeowners who suffered a total loss in a declared disaster already have separate, longer renewal protections under existing law.

    The order also reaches some commercial policies. Insurance Code § 675.55, added by Senate Bill 547 (Chapter 544, Statutes of 2025), the Business Insurance Protection Act, extends the moratorium to certain commercial property policies. It took effect January 1, 2026. The release describes the covered commercial policies as those under $25,000 in annual premium, including policies for homeowners' associations, apartment complexes, student housing, senior living facilities and other property used mainly for residential purposes. The Department's August Bulletin 2026-6, issued for an earlier fire, spells out the statute more precisely. The commercial exclusion applies to policies with $25,000 or more in annual premium only where the insured also averaged at least 25 employees over the prior year. Inland marine, transit and commercial auto coverage is excluded. Habitational properties stay covered even above those thresholds.

    The release does not list the covered ZIP codes. As of this writing, the Department's moratorium page did not yet show a Dove Fire bulletin. Policyholders can check whether a ZIP code is covered with the Department's online moratorium lookup. The Department said consumers who were non-renewed before the declaration date and cannot find coverage, or who are dissatisfied with their current coverage, should contact it for help. So should anyone who believes an insurer is violating the law. The consumer hotline is 800-927-4357, and the TTY line is 800-482-4833.

    Lara said in the release that he is acting to protect Californians from "the stress of losing their insurance." He framed the order as part of a broader effort to restore insurance options statewide.

    The Dove Fire order adds to a growing stack of moratoriums in the same corner of the Sierra foothills. In August, Lara protected more than 64,000 policyholders in Calaveras, San Joaquin, Amador, Tuolumne and Stanislaus counties after the Gann Fire. In September 2025, Bulletin 2025-13 covered Calaveras and Tuolumne ZIP codes after the TCU September Lightning Complex fires.

    The rules are about to get longer. Governor Newsom signed AB 2038 (Harabedian) on September 30, 2026. According to trade press reports, it doubles the post-wildfire moratorium to two years and extends total-loss renewal guarantees from 24 to 36 months, effective January 1, 2027. The Dove Fire release does not mention AB 2038 or say whether the longer period would apply to emergencies declared before the law takes effect.

    For insurers, the order means suspending wildfire-based non-renewals in the affected ZIP codes once the Department publishes them. Carriers writing commercial habitational risks need to apply the same suspension. For employers and property owners, the commercial provisions matter most to those who operate apartment buildings, senior housing, student housing or association-governed communities in the three counties. For them, the moratorium offers a year of stability on renewals, but it does not freeze premiums or bar non-renewals for reasons unrelated to wildfire location.

  • 73 Enforcement Actions Follow Statewide Contractor Sweep
    on November 11, 2026 at 8:07 AM

    California’s Contractors State License Board (CSLB) has taken 73 enforcement actions against suspected unlicensed and noncompliant contractors after a series of 39 undercover stings and job-site sweeps across the state. The operations were part of a 15-state crackdown coordinated by the National Association of State Contractors Licensing Agencies (NASCLA), and the board announced the results on November 2, 2026, according to a republication of the release by the California Statewide Law Enforcement Association. The CSLB’s home page also lists the announcement.

    In the sting operations, which CSLB ran with local law enforcement in three counties it did not name, investigators answered advertisements placed by suspected unlicensed operators and arranged for them to come to designated locations to bid on projects. Those jobs ranged in value from $1,100 to $35,000. The stings produced 25 misdemeanor Notices to Appear for unlicensed contracting and illegal advertising, 10 administrative citations, and six referrals to district attorneys for possible prosecution.

    The sweeps covered 18 counties, where CSLB investigators made 182 visits to active job sites. Those checks led to 11 cases referred to local district attorneys, 13 citations against licensed contractors, six citations against unlicensed individuals, and two Letters of Admonishment. Investigators also issued 11 stop work orders and 20 advisory notices, which the board reported separately from the 73-action total. The release did not break down how the 39 operations were divided between stings and sweeps, and it did not say how many of the violations involved missing workers’ compensation coverage.

    CSLB Registrar David Fogt said in the release that unlicensed activity “often crosses state lines,” and he credited the multistate effort with sending a unified message. The board said individuals who were cited also received information to encourage them to become licensed and comply with the law.

    The board reminded the public that California law bars unlicensed contractors from bidding on or contracting for any project that requires a building permit, uses employee labor, or is valued at $1,000 or more in combined labor and materials. Unlicensed contracting is a misdemeanor under Business and Professions Code § 7028. The $1,000 “minor work” threshold appears in Business and Professions Code § 7048.

    CSLB warned that unlicensed operators often carry neither a license nor the required workers’ compensation insurance, which can leave homeowners on the hook for accidents or damage. Every California employer must secure workers’ compensation coverage under Labor Code § 3700, and licensed contractors must keep a current certificate of coverage, or a valid exemption, on file with CSLB under Business and Professions Code § 7125.

    Unlicensed operators fall outside that system entirely. When one of their workers is hurt, the cost often shifts elsewhere. Under Labor Code § 2750.5, a person performing work that requires a contractor’s license is presumed to be an employee unless he or she holds that license. That presumption can expose a hiring property owner or general contractor to claims, and their own insurers with them. Unlicensed operators also compete for work without paying premiums, undercutting legitimate contractors who bear the cost of coverage.

    This year’s total is lower than the board’s results from earlier NASCLA campaigns. CSLB reported 119 legal actions from its 2025 operations and 229 in 2024, though the scope and number of operations vary from year to year, so the totals are not directly comparable. CSLB licenses about 285,000 contractors in 45 classifications. Consumers can verify a license or report suspected unlicensed activity at cslb.ca.gov or by calling 1-800-321-CSLB (2752).

  • L.A. Superior Court Judge Robert Draper Removed From Office
    on November 11, 2026 at 8:07 AM

    Robert S. Draper has been a judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court for 14 years. Much of the case against him grew out of his handling of Odom v. Los Angeles Community College Dist. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 470, a sexual harassment and retaliation lawsuit brought by a tenured professor against her employer. In 2022 a jury in Judge Draper’s courtroom awarded the professor $10 million. In April 2025, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed that verdict and ordered a new trial, citing prejudicial evidentiary rulings and criticizing the trial judge’s remarks by name.

    On January 14, 2026, the Commission on Judicial Performance filed a Notice of Formal Proceedings against Judge Draper, which it announced publicly on January 20. The notice charged seven counts with 22 separate allegations. They covered his failure to cooperate with the commission’s investigation, his conduct during the Odom trial, his treatment of court staff and colleagues, improper ex parte communications, demeaning courtroom comments, and his defiance of court administrators while on leave.

    The California Supreme Court appointed three special masters: Justice James M. Humes of the First District Court of Appeal, Judge Matthew P. Guasco of Ventura County, and Judge Michael A. Knish of San Bernardino County. They held a six-day evidentiary hearing in April and May 2026. Judge Draper lost his bid for reelection in June 2026, and his term ends in January 2027.

    In a July 24, 2026 report, the masters found that Judge Draper had committed willful misconduct on parts of six counts and prejudicial misconduct on parts of three. They also found one instance of improper action and concluded that several allegations were not proven. They found that he lacked candor in several respects and that parts of his testimony were not credible. The commission heard oral argument on October 7, 2026. Judge Draper represented himself after substituting out his counsel in August.

    In the Commission on Judicial Performance decision of Inquiry Concerning Judge Robert S. Draper, No. 212 (November 2026), the commission ordered Judge Draper removed from office, disqualifying him from acting as a judge. The commission is the constitutional agency that disciplines California judges; it is not a court, and this is a disciplinary order, not a judicial opinion. It adopted the masters’ factual and credibility findings in full and went further on several legal conclusions, finding nine acts of willful misconduct, eight of prejudicial misconduct, and one of improper action. Eight commissioners voted in favor and none dissented. Two commissioners were recused and one did not participate. Judge Draper may seek review in the California Supreme Court.

    Under article VI, section 18, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, a judge may be removed for willful misconduct in office or for prejudicial conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute, but not for improper action alone. The commission found ample grounds of the first two kinds.

    The Odom trial. The commission found that Judge Draper made irrelevant and insensitive comments about race, made gender-based remarks including references to “little girls,” told a vulgar story about secretaries, and became emotionally entangled in the case. It found each of these to be prejudicial misconduct. It found willful misconduct in two later episodes. Judge Draper left a voicemail for defense counsel falsely saying the commission had requested a review. He also presided over an August 2023 hearing after he had recused himself, and at that hearing he threatened to report two attorneys to the State Bar in what appeared to be retaliation. An allegation that he intentionally touched an attorney’s hair was dismissed as unproven.

    Court staff and colleagues. Judge Draper told the presiding judge she was “cute when [she was] mad” and repeated the remark after being counseled. He called a court administrator “cute” after being told not to, and he patted court counsel on the head. Each was prejudicial misconduct. More seriously, he emailed confidential juvenile dependency records, including photographs of unclothed children, to colleagues, a retired judge, and a commission attorney, which the commission found to be willful misconduct. Rejecting the masters’ contrary view, it also held that sending staff and colleagues graphic photos of his own injuries, including his unclothed backside, was prejudicial misconduct.

    Ex parte contacts and courtroom conduct. The commission found willful misconduct where Judge Draper recruited two judges to testify for a litigant with whom he had discussed cases. Disagreeing with the masters, who had called it improper action, it also found willful misconduct where he tried to discuss a restraining-order case with a commissioner, who cut him off. Calling a litigant “a liar and a cheat” and holding him in contempt was likewise willful misconduct.

    Defiance and non-cooperation. The commission found that Judge Draper willfully failed to respond adequately to its investigation letters for more than a year and sent discourteous emails to its staff. While on leave, he sent court leadership rude and abusive emails and repeatedly defied the presiding judge’s directives, including orders not to contact staff or use court systems. Acting in bad faith, he also vacated a colleague’s order granting a peremptory challenge, which went beyond the limits of his authority. The commission did not find credible his claim that he believed the order was invalid.

    Why removal. The commission said Judge Draper had “persistently violated the standards governing judicial behavior.” It treated as aggravating his lack of candor, the number and seriousness of the violations, the harm to individuals and to public confidence, and his continued denial of wrongdoing through oral argument. It gave limited weight to his 14 years without prior discipline and found that his health problems and positive qualities were not substantially mitigating. Because he leaves the bench in January 2027 anyway, the risk of future misconduct carried less weight. Even so, the commission concluded that any lesser sanction would greatly diminish public confidence in the judiciary.

Archived Daily News Stories