Tag: 2025 News

Proposition 103, passed by California voters in 1988, is a landmark insurance reform measure that rolled back auto and homeowners insurance rates by about 20%, established prior approval requirements for rate increases (giving the elected Insurance Commissioner oversight), and created other consumer protections to prevent excessive pricing and ensure fair practices.

Authored by Harvey Rosenfield of Consumer Watchdog, it has saved Californians billions in premiums over the decades but has come under fire amid the state’s ongoing insurance crisis, driven by wildfires, climate change, and rising claims costs. Critics, including some insurers and brokers, argue it stifles market competition and deters companies from offering policies in high-risk areas, leading to insurer pullbacks and coverage gaps.

The conflict escalated in 2025, prompting competing ballot measures for the November 2026 election. One of them was the California Insurance Market Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2026. It was filed in August 2025 by Elizabeth Hammack, a Roseville-based insurance broker and owner of Panorama Insurance Associates.

This initiative sought to overhaul Prop 103 by repealing its core rate-regulation provisions, allowing faster rate approvals, reducing regulatory burdens, and aiming to attract more insurers back to the market. Supporters framed it as essential for stabilizing California’s “free-falling” insurance sector, citing recent catastrophic fires like those in Altadena and Pacific Palisades.

This prompted a response. The Insurance Policyholder Bill of Rights. It was filed on September 22, 2025, by Consumer Watchdog leaders Carmen Balber (executive director), Jamie Court, and Harvey Rosenfield. This measure responded directly to Hammack’s filing and proposed strengthening consumer protections. Key provisions included: Guaranteeing homeowners insurance for those meeting state wildfire mitigation standards (or facing a five-year sales ban for non-compliant insurers).

Consumer Watchdog positioned it as a defense of Prop 103’s legacy while addressing modern challenges like the exodus of five major homeowners insurers from parts of California.

On December 2, 2025 leaders from both sides announced a mutual “armistice,” withdrawing their initiatives from the 2026 ballot. This deal preserves Prop 103’s existing reforms intact for now, avoiding a high-stakes voter showdown that could have divided the insurance debate further.

In a joint statement from Consumer Watchdog, Balber, Court, and Rosenfield explained: “This armistice preserves the landmark protections and consumer savings under insurance reform Proposition 103, which was the principal reason we filed the Policyholder Bill of Rights this year. We said if the broker withdrew, we would withdraw. There is still a huge need for many of the other protections in the ballot measure, including the right to be guaranteed an insurance policy if homeowners meet state wildfire mitigation standards and the right to better claims handling policies.”

“We do not have the financial resources to pursue this fight at this time. However, we will spend the next year building support in order to pressure the insurance industry to sell policies in higher risk areas and to treat their customers better. Polling shows 85% of voters want insurance companies to have a mandate to sell homeowners insurance to people who fire-proof their homes. It’s up to the legislature to enact such changes. If they do not, we will work to have the resources to take this popular fight directly to the voters in 2028.”

California’s insurance market remains strained: Recent laws like SB 1107 (effective January 2026) offer temporary relief by speeding up rate approvals for “good faith” filers, but critics call it a “Band-Aid.”

The competing ballot withdrawals avert a costly signature-gathering and campaign fight (ballot measures require ~546,000 valid signatures), but they don’t resolve underlying tensions – insurers continue to limit policies in fire-prone areas, leaving many homeowners uninsured or underinsured. Public sentiment leans pro-consumer, per the polling cited, which could fuel legislative momentum.

This development highlights the ongoing tug-of-war between deregulation (to lure insurers) and consumer safeguards in a wildfire-ravaged state.

Neill Francis Niblett was employed by the County of Los Angeles’s fire department as a senior mechanic. He frequently voiced complaints about management decisions, often raising his voice toward Samuel S. (a nonparty to this case) who was an assistant chief.

On October 5, 2022, Niblett reportedly acted in a verbally abusive manner after Samuel instructed him to pick up parts left on the floor of a department facility. Several days later, on October 11, 2022, Niblett expressed frustration to department secretary Cari Hughes over the transfer of one of his mechanics without his knowledge. During this conversation, Niblett stated, “If they don’t change things in this department, they’re going to have another situation like they had with Tatone.” This alluded to a June 2021 incident in which firefighter Jonathan Tatone fatally shot a colleague at Fire Station 81.

The County filed a petition for a three-year workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) issued pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.82 that protects nonparty Samuel S.3 from defendant and appellant Neill Francis Niblett on November 18, 2022. It was supported by declarations from Samuel and Hughes. A temporary restraining order was issued shortly thereafter.

Niblett filed a verified response denying the allegations, accompanied by a declaration from union president Luis Del Cid, who described an interaction between Samuel and Niblett but was not a percipient witness. At the January 18, 2023 hearing, Hughes, Samuel, and Del Cid testified; Niblett appeared but did not testify.

The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Niblett’s October 11 statement constituted a credible threat of violence under section 527.8, as it was a knowing and willful statement that would place a reasonable person in fear for their safety or that of their immediate family, serving no legitimate purpose.

The WVRO barred Niblett from harassing Samuel, entering his workplace, or possessing firearms or ammunition, and it was set to expire on January 18, 2026. Due to his conduct, Niblett was placed on leave and had not returned to work as of the hearing.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court in the partially published case of County of Los Angeles v. Neill Francis Niblett  -B327744 (November 2025).

On appeal, Niblett challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the credible threat finding, arguing the statement was mere criticism of management rather than a threat. The appellate court rejected this, holding that substantial evidence – viewed in the light most favorable to the County and under the clear and convincing standard – supported the trial court’s determination. The court reasoned that a reasonable person could interpret Niblett’s reference to the Tatone shooting, made amid ongoing frustrations with department decisions, as an implied threat of violence against management if changes were not made. Samuel, as Niblett’s supervisor and a logical target, was appropriately named as the protected party. The court further concluded that great or irreparable harm would likely result without the order, given the reasonable probability of future unlawful violence.

Niblett’s constitutional claims were also unavailing. His First Amendment challenge failed because the statement qualified as a “true threat,” unprotected by the Constitution. The Second Amendment claim regarding the firearm restriction was rejected, as section 527.8’s provisions align with historical traditions of disarming individuals posing credible threats of violence. Additional claims of error, including procedural and evidentiary issues, were deemed forfeited due to inadequate briefing or being raised for the first time in reply.

Notably, the opinion highlighted concerns over Niblett’s appellate counsel’s apparent misuse of artificial intelligence in preparing the opening brief, which included misrepresentations of case holdings and citation to a nonexistent case. Counsel failed to correct these errors despite the County’s identification of them. In a concurrent ruling, the court ordered counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for undermining the integrity of the appellate process.

The WVRO was affirmed in its entirety.

A federal jury in San Francisco convicted Ruthia He, the founder and CEO of Done, a California-based digital health company, and David Brody, its clinical president, for their roles in a years-long scheme to illegally distribute Adderall over the internet and conspire to commit health care fraud in connection with the submission of false and fraudulent claims for reimbursement for Adderall and other stimulants. Ruthia He was also convicted of conspiring to obstruct justice.

Done Global Inc. was founded in 2019 by Ruthia He, a former Facebook product designer with no medical background. The company capitalized on regulatory changes introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, when the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) relaxed rules requiring in-person consultations for prescribing controlled substances. This allowed Done to offer online access to ADHD medications, including Adderall, Ritalin, and Vyvanse.

According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, He and Brody conspired with others to build a billion-dollar technology company and raise money from investors by providing easy access to over 40 million pills of Adderall and other stimulants in exchange for payment of a monthly subscription fee. They both spent over $40 million on deceptive advertisements on social media networks that sought to convince Americans challenged by a lack of structure during the COVID-19 pandemic that they were suffering from ADHD. Defendants also paid for targeted keyword search advertisements for drug seekers who wanted to obtain Adderall without a legal prescription.

The evidence at trial showed that He and Brody sought to place “hard limits” on clinical discretion by limiting the length of the initial appointment to less than half the length of a typical psychiatric examination, and seeking to increase profits by refusing to pay for any follow-up treatment. In order to facilitate the illegal prescriptions, He paid nurse practitioners around the country up to $60,000 per month to refill prescriptions without clinical interaction, and enabled an “auto-refill” technology feature where patients could receive prescriptions without clinical interaction for years based on an auto-generated email sent each month requesting additional prescriptions. The auto-refill policy, in some instances, resulted in prescriptions being issued for deceased patients.

He instructed employees that successful technology companies profit off addiction, and offered an expensive luxury electric vehicle to employees who broke the law. Brody told nurses to continue prescribing Adderall, even to patients who were abusing other medications, and to disregard the risk of going to jail. He and Brody also prohibited independent clinical practitioners from discharging patients, and patients were not discharged and continued to receive Adderall even after concerned family members repeatedly notified Done that their children were suffering from bipolar, Adderall-induced psychosis, or other mental health conditions that could be worsened by continued prescriptions.

In order to ensure that members continued paying monthly subscription fees, He, Brody, and others conspired to defraud insurers so that Done members would be able to use insurance to pay for Adderall dispensed at pharmacies. He, Brody, and others submitted false and fraudulent prior authorization requests to insurers, which claimed that Done followed the DSM-5 in diagnosing ADHD, utilized urine drug screens, and falsely claimed that non-stimulants had previously been tried without success. As a result, Medicare, Medicaid, and the commercial insurers paid in excess of approximately $14 million.

In 2022, national media outlets reported that Done was making Adderall too easy to get online. In response to questions from the media, investors, and certain major pharmacy chains, the defendants made deceptive statements about Done’s policies. While internal documents showed that the defendants followed a “customer-first” philosophy where they attempted to obtain customer approval ratings higher than America’s highest-rated retailers, offered second opinions to patients who complained of being denied Adderall, and that He – who had no medical training – ultimately was responsible for approving clinical practices, The defendants falsely denied the existence of these policies and claimed Done was run by independent clinical leadership.

To obstruct the government’s investigation, the evidence at trial showed that He moved operations to China to make personnel and evidence unavailable. He limited her communications on company platforms, used encrypted messaging apps with disappearing messages, and deleted incriminatory documents, such as language encouraging Done providers to provide Adderall even to patients who did not have ADHD. He also transferred over $1 million to a Chinese shell company named Make Believe Asia, conducted internet searches for countries that did not have extradition, and was stopped by law enforcement leaving the country.

He and Brody were both convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, four counts of distribution of controlled substances, and one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud. He was also convicted of one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice. He and Brody each face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison on the conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and distribution of controlled substances counts. Sentencings are set for Feb. 25, 2026. Judge Breyer will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

In a newly published decision, the California Court of Appeal (Second District, Division Eight) affirmed the dismissal of a representative PAGA action on claim preclusion grounds, holding that a prior global PAGA settlement barred a subsequent plaintiff’s overlapping claims – even though the settling plaintiff had filed an amended complaint only 35 days after submitting an amended Labor & Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) notice for newly added claims and defendants.

In this case Lauren Brown, a former Dave & Buster’s employee, filed a standalone PAGA suit in June 2019 alleging meal and rest-break violations, off-the-clock work, inaccurate wage statements, and unpaid vacation wages under Labor Code § 227.3.

At that time, at least four other PAGA actions were already pending against the same Dave & Buster’s entities. One of those earlier actions – Andrade v. Dave & Buster’s Management Corporation, Inc. (San Diego Superior Court) -ultimately achieved a court-approved global settlement in November 2022 that expressly released all of the claims Brown was asserting, including the § 227.3 vacation claim, and covered all three Dave & Buster’s entities Brown had sued.

Dave & Buster’s successfully moved for judgment on the pleadings in Brown’s case, contending that the Andrade settlement constituted a final judgment on the merits of the same cause of action between parties in privity, thereby precluding Brown’s suit. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action with prejudice.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal in the published case of Brown v. Dave & Buster’s of California, Inc. -B339729 (November 2025).

On appeal, Brown conceded that the Andrade settlement precluded her non-vacation claims but argued that (1) she retained standing to pursue post-settlement violations (a contention the Court of Appeal swiftly rejected, noting her employment ended in 2018), and (2) Andrade’s failure to wait the full 65 days after her amended LWDA notice meant Andrade was never “deputized” to pursue or settle the newly added vacation-pay claim and additional entities, relying heavily on LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1172.

The Court of Appeal distinguished LaCour, in which the prior settling plaintiff had never provided LWDA notice of the additional claims at all. Here, Andrade did provide an amended notice that specifically identified the § 227.3 claim and the additional defendants. The court held that the statutory 65-day waiting period does not explicitly apply to amended notices, and even if it did, Andrade substantially complied with PAGA’s administrative exhaustion requirement by giving the LWDA actual notice and an opportunity to act. The LWDA’s subsequent acceptance of the settlement (without objection) rendered the premature filing a harmless technical defect.

Citing federal district court authority and the longstanding doctrine of substantial compliance (historically applied to Government Claims Act notices), the panel concluded that invalidating the settlement on this ground would improperly allow later PAGA plaintiffs to collaterally attack prior approved settlements – an outcome the Supreme Court expressly rejected in Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664.

Accordingly, the Andrade settlement fully released Brown’s claims against all defendants, satisfying every element of claim preclusion. The judgment dismissing Brown’s action was affirmed, with costs awarded to Dave & Buster’s.

The decision reinforces the finality of approved PAGA settlements and signals that minor procedural deviations in administrative exhaustion will not undermine claim preclusion when the LWDA received actual notice and declined to intervene.

Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 36 is a landmark 2013 California Court of Appeal decision that clarified minimum wage obligations for employees compensated on a piece-rate basis. Drawing heavily on Armenta v. Osmose, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 314 – which prohibited averaging for hourly employees – the Gonzalez court extended the principle to piece-rate systems. Piece-rate compensation rewards only productive tasks (the “pieces” or “flag hours”), so time spent on non-piece-rate activities (including waiting time under the employer’s control) must be separately compensated at no less than the minimum wage. Averaging effectively “borrows” from productive-time earnings to cover non-productive hours, which California law forbids because it undermines the statutory guarantee of minimum pay for all hours worked.

Following Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 36, the dealership (operating as First Honda Simi Valley) replaced its pure piece-rate (“flag hour”) system in December 2014 with an hourly compensation that paid technicians double the applicable minimum wage for every hour recorded on the biometric time clock (including unproductive time and rest periods), with an additional “flag bonus” paid only when the technician’s flag-hour earnings exceeded the guaranteed hourly pay. The plan explicitly labeled the excess amount as a “bonus” and described as compensation for performance “above and beyond a median, expected level.”

“Flag hours” (also called “book hours,” “flat-rate hours,” or “warranty time”) are the predetermined, fixed amount of time that a manufacturer or industry standard assigns to a specific repair or maintenance task, regardless of how long the task actually takes the technician to perform. These flag hours are intended to represent the amount of time a reasonably skilled technician, using proper tools and working at a normal pace, should need to complete the job. For example, the manufacturer may assign 3.2 flag hours to replace a timing belt. If the technician finishes in 2 hours → they still “flag” (earn credit for) 3.2 hours. If the technician takes 5 hours → they still only flag 3.2 hours.

Plaintiffs Gustavo Mora and Mohammad Hanif, former service technicians, filed a lawsuit in 2018 alleging 7 causes of action for wage theft violations, and the case was later amended to include a PAGA cause of action on behalf of plaintiffs and “other employees of” First Honda. Plaintiffs contended that First Honda Simi Valley still violated California’s “no borrowing rule” because unproductive time generated no flag hours, and the dealership was therefore allegedly using potential bonus money to satisfy minimum-wage obligations.

The trial court initially ordered the parties to arbitrate the case pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, but subsequently withdrew the matter from arbitration at appellants’ request, after First Honda failed to timely pay its arbitration fees. After a bench trial, the trial court upheld the dealership’s post-Gonzalez hourly-plus-bonus compensation plan for service technicians and rejected both individual and PAGA claims.

The Second District Court of Appeal (Division Six) affirmed the judgment in favor of the Honda dealership in the published case of Mora v. C.E. Enterprises, Inc. – No. B337830 (November 2025).

The Court of Appeal rejected plaintiffs characterization, holding that the plan complied with California law because technicians were always paid at least double minimum wage for all hours worked, with any flag bonus paid on top as true incentive pay rather than as part of the base rate. The court distinguished Gonzalez, noting that the dealership never averaged or borrowed from productivity pay to meet the minimum-wage floor; the hourly guarantee stood alone and was always satisfied independently.

The court also held that the plan did not violate Labor Code section 226.2. Even assuming the flag bonus constituted piece-rate compensation, the dealership qualified for the safe-harbor provision of section 226.2, subdivision (a)(7) because it expressly paid “an hourly rate of at least the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked” in addition to any flag-hour bonus.

Finally, the court affirmed the trial court judgment against plaintiffs’ PAGA claim. Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to alleged violations affecting sales and lube employees (the PAGA notice covered only service technicians), and their trial presentation – consisting largely of a law clerk’s assertion that thousands of pay records contained “deficiencies” without concrete examples or calculations – was insufficient to carry their burden of proof.