Tag: 2025 News

Based upon a stipulated Award of May 27, 2015 it was found that while employed on December 19, 2013 as a tower technician by Pearce Services Inc., Andres Hernandez sustained industrial injury to the left knee causing temporary disability from June 23, 2014 to July 6, 2014, permanent disability of 14%, and the need for further medical treatment.

On August 13, 2015, defendant sent applicant a notice that permanent disability payments were ending because the full amount of the stipulated Award had been paid. The notice sent contained all the information required by Administrative Rule 9812(d). (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9812, subd. (d).)

Applicant apparently continued to be provided medical care for his injury on an industrial basis and underwent surgery on October 30, 2018. Defendant reinitiated temporary disability benefits commencing November 3, 2018. On November 14, 2018, defendant sent a notice of resumed temporary disability benefit payments pursuant to Administrative Rule 9812(b) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9812, subd. (b)). Defendant then determined that applicant was entitled to temporary disability benefits at a higher rate pursuant to Labor Code section 4661.5 and sent the appropriate notice on November 28, 2018 pursuant to Administrative Rule 9812(c) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9812, subd. (c).)

On December 17, 2018, defendant sent applicant a notice that temporary disability benefits were ending pursuant to Labor Code section 4656(c)(2) which states that, save exceptions not applicable to the current case, temporary disability indemnity is payable only within five years of the date of injury. Defendant sent applicant a notice that complied with Administrative Rule 9812(d) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9812, subd. (d).)

Additionally, along with the notice that temporary disability was ending, defendant sent a notice pursuant to Administrative Rule 9812(e) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9812, subd. (e)) that applicant’s condition was not yet permanent and stationary and that: “[I]t is too soon to tell if you will have any permanent disability from your injury. I will be checking with your doctor until your condition is permanent and stationary. At that time, your doctor will determine whether you have any permanent disability and if there will be a need for future medical care. I expect to have my information by 3/16/19. I will notify you of the status of permanent disability at that time.”

On February 19, 2019, Hernandez filed a Petition to Reopen alleging that he underwent surgery of his left knee in October of 2018 and that his condition had significantly worsened since the issuance of the stipulated Award. On December 23, 2019 the WCJ found that Hernandez’s Petition to Reopen was barred by the five-year statute of limitations contained in Labor Code section 5410.

After filing a Petition for Reconsideration, the WCAB affirmed the WCJ’s decision in the case of Hernandez v Pearce Services Inc. -ADJ9972218 (May 2025).

Applicant argues that that the statute of limitations should be tolled because he was “misled” by defendant’s claims examiner into not timely filing a petition to reopen. In other contexts, the mere furnishing of benefits without an unequivocal denial in and of itself tolls the statute of limitations.

For instance in McDaniel v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1011 [55 Cal.Comp.Cases 72], the Court of Appeal held that when a defendant provides medical treatment benefits knowing of a potential claim for workers’ compensation benefits, the provision of treatment tolls the one-year limitation period of Labor Code section 5405(c) and triggers the five year period of Labor Code section 5410, running from the date of injury. Only after an explicit unequivocal denial of liability does the statute revert to one year from the denial.

The WCAB noted however that “while McDaniel and similar cases find that the mere furnishing of benefits tolls the one-year statute of limitations found in Labor Code section 5405 for the initial claim of benefits, these claims still remain subject to the five-year statute found in section 5410. While the liberal rules of pleading and construction of the workers’ compensation system militate in favor of tolling of the one-year statute, once five years from the date of injury has elapsed the initial interest favoring an injured worker’s right to present their case on the merits must also be balanced against the interest in finality.”

“As the Supreme Court explained in Nickelsberg v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 288, 299 [56 Cal.Comp.Cases 476], section 5410 does ‘not express a mere concern for barring stale claims. The statute[] express[es] legislative concern for certainty and finality in the determination of compensation benefit obligations.’ “

“Here, there was no legal obligation to inform applicant of the upcoming five-year statute, and, in any case, there was no evidence that the claims representative intentionally withheld this information. Defendant merely paid the legally required benefits and provided the legally required notices.”

The Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles Office of the WCAB issued a notice early this week that he “just received word from our DIR safety and security detail that the WCAB Los Angeles District Office will be closed the remainder of this week due to the civil unrest that has been occurring for the last five days.” The announcement went on to say that in person hearings will proceed using the Court Call platform.

This office of the WCAB is located in the downtown Los Angeles area in close proximity to the federal buildings which are the center of attention of civil unrest related to protests over recent Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) activity in the County and City of Los Angeles. ICE is a federal law enforcement agency under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Its primary mission is to enforce immigration laws and customs regulations in the United States.

On November 19, 2024, the Los Angeles City Council unanimously passed a sanctuary city ordinance (13-0 vote, with two council members absent) that prohibits the use of city resources, property, or personnel for federal immigration enforcement. This ordinance codifies protections for immigrants into municipal law, including barring city employees from inquiring about or sharing information on immigration status and prohibiting cooperation with federal immigration agents unless required by state law. It was signed into effect by Mayor Karen Bass and went into effect within 10 days due to an urgency clause. A revised version of the ordinance, approved on December 4, 2024, included exceptions for cases involving individuals convicted of serious felony crimes, allowing limited cooperation with federal authorities in such instances.

The County of Los Angeles has not formally declared itself a “sanctuary county” through a specific ordinance or resolution, unlike the City of Los Angeles. However, it is listed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a “sanctuary jurisdiction” due to policies that limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. These policies align with California’s Senate Bill 54 (SB 54), the California Values Act of 2017, which restricts local and state agencies from cooperating with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on immigration enforcement for individuals who have committed misdemeanors.

The current Los Angeles protests, which began on June 6, 2025, have included demands for the release of ICE detainees held in downtown Los Angeles, particularly at the Metropolitan Detention Center and the Edward R. Roybal Federal Building. Hundreds of protesters have rallied outside these federal facilities, condemning the ICE raids that resulted in at least 44 arrests across the city on June 6. Demonstrators, including community organizers and families of detainees, have specifically called for the release of those detained, such as Service Employees International Union (SEIU) California President David Huerta, who was arrested during the raids. Protests have involved blocking entrances to federal buildings and clashing with law enforcement, leading to the deployment of tear gas, flash-bang grenades, and less-lethal munitions by federal agents and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).

Now a political turf war has been launched after President Trump issued a Memorandum on June 7, 2025 “call[ing] into Federal service members and units of the National Guard.” Secretary of Defense Hegseth, in turn, issued a Memorandum (DOD Order) that same day to the Adjutant General of California, ordering 2,000 California National Guard members into federal service. And on June 9, 2025, Secretary Hegseth issued another Memorandum (June 9 DOD Order) ordering an additional 2,000 California National Guard members into federal service.

This federal activity was based upon presidential authority created by federal law 10 U.S.C. §12406 which provides in part that whenever “(2) there is a rebellion or danger of a rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States; or (3) the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States;” …. “the President may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State in such numbers as he considers necessary to repel the invasion, suppress the rebacllion, or execute those laws. Orders for these purposes shall be issued through the governors of the States..”

In response, on June 9th Governor Newsome filed case 3:25-cv-04870 in United States District Court for the Northern District of California alleging that 10 U.S.C. §12406 does not authorize President Trump to call the National Guard into Federal service unless the “State requests or consents to federal control.” In this case the lawsuit asserts that Governor Gavin Newsom did not request or consent to the federal control of the State National Guard.

Concurrently he filed an Ex-Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order against Pete Hegseth, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Defense, and the United States Department of Defense from taking any of the actions described in Plaintiffs’ contemporaneously-filed Proposed Order and Order to Show Cause.

According the the Docket, responses to the request for a TRO are due by 6/11/2025, and replies are due by 6/12/2025. The Motion Hearing is set for 6/12/2025 at 1:30 PM in San Francisco, Courtroom 06, 17th Floor, and by videoconference (Zoom Webinar) before Judge Charles R. Breyer. All counsel, members of the public, and media may access the webinar information at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/crb. Zoom guidance and setup can be found at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/zoom/.

Monroe Operations, LLC, doing business as Newport Healthcare is a nationwide behavioral healthcare company which provides therapy for individuals with mental health issues. It has residential treatment facilities across the country including in California, Utah, Minnesota, Connecticut, and Washington.

Prior to starting her employment at Newport Healthcare, Karla Velarde worked as a customer service agent for Air Tahiti. However, she was laid off in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was unemployed for nine months until Newport Healthcare agreed to hire her as a care coordinator.

Newport Healthcare required Velarde to attend an orientation scheduled for her first day of work. Upon arriving at Newport Healthcare’s office, Velarde was escorted to a large conference room where she waited until an HR manager arrived. The HR manager presented Velarde with “a stack of [31] documents and told [her she] was required to complete the forms before [she] could start working.” The HR manager told her, ‘“we gotta get through [these to] get you onboard. We’ll try to get through them as fast as possible.”’ Velarde “felt pressured to fill out the forms quickly, since [the HR manager] was waiting for [her] . . . .”

One of the documents was an arbitration agreement, which Velarde refused to sign because she “did not understand what it was.” Velarde told the HR manager that because she did not understand what it was, she did not feel comfortable signing it. The HR manager told her, “‘if there are ever any issues, [the arbitration agreement] will allow us to resolve them for you.”’ Velarde asked if she needed to sign the agreement in order to start working. The HR manager responded, ‘“Yes. This will help us resolve any issues without having to pay lawyers.”’ Velarde executed the agreement because she “knew that [she] had to sign it to begin working . . . .”

Newport Healthcare later terminated Velarde’s employment. Velarde filed a lawsuit alleging, among other things, discrimination, retaliation, and violation of whistleblower protections against Newport Healthcare and its director of residential services, Amanda Seymour.

Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration which the trial court denied. The trial court ruled Newport Healthcare pressured Velarde to sign the agreement, which she did not want to do, and the agreement unlawfully prohibited Velarde from seeking judicial review of an arbitration award. On appeal, Appellants take issue with the trial court interpreting the agreement in a manner which bars judicial review of an arbitration award.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court denial of the motion to compel arbitration in the published case of Velarde v. Monroe Operations, CA4/3 – G063626 – (June 2025).

“Procedural unconscionability ‘addresses the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power.’” (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 492.) “This element is generally established by showing the agreement is a contract of adhesion, i.e., a ‘standardized contract which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’” (Ibid.)

“Substantive unconscionability looks beyond the circumstances of contract formation and considers ‘the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms’ [citation], focusing on whether the contract will create unfair or one-sided results [citation].” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493.) Substantively “[u]nconscionable terms “‘impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy”’ or attempt to impermissibly alter fundamental legal duties. [Citation.] They may include fine-print terms, unreasonably or unexpectedly harsh terms regarding price or other central aspects of the transaction, and terms that undermine the nondrafting party’s reasonable expectations.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 130 (OTO).)

After a review of the record, the Court of Appeal noted that there “was extensive evidence of procedural unconscionability, with an adhesive contract, buried in a stack of 31 documents to be signed as quickly as possible while a human resources (HR) manager waited, before Velarde could start work that same day.

“Most problematically, in response to Velarde’s statements that she was uncomfortable signing the arbitration agreement as she did not understand it, false representations were made by Newport Healthcare’s HR manager to Velarde about the nature and terms of the agreement.”

“These representations, which specifically and directly contradicted the written terms of the agreement, rendered aspects of the agreement substantively unconscionable. These procedural and substantively unconscionable aspects, taken together, render the agreement unenforceable.”

Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman employed by the Ohio Department of Youth Services, applied for a management position in 2019 but was denied in favor of a lesbian candidate. She was subsequently demoted from her program administrator role to a lower-paying secretarial position, which was then filled by a gay man.

Ames filed a lawsuit under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on her sexual orientation. The District Court granted summary judgment to the agency, citing Sixth Circuit precedent requiring majority-group plaintiffs (like heterosexuals) to show “background circumstances” indicating discrimination against the majority. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reinforcing a circuit split on whether majority-group plaintiffs face a higher evidentiary burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

In the unanimous decision in Ames v Ohio Department of Youth Services – 23-1039 – (June 2025), the United State Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case, holding that Title VII does not impose a heightened evidentiary standard on majority-group plaintiffs. The “background circumstances” rule, which required majority-group plaintiffs to provide additional evidence suggesting that the employer discriminates against the majority, was deemed inconsistent with Title VII’s text and Supreme Court precedents.

Ohio conceded that Title VII imposes the same standard for all plaintiffs but argued the “background circumstances” rule was not a heightened burden. The Court rejected this, noting the Sixth Circuit explicitly applied a higher standard to Ames because of her heterosexual status.

The Court emphasized that Title VII prohibits discrimination against “any individual” based on protected characteristics (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), without distinguishing between majority and minority groups. The statute’s focus is on individual protection, not group status (citing Bostock v. Clayton County 140 S.Ct. 1731 (2020) 590 U.S. 644).

Prior cases, such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) confirm that Title VII applies equally to all individuals, regardless of majority or minority status. The “background circumstances” rule violated this principle by imposing a higher burden on majority-group plaintiffs.

The Court reiterated that the McDonnell Douglas framework is a flexible, burden-shifting tool to evaluate disparate-treatment claims based on circumstantial evidence. The prima facie burden is not onerous, and the Sixth Circuit’s additional requirement for majority-group plaintiffs was an inflexible and improper deviation.

Justice Thomas agreed with the majority but wrote separately to criticize judge-made doctrines like the “background circumstances” rule and the McDonnell Douglas framework itself.

He argued that the “background circumstances” rule lacks textual basis in Title VII, distorts the statute by imposing unequal burdens, and is unworkable due to the difficulty of defining “majority” status (e.g., by race, sex, or religion) in varying contexts.

Thomas expressed skepticism about the McDonnell Douglas framework’s applicability at the summary judgment stage, noting its lack of textual grounding, incompatibility with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, failure to capture all ways to prove discrimination (e.g., mixed-motive cases), and tendency to cause judicial confusion. He suggested the Court reconsider its use in a future case.

The decision eliminates a circuit split, clarifying that Title VII’s protections apply uniformly to all plaintiffs, regardless of majority or minority status, and reinforces the statute’s focus on individual discrimination. It also signals potential future scrutiny of the McDonnell Douglas framework itself.

Hector Gutierrez began working as a school janitor and maintenance worker in August 2011 at Inglewood Middle School Academy. The school operated under the control of Inner City Education Foundation (ICEF).

On February 14, 2012, at the end of the school day, Gutierrez walked to the school’s front office, where school employees had gathered and were laughing. The principal angrily approached plaintiff and, “out of nowhere,” violently kicked him in the groin, causing plaintiff to bend over in “agony.” Several employees saw the incident and laughed. Plaintiff suffered severe pain and emotional distress and has been unable to work since the injury. His last day of work due to the injury was June 29, 2012.

Later, Gutierrez filed three separate worker’s compensation claims with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. Two of those claims – one with an injury date of February 14, 2022, and another filed January 12, 2023 – related to injuries he allegedly sustained from the kick to the groin. As to the January 2023 claim, Gutierrez alleged, “In retrospect beginning 3 weeks or so later after the kick applicant believes depression and other factors caused by the assault unbeknownst to him has caused him to become morbidly obese.”

On January 10, 2023, Gutierrez (in pro. per.) sued ICEF for general negligence, intentional tort, and sexual assault and battery based on injuries he allegedly sustained from the principal’s kick to his groin almost 11 years earlier. ICEF demurred on the following grounds: (1) the Worker’s Compensation Appeals Board had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s injury claims; (2) worker’s compensation was plaintiff’s exclusive remedy; and (3) plaintiff’s claims were time barred. Plaintiff did not file an opposition. On April 18, 2023, the court sustained ICEF’s demurrer with leave to amend.

Plaintiff filed his FAC on May 9, 2023. He again pleaded the same causes of action, except for “intentional tort,” and added causes of action – without the court’s permission – for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well “malice.” ICEF demurred on the same grounds as before and argued the new causes of action were time-barred, insufficiently pleaded, or weren’t causes of action at all.

The court sustained ICEF’s demurrer without leave to amend. The court found plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the FAC’s allegations were insufficient to state a cause of action. The court also noted plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support an exception to worker’s compensation exclusivity.

After judgment had been entered, on September 27, 2023, plaintiff moved for reconsideration. Plaintiff accused ICEF’s attorneys of fraud and of having “bamboozled” the court into believing counsel had agreed to give plaintiff more time to respond to discovery, not to a continuance of the demurrer hearing. Plaintiff argued “[d]efendants” violated his due process rights.

The court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed the judgment of dismissal on the grounds he was denied his federal constitutional rights to due process and of access to the courts under the Fourteenth and First Amendments, respectively.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court in the unpublished case of Gutierrez v Inner City Education Foundation CA2/3 – B333337 – (June 2025)

The Court of Appeal noted it reviewed the record and found no error.

“The record shows plaintiff received adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the court. After ICEF demurred to plaintiff’s initial complaint, he had an opportunity to file his FAC. At plaintiff’s request, the court continued the hearing on ICEF’s demurrer to the FAC from July to August 2023 due to plaintiff’s medical emergency. Before ruling on ICEF’s demurrer, the court considered the written response plaintiff filed, even though he filed the response late and did not appear at the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b) [opposition papers must be filed nine court days before the hearing].)8 Indeed, the court explained in detail plaintiff’s position in its ruling.”

“Nor did plaintiff demonstrate he did not receive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  … “Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden on appeal to demonstrate the court erred in sustaining ICEF’s demurrer to his FAC or that it abused its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend the FAC.”