Tag: 2025 News

Manuel Contreras worked for Green Thumb Produce, Inc., a produce packaging company, from 2016 to 2020, primarily in the sanitation department driving forklifts. During his employment, he discovered he was being paid less than other employees performing similar duties, including some with less seniority. He raised this pay disparity with his supervisors multiple times, but no action was taken. In August 2020, Contreras researched his legal rights, believing the law required equal pay for equal work. He contacted the Labor Commissioner’s Office in San Bernardino County, where a deputy labor commissioner suggested Green Thumb might be violating the law and referred him to the California Equal Pay Act (EPA) and the office’s website.

Contreras reviewed a seven-page FAQ document titled “California Equal Pay Act: Frequently Asked Questions,” which he interpreted as applying to his situation, even though he did not believe the pay difference was due to his gender, race, or ethnicity. On September 3, 2020, he brought the FAQ to work to request a raise from human resources. During lunch, he discussed it with coworkers to find a witness, leading to an encounter with his manager, Miguel Ramos, who took him to HR manager Sendy Ochoa. Contreras explained the FAQ and requested a raise, but Ochoa denied it, accused him of insubordination after he stated he would no longer drive a forklift (meaning additional duties, not his primary one), and sent him home. The next day, Contreras was terminated via security escort and a letter citing violations of company policies, such as disrupting work and refusing instructions.

In 2021, Contreras sued Green Thumb Produce, Inc., for wrongful termination. In his operative first amended complaint filed in 2023, he asserted three causes of action under the California Labor Code: (1) retaliation for exercising employment rights (§ 98.6), (2) whistleblower retaliation (§ 1102.5(b)), alleging he was fired for reporting a believed EPA violation, and (3) retaliation for discussing wages (§ 232). The case proceeded to a jury trial in 2023. The jury found in Contreras’s favor on all three claims, awarding $53,000 in past economic damages, $72,428 in future economic damages, and $47,000 in past non-economic damages, totaling $172,428, plus statutory penalties.

After the verdict, Green Thumb filed a motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on August 18, 2023, challenging only the whistleblower retaliation claim under § 1102.5(b). The trial court granted the partial JNOV, ruling that Contreras’s testimony showed he had not complained of any actual legal violation and could not “make up a non-existent law” for § 1102.5 protections. It entered a second amended judgment on November 20, 2023, reducing penalties to $10,000 (for § 98.6 only) and awarding Contreras $182,428 total. Contreras appealed this ruling, arguing substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding of his reasonable belief in an EPA violation.

The Court of Appeal reversed the JNOV ruling and directed the trial court to reinstate the jury’s verdict in the published case of Contreras v Green Thumb Produce -D085440 (December 2025).

The Court of Appeal first clarified that § 1102.5(b), California’s whistleblower statute, protects employees from retaliation for disclosing information they reasonably believe reveals a legal violation, emphasizing objective reasonableness without requiring proof of an actual violation.

It rejected Green Thumb’s argument that a mistaken legal interpretation automatically defeats a claim, identifying three scenarios of employee mistakes (law, facts, or both) and focusing on reasonableness to align with the statute’s purpose of encouraging reports without fear.

The court dismissed hypotheticals of patently unreasonable beliefs (e.g., mandatory 100% raises) as failing the objective reasonableness test. It then found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict: Contreras’s consultation with a deputy labor commissioner (who suggested a possible violation), his lay interpretation of the FAQ (which often omitted protected classes and could mislead a non-lawyer), and his testimony.

The FAQ’s structure, starting with expansions beyond original gender protections and questions like 9 focusing on “substantially similar work,” supported a reasonable lay misinterpretation, especially given the EPA’s name and Contreras’s limited education. The court distinguished this from cases where no legal foundation was cited, noting Contreras pointed to the EPA as his basis.

Veronica McRae filed a claim with the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) for death benefits as the alleged widow of a deceased worker who had been injured at the Port of Oakland and later passed away. Homeport Insurance, the insurer for the employer, participated in mediation and reached a settlement with McRae. Pursuant to an application under federal law, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an order approving the settlement, requiring Homeport to pay McRae $425,000 for all claims related to disability, medical, and death benefits, and an additional $30,000 directly to her attorneys – Philip Weltin, Daniel Weltin, and their firm, Weltin, Streb & Weltin, LLP – for fees and costs.

Approximately nine months later, the decedent’s daughter informed Homeport that her father had not been married to McRae at the time of his death. Homeport’s investigation revealed a 2010 judgment dissolving the marriage between McRae and the decedent, as well as McRae’s unsuccessful 2022 motion to set aside that default judgment. Homeport then moved with the DOL to vacate the ALJ’s order, alleging it was procured through McRae’s fraud.

While that motion was pending, Homeport initiated a state court lawsuit in Alameda County Superior Court against McRae and her attorneys asserting claims for conversion, imposition of a constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and injunctive and declaratory relief. It also sued McRae separately for fraud.

The attorneys filed a special motion to strike Homeport’s complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), arguing that the claims arose from their protected petitioning activity in representing McRae in the administrative proceeding. They contended Homeport could not prevail because it had no ownership interest in the attorney fees (which were ordered paid directly by the ALJ), the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47) barred liability, and the economic loss rule applied. Homeport opposed the motion, arguing it was untimely, the claims did not arise from protected activity (but rather McRae’s fraud, which was not a public issue), the illegality exception to anti-SLAPP applied, and it had a probability of prevailing based on evidence of McRae’s misrepresentation and its right to the funds.

The trial court granted the attorneys’ anti-SLAPP motion and struck Homeport’s complaint in its entirety. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order striking the complaint in the unpublished case of Homeport Insurance v. McRae -A172243 (December 2025).

The Court of Appeal conducted a de novo review, applying the two-prong anti-SLAPP framework. On prong one (protected activity), the court focused on whether the attorneys’ conduct giving rise to liability fell under section 425.16, subdivision (e) – statements or writings in judicial or official proceedings. It concluded that Homeport’s claims, particularly the conversion claim (from which the others derived), arose from the attorneys’ prosecution of McRae’s allegedly fraudulent LHWCA claim and the procurement of the ALJ order.

The court emphasized that the “wrongful act” element of conversion was tied to these petitioning activities, not merely the receipt of funds. It distinguished cases like Drell v. Cohen (2014) and Optional Capital, Inc. v. DAS Corp. (2014), where protected activity was incidental, and analogized to Rusheen v. Cohen (2006), where noncommunicative acts (like levying on property) were protected if necessarily related to privileged communications.

The court rejected Homeport’s argument that the attorneys failed to identify specific protected acts, as the claims were not “mixed” but entirely based on protected conduct. It also dismissed the illegality exception from Flatley v. Mauro (2006), finding no conclusive evidence that the attorneys knowingly made false representations under the LHWCA’s fraud provision (33 U.S.C. § 931(a)).

On prong two (probability of prevailing), the court held that Homeport failed to meet its burden. It noted Homeport forfeited any challenge to the litigation privilege by not addressing it in its opening brief, but even on the merits, the privilege applied to communications and related acts in the administrative proceeding, including receipt of fees under the ALJ order. Drawing again from Rusheen, the court reasoned that the attorneys’ retention of funds was not an independent wrong but stemmed from the privileged prosecution of the claim.

Homeport also failed to show conversion, as it lacked evidence of a right to the fees or wrongful possession by the attorneys. The court dismissed Homeport’s reliance on a temporary restraining order against McRae (obtained before the attorneys appeared) and other undeveloped arguments, such as public interest concerns or comparisons to New York and Texas law.

The court remanded for the trial court to determine the attorneys’ appellate attorney fees and costs under section 425.16, subdivision (c), as prevailing defendants are entitled to them..

Litigation originated against Sierra Pacific Industries in October 2018 when plaintiff Quinton McDonald, a former nonexempt employee at one of Sierra Pacific’s California sawmills, filed a class action complaint alleging various wage and hour violations under the Labor Code and related unfair competition claims under the Business and Professions Code. The complaint sought to represent eight classes of current and former nonexempt employees, without excluding those who had signed arbitration agreements.

Sierra Pacific, a lumber manufacturer operating facilities across California, answered the initial complaint without asserting arbitration as an affirmative defense. Although it briefly raised arbitration in its response to the first amended complaint in 2019, it omitted the defense from its answer to the operative second amended complaint filed in 2021.

Discovery proved contentious. In December 2018, McDonald requested production of documents, including arbitration agreements applicable to nonexempt employees. Sierra Pacific objected on grounds of overbreadth and third-party privacy. The trial court granted McDonald’s motion to compel in February 2020, ordering production of the agreements without confidentiality restrictions absent a protective order.

Sierra Pacific’s supplemental response provided only an unsigned form agreement and stated that approximately 2,000 nonexempt employees had signed it, without producing signed copies or identifying signatories. Despite multiple instances of monetary sanctions for other discovery violations in 2022, Sierra Pacific did not produce signed agreements until after class certification.

Plaintiffs,including Gary W. Dunehew and Robert L. Sherrill, moved for class certification in October 2021, proposing classes that included signatory employees. Sierra Pacific opposed, noting the existence of arbitration agreements but producing only one unsigned form. The trial court certified eight classes in November 2022. Shortly thereafter, in response to a new production request, Sierra Pacific disclosed over 3,400 signed agreements between January and March 2023. It immediately moved to compel arbitration against absent class members who had signed the agreements, arguing the Federal Arbitration Act governed and that the motion was timely under Sky Sports, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1363, as it could not enforce arbitration against unnamed class members pre-certification.

Plaintiffs opposed on waiver grounds and separately moved for sanctions based on Sierra Pacific’s failure to comply with the February 2020 order. They highlighted Sierra Pacific’s extensive participation in classwide discovery involving signatories (e.g., producing records for 642 signatories in a sample of 1,388 putative members without differentiation), reliance on signatory declarations to oppose certification, and involvement in two mediations aimed at classwide settlements.

The trial court denied the motion to compel in August 2023, applying the multifactor test from St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187 and finding Sierra Pacific’s conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. It also granted sanctions, precluding Sierra Pacific from introducing evidence of the agreements or arguing that class members signed them.

On appeal, the appellate court reviewed the waiver finding de novo under the updated standard from Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, which requires clear and convincing evidence that the party knew of its arbitration right and intentionally relinquished it through inconsistent conduct, without requiring prejudice.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant Sierra Pacific Industries’ motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the appeal from the trial court’s order imposing evidentiary and issue sanctions.In the published case of Sierra Pacific Industries Wage and Hour Cases -C099436 (December 2025).

The court concluded Sierra Pacific waived its rights, emphasizing its years-long litigation without asserting arbitration, defiance of the discovery order, undifferentiated class discovery, mediation participation, and deletion of the arbitration defense. It distinguished cases like Sky Sports, Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, and Piplack v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1281, where delays were justified by intervening legal changes, and drew support from Hill v. Xerox Business Services, LLC (9th Cir. 2023) 59 F.4th 457, holding that pre-certification conduct can establish waiver.
Regarding sanctions, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as no statute authorizes direct appeal from evidentiary or issue sanctions orders (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1). It rejected Sierra Pacific’s argument that the order was effectively an arbitration denial appealable under section 1294 or ancillary under section 1294.2, noting the motions’ distinct purposes and logical separateness.

A former physician from Santa Monica was sentenced today to 30 months in federal prison for repeatedly selling vials of ketamine to actor and author Matthew Perry despite knowing Perry’s well-documented history of drug addiction and that Perry’s personal assistant was administering the drug without medical training or supervision.

Salvador Plasencia, 44, a.k.a. “Dr. P,” was sentenced by United States District Judge Sherilyn Peace Garnett, who also fined him $5,600 and ordered him immediately remanded to federal custody.

Plasencia pleaded guilty on July 23 to four counts of distribution of ketamine. He surrendered his California medical license in September 2025.

Plasencia was a physician who owned and operated a Calabasas-based urgent-care clinic called Malibu Canyon Urgent Care LLC. As a medical doctor, Plasencia knew that ketamine was a controlled substance and an anesthetic that is used to treat – without the approval of the United States Food and Drug Administration – depression and other psychiatric conditions.

At all relevant times, Plasencia knew about potential risks associated with ketamine, including sedation, psychiatric events, abuse and misuse by patients, among others. As his treatment notes reflected, Plasencia also believed that patients “should be monitored by [a] physician when undergoing treatment as a safety Measure,” according to court documents.

On September 30, 2023, Plasencia was introduced to Perry by one of his own patients who stated that Perry was a “high profile person” who was seeking ketamine and was willing to pay “cash and lots of thousands” for ketamine treatment, according to Plasencia’s plea agreement.

“Rather than do what was best for Mr. Perry – someone who had struggled with addiction for most of his life – [Plasencia] sought to exploit Perry’s medical vulnerability for profit,” prosecutors argued in a sentencing memorandum. “Indeed, the day [Plasencia] met Perry he made his profit motive known, telling a co-conspirator: ‘I wonder how much this moron will pay’ and ‘let’s find out.’”

The same day Plasencia met Perry, he contacted Mark Chavez, 55, then a licensed San Diego physician. Plasencia that day drove to Costa Mesa and purchased from Chavez $795 in ketamine vials and tablets, syringes, and gloves. Plasencia then drove to Perry’s home in Los Angeles, injected Perry with ketamine, and left at least one vial of ketamine to Kenneth Iwamasa, 60, of Toluca Lake, Perry’s personal assistant. Iwamasa paid Plasencia $4,500.

During the following weeks, Plasencia again purchased ketamine from Chavez and administered the drug to Perry multiple times at Perry’s home and once in a Long Beach parking lot while in the backseat of Perry’s vehicle.

During one ketamine treatment at Perry’s home, Perry’s blood pressure spiked causing him to freeze up. Notwithstanding Perry’s reaction, Plasencia left additional vials of ketamine with Iwamasa, knowing that Iwamasa would inject the ketamine into the victim.

From September 30, 2023, to October 12, 2023, Plasencia distributed 20 vials and multiple tablets of ketamine and syringes to Iwamasa and Perry, knowing that his conduct fell below the proper standard of medical care and that the ketamine transfers were not for a legitimate medical purpose. As prosecutors argued in their sentencing memorandum, Plasencia charged a total of $57,000 for these efforts, even though the going price of ketamine was only approximately $15 per vial.

Plasencia later placed an order for 10 vials of ketamine through a licensed pharmaceutical company using his Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) license. After receiving the ketamine, on October 27, 2023, he sent the following text message to Iwamasa: “I know you mentioned taking a break. I have been stocking up on the meanwhile. I am not sure when you guys plan to resume but in case its when im out of town this weekend I have left supplies with a nurse of mine …I can always let her know the plan.”

Perry fatally overdosed on ketamine the following day. Plasencia did not provide the ketamine that caused his death.

After Perry’s overdose and in response to a subpoena issued by the DEA to Plasencia, Plasencia falsified purported treatment notes and an invoice for Perry, which prosecutors argued were designed to cover up that he had been illegally selling vials of ketamine to Iwamasa. Among other things, Plasencia provided fraudulent notes that claimed on October 7, 2023, Perry was “scheduled to meet for a treatment session but was not present,” when, in fact, as Plasencia knew, the only person he was schedule to meet on that day was Iwamasa, at midnight, at a public street corner outside of a bar in Santa Monica, to sell Iwamasa vials of ketamine, to be administered to Perry without any health care professional present.

Chavez and Iwamasa pleaded guilty last year to federal drug charges and are scheduled to be sentenced on December 17, 2025, and January 14, 2026, respectively.

Two other defendants charged in connection with Perry’s death – Erik Fleming, 56, of Hawthorne, and Jasveen Sangha, 42, a.k.a. “Ketamine Queen,” of North Hollywood, also pleaded guilty to federal drug charges and await sentencing on January 7, 2026, and February 25, 2026, respectively.

The Los Angeles Police Department, the DEA, and the United States Postal Inspection Service investigated this matter.Assistant United States Attorneys Ian V. Yanniello of the National Security Division and Haoxiaohan H. Cai of the Major Frauds Section prosecuted this case.

California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), codified in Business and Professions Code Section 17200, prohibits any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice. This broad statute has been applied to challenge “no-poach” provisions – also known as no-hire or non-solicitation agreements between competing companies – where employers agree not to recruit, solicit, or hire each other’s employees, either explicitly or through informal arrangements. Such agreements are viewed as anticompetitive because they restrict employee mobility, suppress wages by limiting competition for talent, and hinder workers’ ability to negotiate better compensation or job terms.

No-poach provisions also may violate California antitrust laws under the Cartwright Act (Business and Professions Code §§ 16720 et seq.), which bars agreements that restrain trade, including those that suppress compensation or limit hiring among competitors. They can also constitute violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL – Section 17200) when deemed unlawful or unfair business practices.

PSSI is a national cleaning and sanitation company that contracts with dozens of meatpacking and food processing facilities in California and hundreds across the country. Nationally, PSSI employs over 17,000 workers across approximately 500 worksites. PSSI has had cleaning contracts with over 20 meatpacking and food processing companies in California, including well-known names such as Foster Farms, Harris Ranch, and Pilgrim’s Pride.

DOJ’s investigation revealed that PSSI had implemented a no-poach provision in 22 out of its 24 operative contracts in California, which impacted the rights of approximately 6,000 employees who worked pursuant to those contracts. Today’s judgment, once approved by the court, resolves the allegations stated above.

According to the Attorney General, this business practice, often hidden from employees, can have serious implications including artificially lowering employee compensation, reducing incentives for companies to improve working conditions, and limiting employee career growth.

Last April, the Attorney General filed a lawsuit against PSSI in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, Case No. 25CU022640C, entitled The People of the State of California v. Packers Sanitation Services, Inc., LTD., dba Fortrex; Packers Sanitation Services, LTD., LLC, a California corporation; and Does 1 through 20, alleging a cause of action for violations of Business and Professions Code Section 17200 Unfair Competition Law related to the No Hire Provision allegedly contained within Services Agreements So-called no-poach provisions are contractual agreements between employers to not hire each other’s employees.

The People further allege that PSSI’s No Hire Provision had the effect of restraining employee mobility in violation of Business and Professions Code section 16600.

PSSI removed the No Hire Provision from all of its California Services Agreements by February 2024.

This week the California Attorney General announced a settlement against Packers Sanitation Services, Inc. LTD., now doing business as Fortrex (PSSI), a national cleaning and sanitation company, resolving allegations that the company used unlawful “no poach” agreements that restrict competition. As part of the settlement, PSSI will provide notice to employees and customers regarding its discontinued use of the unlawful provision, in addition to paying $500,000 in civil penalties.

According to the Settlement Agreement the Defendants continue to deny all allegations of wrongdoing and liability in connection with this litigation.

There have been several other no-poaching cases filed in California dating back to at least 2011.

2011 – In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, Settled in 2015 for $415 million.
2014 – In re Animation Workers Antitrust Litigation, Settled in 2017 for $100 million.
2016 – Frost v. LG Electronics Inc., Dismissed in 2018 for failure to plausibly allege U.S. impact.
2017 – Markson v. CRST International Inc, Ongoing
2018 – Multistate Fast-Food No-Poach Settlements (e.g., Arby’s, Dunkin’, Five Guys, Little Caesars), no monetary penalties but injunctive relief.
2019 – Multistate Fast-Food No-Poach Settlements (e.g., Burger King, Popeyes, Tim Hortons), 2020 settlements prohibited future use nationwide.