Nick Miletak was hired to participate in Royal Coach Tours’ student driver trainee program. On the day formal classroom instruction was set to begin, Miletak showed up, handed in his resignation, and demanded compensation for time he had been available before the formal training started. Royal Coach refused but still paid him for 11 hours of classroom time he had logged during informal training.
About a week after resigning, Miletak filed a civil lawsuit against Royal Coach alleging five causes of action. After Royal Coach demurred, Miletak filed an amended complaint asserting two claims: promissory estoppel and constructive discharge. Following a court trial, judgment was entered in Royal Coach’s favor. Miletak appealed, and the Sixth District affirmed. Royal Coach then sued Miletak for malicious prosecution.
A bench trial was held on the malicious prosecution claim without a court reporter present. The trial court issued a statement of decision finding that Miletak’s prior employment action had terminated in Royal Coach’s favor, that Miletak lacked probable cause to bring the claims, that he pursued the action with malice, and that Royal Coach suffered damages. The court awarded Royal Coach $257,197.53, including punitive damages.
Miletak subsequently filed motions for a new trial, to dismiss, and to vacate the judgment. The trial court denied each one.
The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in its entirety in the unpublished case of Royal Coach Tours, Inc. v. Miletak, -H052687 (May 2026). Miletak raised thirteen separate contentions on appeal; the court rejected all of them.
Miletak appealed in pro per. The court’s analysis was shaped throughout by Miletak’s repeated failure to meet basic appellate requirements — providing adequate record citations, presenting developed legal arguments, and confining his claims to matters in the record. The court invoked the principle from Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609, that the burden falls on the appellant to demonstrate error on the basis of the record presented.
On personal jurisdiction, Miletak argued the trial court lost jurisdiction when he relocated to Florida. The court held that once a trial court acquires jurisdiction over a party, that jurisdiction continues to final judgment and is not defeated by the party’s relocation, citing Goldman v. Simpson (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 255, 263–264. Miletak’s reliance on Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117 was misplaced because that case addressed an entirely different question about claims by foreign plaintiffs against a foreign defendant.
On the absence of a court reporter, Miletak claimed he requested one at trial. But the settled statement, the order denying his new trial motion, and the trial court’s own statements at the settled statement hearing all indicated that no such request was made. Without record evidence of a request, the court found no error.
On the denial of a jury trial, the record showed Miletak failed to timely request a jury or demonstrate that his partial fee waiver covered jury fees. The court applied TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra (2024) 15 Cal.5th 766, which holds that a litigant challenging the denial of relief from a jury waiver for the first time on appeal must show prejudice — something Miletak never attempted.
On probable cause, the central substantive issue, Miletak argued that the denial of Royal Coach’s nonsuit motion in the underlying employment action conclusively established probable cause under the interim adverse judgment rule. The court disagreed. Drawing on Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767 and Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, the court explained that the interim adverse judgment rule applies only to rulings on the merits, not those resting on procedural or technical grounds. Here, the nonsuit motion was denied based on Miletak’s opening statement — before any evidence was presented — so the denial said nothing about the substantive merits of his promissory estoppel claim.
The court also noted that Miletak attributed a fabricated quotation to Parrish, claiming that probable cause for any single claim insulates the entire suit. The California Supreme Court has held precisely the opposite: a malicious prosecution suit may be maintained where even one of several claims in the prior action lacked probable cause. See Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 671.
On the remaining issues — evidentiary rulings, judicial bias, fraud on the court, the settled statement, denial of writ petitions, and the prior anti-SLAPP appeal — the court found each contention either unsupported by record citations, procedurally forfeited, or substantively without merit. Multiple claims were deemed waived under Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856, for failure to cite the record.