In November 2009, Chany Lopez was an employee of the San Diego Unified School District. While driving a district truck, he was sideswiped. Although he complained to coworkers that he was injured in the accident, he then declined any medical treatment .
Later, Lopez submitted a workers’ compensation claim for pain in his neck and lower back arising from the accident. Third party administrator York Risk Services opened a file and provided benefits. He denied having “previous occupational injuries or illnesses” and “any preexisting conditions that complicate or prolong diagnosis or treatment” when evaluated by his treating physician and to an investigator when interviewed for an AOE-COE investigation. He also denied knowing anything about the workers’ compensation system and denied he had been through the process of filing a claim before the November 2009 accident to the investigator.
York discovered that Lopez had in fact submitted workers’ compensation claims when employed by the City of San Diego in 1991 for left shoulder, left arm and upper back and in March 1993 for low back and both legs; and also in January 1996 for low back.
A jury convicted Lopez of four felony counts of unlawfully making a knowingly false and fraudulent statement in violation of Insurance Code section 1871.4, subdivision (a)(1) in connection with his filing of a workers’ compensation claim. The court sentenced him to three years’ formal probation, including 180 days in custody in a work furlough program.
On appeal, Lopez contended the court erred in instructing the jury, in denying his motion for acquittal under Penal Code section 1118.1, and in refusing to reduce his felony convictions to misdemeanors. He further contends the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. The Court of Appeal in the unpublished case of People v Chaney Lopez rejected his arguments and sustained the conviction.
With regard to the jury instruction, Lopez argued that Insurance Code section 1871.4, subdivision (a)(1) requires the People to show that defendant, as opposed to the insurer, knew his alleged misstatements were material. This section provides in relevant part that it is unlawful to “[m]ake or cause to be made a knowingly false or fraudulent material statement or material representation for the purpose of obtaining or denying any compensation, as defined in Section 3207 of the Labor Code.”
The Court of Appeal ruled that “the jury was properly instructed that the false or fraudulent statement must be material – viewed from the perspective of an insurer – and that, when defendant made the statement, he had the specific intent to obtain workers’ compensation benefits.”
Lopez also contended that he should only be found guilty of one felony count for making false or fraudulent statements in connection with his 2011 workers’ compensation claim because, even assuming his omissions were material, there allegedly was only one victim – the district – and there was only one claim for workers’ compensation benefits.
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and ruled that “defendant on four separate occasions made knowingly false statements to four separate individuals in connection with his 2011 workers’ compensation claim. As we have found, under the plain language of Insurance Code section 1871.4, subdivision (a)(1), each false statement constituted a separate offense.”