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Overbroad Arbitration Clause Trimmed and Case Sent to Arbitration

CN Motor Company LLC, doing business as Santa Monica Lincoln, is an automobile dealership. Luis Antonio Salazar filled out an employment application on June 6, 2022, listing a start date of June 20, 2022, and on June 8 he signed a two-page “Applicant Statement and Agreement” containing an arbitration provision. He completed other hiring paperwork, including a W-4, about a week later, and worked as an hourly employee from June 2022 to March 2024. Salazar is primarily a Spanish speaker; his declaration, translated for him, stated he cannot read English documents unless they are translated.

The agreement bore a capitalized title warning that it contained a binding arbitration agreement, and a second capitalized warning appeared above the signature block. The body was single-spaced, 11-point type across 15 paragraphs. Paragraph 4 required individual arbitration of “all disputes of any nature” arising out of or related in any way to the employee’s job application, employment, or “any other relationship/interaction” with the company and its “Affiliates.” Affiliates were defined to include owners, managers, employees, agents, attorneys, sister and parent companies, joint venturers, alleged joint employers, independent contractors and benefit-plan parties. Paragraph 5 listed exceptions for certain NLRB, workers’ compensation, EDD and Labor Commissioner wage claims and stated the agreement was not revocable. Paragraph 11 required a party starting a claim to deliver a dated letter to the general manager and the controller or business manager, while providing only that the company “may similarly commence claims” by letter to the employee.

In June 2024 Salazar filed a putative class action in Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging ten Labor Code and unfair competition claims. CN Motor moved to compel arbitration. On December 16, 2024, Judge Lawrence P. Riff found that CN Motor had proven an agreement to arbitrate existed but held it unenforceable. The court found a moderate-to-high degree of procedural unconscionability, based on the adhesive form, time pressure, the English-only presentation to a Spanish speaker, and surprise from the dense format. It found moderate substantive unconscionability based on Paragraph 4’s overbreadth, a lack of mutuality regarding Affiliates and who was bound, infinite duration under Paragraph 5’s “not revocable” language, and Paragraph 11’s one-sided procedure for starting arbitration. Because the defects went to the core of the agreement, the court declined to sever them and denied the motion. CN Motor appealed.

In the published case of Salazar v. CN Motor Company LLC, No. B344433 (October 2026), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed the order denying the employer’s motion to compel arbitration, with directions to grant the motion as to Salazar’s individual claims under the agreement after striking the unconscionable terms, and to decide his challenge to the class action waiver on remand. The opinion was filed October 19, 2026, as unpublished; on November 12, 2026, the court certified it for publication with no change in the judgment.

The court cut the procedural unconscionability finding down to a low level. It found no substantial evidence of oppression: any pressure to sign other forms at the worksite came after the arbitration agreement was signed, and Salazar signed it two weeks before starting work. On the language issue, the court stressed that Salazar offered no evidence that he asked for a translation, told management before signing that he was not fluent in English, or met with anyone at the dealership before signing. He first raised his difficulty reading English after he signed, and the cases finding oppression on this basis involved employers who knew of a worker’s limited English. The court also found no surprise, given the conspicuous capitalized warnings and readable 11-point font. That left only the agreement’s adhesive nature, which supports a low degree of procedural unconscionability.

On substance, the court agreed with the trial court that the agreement was overbroad and lacked mutuality, and it rated the substantive unconscionability as high. Covering disputes of any nature with the company and its sprawling list of Affiliates, including matters unrelated to employment, showed an intent to use arbitration to shield the employer and its affiliates from unrelated claims. Paragraph 11 was one-sided because only the employee faced a mandatory, specific notice requirement. The court disagreed with the trial court on duration, however, reading the “not revocable” language as modifying only the agency-proceedings exception in Paragraph 5, and noting that a contract with no stated term ends after a reasonable time. Drawing on Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, among other cases, the court treated the agreement as unenforceable in its present form.

The decisive question was severance. Under Civil Code § 1670.5, a trial court’s choice to refuse enforcement rather than sever is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Applying the framework of Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, the court asked first whether the contract’s central purpose was tainted with illegality, and then whether striking or limiting the offending terms would cure the problem without rewriting the contract. Ramirez rejects any bright-line rule that multiple unconscionable terms require refusing enforcement. Here, the central purpose of arbitrating employment disputes was not tainted, and the offending language could be removed cleanly. The court struck “of any nature,” “or any other relationship/interaction with,” and “Affiliates” from Paragraph 4, removed the illustrative list of covered claims, and severed Paragraph 11 entirely. The remaining agreement is enforceable only as to claims arising from or connected to Salazar’s employment with CN Motor. Because removing these terms narrowed arbitration only between employer and employee, the court held the refusal to sever was error. Since the trial court never ruled on Salazar’s attack on the class action waiver, the appellate court ordered only his individual claims to arbitration for now and sent the waiver question back for decision.

Panel Refuses to Enforce Lifetime Arbitration Agreement

VXI Global Solutions, LLC operates customer service call centers nationwide. In February 2023 it hired Tracie Bennett, who has a high school education, as an account associate; she left the job in April 2023. Her new-hire packet ran roughly 100 pages and included an arbitration agreement and a separate confidentiality agreement, both signed the same day. Bennett did not consult a lawyer, though Global’s corporate counsel testified she had the opportunity to review the packet during orientation.

The arbitration agreement, drafted by Global and written in the employee’s voice, required arbitration of all individual claims involving the “Company” and its past or present partners, officers, employees or agents, “whether or not those claims or controversies arise out of my employment.” It defined “Company” broadly to reach partners, officers, directors, employees, affiliates, benefit plans and successors. It survived termination of employment, could be modified or revoked only by a writing signed by all of Global’s partners and the employee, and contained a severability clause. The companion confidentiality agreement barred Bennett from soliciting Global employees for a competing business during her employment and for one year afterward, and entitled Global to injunctive relief without proof of actual damages and without prior actual notice.

In October 2023, Bennett filed a putative class action in Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging 10 causes of action, including unpaid minimum wages and overtime and missed meal and rest breaks. Global moved to compel arbitration.

Judge David S. Cunningham III held that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) governed the agreement and found a low degree of procedural unconscionability because it was a contract of adhesion. Relying on Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, the court found substantive unconscionability in two respects: the agreement reached claims unrelated to employment, and its duration was unreasonable because it outlived the job and could be ended only by mutual agreement. The court rejected Bennett’s other arguments, including challenges to the attorney fee terms, the waiver of public injunctive relief, and the handling of PAGA representative claims, and it did not reach her attacks on the confidentiality agreement. Concluding the defects could not be severed without rewriting the contract, the court denied the motion. Global appealed, as an order denying arbitration is immediately appealable under Code of Civil Procedure § 1294, subdivision (a).

In the published case of Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions, LLC, No. B346763 (November 2026), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order denying the employer’s motion to compel arbitration and awarded Bennett her costs on appeal. The opinion, filed November 13, 2026, is certified for publication. Justice Viramontes wrote for the majority, with Presiding Justice Stratton concurring; Justice Wiley filed an extensive dissent.

The majority first held that, under Civil Code § 1642, the arbitration and confidentiality agreements must be read together as a single contract, because they were signed in the same transaction and address related subject matter. Unfair terms in the confidentiality agreement therefore count against the arbitration agreement. On procedural unconscionability, the court agreed the degree was low. Global did not dispute that the agreement was adhesive, but there was no evidence of pressure or a rushed signing, Bennett had a reasonable chance to review the documents and consult counsel, and the language, while sometimes lengthy, was not unduly complex. Her education level and unfamiliarity with arbitration did not show she could not understand the terms.

Substantive unconscionability, however, was high. Read as a whole, the agreement would force Bennett to arbitrate nearly any claim involving Global, related to her job or not, for the rest of her life unless both sides agreed otherwise. The court rejected Global’s narrower reading because it would render the “whether or not” language meaningless. The expansive definition of “Company” made a large group of employees, officers, agents and affiliates third-party beneficiaries who could compel Bennett to arbitrate, while she had no reciprocal right to force their claims against her into arbitration, a one-sided arrangement Global did not justify. The injunctive relief clause let Global obtain injunctions without proving the usual elements, including irreparable harm. And the nonsolicitation clause, which was not limited to unlawful means of solicitation, was void under Business and Professions Code § 16600.

Turning to remedy, the court explained that Civil Code § 1670.5, subdivision (a), lets a court refuse enforcement, sever an offending term, or limit it, but not rewrite the parties’ bargain. Because the agreement contained multiple unconscionable terms and its overbroad scope went to its central purpose, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sever. Global’s proposed fix of striking two phrases would not work, the majority said, because the remaining text would still cover all claims involving Global, and adding limiting language would amount to rewriting the contract. Striking the confidentiality agreement’s injunctive and nonsolicitation terms would not cure the arbitration agreement’s own defects.

Finally, the majority rejected the dissent’s position that the FAA preempts California’s unconscionability analysis here. It relied on Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, and Ninth Circuit decisions applying California law. It distinguished U.S. Supreme Court rulings such as AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 as striking down rules that barred arbitration outright or imposed procedures at odds with its basic features. Unconscionability findings arise more often in adhesive contracts, the majority reasoned, and such contracts frequently contain arbitration clauses, so arbitration is not being singled out.

November 9, 2026 – News Podcast


Rene Thomas Folse, JD, Ph.D. is the host for this edition which reports on the following news stories: LC 3600(a)(10) Post-Termination Defense Waived if Not Plead in Answer. Sheriff’s Chiefs Lack Authority to Settle Deputies’ Discipline Appeals. FBI Most Wanted Healthcare Fraud Fugitive to Serve 20 Years. FRISS Survey: Insurers See AI Fraud Coming but Few Are Ready. WCIRB Reports Medical Care Using New Resource-Based Yardstick. New DOL Rules Allow Employers to See What Their PBMs Earn. 2027 Employer Health Insurance Premiums to Increase 8.2%. Meloxicam Drives Surge in Comp Anti-Inflammatory Spending.

HHS Opens the Door to Compounded “Healing” Peptides

Some of those who are recovering from torn tendons, strained muscles and orthopedic surgery are increasingly turning to injectable compounds called peptides that promise faster healing, and a new federal policy is about to make them easier to get. On October 30, 2026, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services published a Federal Register notice announcing that it will not take enforcement action against licensed pharmacies and physicians that compound six unapproved peptides, provided they meet ten conditions. The most popular of the six, BPC-157, has never been approved by the FDA for any use and has almost no human research behind it.

Peptides are short chains of amino acids, the building blocks of proteins. Some are well established medicines; insulin and the GLP-1 weight-loss drugs are peptides. The compounds covered by the new policy are different. They have been sold for years online as “research chemicals not for human use,” and they have built a following among athletes, fitness enthusiasts and wellness clinics on the strength of animal studies and social media testimonials. BPC-157 is promoted as the “Wolverine peptide” for tendon, ligament and muscle repair. TB-500 (spoken “T-B five hundred”), a fragment related to a natural protein called thymosin beta-4 (THY-moh-sin BAY-tuh four), is marketed for wound and tissue healing.

The HHS policy, signed by Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., covers BPC-157, TB-500, epitalon, KPV, MOTS-c and semax. It applies to compounding under Section 503A of the federal drug law, the provision that lets state-licensed pharmacies and physicians prepare customized medications for individual patients with a prescription. According to The American Journal of Managed Care, the conditions require that the raw ingredient come from an FDA-registered manufacturer with a certificate of analysis showing identity, purity and potency, that each product contain only one active ingredient, that it be labeled as a compounded drug, and that serious adverse events be reported to the FDA. Each peptide is limited to particular routes; BPC-157, for example, may be compounded for injection under the skin or into muscle, by mouth or for topical use.

It is important to be precise about what the policy does. It is not FDA approval, and it does not add the peptides to the official list of ingredients that pharmacies may lawfully use in compounding. It is a statement that HHS does not intend to enforce the law against compounders who follow its conditions while the FDA decides, through rulemaking whether each substance belongs on that list. HHS says the goal is to steer users away from gray-market products made overseas toward a more controlled source. The policy is labeled a draft, HHS may revisit it if safety or quality problems emerge, and comments were due two weeks after publication.

The decision overrode the agency’s own scientists. In July, the FDA’s Pharmacy Compounding Advisory Committee voted 8 to 6, with one abstention, to recommend BPC-157, KPV and TB-500 for the compounding list, and ultimately recommended six of the seven peptides it reviewed, after career FDA reviewers had recommended against all seven. CNN reported that FDA officials warned their scientific staff would not support a regulation deeming the peptides safe, and that Kennedy has called himself a fan of peptides and has described using BPC-157 for a muscle injury.

The clinical evidence is thin. FDA briefing materials found the available studies, including five on BPC-157, too short and small to establish safety or effectiveness. In a November 5 commentary in Healio’s Orthopedics Today, the authors noted that most BPC-157 animal research comes from a single laboratory, none of it has examined healing after surgical repair, and the human evidence consists of a single case series. The first randomized, placebo-controlled pilot study, in patients after rotator cuff repair, is not scheduled to begin until January 2027. In a separate Healio feature, sports medicine surgeon Jason Dragoo said there is really no human clinical data showing BPC-157 improves healing or performance. Researchers have also debated whether the peptide’s tendency to stimulate new blood vessel growth, called angiogenesis could carry long-term risks.

Use is climbing regardless. A preprint analysis of clinical notes found newly confirmed BPC-157 users rose about 33-fold between early 2020 and early 2026, and about a third of those who documented a source obtained it from gray-market vendors. Product quality is a real concern: an obesity medicine specialist told AJMC that gray-market peptides often contain 5 to 75 percent of the labeled amount, and some carry contaminants. The FDA’s adverse event database has logged 10 serious reports tied to BPC-157 since 2021, eight of them in 2026, though such reports do not prove the drug caused the problem. BPC-157 and TB-500 are also on the World Anti-Doping Agency’s prohibited list.

The workers’ compensation implications start with treatment requests. Some treating physicians, particularly in sports medicine and wellness-oriented practices, may now request authorization for compounded BPC-157 or TB-500 after tendon and soft-tissue injuries. Utilization reviewers will be weighing products that are not FDA approved for any indication and lack published human trials in musculoskeletal healing, against evidence-based treatment standards such as California’s Medical Treatment Utilization Schedule. The workers’ compensation system has a long history of disputes over compounded medications, and payers will want to know the dispensing pharmacy, the source of the raw ingredient and whether the product meets the policy’s conditions. The federal policy does not require any payer to cover these drugs, and AJMC notes that compounded drugs generally fall outside standard pharmacy benefits.

The second issue is undisclosed self-treatment. Because BPC-157 has no national drug code, it never appears on a structured medication list or a pharmacy claim. Many injured users are buying peptides on their own. and may not mention them to a surgeon or a claims examiner. Surgeons are now being urged to ask about peptide use before operating, and claims professionals reviewing pre-operative records may want to see whether that question was asked.

The policy remains in effect until the FDA finishes rulemaking on each peptide, a process AJMC says can take 12 to 24 months, and it could be revised sooner if safety signals emerge. The rotator cuff pilot trial in 2027 may offer the first controlled human data relevant to work injuries. Until then, claims professionals should treat peptides as an unproven, self-directed treatment that is becoming easier to obtain, and ask about it early when soft-tissue injuries and orthopedic surgery are involved.

DOI Issues Non-Renewal Moratorium for 50,000 Policyholders

The California Insurance Commissioner has ordered insurers to preserve residential property coverage for about 50,000 policyholders in Tuolumne, Stanislaus and Calaveras counties, imposing a one-year moratorium on cancellations and non-renewals after Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency for the Dove Fire, the California Department of Insurance announced this week.

The Dove Fire was a comparatively small blaze. According to the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, it started July 26 near Highway 108 and Stockton Street in Tuolumne County, burned 226 acres, destroyed 12 structures and was fully contained August 1. The Governor’s emergency proclamation did not come until October 15, 2026, and was aimed at speeding the removal of hazardous debris from affected properties. Because the moratorium runs for one year from the date of the Governor’s declaration, not the date of the fire, the protection runs from October 15, 2026, about two and a half months after the fire was contained.

The order rests on Insurance Code § 675.1, enacted in 2018 through Senate Bill 824, which Lara authored as a state senator. Under the statute, insurers may not cancel or refuse to renew a residential policy for property in a ZIP code within or adjacent to a fire perimeter for one year after an emergency declaration, when the action is based solely on the property’s location in a wildfire area. CAL FIRE and Cal OES identify the perimeter, and the Commissioner then issues a bulletin listing the covered ZIP codes. According to the Department, the protection applies whether or not a policyholder suffered a loss. Homeowners who suffered a total loss in a declared disaster already have separate, longer renewal protections under existing law.

The order also reaches some commercial policies. Insurance Code § 675.55, added by Senate Bill 547 (Chapter 544, Statutes of 2025), the Business Insurance Protection Act, extends the moratorium to certain commercial property policies. It took effect January 1, 2026. The release describes the covered commercial policies as those under $25,000 in annual premium, including policies for homeowners’ associations, apartment complexes, student housing, senior living facilities and other property used mainly for residential purposes. The Department’s August Bulletin 2026-6, issued for an earlier fire, spells out the statute more precisely. The commercial exclusion applies to policies with $25,000 or more in annual premium only where the insured also averaged at least 25 employees over the prior year. Inland marine, transit and commercial auto coverage is excluded. Habitational properties stay covered even above those thresholds.

The release does not list the covered ZIP codes. As of this writing, the Department’s moratorium page did not yet show a Dove Fire bulletin. Policyholders can check whether a ZIP code is covered with the Department’s online moratorium lookup. The Department said consumers who were non-renewed before the declaration date and cannot find coverage, or who are dissatisfied with their current coverage, should contact it for help. So should anyone who believes an insurer is violating the law. The consumer hotline is 800-927-4357, and the TTY line is 800-482-4833.

Lara said in the release that he is acting to protect Californians from “the stress of losing their insurance.” He framed the order as part of a broader effort to restore insurance options statewide.

The Dove Fire order adds to a growing stack of moratoriums in the same corner of the Sierra foothills. In August, Lara protected more than 64,000 policyholders in Calaveras, San Joaquin, Amador, Tuolumne and Stanislaus counties after the Gann Fire. In September 2025, Bulletin 2025-13 covered Calaveras and Tuolumne ZIP codes after the TCU September Lightning Complex fires.

The rules are about to get longer. Governor Newsom signed AB 2038 (Harabedian) on September 30, 2026. According to trade press reports, it doubles the post-wildfire moratorium to two years and extends total-loss renewal guarantees from 24 to 36 months, effective January 1, 2027. The Dove Fire release does not mention AB 2038 or say whether the longer period would apply to emergencies declared before the law takes effect.

For insurers, the order means suspending wildfire-based non-renewals in the affected ZIP codes once the Department publishes them. Carriers writing commercial habitational risks need to apply the same suspension. For employers and property owners, the commercial provisions matter most to those who operate apartment buildings, senior housing, student housing or association-governed communities in the three counties. For them, the moratorium offers a year of stability on renewals, but it does not freeze premiums or bar non-renewals for reasons unrelated to wildfire location.

73 Enforcement Actions Follow Statewide Contractor Sweep

California’s Contractors State License Board (CSLB) has taken 73 enforcement actions against suspected unlicensed and noncompliant contractors after a series of 39 undercover stings and job-site sweeps across the state. The operations were part of a 15-state crackdown coordinated by the National Association of State Contractors Licensing Agencies (NASCLA), and the board announced the results on November 2, 2026, according to a republication of the release by the California Statewide Law Enforcement Association. The CSLB’s home page also lists the announcement.

In the sting operations, which CSLB ran with local law enforcement in three counties it did not name, investigators answered advertisements placed by suspected unlicensed operators and arranged for them to come to designated locations to bid on projects. Those jobs ranged in value from $1,100 to $35,000. The stings produced 25 misdemeanor Notices to Appear for unlicensed contracting and illegal advertising, 10 administrative citations, and six referrals to district attorneys for possible prosecution.

The sweeps covered 18 counties, where CSLB investigators made 182 visits to active job sites. Those checks led to 11 cases referred to local district attorneys, 13 citations against licensed contractors, six citations against unlicensed individuals, and two Letters of Admonishment. Investigators also issued 11 stop work orders and 20 advisory notices, which the board reported separately from the 73-action total. The release did not break down how the 39 operations were divided between stings and sweeps, and it did not say how many of the violations involved missing workers’ compensation coverage.

CSLB Registrar David Fogt said in the release that unlicensed activity “often crosses state lines,” and he credited the multistate effort with sending a unified message. The board said individuals who were cited also received information to encourage them to become licensed and comply with the law.

The board reminded the public that California law bars unlicensed contractors from bidding on or contracting for any project that requires a building permit, uses employee labor, or is valued at $1,000 or more in combined labor and materials. Unlicensed contracting is a misdemeanor under Business and Professions Code § 7028. The $1,000 “minor work” threshold appears in Business and Professions Code § 7048.

CSLB warned that unlicensed operators often carry neither a license nor the required workers’ compensation insurance, which can leave homeowners on the hook for accidents or damage. Every California employer must secure workers’ compensation coverage under Labor Code § 3700, and licensed contractors must keep a current certificate of coverage, or a valid exemption, on file with CSLB under Business and Professions Code § 7125.

Unlicensed operators fall outside that system entirely. When one of their workers is hurt, the cost often shifts elsewhere. Under Labor Code § 2750.5, a person performing work that requires a contractor’s license is presumed to be an employee unless he or she holds that license. That presumption can expose a hiring property owner or general contractor to claims, and their own insurers with them. Unlicensed operators also compete for work without paying premiums, undercutting legitimate contractors who bear the cost of coverage.

This year’s total is lower than the board’s results from earlier NASCLA campaigns. CSLB reported 119 legal actions from its 2025 operations and 229 in 2024, though the scope and number of operations vary from year to year, so the totals are not directly comparable. CSLB licenses about 285,000 contractors in 45 classifications. Consumers can verify a license or report suspected unlicensed activity at cslb.ca.gov or by calling 1-800-321-CSLB (2752).

L.A. Superior Court Judge Robert Draper Removed From Office

Robert S. Draper has been a judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court for 14 years. Much of the case against him grew out of his handling of Odom v. Los Angeles Community College Dist. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 470, a sexual harassment and retaliation lawsuit brought by a tenured professor against her employer. In 2022 a jury in Judge Draper’s courtroom awarded the professor $10 million. In April 2025, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed that verdict and ordered a new trial, citing prejudicial evidentiary rulings and criticizing the trial judge’s remarks by name.

On January 14, 2026, the Commission on Judicial Performance filed a Notice of Formal Proceedings against Judge Draper, which it announced publicly on January 20. The notice charged seven counts with 22 separate allegations. They covered his failure to cooperate with the commission’s investigation, his conduct during the Odom trial, his treatment of court staff and colleagues, improper ex parte communications, demeaning courtroom comments, and his defiance of court administrators while on leave.

The California Supreme Court appointed three special masters: Justice James M. Humes of the First District Court of Appeal, Judge Matthew P. Guasco of Ventura County, and Judge Michael A. Knish of San Bernardino County. They held a six-day evidentiary hearing in April and May 2026. Judge Draper lost his bid for reelection in June 2026, and his term ends in January 2027.

In a July 24, 2026 report, the masters found that Judge Draper had committed willful misconduct on parts of six counts and prejudicial misconduct on parts of three. They also found one instance of improper action and concluded that several allegations were not proven. They found that he lacked candor in several respects and that parts of his testimony were not credible. The commission heard oral argument on October 7, 2026. Judge Draper represented himself after substituting out his counsel in August.

In the Commission on Judicial Performance decision of Inquiry Concerning Judge Robert S. Draper, No. 212 (November 2026), the commission ordered Judge Draper removed from office, disqualifying him from acting as a judge. The commission is the constitutional agency that disciplines California judges; it is not a court, and this is a disciplinary order, not a judicial opinion. It adopted the masters’ factual and credibility findings in full and went further on several legal conclusions, finding nine acts of willful misconduct, eight of prejudicial misconduct, and one of improper action. Eight commissioners voted in favor and none dissented. Two commissioners were recused and one did not participate. Judge Draper may seek review in the California Supreme Court.

Under article VI, section 18, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, a judge may be removed for willful misconduct in office or for prejudicial conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute, but not for improper action alone. The commission found ample grounds of the first two kinds.

The Odom trial. The commission found that Judge Draper made irrelevant and insensitive comments about race, made gender-based remarks including references to “little girls,” told a vulgar story about secretaries, and became emotionally entangled in the case. It found each of these to be prejudicial misconduct. It found willful misconduct in two later episodes. Judge Draper left a voicemail for defense counsel falsely saying the commission had requested a review. He also presided over an August 2023 hearing after he had recused himself, and at that hearing he threatened to report two attorneys to the State Bar in what appeared to be retaliation. An allegation that he intentionally touched an attorney’s hair was dismissed as unproven.

Court staff and colleagues. Judge Draper told the presiding judge she was “cute when [she was] mad” and repeated the remark after being counseled. He called a court administrator “cute” after being told not to, and he patted court counsel on the head. Each was prejudicial misconduct. More seriously, he emailed confidential juvenile dependency records, including photographs of unclothed children, to colleagues, a retired judge, and a commission attorney, which the commission found to be willful misconduct. Rejecting the masters’ contrary view, it also held that sending staff and colleagues graphic photos of his own injuries, including his unclothed backside, was prejudicial misconduct.

Ex parte contacts and courtroom conduct. The commission found willful misconduct where Judge Draper recruited two judges to testify for a litigant with whom he had discussed cases. Disagreeing with the masters, who had called it improper action, it also found willful misconduct where he tried to discuss a restraining-order case with a commissioner, who cut him off. Calling a litigant “a liar and a cheat” and holding him in contempt was likewise willful misconduct.

Defiance and non-cooperation. The commission found that Judge Draper willfully failed to respond adequately to its investigation letters for more than a year and sent discourteous emails to its staff. While on leave, he sent court leadership rude and abusive emails and repeatedly defied the presiding judge’s directives, including orders not to contact staff or use court systems. Acting in bad faith, he also vacated a colleague’s order granting a peremptory challenge, which went beyond the limits of his authority. The commission did not find credible his claim that he believed the order was invalid.

Why removal. The commission said Judge Draper had “persistently violated the standards governing judicial behavior.” It treated as aggravating his lack of candor, the number and seriousness of the violations, the harm to individuals and to public confidence, and his continued denial of wrongdoing through oral argument. It gave limited weight to his 14 years without prior discipline and found that his health problems and positive qualities were not substantially mitigating. Because he leaves the bench in January 2027 anyway, the risk of future misconduct carried less weight. Even so, the commission concluded that any lesser sanction would greatly diminish public confidence in the judiciary.

9th Cir. Blocks California Climate-Risk Law and Scope 3 Reporting

In 2023, California enacted two companion climate-disclosure statutes. The Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act, known as SB 253 and codified at Health and Safety Code § 38532, applies to entities doing business in California with more than $1 billion in annual revenue. It requires them to report their greenhouse gas emissions each year under the Greenhouse Gas Protocol in three categories: Scope 1 (direct emissions from sources the company owns or controls), Scope 2 (emissions from energy the company purchases), and Scope 3 (indirect upstream and downstream emissions across the company’s value chain, from sources it does not own or control). The Climate-Related Financial Risk Act, known as SB 261 and codified at Health and Safety Code § 38533, applies to companies with more than $500 million in annual revenue doing business in California. It requires a biennial report on the company’s “climate-related financial risk” under the framework of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, along with the measures the company has adopted to reduce and adapt to that risk. According to the dissent, both laws carry administrative penalties and annual fees payable to the California Air Resources Board (CARB).

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the California Chamber of Commerce, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Los Angeles County Business Federation, the Central Valley Business Federation, and Western Growers Association sued the CARB chair and executive officer and the California Attorney General in the Central District of California. They alleged that both statutes facially violate the First Amendment by compelling speech. Other, non-First Amendment claims were not part of this appeal.

The district court denied the business groups’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It concluded that both laws regulate commercial speech, so strict scrutiny did not apply. It reviewed SB 261 under intermediate scrutiny and SB 253 under the more deferential standard of Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel (1985) 471 U.S. 626, and found that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success, irreparable harm, or that the equities and public interest favored them. The plaintiffs appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). On November 18, 2025, the Ninth Circuit enjoined enforcement of SB 261 pending appeal, but declined to do the same for SB 253.

In the published case of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Sanchez, No. 25-5327 (November 2026), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the district court’s order denying a preliminary injunction. The panel affirmed the denial as to SB 253’s Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions disclosures, which may therefore proceed. It reversed the denial as to SB 253’s Scope 3 disclosure requirement and as to SB 261 in its entirety, finding both likely unconstitutional. It remanded for the district court to decide in the first instance whether the Scope 3 provision can be severed from the rest of SB 253, which contains a severability clause.

The court began with the governing framework. Content-based compelled speech is presumptively unconstitutional and draws strict scrutiny, as in X Corp. v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2024) 116 F.4th 888 and National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018) 585 U.S. 755. Commercial speech generally receives intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980) 447 U.S. 557, and purely factual, uncontroversial disclosures may receive the lighter Zauderer review. The preliminary-injunction factors came from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council (2008) 555 U.S. 7.

Scope 1 and Scope 2. Relying heavily on Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Stolfi (9th Cir. 2025) 153 F.4th 795, the majority held that these provisions compel factual emissions information bearing on a company’s own operations and its risk profile in capital markets, and therefore regulate commercial speech. It rejected the argument that commercial speech is limited to speech proposing a transaction. The court did not decide whether Zauderer or intermediate scrutiny applied, because the provisions likely survive the tougher intermediate test. The State had substantial interests in giving investors better information and in reducing emissions, though the court found no record support for a separate anti-“greenwashing” rationale. Studies showing that mandatory Scope 1 and 2 reporting produced emissions reductions of roughly 7 to 8 percent persuaded the court that the requirements directly advance those interests and are not more extensive than necessary. The facial challenge also failed under Moody v. NetChoice, LLC (2024) 603 U.S. 707, because most covered companies are publicly traded, so any unconstitutional applications do not substantially outweigh the lawful ones. On the remaining factors, the plaintiffs showed no irreparable harm, and the equities favored the State.

Scope 3. The court reached a different result for value-chain emissions. Because Scope 3 concerns diffuse conduct by third parties rather than the company’s own operations, the panel held it is not tethered closely enough to the company’s commercial transactions to qualify as commercial speech, so strict scrutiny applies. The State could not carry that burden. Companies do not hold Scope 3 data the way they hold their own emissions data, and the record did not show their estimates would be more reliable than the State’s own. The link to investor decisions was too attenuated, and no study examined mandatory Scope 3 reporting, so the emissions-reduction evidence did not support it.

SB 261. The court held that climate-risk reports require predictive and normative judgments, under a state-prescribed framework, on a politically charged subject. That makes them noncommercial speech subject to strict scrutiny, which the majority said the State had “all but concede[d]” it could not satisfy. Even assuming compelling interests, SB 261 was not narrowly tailored, because less restrictive options existed, such as publicizing voluntary disclosures or regulating emissions directly. For both SB 261 and Scope 3, the loss of First Amendment freedoms constituted irreparable harm, and the equities and public interest favored the plaintiffs.

The partial dissent. Judge Bennett would have treated both statutes as compelling noncommercial speech and enjoined them both. In his view, commercial speech requires a close tie to a specific product or service, and firm-level emissions data informs readers about companies, not particular products. He warned that equating investors’ interest in companies with consumers’ interest in products could justify broad compelled disclosures, including ones aimed at people in employment markets, citing Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting (9th Cir. 2013) 709 F.3d 808.

In a same-day client alert, Foley & Lardner observed that SB 253’s Scope 1 and 2 filing deadline remains November 10, 2026, the day after the ruling, and said it expects the district court to enter a preliminary injunction against the Scope 3 and SB 261 requirements in line with the opinion. That November 10 date reflects CARB’s extension of the original August 10, 2026 first-year deadline, as described in CARB’s rulemaking materials. Further review, either by the full Ninth Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court, remains possible.

Drivers Too Late to Intervene and Challenge Class Settlement

Apria Healthcare provides home healthcare services. Its products are delivered by drivers and couriers, some of them employed through staffing agencies. In February 2022, former Apria licensed vocational nurse Travis Smith filed a wage-and-hour class action in Sutter County Superior Court on behalf of nonexempt Apria employees, and he later filed a separate action seeking civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), Labor Code § 2698 et seq. A 2023 stipulated order dismissed the class action, sent Smith’s individual PAGA claims to arbitration, and stayed the representative claims.

Meanwhile, a separate Los Angeles case, Quintero v. Apria Healthcare, produced a certified class of delivery drivers and settled for $16.5 million. In July 2024, the same plaintiffs’ firm filed a new class action in Los Angeles County Superior Court on behalf of drivers Angela Tisdale and Terrance Pratt, asserting the Quintero claims for drivers hired after September 14, 2021. Apria removed that case to federal court in November 2024.

Back in Sutter County, the Smith parties accepted a mediator’s proposal around June 2024 and signed a memorandum of understanding in October 2024. With Apria’s agreement, Smith filed an amended class and representative complaint on November 1, 2024 that revived the wage-and-hour claims and added a delivery driver, Uriel Arauz, along with courier claims mirroring those in the Tisdale/Pratt case. The settlement totaled $5.75 million, with $977,500 allocated to roughly 350 delivery drivers. Counsel for Tisdale and Pratt said the per-person value for the Quintero couriers was nearly 50 times that of the Smith couriers.

Beginning in August 2024, Tisdale and Pratt’s lawyers accused the Smith parties of a “reverse auction,” in which a defendant facing several class actions settles with the weakest plaintiffs’ counsel in hopes of winning approval of a cheap deal that bars the other claims. They repeated that charge in an October 15, 2024 brief in the federal case. Apria refused to disclose the memorandum’s terms. The Smith settlement won preliminary approval on April 21, 2025. Tisdale and Pratt say they learned of it on April 30, and on May 8, 2025 they filed an ex parte application to intervene, reconsider preliminary approval, and transfer the case to Los Angeles.

The Sutter County Superior Court denied the application, finding the reverse-auction theory had no basis beyond hope and conjecture. Its June 6, 2025 order denied the motion to intervene without making an express finding on timeliness. Tisdale and Pratt appealed. While the appeal was pending, the court granted final approval and entered judgment in August 2025. According to evidence Apria submitted on appeal, Tisdale and Pratt opted out of the settlement, and settlement checks went out in September 2025.

In the published case of Smith v. Apria Healthcare, No. C104113 (November 2026), the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order denying intervention. Before reaching the merits, the court denied Apria’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. It held that, even assuming the settlement was inadequate, the application to intervene was untimely, which defeated both mandatory and permissive intervention. Apria and the Smith plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal.

Apria argued that the final judgment, the lack of an appeal from it, and the distribution of settlement funds made the appeal moot under Hindman v. Owl Drug Co. (1935) 4 Cal.2d 451. The court disagreed. A 1977 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure § 387 permits intervention even after judgment, as recognized in Mallick v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434. In addition, a separate pending appeal by a non-objecting class member, Ahsaki Hudson (No. C105695), challenging the denial of her motion to vacate the judgment could theoretically revive the Smith action and give Tisdale and Pratt a path back in. The court expressed no view on the merits of that appeal.

Both mandatory and permissive intervention under section 387 require a “timely application.” Noting that the standard of review for mandatory intervention is unsettled, the court presumed the trial court impliedly found the application untimely and reviewed that finding for abuse of discretion, following Britt v. East Side Hardware Co. (1914) 25 Cal.App. 231. Tisdale and Pratt effectively conceded that standard.

Timeliness is judged by the totality of the circumstances, as stated in Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Lacy (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 560, and runs from when a would-be intervener knew or should have known its interests were not being adequately protected. Borrowing from R&G Mortgage Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (1st Cir. 2009) 584 F.3d 1, the court held that awareness of a measurable risk is enough; certainty is not required. Tisdale and Pratt’s own evidence showed they suspected a reverse auction by late August 2024 and got no answers from Apria or the Smith plaintiffs. By the time they publicly raised the charge on October 15, 2024, the court said, that “should have been their cue to act.” Not knowing the precise settlement terms did not excuse waiting.

First, the stage of proceedings weighed against intervention, because the application came after preliminary approval and class notice, on the eve of final settlement. Second, the prejudice to the settling parties was significant: intervention in October 2024 might have spared months of work, but intervention in May 2025 would have scuttled the deal with no assurance of a better outcome for the class. Third, the delay of more than six months was unjustified. Because untimeliness defeated both forms of intervention, the court did not reach the remaining arguments or decide whether the settlement was fair.

SCIF’s $555K Premium Win Grows by $908K in Prejudgment Interest

This unpublished California Court of Appeal opinion, which under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115 generally may not be cited or relied on by other courts or parties, is the latest chapter in a long-running dispute over payment by an employer for SCIF insurance over a single policy year. State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF) issued a 2005 workers’ compensation policy to ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc., a nurse staffing company, with an estimated premium of $250,000 that ReadyLink paid up front. After the policy year closed, SCIF audited ReadyLink’s payroll and other records to set the final premium retroactively, with any difference to be settled by an additional payment or a refund.

The dispute centered on per diem payments to ReadyLink’s nurses, which were generated by proprietary software and which ReadyLink did not require nurses to document. Counting those payments as compensation produced an additional premium of $555,327.53. As the Court of Appeal recounted in an earlier published opinion, the Insurance Commissioner approved SCIF’s application of the relevant regulation, and ReadyLink’s writ challenge to that decision failed. SCIF then sued for breach of contract in Riverside County Superior Court to collect the additional premium.

The trial court first granted SCIF judgment on the pleadings, but the Court of Appeal reversed in State Comp. Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 422. At the jury trial on remand, SCIF presented a premium collection specialist and a certified public accountant to support the $555,327.53 figure. ReadyLink did not rebut them, stipulated that the invoice arithmetic was correct, and relied on a waiver defense. The jury rejected waiver but nonetheless found that ReadyLink owed no additional premium. The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the full $555,327.53, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in the unpublished opinion of State Compensation Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare (May 8, 2026, D083359).

While ReadyLink’s appeal from that judgment was pending, SCIF moved for prejudgment interest under Civil Code § 3287. SCIF asked for $907,998.38 under subdivision (a), measured from 30 days after it invoiced ReadyLink through the date of judgment. In the alternative, it proposed $912,562.71 under subdivision (a) measured from the invoice date, or $493,404.61 under subdivision (b) measured from the filing of the action. After oral argument, the Riverside County Superior Court (Judge Kira L. Klatchko) awarded the $907,998.38. ReadyLink appealed, without disputing SCIF’s math.

In the unpublished case of State Compensation Insurance Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc., No. D086046 (November 2026), the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the postjudgment order awarding SCIF $907,998.38 in prejudgment interest.

The panel started with the two parts of section 3287. Subdivision (a) provides for nondiscretionary interest on liquidated damages, while subdivision (b) gives courts discretion over interest on unliquidated contract damages, as explained in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506. Reviewing the subdivision (a) award de novo under KGM Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 376, the court noted that the provision “requires both certainty and vesting,” quoting International Currency Technologies v. ICT, Inc. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 639. That test compensates plaintiffs for the lost use of their money, and it protects defendants by limiting mandatory interest to cases where the amount owed is certain, drawing on Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279.

The court found both requirements met. The damages were certain because the amount came from ReadyLink’s own payroll records, two witnesses corroborated it without being impeached or rebutted, and ReadyLink’s counsel conceded at trial that he would not dispute the calculation. The damages vested on the day SCIF’s properly calculated invoice had remained unpaid for 30 days, so interest ran from that day and the award was mandatory.

ReadyLink argued that SCIF was not obligated to collect the premium, could have enforced its position only prospectively, and offered no evidence that it needed the money. The panel found these points indistinguishable from those it had already rejected as irrelevant to damages in its May 2026 opinion, which it could cite as law of the case under rule 8.1115(b)(1). That opinion reasoned that a promisee is injured by a breach even if it can get by without the money: “If it received less than what it bargained for, it is harmed.”

Two further arguments failed in footnotes. Having to prove the amount at trial did not make it uncertain, the court said, because damage and its amount are elements of every breach of contract action. ReadyLink also contended at oral argument that the disputed per diem inputs made the damages uncertain, but its reply brief acknowledged it never disputed that the invoice arithmetic was calculable, and the court noted an administrative law judge’s conclusion that ReadyLink did not require nurses to document per diem expenses.

Finally, ReadyLink asked the court to shorten the interest period under subdivision (b) by excluding the time before SCIF filed suit and the time its appeal of the pretrial judgment was pending. Because subdivision (b) applies only to unliquidated damages and these damages were liquidated, the trial court had no discretion to shorten the period.