MultiPlan Corporation was founded in 1980 in New York City as a hospital network aimed at giving patients access to care and controlling costs when they went outside a narrow insurance network. Over the following decades it built out a preferred provider organization (PPO) business and grew through consolidation into a national network.
In April 2024, a New York Times investigation by Chris Hamby (“Insurers Reap Hidden Fees by Slashing Payments. You May Get the Bill“) reported that MultiPlan and the insurers using its services shared a financial incentive to push reimbursements as low as possible, since both parties’ fees rose as the amount paid to providers fell — leaving patients exposed to larger balance bills.
The article resulted in a wave of private antitrust litigation from hospital systems and providers, which was consolidated into the multidistrict litigation In re MultiPlan Health Insurance Provider Litigation in the Northern District of Illinois — the same MDL whose 2025 ruling on a motion to dismiss the Court of Appeal relied on in this VHS Liquidating Trust case. In February 2025, amid this litigation and reputational pressure, the company rebranded from MultiPlan to Claritev Corporation, moving its NYSE ticker from MPLN to CTEV.
Last June, the Arizona AG announced a lawsuit against MultiPlan and several large health insurers, alleging they quietly built and operated a system that slashed payments to doctors and hospitals — and left Arizonans having to pay more for out-of-network care.
In this September 2026 published California court of appeal decision, VHS Liquidating Trust is the bankruptcy liquidator for Verity Health System of California, a former not-for-profit operator of six hospitals in the San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Jose areas that went bankrupt in 2018. Verity, like other hospitals, was paid for patient care by a mix of patients, government payors, and private insurers. Where a hospital has no contract covering a particular service, the service is billed as “out-of-network” (OON), and the insurer typically reimburses the provider at a rate based on the “usual, customary, and reasonable” (UCR) rate for the area.
Based on these allegations, VHS sued MultiPlan (without naming the insurers, who had separately compelled arbitration) for horizontal price fixing, price tampering, and unlawful exchange of competitively sensitive information under the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq.), plus a derivative Unfair Competition Law claim.
VHS’s complaint alleges that MultiPlan Corporation (now Claritev Corporation), which markets algorithm-driven data analytics to health insurers, offers a “repricing” service that insurers use to set OON reimbursement rates. Insurers send MultiPlan a claim; MultiPlan’s proprietary algorithm, built on a pooled database of roughly a billion claims from more than 700 insurers, recommends a price; and MultiPlan then presents that price to the provider on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. By 2020 MultiPlan was repricing 370,000 OON claims per day, and insurers reportedly followed its recommendations without human review 87 percent of the time. VHS alleges this scheme is the successor to an earlier practice, involving a MultiPlan predecessor called Ingenix, that a 2009 New York Attorney General enforcement action forced to shut down. VHS contends that MultiPlan operates as the “hub” of a “hub, spoke, and rim” conspiracy: insurers (the spokes) know from MultiPlan’s own public statements that their competitors also submit sensitive claims data to MultiPlan and follow its recommended prices the vast majority of the time, giving each insurer the assurance it needs to accept suppressed rates without fear that a rival will out-compete it by paying more.
The San Francisco County Superior Court sustained MultiPlan’s demurrer to the entire complaint without leave to amend. The trial court reasoned that an insurer’s reimbursement for OON services is not a standalone product or service but is simply part of the insurance policy the insurer already owes its subscriber; without a discrete product, the court held, there is no “price” that the Cartwright Act’s price-fixing and price-tampering provisions can reach. Because the information-exchange claims and the UCL claim were premised on the same theory, those fell with the price-fixing claims, and final judgment was entered for MultiPlan.
In the published case of VHS Liquidating Trust v. MultiPlan Corporation et al., No. A171914 (1st Dist., Div. 3, Sept. 2026): Reversed and remanded. The Court of Appeal held that OON reimbursements are not categorically exempt from Cartwright Act scrutiny, reversed the judgment on the demurrer, and sent the case back to the trial court to consider MultiPlan’s remaining, unaddressed arguments in the first instance.
Writing for a unanimous panel, the court held that the trial court’s exemption for OON reimbursements has no basis in the Cartwright Act’s text or in case law. The statute broadly prohibits combinations that fix or tamper with the price of an “article, commodity or transportation,” and California courts have long read it to cover services as well, and to reach buyers’ price-fixing (not just sellers’). The court reasoned that an insurer’s contractual duty to its subscriber and its separate market transaction with a provider are analytically distinct: just as a general contractor’s obligation to a homeowner does not exempt its payments to subcontractors from antitrust scrutiny, an insurer’s coverage promise to its subscriber does not exempt its reimbursement negotiations with providers.
Because no California case had addressed the question directly, the court also surveyed federal authority, noting that under the Cartwright Act federal precedent is instructive but not binding, since the Act is “broader in range and deeper in reach” than the Sherman Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920). The court declined to follow three federal district court decisions the trial court had relied on—Franco v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. (D.N.J. 2011) 818 F.Supp.2d 792, In re Aetna UCR Litigation (D.N.J. 2015), and Pacific Recovery Solutions v. Cigna Behavioral Health, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2021)—because those cases analyzed the question from the perspective of insurance subscribers, not providers, and did not address whether a provider-insurer transaction could itself be price-fixed. Instead, the court found persuasive the federal multidistrict litigation against MultiPlan itself, where the presiding judge rejected the identical argument as a “sleight of hand” that analyzed the wrong market (In re MultiPlan Health Insurance Provider Litigation (N.D. Ill. 2025) 789 F.Supp.3d 614).
The court further relied on U.S. Supreme Court and First Circuit authority holding that an insurer’s payments to providers are legally distinct from its coverage obligations to policyholders. In Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co. (1979) 440 U.S. 205, the Supreme Court held that an insurer’s pharmacy reimbursement agreements were “merely arrangements for the purchase of goods and services,” separate from the insurer’s obligations under its policies. In Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. (1st Cir. 1984) 749 F.2d 922, the First Circuit similarly held that any distinction between “purchasing” and “insurance reimbursement” is “irrelevant for antitrust purposes.” Applying that same logic, the panel concluded it would be illogical to hold that providers can be liable for fixing the prices they charge insurers, but insurers cannot be liable for fixing the prices they pay providers.
Because it reversed on this threshold ground, the court did not reach MultiPlan’s other arguments, including one based on the Knox-Keene Act, and remanded for the trial court to address them in the first instance. In a footnote, the court added—without resting its holding on the point—that it viewed the trial court’s rule as posing a policy concern, since it would exempt a significant portion of the healthcare industry from antitrust scrutiny at a time when courts have also been reluctant to let insurance subscribers challenge similar conduct.
