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College Soccer Coach Fired for Discouraging Reporting of Misconduct

Ruben Gonzalez had been head coach of Cerritos College’s women’s soccer team since 2006 and also taught health, sports psychology, and other classes. In January 2021, the Board of Trustees of the Cerritos Community College District voted to dismiss him under Education Code § 87732, which lists the grounds for dismissing a permanent community college employee. The district’s amended charges accused him of immoral conduct, dishonesty, evident unfitness for service, and persistent violation of school laws or regulations.

An administrative law judge (ALJ) held an 11-day hearing beginning in September 2021. Because many allegations reached back more than a decade, Gonzalez invoked the four-year limit in Education Code § 87680, and the ALJ excluded most evidence older than four years. The ALJ did admit part of the testimony of former player CR, who said that after she reported sexual misconduct to the athletic dean in 2013, Gonzalez angrily confronted her in front of the team, cut her playing time, and gave her a negative reference when she tried to transfer.

Two more recent players also testified. AZ said that after a 2019 investigation, Gonzalez told players not to speak to investigators and dismissed the allegations, that the team environment was toxic, and that he did nothing after a teammate threatened her for reporting misconduct. AJ described a road trip on which coaches were intoxicated while Gonzalez was present, flirtation during practice, and a chat-app accusation that a player was sleeping with a coach; she said she did not report an assault by an assistant coach for fear of losing playing time. Several defense witnesses testified that Gonzalez never discouraged reporting, and Gonzalez denied wrongdoing.

In August 2022, the ALJ upheld the dismissal on two grounds, immoral conduct and evident unfitness for service, finding the three players credible and Gonzalez not credible about how he treated CR after her report. The ALJ rejected the dishonesty and persistent-violation charges.

Both sides petitioned the Los Angeles County Superior Court for a writ of administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5: Gonzalez to overturn the dismissal, and the district to challenge the evidentiary exclusions and the dishonesty ruling. Exercising its independent judgment as required by Education Code § 87682, Judge James C. Chalfant denied both petitions in November 2024. The court agreed that the ALJ properly excluded most time-barred evidence and properly found evident unfitness for service, but it reversed the immoral-conduct finding, concluding that Gonzalez’s failure to address the teammate’s threat against AZ was not immoral conduct. Gonzalez appealed.

In the partially published case of Gonzalez v. Board of Trustees of the Cerritos Community College District, No. B344342 (November 2026), the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying Gonzalez’s petition, leaving his dismissal for evident unfitness for service in place. The opinion was filed November 6, 2026, and modified and certified for partial publication on November 18, 2026; Parts II and IV of the Discussion are not published.

Because the trial court exercised its independent judgment, the Court of Appeal asked only whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings. It did not reweigh the evidence or second-guess credibility determinations.

The court explained that “evident unfitness for service” means being clearly unsuited for the position, ordinarily because of a defect in temperament. Courts first apply the factors set out in Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214 to determine whether the conduct bears on fitness to teach, and then ask whether the unfitness is “evident,” meaning attributable to a temperamental defect. Only the relevant Morrison factors need be addressed, and the court found that the trial court had properly considered them.

Substantial evidence showed that Gonzalez knew of the toxic team environment. The court pointed to his instruction that players avoid investigators, his role in an earlier agreement to keep an assistant coach “in check,” his presence when coaches were intoxicated, his awareness of flirtation and the chat-app allegation, and his failure to act after the teammate’s threat against AZ. He knew of multiple investigations, tried to shut down two of them, and on two occasions reacted with anger toward players who reported misconduct. Given the team culture, the court held, that was enough to support a finding that players were discouraged from reporting, and the trial court was entitled to reject the contrary defense testimony. The court also found no meaningful inconsistency in the trial court’s statements about what Gonzalez knew.

On the four-year limit in section 87680, the court relied on Atwater Elementary School Dist. v. California Dept. of General Services (2007) 41 Cal.4th 227, which recognized that equitable estoppel can permit evidence outside the four-year window. CR’s testimony about retaliation after her report was properly admitted, because the retaliation was itself recent misconduct and she had been prevented from reporting it. In any event, the court concluded that the testimony of AZ and AJ alone supported the finding, so Gonzalez could not show prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.

In an unpublished part of the opinion, the court declined to consider Gonzalez’s argument that he was owed back pay for his unpaid suspension now that the immoral-conduct charge supporting it had been reversed. The court held the argument was forfeited because he had not properly raised it below.

CDI Launches Development of Insurance Industry AI Safeguards

California’s Insurance Commissioner has launched a statewide effort to develop consumer safeguards for the use of artificial intelligence in insurance, announcing a public workshop and an industry survey that will help shape how the state approaches transparency, accountability, privacy, and fairness as insurers increasingly rely on AI-driven tools. The California Department of Insurance (CDI) announced the initiative in a press release.

According to the Department, AI and other advanced analytics are now used across the industry to support claims processing, fraud detection, customer service, underwriting support, and operational decision-making. CDI acknowledges that these tools can improve efficiency and customer service, but it warns that, without proper design, testing, monitoring, and oversight, they may produce inaccurate outcomes, compromise sensitive personal information, reduce transparency, or amplify unfair bias and discrimination. The Department says it is seeking input now because today’s decisions about AI governance will shape how consumers experience and access coverage for years to come.

The Commissioner framed the initiative around insurer accountability, stressing that carriers remain responsible for the AI systems they use whether they build those tools in-house or buy them from a vendor. “You can outsource technology, but you cannot outsource responsibility,” the Commissioner said.

The centerpiece is a virtual public discussion workshop on December 15, 2026, beginning at 10 a.m. Pacific time and ending at noon or earlier, once all attendees who wish to comment have done so. Consumers, advocates, insurers, researchers, academics, technology developers, and other interested parties are invited to attend and comment. CDI is asking participants to share experiences, concerns, and recommendations on transparency, fairness, privacy, human oversight, accountability, and insurers’ responsibility for technology supplied by third-party vendors. Technical expertise is not required; the Department says it wants to hear from ordinary consumers about what information and support would help them understand decisions involving AI. Written comments and supporting materials may be emailed to CDIRegulations@insurance.ca.gov by December 12, 2026, and workshop comments will be made public. Registration details are in the Department’s workshop invitation.

Alongside the workshop, CDI is launching its Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence (RUAI) Survey to learn how insurers are deploying AI, how they govern those systems, what role third-party vendors play, and what operational effects AI adoption is having. The survey goes to a representative sample of the market: California-admitted insurers or insurance groups that wrote at least $250 million in California premium in 2025, selected California-admitted InsurTech companies, and selected insurers and groups that do business through managing general agents. Responses are due December 30, 2026. The Department says the findings will give it a clearer picture of current industry practices and help identify where additional consumer safeguards, transparency standards, or regulatory guidance may be warranted.

CDI is careful to stress that this is an information-gathering stage, not a rulemaking. The workshop will not focus on specific regulatory text, and the invitation is not a Notice of Proposed Action. Any formal regulatory proposal that follows would have its own public comment process. The Department also notes that the announcement does not change any existing insurance policies, coverage, or rates.

The initiative builds on earlier CDI actions on technology and fairness, including the Department’s 2022 Bias and Unfair Discrimination Bulletin, a 2022 public discussion on AI and insurance, and a 2023 survey of automated decision-making tools. It also follows enactment of Senate Bill 354, the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act, which the Commissioner sponsored and Governor Newsom signed on September 27, 2026 (Chapter 481, Statutes of 2026). The law replaces California’s decades-old insurance privacy statute with a modernized framework governing how insurers and their third-party service providers collect, use, and share consumers’ personal information. CDI described the bill as part of a broader consumer protection package signed this fall, and legal commentators report that it becomes operative July 1, 2028.

For insurers, including workers’ compensation carriers that increasingly use predictive models and automated tools in claims triage, fraud detection, and underwriting, the survey is an immediate task, and the workshop is an early chance to influence what any future California AI standards might require. Employers and other policyholders also have an opening to weigh in on how much transparency and human review they expect when an algorithm helps shape coverage or claims decisions.

November 16, 2026 – News Podcast


Rene Thomas Folse, JD, Ph.D. is the host for this edition which reports on the following news stories: SCIF’s $555K Premium Win Grows by $908K in Prejudgment Interest. Drivers Too Late to Intervene and Challenge Class Settlement. 9th Cir. Blocks California Climate-Risk Law and Scope 3 Reporting. SoCal Clinical Lab and Owner Resolves Kickbacks Case for $1.25M. 73 Enforcement Actions Follow Statewide Contractor Sweep. L.A. Superior Court Judge Robert Draper Removed From Office. DOI Issues Non-Renewal Moratorium for 50,000 Policyholders. HHS Opens the Door to Compounded “Healing” Peptides.

Lascivious Conduct Not Required to Trigger Ban on Forced Arbitration

Jane Doe worked as a guest reception manager at The Maybourne Beverly Hills hotel from May 2015 until January 2024. In June 2020, she signed an arbitration agreement requiring that employment-related disputes be arbitrated under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

According to her complaint, after she disclosed her first pregnancy in October 2020, she heard comments that she could not keep working after having a baby, or remain a “career woman” once she had children. In November 2021, after returning from maternity leave, she applied for a director position but was never interviewed; the position was closed and later filled by a man. After a second maternity leave ended in May 2023, she was told there was no room for her to grow professionally. In December 2023, a regional director told her that her children would always be her first priority and suggested she stop seeking promotions or raises.

Doe alleges that the hotel’s human resources director then accused her, falsely, of having a sexual relationship with a coworker. She was suspended without pay and fired five days later. She contends the termination was retaliation for her requests for pay equity.

In March 2024, Doe sued Maybourne and related entities in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Her claims included hostile work environment harassment based on sex, gender, and pregnancy; sex discrimination and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Maybourne moved to compel arbitration. Doe opposed the motion, invoking the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), Pub. L. No. 117-90, 136 Stat. 26.

Judge Lynne M. Hobbs denied the motion as to Maybourne. The court concluded that Doe’s claims amounted to sexual harassment under California law, which covers harassment based on pregnancy and does not require sexual desire. Maybourne appealed the order denying arbitration.

In the published case of Doe v. The Maybourne Beverly Hills Operator, LLC, No. B341400 (November 2026), the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Seven, affirmed the trial court’s order denying Maybourne’s motion to compel arbitration. The court held that a “sexual harassment dispute” under the EFAA is not limited to sexual misconduct and can include a FEHA hostile work environment claim based on gender or pregnancy, even without any lascivious conduct. It further held that Doe’s complaint adequately alleged such a dispute, so the entire case may proceed in court. Justice Stone wrote the opinion, joined by Presiding Justice Martinez and Justice Feuer. Doe was awarded her costs on appeal.

The parties agreed the FAA governed the arbitration agreement. Section 2 of the FAA (9 U.S.C. § 2) makes arbitration agreements enforceable except as provided in “chapter 4,” which is the EFAA. Under 9 U.S.C. § 402, a predispute arbitration agreement is unenforceable, at the plaintiff’s election, in a case relating to a sexual assault or sexual harassment dispute. Reviewing that question of statutory interpretation de novo, the court noted that no California court had yet decided it.

The court began with the text. The EFAA defines a sexual harassment dispute as one relating to conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment “under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law” (9 U.S.C. § 401(4)). The statute therefore borrows the definition of sexual harassment from whatever law the plaintiff invokes. Because the text is clear, the court found no need to rely on legislative history or the #MeToo context in which Congress acted. Citing Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) 590 U.S. 644, the court observed that statutory text controls even when its drafters may not have anticipated a particular application.

Turning to California law, the court explained that FEHA prohibits harassment because of sex, which includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy. FEHA expressly provides that sexually harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire (Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C)), and “sex” and “gender” are used interchangeably. Courts have long recognized that hostility toward women, not sexual attraction, can drive a sexual harassment claim. A FEHA hostile work environment claim based on gender or pregnancy is therefore a sexual harassment dispute within the meaning of the EFAA.

The court next addressed what a plaintiff must plead to invoke the EFAA. Federal courts have split on the question, with standards ranging from the plausibility test of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662 to a more lenient “nonfrivolous” standard. A divided Ninth Circuit panel in Holland-Thielen v. SpaceX (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2026, No. 25-4811) recently adopted a looser standard under which the conduct need only be asserted, but the state court noted it is not bound by that decision. The court concluded that California’s own pleading rules do not apply, because the EFAA directs that federal law determines its applicability and because state rules could undermine uniform application of federal law. It ultimately found it unnecessary to choose a standard, because Doe’s complaint satisfies even the demanding Twombly/Iqbal test.

Doe alleged unwelcome comments based on her gender and pregnancy, a false accusation of sexual misconduct, and a broad pattern of excluding women from advancement. Relying on Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, the court explained that personnel decisions can themselves communicate a hostile message when they form a widespread pattern. Read together and in Doe’s favor, the allegations plausibly describe an objectively hostile work environment. The court cautioned that a trier of fact may ultimately find the conduct was not severe or pervasive, but that question does not prevent the claim from triggering the EFAA at this stage. Because the EFAA applies to the “case,” the denial of arbitration extends to all of Doe’s claims.

IMR Volume Dips for First Time Since 2022

After three straight years of growth, independent medical review (IMR) activity in California workers’ compensation has finally leveled off. Volume slipped slightly in the first nine months of 2026, while the share of disputes in which IMR physicians side with the original utilization review decision stayed above 90%, according to a November 9, 2026 release from the California Workers’ Compensation Institute (CWCI).

CWCI counted 110,965 IMR decision letters issued from January through September 2026, down 3.1% from the same period in 2025. That is the first decline since IMR volume began climbing back from a historic low in 2022. Even so, this year’s nine-month total remains higher than the comparable totals for every year from 2020 through 2024, so the dip leaves volume well above where it stood just a few years ago. The Institute’s analysis draws on state data covering roughly 1.8 million IMR decision letters issued from 2015 through September 2026.

IMR is the final step for resolving disputes over whether a treatment requested by an injured worker’s doctor is medically necessary. The process was created by Senate Bill 863, the 2012 reform package that overhauled California’s system for resolving medical treatment disputes. When a claims administrator’s utilization review denies or modifies a treatment request under Labor Code § 4610, the worker or the worker’s representative may ask for IMR under Labor Code § 4610.5. The Division of Workers’ Compensation contracts with an independent medical review organization, currently Maximus Federal Services, to conduct the reviews. State regulations (8 CCR § 9792.10.6) generally require a final determination within 30 days of receiving the application and supporting records. Under Labor Code § 4610.6, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board may overturn an IMR determination only on narrow grounds, which makes IMR outcomes effectively final in most disputes.

Those outcomes continue to strongly favor the original review decision. CWCI reports that IMR physicians upheld utilization review denials and modifications in 90.2% of 2026 decisions, up slightly from 89.8% in 2025 and consistent with the narrow range seen since 2015. Uphold rates varied by type of service, from a low of 80.8% for evaluation and management services to a high of 95.2% for acupuncture. The uphold rate rose from 86.1% to 88.8% for surgery requests and from 81.3% to 83.1% for psychiatric services.

Prescription drugs remain the largest source of IMR disputes, at 30.8% of decisions, up from 30.5% in 2025. Physical therapy ranked second at 13.2% and injections third at 12.8%.

Within the drug category, the data shows a continued move away from opioid disputes. Opioids fell to 16.7% of prescription drug IMRs, and the share of opioid denials upheld reached an all-time high of 95.7%. Dermatological drugs, the topical creams and similar products often prescribed for pain, rose to a record 25.9% of pharmaceutical IMRs. That is more than double their 12.3% share in 2018, making them the most frequently disputed drug category. Musculoskeletal drugs ranked second at 20.0% and had the highest uphold rate of any drug group, at 98.5%. Anticonvulsants, some of which are prescribed for nerve pain, also hit a record at 10.6% of drug IMRs.

The drug findings come on the heels of other CWCI research tracking prescription cost drivers. Earlier this month, the Institute reported that meloxicam has become the largest source of anti-inflammatory drug spending in California workers’ comp, driven largely by high-cost capsule formulations.

As in prior years, a small group of physicians generates most of the IMR caseload. In the 12 months ending September 2026, the top 10% of requesting physicians, 789 providers, accounted for 84.5% of disputed service requests. The top 1%, just 79 providers, accounted for 41.9%. Ten individual physicians alone accounted for 10.4% of disputed requests decided through IMR, and their requests were upheld at a 90.3% rate, almost exactly the system-wide average. This concentration has been a recurring theme of CWCI’s IMR research and has long fueled debate over whether a relatively small number of high-volume prescribers drives a disproportionate share of medical disputes and the costs of administering them.

The release does not offer an explanation for this year’s decline, and the figures cover only three quarters. CWCI says it will publish full-year 2026 results later, and the more detailed statistics behind the release are available only to CWCI members through the Independent Medical Review section of the Research tab on the CWCI website. Readers looking for longer-term context can consult CWCI’s earlier research update on IMR trends and outcomes from 2015 through 2025.

Medi-Cal Patient’s Injury Settlement Exempt from Hospital Lien Act

Sunfa Reneau was injured in a car accident caused by Andre Hernandez on June 3, 2020. Two days later she was treated at Long Beach Memorial Medical Center. She presented her Medi-Cal card, and the hospital’s admissions manager confirmed her eligibility. The hospital billed Medi-Cal for some of the services it provided, but $7,683 in charges for other services were never submitted to Medi-Cal and reportedly remain unpaid.

On July 24, 2020, the hospital’s attorneys, Yoshida & Garcia, Inc., wrote to Hernandez’s auto insurer, Alliance United, giving notice of a hospital lien under Civil Code § 3045.5 of the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) and threatening suit over the unpaid $7,683. In March 2021, Reneau settled her claim against Hernandez for $7,500, to be paid by Alliance United. The law firm continued to pursue the lien, and the insurer withheld Reneau’s settlement funds.

Reneau filed suit in June 2021, and the defendants removed the case to federal court. Her operative third amended complaint asserted putative class claims under federal and California debt collection law and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. In May 2024, the federal court dismissed the federal debt collection claim and remanded the remaining claims to the Los Angeles County Superior Court.

Judge Kenneth R. Freeman then sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the state debt collection and UCL claims without leave to amend. The court reasoned that the HLA and the Medi-Cal Act could be harmonized to permit the lien, and that the UCL could not be used to attack the HLA’s “safe harbor.” Judgment was entered, and Reneau appealed, challenging only the dismissal of her UCL claim.

In the published case of Reneau v. Yoshida & Garcia, Inc., No. B345787 (November 2026), the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Five, reversed the judgment and the order sustaining the demurrer to the UCL claim, and remanded for the case to proceed on that claim alone. The court held that a hospital may not assert an HLA lien for services provided to a Medi-Cal beneficiary, that the lien here was therefore invalid, and that the invalid lien can support a UCL claim.

Reviewing the demurrer de novo and accepting the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, the court began with the HLA, Civil Code § 3045.1 et seq., which gives hospitals a lien against a patient’s recovery from a third-party tortfeasor. In Parnell v. Adventist Health System/West (2005) 35 Cal.4th 595, the California Supreme Court held that the lien “requires the existence of an underlying debt owed by the patient to the hospital.” If the patient owes nothing, no lien attaches. (Parnell also disapproved Swanson v. St. John’s Regional Medical Center (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 245 to the extent it conflicted.)

The court then turned to the Medi-Cal framework. Federal Medicaid law, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, strictly limits how providers are reimbursed. The Medi-Cal Act requires providers to bill Medi-Cal and bars them from seeking payment from beneficiaries or from anyone other than the state or a qualifying third-party payor (Welfare and Institutions Code § 14019.4). The right to recover from liable third parties belongs to the state agency, not the provider, and beneficiaries assign their recovery rights to the state rather than to providers (Welfare and Institutions Code § 14124.71). As the Supreme Court noted in Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003) 30 Cal.4th 798, Medicaid beneficiaries need not assign to providers their right to recover from third parties.

Putting the two together, the court found that the defendants offered no reason why Parnell’s debt requirement should not apply in the Medi-Cal setting. Reneau owed the hospital nothing, and a settling tortfeasor is not a “third-party payor” within the meaning of section 14019.4. The HLA lien therefore conflicted with the Medi-Cal Act and was invalid.

On the UCL claim, the court acknowledged that the statute’s reach over unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent practices is broad but cannot be used to attack a legislative safe harbor. Under Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, plaintiffs “may not use the general unfair competition law to assault that harbor.” But the HLA provides no safe harbor here, the court explained, because the defendants had no authority under the HLA to assert the lien in the first place.

The court also rejected the argument that its holding should apply only prospectively. Because the governing statutes and cases are long-standing, the ruling simply applies existing law to new facts. The court distinguished Olszewski, which involved a statute that was itself preempted; here, the HLA is facially valid and only its use against a Medi-Cal beneficiary was improper. The court further held that Reneau did not need a separate declaratory relief cause of action, since her complaint already sought a judicial declaration that the practices were prohibited, and it deemed the defendants’ litigation privilege argument forfeited because it was not presented under a proper heading.

For hospitals, lien claimants, and liability and auto insurers handling settlements with Medi-Cal patients, the published ruling makes clear that a provider who accepts a Medi-Cal patient cannot sidestep Medi-Cal billing rules by asserting an HLA lien against the patient’s third-party recovery, and that doing so may expose the provider and its collection counsel to UCL liability.

GLP-1 Drugs a Minor Cost Problem in Comp Medical

GLP-1 weight-loss and diabetes drugs may dominate headlines and group health budgets, but they barely register in workers’ compensation costs, according to new data from the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI). In the latest installment of its “Asked & Answered” series, published November 10, 2026, NCCI reports that GLP-1 drugs accounted for only about 0.02% of workers’ compensation medical spending in 2025, and the bureau says it does not expect them to become a significant loss driver.

The “Asked & Answered” series responds to questions submitted by stakeholders, using NCCI data to explain what trends mean for the workers’ compensation system. This edition, written by Geena Baldi, takes on two questions: how much GLP-1 medications are showing up in comp claims, and where the medical share of total losses stands today.

On the first question, NCCI’s Medical Data Call shows roughly $1.9 million paid for GLP-1 drugs in 2025, against about $9.3 billion in total workers’ compensation medical payments. Claims involving GLP-1s likewise made up about 0.02% of claim counts.

That small number has been growing. NCCI dates the starting point to 2021, when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration first approved semaglutide for chronic weight management. Since then, GLP-1 payments in workers’ compensation have grown at an average annual rate of nearly 40%, rising from 0.01% of medical spend in 2021 to 0.02% in 2025. According to NCCI, that growth reflects more claims involving the drugs rather than higher prices: the average amount paid per transaction has held steady at roughly $1,200 to $1,300.

NCCI cautions that with use this limited, broad generalizations about GLP-1 claims are difficult. The bureau classified diagnoses and body systems using the top two ICD-10 codes on each medical bill, and it examined whether the drugs were being used to help injured workers lose weight before surgery (defining major surgery as a non-injection service with a 90-day global follow-up period under CMS rules, or a procedure involving spinal neurostimulators). Its key finding: the data shows no meaningful use of GLP-1s for pre-surgical weight loss.

Looking ahead, NCCI says it does not anticipate GLP-1s becoming a significant cost driver, largely because obesity is typically not a compensable injury. The bureau says it will keep monitoring the drugs and report further insights as warranted.

The second part of the article updates a metric NCCI first presented at its Annual Insights Symposium in 2024 and 2025: the share of workers’ compensation losses attributable to medical costs. NCCI’s preliminary estimate puts the medical share for Accident Year 2025 at 53%, unchanged from Accident Year 2024. The share has been roughly flat for at least two decades, peaking at 56.6% in Accident Year 2016 and drifting down since.

NCCI attributes the recent decline to indemnity losses growing faster than medical losses, consistent with its finding that wage growth has recently outpaced medical inflation as measured by its Workers Compensation Weighted Medical Price Index (see NCCI’s Medical Inflation Insights). Because indemnity benefits are tied to wages, faster wage growth pushes up the indemnity side of the ledger. NCCI notes that wage projections from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and medical price projections from CMS suggest the pattern will continue. Accident Year 2026 estimates are still developing, but if wages keep outpacing medical prices, NCCI says the medical share could remain near 2024–2025 levels or decline.

NCCI flags several caveats for the medical-share figures. They are based on NCCI Financial Call data developed to ultimate, covering data through December 31, 2024, with 2025 figures preliminary and valued as of December 31, 2025. The data excludes large-deductible policies and COVID-19 claims through July 1, 2023, and covers all states where NCCI provides ratemaking services, with Texas excluded through 2010 and West Virginia through 2014. The methodology mirrors the approach in NCCI’s most recent rate and loss cost filings.

For employers and insurers, the takeaway is twofold: the GLP-1 boom that is straining group health plans has so far had a negligible effect on comp medical costs, and the long-standing medical-versus-indemnity split remains stable, with wage growth, not medical inflation, currently doing more to move the needle. Stakeholders can submit questions for future installments to NCCI at INSIGHTS@ncci.com.

Overbroad Arbitration Clause Trimmed and Case Sent to Arbitration

CN Motor Company LLC, doing business as Santa Monica Lincoln, is an automobile dealership. Luis Antonio Salazar filled out an employment application on June 6, 2022, listing a start date of June 20, 2022, and on June 8 he signed a two-page “Applicant Statement and Agreement” containing an arbitration provision. He completed other hiring paperwork, including a W-4, about a week later, and worked as an hourly employee from June 2022 to March 2024. Salazar is primarily a Spanish speaker; his declaration, translated for him, stated he cannot read English documents unless they are translated.

The agreement bore a capitalized title warning that it contained a binding arbitration agreement, and a second capitalized warning appeared above the signature block. The body was single-spaced, 11-point type across 15 paragraphs. Paragraph 4 required individual arbitration of “all disputes of any nature” arising out of or related in any way to the employee’s job application, employment, or “any other relationship/interaction” with the company and its “Affiliates.” Affiliates were defined to include owners, managers, employees, agents, attorneys, sister and parent companies, joint venturers, alleged joint employers, independent contractors and benefit-plan parties. Paragraph 5 listed exceptions for certain NLRB, workers’ compensation, EDD and Labor Commissioner wage claims and stated the agreement was not revocable. Paragraph 11 required a party starting a claim to deliver a dated letter to the general manager and the controller or business manager, while providing only that the company “may similarly commence claims” by letter to the employee.

In June 2024 Salazar filed a putative class action in Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging ten Labor Code and unfair competition claims. CN Motor moved to compel arbitration. On December 16, 2024, Judge Lawrence P. Riff found that CN Motor had proven an agreement to arbitrate existed but held it unenforceable. The court found a moderate-to-high degree of procedural unconscionability, based on the adhesive form, time pressure, the English-only presentation to a Spanish speaker, and surprise from the dense format. It found moderate substantive unconscionability based on Paragraph 4’s overbreadth, a lack of mutuality regarding Affiliates and who was bound, infinite duration under Paragraph 5’s “not revocable” language, and Paragraph 11’s one-sided procedure for starting arbitration. Because the defects went to the core of the agreement, the court declined to sever them and denied the motion. CN Motor appealed.

In the published case of Salazar v. CN Motor Company LLC, No. B344433 (October 2026), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed the order denying the employer’s motion to compel arbitration, with directions to grant the motion as to Salazar’s individual claims under the agreement after striking the unconscionable terms, and to decide his challenge to the class action waiver on remand. The opinion was filed October 19, 2026, as unpublished; on November 12, 2026, the court certified it for publication with no change in the judgment.

The court cut the procedural unconscionability finding down to a low level. It found no substantial evidence of oppression: any pressure to sign other forms at the worksite came after the arbitration agreement was signed, and Salazar signed it two weeks before starting work. On the language issue, the court stressed that Salazar offered no evidence that he asked for a translation, told management before signing that he was not fluent in English, or met with anyone at the dealership before signing. He first raised his difficulty reading English after he signed, and the cases finding oppression on this basis involved employers who knew of a worker’s limited English. The court also found no surprise, given the conspicuous capitalized warnings and readable 11-point font. That left only the agreement’s adhesive nature, which supports a low degree of procedural unconscionability.

On substance, the court agreed with the trial court that the agreement was overbroad and lacked mutuality, and it rated the substantive unconscionability as high. Covering disputes of any nature with the company and its sprawling list of Affiliates, including matters unrelated to employment, showed an intent to use arbitration to shield the employer and its affiliates from unrelated claims. Paragraph 11 was one-sided because only the employee faced a mandatory, specific notice requirement. The court disagreed with the trial court on duration, however, reading the “not revocable” language as modifying only the agency-proceedings exception in Paragraph 5, and noting that a contract with no stated term ends after a reasonable time. Drawing on Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, among other cases, the court treated the agreement as unenforceable in its present form.

The decisive question was severance. Under Civil Code § 1670.5, a trial court’s choice to refuse enforcement rather than sever is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Applying the framework of Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, the court asked first whether the contract’s central purpose was tainted with illegality, and then whether striking or limiting the offending terms would cure the problem without rewriting the contract. Ramirez rejects any bright-line rule that multiple unconscionable terms require refusing enforcement. Here, the central purpose of arbitrating employment disputes was not tainted, and the offending language could be removed cleanly. The court struck “of any nature,” “or any other relationship/interaction with,” and “Affiliates” from Paragraph 4, removed the illustrative list of covered claims, and severed Paragraph 11 entirely. The remaining agreement is enforceable only as to claims arising from or connected to Salazar’s employment with CN Motor. Because removing these terms narrowed arbitration only between employer and employee, the court held the refusal to sever was error. Since the trial court never ruled on Salazar’s attack on the class action waiver, the appellate court ordered only his individual claims to arbitration for now and sent the waiver question back for decision.

Panel Refuses to Enforce Lifetime Arbitration Agreement

VXI Global Solutions, LLC operates customer service call centers nationwide. In February 2023 it hired Tracie Bennett, who has a high school education, as an account associate; she left the job in April 2023. Her new-hire packet ran roughly 100 pages and included an arbitration agreement and a separate confidentiality agreement, both signed the same day. Bennett did not consult a lawyer, though Global’s corporate counsel testified she had the opportunity to review the packet during orientation.

The arbitration agreement, drafted by Global and written in the employee’s voice, required arbitration of all individual claims involving the “Company” and its past or present partners, officers, employees or agents, “whether or not those claims or controversies arise out of my employment.” It defined “Company” broadly to reach partners, officers, directors, employees, affiliates, benefit plans and successors. It survived termination of employment, could be modified or revoked only by a writing signed by all of Global’s partners and the employee, and contained a severability clause. The companion confidentiality agreement barred Bennett from soliciting Global employees for a competing business during her employment and for one year afterward, and entitled Global to injunctive relief without proof of actual damages and without prior actual notice.

In October 2023, Bennett filed a putative class action in Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging 10 causes of action, including unpaid minimum wages and overtime and missed meal and rest breaks. Global moved to compel arbitration.

Judge David S. Cunningham III held that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) governed the agreement and found a low degree of procedural unconscionability because it was a contract of adhesion. Relying on Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, the court found substantive unconscionability in two respects: the agreement reached claims unrelated to employment, and its duration was unreasonable because it outlived the job and could be ended only by mutual agreement. The court rejected Bennett’s other arguments, including challenges to the attorney fee terms, the waiver of public injunctive relief, and the handling of PAGA representative claims, and it did not reach her attacks on the confidentiality agreement. Concluding the defects could not be severed without rewriting the contract, the court denied the motion. Global appealed, as an order denying arbitration is immediately appealable under Code of Civil Procedure § 1294, subdivision (a).

In the published case of Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions, LLC, No. B346763 (November 2026), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order denying the employer’s motion to compel arbitration and awarded Bennett her costs on appeal. The opinion, filed November 13, 2026, is certified for publication. Justice Viramontes wrote for the majority, with Presiding Justice Stratton concurring; Justice Wiley filed an extensive dissent.

The majority first held that, under Civil Code § 1642, the arbitration and confidentiality agreements must be read together as a single contract, because they were signed in the same transaction and address related subject matter. Unfair terms in the confidentiality agreement therefore count against the arbitration agreement. On procedural unconscionability, the court agreed the degree was low. Global did not dispute that the agreement was adhesive, but there was no evidence of pressure or a rushed signing, Bennett had a reasonable chance to review the documents and consult counsel, and the language, while sometimes lengthy, was not unduly complex. Her education level and unfamiliarity with arbitration did not show she could not understand the terms.

Substantive unconscionability, however, was high. Read as a whole, the agreement would force Bennett to arbitrate nearly any claim involving Global, related to her job or not, for the rest of her life unless both sides agreed otherwise. The court rejected Global’s narrower reading because it would render the “whether or not” language meaningless. The expansive definition of “Company” made a large group of employees, officers, agents and affiliates third-party beneficiaries who could compel Bennett to arbitrate, while she had no reciprocal right to force their claims against her into arbitration, a one-sided arrangement Global did not justify. The injunctive relief clause let Global obtain injunctions without proving the usual elements, including irreparable harm. And the nonsolicitation clause, which was not limited to unlawful means of solicitation, was void under Business and Professions Code § 16600.

Turning to remedy, the court explained that Civil Code § 1670.5, subdivision (a), lets a court refuse enforcement, sever an offending term, or limit it, but not rewrite the parties’ bargain. Because the agreement contained multiple unconscionable terms and its overbroad scope went to its central purpose, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sever. Global’s proposed fix of striking two phrases would not work, the majority said, because the remaining text would still cover all claims involving Global, and adding limiting language would amount to rewriting the contract. Striking the confidentiality agreement’s injunctive and nonsolicitation terms would not cure the arbitration agreement’s own defects.

Finally, the majority rejected the dissent’s position that the FAA preempts California’s unconscionability analysis here. It relied on Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, and Ninth Circuit decisions applying California law. It distinguished U.S. Supreme Court rulings such as AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 as striking down rules that barred arbitration outright or imposed procedures at odds with its basic features. Unconscionability findings arise more often in adhesive contracts, the majority reasoned, and such contracts frequently contain arbitration clauses, so arbitration is not being singled out.

November 9, 2026 – News Podcast


Rene Thomas Folse, JD, Ph.D. is the host for this edition which reports on the following news stories: LC 3600(a)(10) Post-Termination Defense Waived if Not Plead in Answer. Sheriff’s Chiefs Lack Authority to Settle Deputies’ Discipline Appeals. FBI Most Wanted Healthcare Fraud Fugitive to Serve 20 Years. FRISS Survey: Insurers See AI Fraud Coming but Few Are Ready. WCIRB Reports Medical Care Using New Resource-Based Yardstick. New DOL Rules Allow Employers to See What Their PBMs Earn. 2027 Employer Health Insurance Premiums to Increase 8.2%. Meloxicam Drives Surge in Comp Anti-Inflammatory Spending.