Hyewon Pechkis and Joseph Pechkis, a married couple, were tenured physics professors at California State University, Chico (Chico State). Hyewon alleged she was subjected to harassment and discrimination by the department chair based on his perceived bias against women and Hyewon’s Korean ancestry and national origin. The chair allegedly confronted Hyewon aggressively enough to cause her to fear for her physical safety, and she was eventually diagnosed with chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder stemming from the hostile working environment. The couple raised their concerns with the dean of the College of Natural Sciences, but Chico State took no action to address the chair’s behavior.

With no relief forthcoming, the Pechkises accepted employment offers at California Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly), 400 miles away, effectively giving up their tenured positions at Chico State. Shortly after they announced their planned departure, Chico State Vice Provost Mahalley Allen emailed Hyewon claiming the university had “serious concerns” about a potential Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) violation related to old blog postings Hyewon had written in Korean, which the complaint alleged were based on inaccurate translations. The complaint further alleged that Allen contacted Cal Poly to inform them of the unresolved FERPA investigation in what plaintiffs characterized as an attempt to sabotage their transfer. A Chico State dean also allegedly caused unnecessary delays in transferring plaintiffs’ lab equipment to Cal Poly. Despite these efforts, Cal Poly continued to extend employment offers to both professors.

In December 2024, the Pechkises filed suit against the Trustees of the California State University asserting six causes of action: discrimination, retaliation under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), failure to engage in the interactive process, hostile working environment, failure to prevent discrimination and harassment, and whistleblower retaliation.

In March 2025, defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 seeking to strike the second cause of action (FEHA retaliation) and the sixth cause of action (whistleblower retaliation). The Butte County Superior Court denied the motion. The court found that defendant had satisfied the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis — that the challenged claims arose from protected activity — because the FERPA investigation constituted an “official proceeding authorized by law.” However, the court then found that plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, concluding that their discrimination complaints were protected activity and that Chico State’s constructive discharge of their tenured employment qualified as an adverse employment action. Defendant appealed.

The Third District affirmed the denial but on different grounds than the trial court in the published case of Pechkis v. Trustees of the California State University, No. C103742 (March 2026),holding that defendant failed to carry its burden on the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis in the first place.

The court applied the framework established in Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009, which requires a defendant bringing an anti-SLAPP motion to “identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity” through a claim-by-claim elemental analysis. The court found that defendant had instead employed the kind of broad “gravamen” approach that the Supreme Court disapproved of in Bonni — essentially arguing that because the retaliation causes of action were based “in part” on communications between Chico State employees and Cal Poly, both causes of action should be stricken in their entirety. Citing Park v. Nazari (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1108–1109, the court held that when a defendant seeks to strike entire causes of action without identifying specific claims within them that rest on protected activity, the defendant fails to carry its first-step burden so long as the causes of action contain at least one claim that does not arise from protected conduct.

The court identified several allegations of potentially unprotected conduct underlying the challenged causes of action that defendant never addressed. Both causes of action alleged retaliation through constructive discharge — an adverse employment action that courts have recognized as unprotected activity. The court noted that defendant itself effectively conceded constructive discharge was central to these causes of action by making it the sole focus of its second-prong argument, yet defendant never explained how constructive discharge constituted protected activity under the first prong. Similarly, the causes of action alleged retaliation through the initiation of a sham FERPA investigation, and the court observed that under Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 773, claims based on the fact of an investigation or its outcome — as opposed to investigation-related speech — are not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute.

The court also rejected defendant’s assumption that because the FERPA investigation qualified as an “official proceeding authorized by law,” all acts associated with it were shielded by anti-SLAPP protection. The statute protects only “written or oral statement[s]” made in connection with such proceedings, not every act undertaken within them. Quoting the Supreme Court’s warning in Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067, the court cautioned that conflating discriminatory decisions with investigation-related speech in the anti-SLAPP analysis could render the statute “fatal for most harassment, discrimination and retaliation actions against public employers.”

The court acknowledged that individual allegations within the two causes of action might still be protected conduct susceptible to a more targeted anti-SLAPP motion but declined to perform that analysis on defendant’s behalf, concluding that defendant had “wholly failed to ‘propose where to make the incisions.’ “

Jessica Garcia worked for The Merchant of Tennis, Inc. (Merchant), a California corporation operating in San Bernardino County, from July through December 2019. In May 2022, she filed a third amended consolidated class action complaint on behalf of herself and other employees, alleging various wage-and-hour violations under the California Labor Code and other federal and state employment laws.

While Garcia’s motion for class certification was pending in 2024, Merchant pulled approximately 954 current and former employees into mandatory meetings with management and asked them to sign individual settlement agreements releasing their wage and hour claims in exchange for cash payments averaging roughly $918 each — over $875,000 in total. Garcia had not signed an agreement, but the vast majority of putative class members had.

In November 2024, Garcia moved to invalidate the settlements, arguing Merchant obtained them through fraud and coercion. The trial court found that Merchant had made “false and misleading” representations to secure the agreements: it gave workers unfounded claims about the low recovery rates in class actions, falsely stated that certain claims had been dismissed, described the releases as limited when they actually covered all claims, marked communications “confidential” to discourage sharing with class counsel, and misleadingly suggested that arbitration agreements barred participation in the lawsuit without disclosing that only 40 percent of workers had such agreements. The court concluded the 954 individual settlement agreements were voidable and ordered a curative notice giving workers 45 days to revoke their agreements and join the class action.

The parties then fought over what the curative notice should say about repayment. Merchant wanted the notice to warn workers that if they revoked their settlements and Merchant ultimately prevailed, they could be required to return the money. Garcia argued that including such language would discourage low-wage workers from joining the suit and that any repayment issue could be addressed later through an offset against recovery.

The San Bernardino County Superior Court sided with Garcia. Finding no binding California authority on point, the court followed two federal cases — Marino v. CACafe, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017) 2017 WL 1540717 and McClellan v. Midwest Machining, Inc. (6th Cir. 2018) 900 F.3d 297 — and ruled that the curative notice would inform workers they would not be required to return any payment, though the amount received might be treated as an offset against any future recovery. The court rejected Merchant’s argument that California’s rescission statutes (Civ. Code, §§ 1689, 1691) required immediate repayment, calling that position “simplistic legal analysis” that ignored the complexity of the employer-employee relationship and the court’s duty to prevent abuses undermining the administration of justice. The court stayed its order to allow Merchant to seek appellate review.

The Court of Appeal granted Merchant’s petition for writ of mandate in a 2–1 decision, directing the trial court to vacate its February 28, 2025 order and reconsider the curative notice in the published case of The Merchant of Tennis, Inc. v. Superior Court  No. E085766 (March 2026).

The majority (Acting Presiding Justice Miller, joined by Justice Codrington) held that California’s rescission statutes govern the situation and require the curative notice to inform workers that repayment of settlement funds may be required at the conclusion of litigation. The court acknowledged that under Civil Code section 1693, repayment need not be immediate and can be delayed until judgment without substantial prejudice to the other party.

But the majority concluded that neither section 1692 nor section 1693 authorizes a trial court to forgive repayment entirely at the outset of litigation. The court read section 1692 — which permits a court to “in its judgment adjust the equities between the parties” — as contemplating equitable adjustments at the time of final judgment, not at the beginning of a case. The majority found the federal authorities relied on by the trial court unpersuasive, noting that Marino provided no analysis of California rescission law, and McClellan addressed a narrow exception for federal Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims brought by an individual plaintiff, not a California wage-and-hour class action.

However, the court stopped short of requiring immediate repayment, holding that the curative notice should inform class members that if they choose to rescind, they could be responsible for repayment at the conclusion of litigation under Civil Code sections 1689, 1691, and 1693, while the trial court retains discretion to adjust equities under section 1692 at the time of judgment.

Justice Raphael dissented, arguing that the majority’s reading of the rescission statutes was too rigid and that section 1692 grants trial courts broad equitable authority to fashion remedies — including excusing repayment — at any stage of a proceeding, not only at final judgment.

Kathleen Charles, a dementia patient who was otherwise in good health, was admitted to the memory care wing of WellQuest Elk Grove, a residential care facility in Sacramento County. Her family informed staff that Kathleen was a “wanderer” who needed monitoring, and WellQuest’s own service plan noted she required frequent supervision. Three days after admission, Kathleen was found sitting unattended in an outdoor courtyard in direct sunlight on a day when the temperature reached 102 degrees. She had burns covering roughly a quarter of her body and an internal temperature of about 105 degrees. She fell into a coma and died four days later.

When Kathleen was admitted, her niece Erika Wright – acting under a durable power of attorney for Kathleen’s health care – signed an arbitration agreement on Kathleen’s behalf. The agreement provided that “any and all claims or disputes arising from or related to this Agreement or to your rights, obligations, care, or services at WellQuest of Elk Grove shall be resolved by submission to neutral, binding arbitration in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act.” It also contained a delegation clause stating that “an arbitrator will decide any question about whether a claim or dispute must be arbitrated.” The agreement designated JAMS as the arbitration administrator but did not reference any specific JAMS rules or provide a link to them.

Eight months after Kathleen’s death, her family filed suit. On Kathleen’s behalf (as survivor claims), plaintiffs alleged elder neglect, negligence, fraud, and a criminal elder abuse tort. Her brother Raymond, niece Erika, and nephew Thomas also brought individual claims for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

WellQuest moved to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. The Superior Court Judge denied the motion on multiple grounds. First, the court found that the delegation clause did not “clearly and unmistakably” assign threshold arbitrability questions – including enforceability and unconscionability – to the arbitrator, so the court resolved those issues itself. Second, the court determined that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable. Third, it held that Raymond, Erika, and Thomas were not parties to the agreement, so their individual wrongful death and emotional distress claims were not arbitrable. Finally, turning to Kathleen’s survivor claims, the court exercised its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c), and declined to compel arbitration, finding that if those claims went to arbitration while the family’s individual claims proceeded in court, there was a risk of conflicting rulings on common factual and legal issues. The court also rejected WellQuest’s argument that the FAA’s procedural provisions governed the agreement, concluding that the phrase “in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act” did not expressly incorporate the FAA’s procedural rules.

The Third District affirmed the trial court on all issues in the published case of Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove -C105070 (March 2026)

On the delegation clause, the court held that the language – providing that “an arbitrator will decide any question about whether a claim or dispute must be arbitrated” – fell short of the “clear and unmistakable” standard required to delegate threshold arbitrability issues away from the court. The court contrasted the agreement with the provision upheld in Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 892, where the clause explicitly covered “the interpretation, validity, or enforceability” of the agreement and incorporated specific JAMS rules that expressly assigned arbitrability to the arbitrator. Here, the clause said nothing about enforceability, unconscionability, or interpretation of the agreement itself, and the JAMS reference included no link to or copy of the applicable rules. Drawing on the reasoning in Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 783, the court explained that when delegation language is susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations — one covering only substantive disputes and the other reaching threshold enforceability questions — the ambiguity cannot satisfy the heightened “clear and unmistakable” standard.

On the FAA preemption issue, the court held that the phrase “in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act” did not expressly designate the FAA’s procedural provisions as controlling. Relying on the California Supreme Court’s holdings in Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, Cable Connection, Inc v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, and most recently Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 582, the court reaffirmed that the California Arbitration Act’s procedural rules – including section 1281.2, subdivision (c) – apply by default in state court proceedings, and parties must use express language to opt out of them in favor of the FAA’s procedural framework. The court acknowledged the contrary result in Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, where the phrase “pursuant to the FAA” was found sufficient, but disagreed with that reasoning, finding it inconsistent with the principle that a departure from the default CAA framework requires more exacting language. Following Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 177, the court concluded the agreement implicitly incorporated the CAA’s procedural provisions, leaving the trial court free to apply section 1281.2, subdivision (c), to keep all claims together and avoid conflicting rulings.

Because these two holdings disposed of the appeal, the court did not reach the parties’ remaining arguments regarding unconscionability or whether Raymond’s statutory right to trial preference would independently override arbitration.