Blake Lively and Justin Baldoni co-starred in the film It Ends With Us, a movie exploring domestic violence based on a Colleen Hoover novel. Baldoni co-founded Wayfarer Studios and also directed the film. Lively’s role was negotiated through her loanout company, Blakel, Inc., under an Offer Letter dated May 4, 2023. The parties never executed the contemplated long-form Actor Loanout Agreement (“ALA”), though they negotiated it for over a year while filming proceeded. A separate Contract Rider Agreement (“CRA”) was signed in January 2024, setting conditions — including a no-retaliation clause — under which Lively would return to production after the 2023 WGA/SAG-AFTRA strikes.

Lively alleged in the lawsuit she filed in the United States District Court Southern District of New York that during the first phase of filming in New Jersey, Baldoni and Wayfarer CEO Jamey Heath subjected her to sexual harassment and a hostile work environment — including comments about her body, an intrusion on her physical privacy while she was undressed, pressure to perform nudity beyond what was agreed, and discussions of personal sexual matters. In November 2023, Lively’s attorneys sent a “Protections for Return to Production” letter identifying seventeen conditions for her return to set. A January 4, 2024 all-hands meeting addressed these concerns, and the CRA was signed shortly after. Lively alleged that following the film’s August 2024 release, the defendants launched a coordinated public-relations campaign — engaging crisis consultants, digital operatives, and media contacts — to destroy her reputation in retaliation for her complaints. Expert reports submitted by Lively showed statistical evidence of artificially manipulated online content targeting her.

In the Opinion and Order on Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment in the case of Lively v. Wayfarer Studios LLC No. 24-cv-10049 (S.D.N.Y.) on April 2, 2026, Judge Liman ruled on the Wayfarer Parties’ combined motions for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment on all thirteen of Lively’s claims, which spanned Title VII, California FEHA, California Labor Code § 1102.5, breach of contract, defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy.

The court granted the motions on most claims but denied them on three: (1) Lively’s FEHA retaliation claim against IEWUM and Wayfarer (Count Four); (2) her FEHA aiding-and-abetting retaliation claim against The Advocacy Group, LLC (Count Seven); and (3) her breach of the CRA claim against It Ends With Us Movie LLC (Count Nine). All other claims — including Title VII, California Labor Code § 1102.5, FEHA sexual harassment, defamation, false light, civil conspiracy, and breach of the ALA — were dismissed.

Employment Status (Title VII and California Labor Code). The court held that Lively was an independent contractor, not an employee, under both the federal Reid factors and California’s Borello test. Lively enjoyed extensive contractual approval rights over the script, director, co-lead, wardrobe, marketing, and release pattern; she exercised significant practical control over hiring, firing, editing, and production logistics; she was paid a flat fee plus equity through her loanout entity with no tax withholding or benefits; and her engagement was limited to a single six-week project. Citing Alberty-Velez v. Corporacion de Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publica, 361 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004), and Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486 (8th Cir. 2003), the court reasoned that a director’s creative control over an actor does not automatically convert the actor into an employee, and that Lively’s independence — both contractual and practical — was overwhelming.

Contract Claims. The ALA was found unenforceable because it was never signed, IEWUM consistently insisted on execution as a condition precedent, and Lively could not identify which draft bound the parties or when. The CRA, however, was enforceable: it was signed by both parties, supported by valid consideration (Lively’s agreement to return to set when her obligation to do so was doubtful), and its anti-retaliation clause was not dependent on execution of the ALA.

Why a New York Federal Court Applied California FEHA. This is the opinion’s most significant issue. California law presumes its statutes do not apply extraterritorially, citing Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 539 (Cal. 1999), and courts have consistently held that FEHA does not reach conduct occurring outside California. See Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The ALA’s California choice-of-law clause could not resolve this issue because the ALA was never executed.

The court therefore applied the Campbell framework, which asks whether the “core of the alleged wrongful conduct” — particularly the “ultimate” or “crucial” discriminatory acts — occurred in California. For the sexual harassment claims, the answer was no: the alleged hostile-work-environment conduct occurred on a New Jersey film set, and California connections such as Heath’s text messages or pre-production Zoom calls were too peripheral to constitute “core” wrongdoing. The court rejected Lively’s argument that retaliatory acts committed from California could bootstrap her harassment claims into California’s territorial reach, noting that the alleged retaliation occurred after the working relationship ended and thus could not create a hostile work environment.

For the retaliation claims, however, the court reached the opposite conclusion. The allegedly retaliatory smear campaign was planned, directed, and largely executed from California. Baldoni and Heath — both California residents — directed their California-based PR consultants (TAG, Nathan) to implement the campaign. TAG retained a digital operative (Wallace) from California. The “decision to take retaliatory actions was made in California,” which courts have held satisfies the territorial nexus. See eShares, Inc. v. Talton, 2025 WL 936921, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2025). The court further noted that FEHA’s anti-retaliation provision protects “any person” — not just employees — meaning Lively’s independent-contractor status did not bar her FEHA retaliation claim. See Fitzsimons v. California Emergency Physicians Medical Group, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 265, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).

Retaliation — Triable Issues. The court found genuine factual disputes on all three elements of the FEHA retaliation claim: (1) Lively engaged in protected activity through the Protections Letter and all-hands meeting, and it was reasonable for her to believe she was opposing sexual harassment; (2) the Wayfarer Parties’ campaign — including statements about wanting to “bury” and “destroy” Lively, coordination with digital operatives whose work would be “untraceable,” and expert evidence of artificially manipulated online content — could constitute adverse employment action materially impairing her career prospects; and (3) a jury could infer retaliatory motive from the sequence of events and the Wayfarer Parties’ documented anger over Lively’s complaints.

Remaining Claims Dismissed. The defamation claim was barred by New York’s fair-report privilege because all challenged statements were made by counsel in connection with judicial proceedings. The false-light claim failed because New York law — which governed under choice-of-law analysis focused on Lively’s New York domicile — does not recognize the tort. Civil conspiracy claims fell with the underlying torts they were predicated on. Individual aiding-and-abetting claims against Nathan and Abel were barred under Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333 (Cal. 1998), which prohibits personal liability for individual nonemployer agents, though the court reserved judgment on TAG’s potential liability as a business-entity agent under Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group, 534 P.3d 40 (Cal. 2023).

The case is scheduled to proceed to trial on May 18, 2026 in New York.

Gregg Rader sustained an industrial injury to his psyche in the form of emotional stress while employed by Ticketmaster Corporation, with dates of injury spanning from November 12, 1991 through November 12, 1992. On January 19, 2011, a Workers’ Compensation Judge approved the parties’ Stipulations with Request for Award, granting Rader an award of 100 percent permanent total disability at a weekly rate of $336.00.

As part of that award, the WCJ approved an attorney’s fee of $39,444.71 — calculated as 15 percent of the present value of Rader’s anticipated lifetime benefits of $262,964.75 (after a 3% present value reduction). To fund this fee, the parties agreed to commute it laterally from Rader’s weekly benefits, reducing each payment by $50.40 and yielding a net weekly payment of $285.60.

Years later, Rader contended that the total amount withheld from his weekly benefits had fully satisfied the $39,444.71 attorney’s fee. His math was straightforward: dividing $39,444.71 by $50.40 per week produced roughly 782.63 weeks, which — counted from the initial payment date of June 6, 2008 — pointed to approximately June 5, 2023 as the date the commutation should have ended. He argued that his weekly rate should have returned to the full $336.00 at that point and sought penalties and interest for the continued withholding. Defendant State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF) countered that the award was silent on any end date for the commutation and that the WCAB lacked jurisdiction to alter the award.

The WCJ sided with SCIF. The WCJ reasoned that imprecision is inherent in life-expectancy estimates and that the gross amount of weekly reductions exceeding the fee amount was simply the expected outcome when an applicant outlives the projected life expectancy. The WCJ further found that under Labor Code section 5804, the attempt to undo the rate reduction was filed many years outside the permissible five-year window for amending an award, and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.

Last January, the WCAB granted Rader’s Petition for Reconsideration in the Significant Panel Decision of Gregg Rader v Ticketmaster -ADJ7138762 (January 2026) and substitute new Findings of Fact that the WCAB retains ongoing jurisdiction over the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 5803, and that because defendant has taken credit from applicant’s weekly payment of permanent indemnity in an amount equivalent to the dollar amount of commuted attorney’s fees, applicant is thereafter entitled to the full amount of his award without further reduction for attorney’s fees.

The State Fund was now the aggrieved party in the case for the first time, thus it was allowed to filed its own Petition for Reconsideration. The WCAB just denied SCIF’s petition for reconsideration in the second panel decision of  Rader v. Ticketmaster Corporation -ADJ7138762 (April 2026), affirming its own January 8, 2026 Opinion and Decision After Reconsideration (ODAR) which has been deemed a Significant Panel Decision. That earlier decision had revIersed the WCJ, holding that the WCAB retains jurisdiction over the dispute and that the weekly commutation ends once the gross amount of the awarded attorney’s fee ($39,444.71) has been fully satisfied — after which Rader is entitled to his full $336.00 weekly rate.

On Jurisdiction: The WCAB acknowledged that Labor Code section 5804 bars rescission, alteration, or amendment of an award more than five years from the date of injury. However, the Board drew a critical distinction: this dispute concerned the enforcement of the existing award’s terms — specifically, the allocation of attorney’s fees — rather than an alteration of the underlying disability award itself. Under Labor Code section 5803, the WCAB retains ongoing jurisdiction to enforce its orders and awards, including matters collateral to the award such as commutations and attorney’s fees. Relying on Hodge v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 501, 508-509 [46 Cal.Comp.Cases 1034], the Board emphasized that commutation merely alters the form of an award and does not affect the merits of the basic decision determining the worker’s right to benefits.

On the Merits: The WCAB examined the actual language of the Stipulations and Award and found that the only basis for withholding was to satisfy the specified attorney’s fee lien of $39,444.71. Neither the Stipulations nor the Award authorized withholding for any other purpose or contemplated an indefinite reduction. The Board reasoned that once a lien is fully paid, no statutory basis exists to continue allowing it as a charge against compensation under Labor Code section 4903(a). Additionally, under Labor Code section 5100, all commutations must avoid inequity and undue hardship to the applicant — and continuing to reduce benefits for attorney’s fees that have already been fully satisfied would be manifestly inequitable.

On SCIF’s Commutation Table Argument: SCIF pointed to Examples D and E in the commutation instructions under Administrative Director Rule 10169.1 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10169.1), which provide that after commutation of all remaining life pension indemnity, no further benefits are due. The WCAB found these examples inapposite because they involve commuting the entirety of an applicant’s future benefits, whereas here the parties commuted only a fixed dollar amount of attorney’s fees from an ongoing lifetime benefit stream.

A Remaining Open Question: While affirming that the commutation must end once the fee amount is satisfied, the WCAB expressly declined to opine on whether the present-value equivalent of the fees had already been fully withheld — noting that such a determination may require expert testimony and proper application of the 3% present-value calculations under AD Rules 10169 and 10169.1. The Board encouraged the parties to resolve the issue amicably but reminded them that any further proceedings must be supported by substantial evidence in the record, citing Hamilton v. Lockheed Corporation (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473, 478 (Appeals Bd. en banc).

Jeanette France worked as an occupational health nurse for the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP), first through a staffing agency from June to September 2016, and then as a direct hire under an emergency appointment beginning September 27, 2016. Emergency appointments under the Los Angeles City Charter are temporary, capped at one year, and may be terminated at any time without cause.

France’s immediate supervisor was Bedros Okhanes, who reported to medical director Dr. Leslie Michelle Israel. On January 9, 2017, France was injured at work when a chair she was sitting in fell, causing injuries to her lower back and shoulder. The next day she reported the injury and filed a workers’ compensation claim. On February 1, 2017 — less than a month after the injury — the DWP terminated her employment. France described a sequence of events that day: she was first called to the workers’ compensation office, where she met with Okhanes and two workers’ compensation staff members who asked her to sign documents. France told them she had retained a lawyer — something she had not previously disclosed. Ten to fifteen minutes later, she was called into Dr. Israel’s office, where the DWP’s director of human resources, Deitra Barnett, told France she was fired without explanation.

The DWP maintained that France was terminated for poor job performance that predated her injury. Dr. Israel identified several concerns: France failed to check patient identification before administering vaccines, left vaccines unrefrigerated, and did not take a patient’s blood pressure before a breathing test. Okhanes, in a 2019 deposition (he passed away in 2022), confirmed that France had “problems with her assignments.” Barnett testified that as an emergency hire, no written documentation of performance deficiencies was required before termination.

France denied ever being spoken to about performance issues or receiving any discipline. She also pointed out that the DWP’s internal termination paperwork listed no reason for her discharge.

France pursued two tracks. First, she filed a civil lawsuit under the Fair Employment and Housing Act alleging disability discrimination and retaliation. In December 2019, the Los Angeles County Superior Court granted summary judgment for the DWP, finding under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 that France was terminated for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons — namely, poor performance predating her injury — and that France failed to raise a triable issue of pretext.

Second, France filed a workers’ compensation petition alleging the DWP violated Labor Code section 132a, which prohibits employers from discharging employees for filing or threatening to file a workers’ compensation claim. After a multi-day hearing, the workers’ compensation judge denied the claim, finding that France failed to prove the termination was retaliatory in light of the performance evidence, and that she produced no evidence that those involved in terminating her even knew about her statements in the workers’ compensation meeting minutes earlier.

France sought reconsideration. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) granted the petition, reversed the judge, and found the DWP had violated section 132a. The WCAB concluded the DWP failed to carry its burden of establishing good cause for termination, emphasizing the absence of written disciplinary records, the lack of a stated reason on termination paperwork, and the fact that Dr. Israel could not recall exact dates for the performance issues she observed.

The Court of Appeal granted the DWP’s petition for writ of review in the unpublished case of L.A. Department of Water & Power v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board  Case No. E086551 (April 2026) and annulled the WCAB’s decision, directing the WCAB to reinstate the workers’ compensation judge’s original order denying France’s section 132a claim.

The court held that the WCAB’s findings were unreasonable because the Board systematically ignored relevant evidence rather than evaluating the record as a whole. Citing Bracken v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 246, 255, the court emphasized that while the WCAB has broad authority to make its own credibility determinations on reconsideration, it cannot meet the substantial evidence standard by isolating favorable evidence and ignoring contradictory facts. The court also relied on Lamb v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274, 281 and Garza v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 317 for the same principle.

Specifically, the court identified several ways the WCAB mischaracterized the record. Both Barnett and Israel testified that France was terminated for poor performance, yet the WCAB found that no witness confirmed this. The WCAB stated Barnett testified France was terminated merely because the emergency appointment ended, but Barnett actually testified the appointment was ended because of poor performance. The WCAB discredited Israel’s testimony because she could not recall specific dates for the performance issues, while ignoring the superior court’s summary judgment order — part of the record — containing Israel’s declaration placing those issues in October and November 2016, well before the injury. The WCAB faulted the absence of testimony from France’s direct supervisor Okhanes without acknowledging his 2019 deposition testimony, which was in the record and was the only testimony available given his death in 2022. Finally, the WCAB drew negative inferences from the lack of written documentation without addressing Barnett’s unrebutted explanation that emergency hires required no such documentation under the City Charter.

The court stressed that the WCAB was free to weigh evidence and make credibility determinations, but it was not free to simply ignore evidence that cut against its conclusions. Because the WCAB’s decision was not based on the entire record as required by Labor Code section 5952, the court annulled it under the standard set forth in Smith v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 530, 535 and ordered reinstatement of the original award following Redner v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 83, 97.