On January 1, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services launched the Transforming Episode Accountability Model (TEAM) - a mandatory, five-year program that requires approximately 740 acute care hospitals to take financial responsibility for the entire episode of a patient's surgical care, from the operating room through 30 days post-discharge. While this is a Medicare regulation, its effects are already influencing how orthopedic injuries are treated across all payer types, including workers' compensation. Three of the five surgical categories covered by TEAM are directly relevant to workplace injuries: lower extremity joint replacement (hip, knee, and ankle), surgical hip and femur fracture treatment, and spinal fusion. For each episode, CMS sets a risk-adjusted target price. Hospitals that come in under budget while meeting quality benchmarks earn bonuses; those that exceed the target owe money back. Unlike earlier voluntary bundled-payment experiments, there is no opt-out. Outpatient joint replacement is becoming the norm. Same-day discharge for total hip and knee replacement is now routine for appropriately selected patients. Outpatient orthopedic volume was already 33 times higher than inpatient volume by late 2023, and TEAM's episode-based pricing further incentivizes hospitals to move procedures to ambulatory surgery centers and send patients home the same day. Advances in regional anesthesia, minimally invasive techniques, and "prehabilitation" protocols have made this clinically safe for many patients. Post-surgical rehabilitation is being compressed. Hospitals are now accountable for all costs in the 30-day post-discharge window - physical therapy, home health, imaging, and ER visits. Physical therapy often begins within hours of surgery, and remote monitoring and telehealth follow-ups are replacing some in-person visits. Patient-reported outcomes now affect reimbursement. TEAM ties hospital payment to a Composite Quality Score that includes readmission rates, complications, and - notably - patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs). The patient's own assessment of pain, function, and satisfaction directly affects the hospital's bottom line. Faster timelines will become the expectation. As same-day joint replacement becomes standard of care, carriers and utilization reviewers will increasingly expect injured workers to follow accelerated protocols. Defense counsel should recognize that same-day discharge now reflects mainstream practice - not corner-cutting. Claimant's counsel should watch for cases where comorbidities or job demands make an accelerated timeline inappropriate. Financial incentives may influence treatment decisions. TEAM creates pressure to reduce episode costs. While this often aligns with good care, attorneys should be alert to situations where cost-reduction incentives conflict with a worker's needs - premature discharge, inadequate post-op rehab, or limited follow-up visits within the 30-day window. Patient-reported outcome data may become discoverable. Hospitals are now collecting standardized, quantitative data on how patients perceive their own recovery before and after surgery. This data could become relevant in disputes over disability extent, surgical success, or maximum medical improvement. Reimbursement pressures may affect provider availability. CMS simultaneously applied a −2.5% efficiency adjustment to orthopedic surgical work RVUs in 2026, on top of roughly 20% cumulative RVU reductions for hip and knee arthroplasty over the past decade. As Medicare margins tighten, some surgeons may become more selective about which payers they accept — potentially affecting the availability of specialists willing to treat comp patients. CMS has stated its goal of placing 100% of Medicare recipients under alternative payment models by 2030. The trends TEAM is accelerating - outpatient surgery, compressed rehabilitation, data-driven outcome tracking, and cost-conscious episode management - will increasingly define how workplace musculoskeletal injuries are treated regardless of the payer. Practitioners should understand these dynamics now, because they will soon shape the medical evidence, treatment timelines, and expert opinions in your cases. Keep in mind that the TEAM model applies to Medicare; workers' compensation systems are governed by state law and may differ in their treatment and reimbursement frameworks ...

Rita-Ann Chapman began using Avon talcum powder products in 1954 at the age of eight, continuing multiple times per week until 1978, and then again from 1995 to 2010. She was eventually diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease caused by asbestos exposure. The Chapmans sued dozens of defendants; by the time of trial, only Avon and Hyster-Yale Group, Inc. remained in the case. Mrs. Chapman died on March 16, 2025, and Gary Chapman continued the case as her successor-in-interest. At trial, the Chapmans presented extensive evidence that Avon's talc products contained asbestos. Internal Avon memos from the early 1970s acknowledged asbestos contamination - some showing tremolite asbestos levels as high as 20–25 percent in certain talc sources. The Chapmans' expert, Dr. William Longo, tested vintage Avon products and found chrysotile asbestos using a refined sample preparation method originally developed at the Colorado School of Mines in 1973. Their medical expert, Dr. Steven Haber, opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mrs. Chapman's decades of Avon talc use was a substantial factor in causing her mesothelioma. A biostatistics expert, Dr. David Madigan, testified that Mrs. Chapman's odds of avoiding asbestos exposure across all the Italian-sourced talc products she used were astronomically low. Avon countered with its own testing showing no asbestos and with expert testimony suggesting that many mesotheliomas are spontaneous or genetic, and that women's mesothelioma rates had remained relatively flat regardless of asbestos usage trends. The jury found Avon strictly liable for selling products with inadequate warnings and with manufacturing and design defects. It also found Avon liable for negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment, and determined that Avon acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. The jury awarded $40,831,453 in compensatory damages and $10.3 million in punitive damages, apportioning 90 percent fault to Avon. The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment in full in the published case of Chapman v. Avon Products, Inc.- Case Nos. B327749 & B330345 (March 2026) Avon raised four claims of error on appeal: that the trial court improperly admitted Dr. Longo's chrysotile testing testimony, improperly excluded corporate witness Lisa Gallo, improperly allowed Dr. Haber to testify on asbestos testing methods and Avon's internal documents, and that insufficient evidence supported the verdict. On Dr. Longo's testimony, the court found that Avon had expressly conceded at trial that its challenge was based on reliability under the Sargon standard rather than novelty under Kelly, thereby waiving any Kelly challenge. See Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 and People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24. The trial court properly exercised its gatekeeping role and reasonably concluded that Dr. Longo's methods - which combined an established 1973 sample preparation technique with longstanding PLM analysis - were not clearly invalid or unreliable. On Lisa Gallo's exclusion, the court found no abuse of discretion. Avon listed Gallo only as a corporate representative and never disclosed her as a witness with personal knowledge of relevant facts, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.090, subdivision (a)(1)(A). Gallo herself had denied in deposition testimony that she worked with Avon's talc products, and most of the testimony Avon proposed she give concerned events predating her 1994 employment. The court also rejected Avon's misconduct argument regarding plaintiffs' "corporate silence" closing argument, finding it was fair comment on the evidence. See LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 939. On Dr. Haber's testimony, the court held that his extensive qualifications in occupational and environmental medicine - including decades of assessing environmental causes of pulmonary disease - provided a sufficient foundation for interpreting asbestos testing methods and Avon's internal documents. Avon had failed to object to his qualification as an expert and forfeited several specific challenges by not raising them under proper headings or with timely objections. See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142. On sufficiency of the evidence, the court found Avon waived this claim entirely by failing to set forth all material evidence - both favorable and unfavorable - as required under established appellate standards. Avon's brief cherry-picked testimony favorable to its position while largely ignoring its own damaging 1970s memos and the Chapmans' extensive expert testimony. See Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875; Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400 ...

Alexander Sorokunov worked for NetApp from 2016 through June 2019, earning an annual salary plus commissions governed by an individual Goal Sheet and the company's Compensation Plan for fiscal year 2019. The Plan calculated commissions as a percentage of sales revenue achieved in the employee's territory, but also contained a windfall provision that reserved NetApp's right to limit commission payments when an employee's goal attainment exceeded 200 percent. In fiscal year 2019, Sorokunov and roughly 300 other employees exceeded the 200 percent threshold. In May 2019, NetApp invoked the windfall provision, informing employees that further commissions above that level would not be paid. NetApp attributed the widespread over-attainment to forecasting errors. Sorokunov's final paycheck for the fiscal year was reduced by $31,402.42 as a result. He resigned the following month. Sorokunov then filed a PAGA notice with the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and NetApp, and in January 2020 filed a First Amended Complaint. He alleged that the Plan violated Labor Code section 2751(a) by failing to set forth the method by which commissions would be computed and paid; that NetApp violated section 221 by collecting wages already paid; and that NetApp violated section 223 by secretly paying less than the contractual wage scale. He also asserted claims for unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., breach of contract, and PAGA penalties, along with an individual claim under Labor Code section 202(a) for failure to pay earned commissions upon resignation. In December 2020, the trial court granted NetApp's petition to compel arbitration of Sorokunov's individual non-PAGA claims. In May 2024, the court denied Sorokunov's motion for summary adjudication of his PAGA claim regarding section 2751(a), finding he had not shown the Plan was subject to the statute and that triable issues of fact remained. In July 2024, the arbitrator ruled in NetApp's favor on every individual claim, finding no breach of contract, no violation of sections 221, 223, or 2751, and no merit to the wage fraud claims. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award in September 2024 and then granted NetApp's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the PAGA cause of action, concluding that Sorokunov lacked standing as an aggrieved employee based on the arbitrator's findings. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in its entirety in the published case of Sorokunov v. NetApp, Inc., Case No. A171964 (March 2026).. Sorokunov argued that NetApp's power to unilaterally amend, suspend, or terminate the Plan rendered its promise to arbitrate illusory, relying on Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1425. The court distinguished Peleg because NetApp's modification clause required that any changes be "consistent with and to the extent permitted by applicable law." Under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as recognized in 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1214, and Casas v. Carmax Auto Superstores California LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1233, this language prevented NetApp from applying modifications to claims that were known but not yet filed, rendering the arbitration agreement enforceable. Sorokunov also framed his appeal as a pure question of statutory interpretation, but failed to challenge in his opening brief the trial court's alternative finding that triable issues existed as to whether his compensation qualified as "commissions" under section 2751. Citing People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1232, the court held this forfeiture alone supported affirmance. On the merits, the court agreed that section 2751(a) requires only that the method of computing commissions be set forth in writing, not that the method be purely mechanical, and that NetApp's Plan met that standard. Applying the standard from Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 916–918, the court reviewed the award for clear legal error affecting unwaivable statutory rights and found none. On section 221, the court cited Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 217, 239, for the principle that wage-protection statutes do not prohibit systems where final compensation remains contingent on post-performance events. On section 223, the court agreed the windfall provision was not secret, as it was plainly disclosed in the Plan. The court followed Rocha v. U-Haul Co. of California (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 65 and Rodriguez v. Lawrence Equipment, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 645, holding that the arbitrator's determination that no Labor Code violations occurred against Sorokunov precluded him from claiming aggrieved-employee status under PAGA. The court noted that the California Supreme Court endorsed this approach in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1124, and Stone v. Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1040, 1076–1077. The court declined to follow Gavriiloglou v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 595, which had reached the opposite conclusion, and distinguished Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 127 on its facts. The court rejected Sorokunov's policy objection by noting that the judgment had no preclusive effect on the LWDA, which remained free to bring its own enforcement action ...

Licensed insurance agent Gonzalo Lorona, 58, of Oxnard, has been charged with 37 felony counts, including insurance fraud and grand theft, after a California Department of Insurance investigation found he allegedly stole client premium payments and issued fraudulent insurance certificates leaving organizations uninsured and at financial risk. Gonzalo Lorona is the CEO of Oxnard Insurance Agency, based in Oxnard, California. Before running Oxnard Insurance Agency, Lorona worked at Procter & Gamble from approximately 1985 to 2012 as a tech. He became owner of Oxnard Insurance Agency in August 2005 and took on the CEO title around January 2012.Oxnard Insurance Agency LLC was incorporated in October 2019, registered at 200 North Hayes Ave, Oxnard, CA 93030. As of mid-2025, the LLC's status was listed as "suspended" by the Franchise Tax Board. The investigation began after a soccer player tragically lost their life following a fight during a game. The Ventura County School District discovered the certificate provided by the local soccer league was fake and the policy listed on the certificate, which was issued by Lorona’s agency, did not exist. The district requires leagues to carry insurance before using school fields. Investigators identified 13 fraudulent insurance certificates and found that from 2018 to 2024, Lorona allegedly stole more than $10,000 from five soccer league owners who believed they had valid coverage. Instead of purchasing policies, Lorona allegedly kept the cash and issued fake certificates, leaving leagues uninsured and exposing the school district to financial risk. The Department of Insurance has initiated action against Lorona’s insurance license. This case is being prosecuted by the Ventura County District Attorney’s Office ...

John Sarviss worked as a helicopter pilot for the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. He filed a workers' compensation claim alleging cumulative trauma injuries to his back and bilateral lower extremities during the period from July 21, 2008 to July 9, 2012. In May 2013, the parties entered a stipulation in which the employer accepted the claim as an industrial injury, with all further issues - including the nature and extent of disability - to be determined by medical evaluators. The case was complicated by serious credibility problems that emerged over the course of multiple medical evaluations. Dr. Steven Silbart, an Agreed Medical Evaluator, issued a supplemental report in March 2022 after reviewing Sarviss's deposition transcript and full medical file. Dr. Silbart identified significant credibility concerns. Sarviss had completely failed to disclose to a prior medical examiner a nonindustrial incident in 2011 involving a herniated disc that required surgery. Additionally, Sarviss had testified that his treating physician linked his herniated disc to something other than lifting a heavy object, when in fact the physician's own reports attributed the injury specifically to lifting a heavy cabinet. Sarviss also recanted a prior history he had given of injuring his low back in a service-connected helicopter crash in the Army in 1971. A second evaluator, Dr. Kenneth Sabbag, was appointed under Labor Code section 5701 after the parties lost confidence in Dr. Silbart and other prior evaluators. Dr. Sabbag examined Sarviss in August 2023 and encountered similar problems. He could not reconcile multiple discrepancies in the applicant's account - including conflicting stories about the 2011 injury, the absence of any documented work-related injury before July 2012, and the fact that Sarviss claimed he needed a cane but did not bring one to the exam, offering the false explanation that TSA prohibits canes on airplanes. Dr. Sabbag also noted that Sarviss had an extensive prior career as a freelance helicopter pilot for the film industry involving physically arduous work, yet denied any prior injuries. Dr. Sabbag deferred the credibility question to the trier of fact but acknowledged in his March 2024 deposition that conflicting data existed and he had been unable to resolve it. At trial on September 15, 2025, Sarviss testified under oath - three separate times - that he was never injured before working for the Department of Water and Power, despite extensive medical records documenting a 1993 helicopter crash causing a severe thoracic compression fracture and lower extremity injuries requiring approximately 20 reconstructive surgeries. The workers' compensation administrative law judge issued Findings of Fact and an Order on November 24, 2025. While the WCJ found, based on the parties' stipulations, that Sarviss did sustain industrial injury to his lumbar spine, cervical spine, and lower extremities, the WCJ concluded there was no substantial evidence to establish periods of temporary disability, permanent disability, the nature and extent of the injuries, or any need for further medical treatment. The WCJ reasoned that because Sarviss had never provided a complete and honest medical history to any of the evaluating physicians, none of their medical reports constituted substantial medical evidence. As a result, the WCJ found Sarviss failed to meet his burden of proof and ordered the matter off calendar with no award of benefits or attorney fees. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board denied Sarviss's Petition for Reconsideration, affirming the WCJ's decision in full in the panel decision of Sarviss v City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. -ADJ8666280 (February 2026) The WCAB grounded its analysis in the well-established principle that all decisions must be supported by substantial evidence. Citing Lamb v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310], Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500], and LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16], the Board reaffirmed that substantial evidence requires more than speculation or conjecture. Relying on Escobedo v. Marshalls (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604 (Appeals Board en banc), the Board noted that a medical opinion must be based on pertinent facts, an adequate examination and history, and must set forth its reasoning. The Board further cited Hegglin v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 162 [36 Cal.Comp.Cases 93] for the proposition that medical opinions based on inadequate histories fail to constitute substantial evidence. Applying these standards, the Board agreed with the WCJ that every medical report in the record was undermined by Sarviss's failure to provide a complete and truthful history. Because none of the medical evaluations rested on an accurate factual foundation, none could serve as substantial evidence to support an award of benefits. The Board also rejected Sarviss's argument that the 2013 stipulation accepting his injury as industrial entitled him to ongoing benefits. Citing Labor Code section 4909, the Board noted that payments made during a disputed period do not constitute an admission of liability, and the stipulation itself reserved all further issues for medical determination - the very determination that could not be made due to the incomplete histories. Finally, the Board gave great weight to the WCJ's credibility findings, citing Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 318–319 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500], which holds that a trial judge who observes a witness's demeanor is entitled to deference on credibility unless there is evidence of considerable substantiality to the contrary. The Board found no such contrary evidence and concluded that Sarviss had failed to meet his burden of proof on all issues ...

Floyd Skeren Manukian Langevin is pleased to announce that in partnership with Fisher Phillips, the firm’s annual Employment Law Conference will return on June 5, 2026, at the Disneyland Hotel. The conference will feature keynote speakers, and the latest hot topics in employment law, workers’ compensation, and HR. Conference sessions include: - - Employment Law: Case and Legislative Update - - What’s New from the California Civil Rights Department and EEOC - - Wage and Hour Update (Including the PAGA Reform and Latest on Meal and Rest Break Requirements) - - Key Compliance Considerations and Risks Associated with AI - - Spotting and Preventing Employment Law Exposure in WC Claims - - The Challenges of Accommodating Work Restrictions, Medical Conditions, and Disabilities - - Substance Abuse in the Workplace: The Challenges of Managing Risk, Compliance, and Employee Support - - California Leave Law Update: Best Practices for HR Professionals, with a Focus on the Overlap Between FMLA, CFRA, and PDL - - Ethical Dilemmas in Employment Law, Work Comp and General Liability Cases - - Effective Workplace Investigations: Best Practices for HR - - Key Strategies for Defending Complex Stress Claims - - Work Comp Caselaw Update/Key Defense Strategies in 2026 for Complex Litigation More details about these topics, and more, can be found by viewing the Agenda. The day will end with a cocktail reception where attendees can connect with conference presenters. Rene Thomas Folse, JD, PhD., is the MCLE sponsor for this event and has sole responsibility for the MCLE content – California State Bar Sponsor #11240. Attorneys can earn up to 6.5 hours for courses that meet the California State Bar criteria. Fisher Phillips will be providing 6.0 hours of SHRM/HRCI credit. WorkCompAcademy will issue Continuing Education Certificates of Completion for courses meeting the California Department of Insurance criteria. Adjusters can earn up to 6.5 hours of Continuing Education credits. Discount Hotel Room Reservations are available upon registration. DATE AND TIME: June 5, 2026 from 7:45 am PDT until 6:00 pm PDT LOCATION: Disneyland Hotel, 1150 West Magic Way, Anaheim, CA 90802 Price:Early Bird (until 3/31/2026): $395 - General Entry Fee (after 3/31/2026): $450 To register for this event, please visit the registration page where you may register online. Exhibitors may also register to reserve space in the event Exhibitor Area ...

A Los Angeles police officer was charged with two counts of felony insurance fraud for allegedly exaggerating an on-duty injury to collect disability benefits while participating in recreational skydiving and other physical activity. Christopher Brandon Carnahan (dob 6/30/82) of Norwalk is charged in case 26CJCF01236 with two counts of felony insurance fraud. His arraignment will be scheduled for a later date. He is being held on $100,000 bail. If convicted as charged, Carnahan faces up to six years state prison to be served in county jail. He's a 43-year-old LAPD veteran with 18 years of service, residing in Norwalk, California. He holds the rank of Police Officer II and is assigned to the 77th Division, with serial number 39135 and badge number 20710. On May 22, 2023, Officer Carnahan purportedly injured his left elbow while on duty and was subsequently placed on Temporary Totally Disabled (TTD) status. Officers with this status are entitled to receive 100% of their base salary tax-free for up to one year, and then two-thirds thereafter if the injury persists. Prosecutors allege that while on TTD status, Carnahan completed many skydives at Skydive Elsinore in Lake Elsinore, California and worked out at a fitness center, contrary to his claims of being temporarily totally disabled. The DA's office released photos showing what appears to be Carnahan skydiving and exercising, including one image dated May 23, 2024, showing him holding dumbbells The case is being prosecuted by Deputy District Attorney Arunas Sodonis of the Healthcare Fraud Division and investigated by the Los Angeles Police Department. “This case is about honesty and accountability,” Los Angeles County District Attorney Nathan J. Hochman said. “Claiming to be temporarily totally disabled and collecting disability benefits intended for injured workers while engaging in physically demanding activities like skydiving is a crime. This is an officer who knows the law and understands the standards he is sworn to uphold.” ...

Sarkis Dishchyan, 47, of Pasadena, Ani Suzie Labbad, 47, of Pasadena, and Violett Lara Labbad, 44, of Pasadena, were arraigned last week, on multiple counts of felony insurance fraud, for allegedly staging a vehicle accident involving their Porsche Cayenne, in order to collect nearly $39,000 in undeserved insurance payouts. An investigation was launched after a suspected fraudulent claim referral was received by investigators at the California Department of Insurance. According to the referral, an individual allegedly admitted to unwittingly being involved in a staged collision involving the claimant, Ani Labbad and her husband Dishchyan. This individual claimed that Dishchyan, whom they know through their sibling who was formerly incarcerated with Dishchyan, reached out with an opportunity to make $5,000. Dishchyan covered the cost of airfare and hotel from Illinois to California and asked the individual to rent a vehicle from a rental car company. An investigation revealed that once this individual arrived in California, they were riding in the rental car as a passenger while Dishchya drove and intentionally rear-ended a Porsche, causing the rental car to flip and land on its roof. The Porsche was being driven by a person who claimed to be Ani Labbad, Dishchyan’s wife. A witness at the scene claimed they saw a man crawl out of the overturned rental car and flee on foot before Pasadena Police Department arrived on scene. Further investigation and body camera footage found that the driver of the Porsche was actually Violett Labbad, Ani Labbad’s sister, who gave Pasadena police Ani’s driver’s license and identified herself as Ani at the scene of the collision. According to the passenger in the rental car, they were not aware that Dishchyan was planning to rear-end the Porsche until just prior to the collision. Cell phone data was used to confirm both Dishchyan and Violett Labbad’s cell phones were in the vicinity at the time of the collision, while Ani Labbad’s location was at her home address. Cell phone data also confirmed on the day of the collision, Dishchyan sent a text to Violett Labbad requesting her help that night, and additional text messages from Ani Labbad to Dishchyan stating Violett was “on her way”. These texts were time-stamped minutes before the collision. After the staged collision, Ani Labbad filed a claim with her insurance company, and with the insurance carrier for the car rental company and received $38,932.21. The third-party-administer for the car rental company then filed a claim with the individual’s insurance policy due to lack of liability coverage and non-cooperation from the individual. Dishchyan, Ani Labbad, and Violett Labbad were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. This case is being prosecuted by the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office ...

For those of us who handle workers' compensation claims involving knee injuries, there's a new medical technology we need to know about - because it's going to start showing up in our cases if it hasn't already. It's called the "smart knee" implant, and the leading device right now is the Zimmer Biomet Persona IQ - the first and currently only FDA-approved knee replacement with built-in sensor technology. From the outside, it looks and functions like any standard total knee replacement. But embedded inside the tibial stem is a tiny wireless sensor that continuously tracks the patient's recovery in real time. The implant measures range of motion, step count, walking speed, stride length, and pressure distribution across the joint. That data is wirelessly transmitted to a small base station plugged into the patient's home Wi-Fi, and from there it uploads to a secure, HIPAA-compliant cloud platform. The treating surgeon can log in and review the data remotely. The patient can see their own progress through a smartphone app, and even compare their recovery metrics against national benchmarks for patients of the same age and stage of recovery. This isn't experimental. It's being used right now at major orthopedic centers across the country, including Mayo Clinic, the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York, UChicago Medicine, and Lee Health in Florida. And adoption is expanding rapidly into smaller community hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers. As recently as June 2025, UP Health System in Michigan's Upper Peninsula began offering the device for the first time. So why should workers' comp practitioners care? Several reasons. First, this technology replaces subjective recovery assessments with objective data. Historically, post-operative knee recovery has been tracked through periodic office visits and patient self-reports - the surgeon asks patients how they feel, watches them walk across the room, and measures their range of motion with a goniometer. One Mayo Clinic surgeon described the traditional approach as "very, very subjective." The smart knee changes that equation entirely. Now the surgeon has daily biomechanical data showing exactly how the knee is performing between visits. For attorneys and adjusters, this means disputes about whether a claimant has reached maximum medical improvement, whether recovery is progressing on schedule, or whether functional limitations are consistent with the objective findings could increasingly be resolved by implant data rather than dueling medical opinions. Second, the technology enables earlier intervention when recovery stalls. Orthopedic surgeons at UChicago Medicine have emphasized that the first three months after knee replacement are critical - if patients don't regain adequate strength and range of motion during that window, those losses can be very difficult to make up later. With the smart implant, a surgeon who sees a sudden drop in step count or a plateau in range of motion can reach out to the patient immediately and adjust the rehabilitation plan. That kind of early intervention could shorten disability durations and reduce overall claim costs. Third, smart implants reduce the need for frequent in-person follow-up visits. The remote monitoring capability means patients who live far from their treating surgeon may not need to travel as often for routine post-operative checks - a meaningful consideration in workers' comp, where mileage reimbursement, time off work for medical appointments, and delays in scheduling all add friction and cost to the system. Fourth, consider the long-term implications. The sensor battery is designed to last at least 10 years, and the device can help detect early signs of implant loosening, abnormal wear patterns, or biomechanical changes that might signal a problem before the patient even notices symptoms. Since workers' comp carriers often remain responsible for future medical treatment related to the original injury - including revision surgery - early detection of developing problems could mean smaller, less invasive, and less expensive interventions down the road. Finally - and perhaps most significantly for litigators - think about the evidentiary implications. These implants generate a continuous, objective record of the patient's functional capacity. Daily step counts. Walking speed. Stride length. Range of motion trends over weeks and months. That data could become powerful evidence in disputes over functional limitations, compliance with prescribed physical therapy, and readiness to return to work. It cuts both ways: it could support a claimant who is doing everything right but still struggling, or it could undermine a claim where the reported limitations don't match the biomechanical data. The smart knee is not yet the standard of care for every total knee replacement — cost, patient comfort with the technology, and the need for home Wi-Fi are still limiting factors. But adoption is growing quickly, and as it does, workers' comp professionals on both sides of the aisle will need to understand what this data means, how to obtain it, and how to use it. This is one worth watching ...

The United States Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division filed an 81 page lawsuit against the University of California alleging it engaged in a hostile work environment against Jewish and Israeli faculty and staff at its University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. According to the complaint, after the Hamas-led massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023, antisemitic acts pervaded UCLA. The suit alleges the university engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII against Jewish and Israeli employees at UCLA by failing to prevent and correct discriminatory and harassing conduct. The lawsuit further alleges the university negligently permitted a hostile work environment against two charging parties and other aggrieved Jewish and Israeli employees. In 2024, the university allowed antisemitic harassment to continue unabated for days in front of its iconic Royce Hall: among other acts, Jews were not permitted on portions of the main quad, Jewish professors were assaulted, and swastikas were graffitied on university buildings. The university has ignored, and continues to ignore, gross and repeated violations of viewpoint-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions involving these and other actions directed against Jewish and Israeli employees. Jewish and Israeli faculty have been physically threatened, had their classrooms disrupted, and had their workplaces papered with disturbing images. Jewish professors have been, and continue to be, subjected to ostracism and harassment by their colleagues and students, while their colleagues and supervisors not only have failed to report those acts as required but have even participated in them. Numerous Jewish and Israeli employees have been forced to take leave, work from home, and even leave their jobs to avoid the hostile work environment. “UCLA failed to live up to its systemwide commitment to diversity and equal opportunity when it stood by as Jewish employees were subjected to harassment,” said First Assistant United States Attorney Bill Essayli. “The federal government has an obligation to step in and ensure a discrimination-free environment at our universities.” “Based on our investigation, UCLA administrators allegedly allowed virulent anti-Semitism to flourish on campus, harming students and staff alike,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Today’s lawsuit underscores that this Department of Justice stands strong against hate and anti-Semitism in all its vile forms.” “The litany of vile acts of antisemitism that allegedly took place, and continue to take place, at UCLA are, if found to be true, a mark of shame against the University of California,” said Assistant Attorney General Harmeet K. Dhillon of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. “The Justice Department will ensure that UCLA maintains an environment for its employees free from antisemitic harassment.” The lawsuit stems from a Commissioner’s Charge filed by then-Commissioner Andrea Lucas of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in June 2024. The EEOC was instrumental in investigating the allegations of harassment at UCLA and in identifying the university’s poor complaint system. “The EEOC is committed to eradicating antisemitism at work,” said EEOC Chair Andrea Lucas. “If a university will not investigate and remedy repeated allegations of antisemitism against its employees, then EEOC will.” DOJ attorneys allege "Until the United States Department of Justice issued its notice of investigation letter to UCLA in March 2025, not a single one of the dozens of civil rights complaints filed by Jewish and Israeli employees since October 7 was properly investigated. UCLA’s Office of Equity, Diversity, & Inclusion (EDI Office), tasked with oversight of all discrimination complaints, routinely ignored complaints of antisemitism. And UCLA continues to mishandle them. Then-interim Chancellor Darnell Hunt testified to the Regents of the University of California (Regents or UC) that UCLA received “hundreds” of antisemitism complaints after October 7 and that “all those cases were taken up” for investigation. Yet not a single student, staff member, or faculty member was ultimately formally disciplined for antisemitic behavior - including those who were arrested for illegal conduct." ...

Karen Majovski is a deputy city attorney (DCA) in the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office. The office uses a classification system - DCA-I through DCA-IV - with pay steps within each classification, all governed by memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the City and DCA labor unions. Within each classification, DCAs automatically advance one step per year. Promotions from DCA-I to DCA-II and from DCA-II to DCA-III could be automatic under certain conditions, but promotions from DCA-III upward were never automatic and were typically granted through competitive Performance Recognition Programs (PRPs) or, more rarely, by discretionary action. Majovski obtained her law degree in 2013 and was admitted to the State Bar in December 2013. In May 2014, with only five months of legal experience and no employment litigation background, the City hired her as a DCA-I in the Workers' Compensation Division (WCD). She advanced through automatic pay steps over the next two years. In November 2016, Majovski transferred to the Employment Litigation Division (ELD). At the time of the transfer, she asked Chief Assistant City Attorney Thom Peters to promote her to DCA-III, pointing to another female attorney who had been hired at that level. Peters escalated the request to Chief of Staff Leela Kapur, who declined, explaining that Majovski had come in with no experience and that her workers' compensation background was not comparable to employment litigation. Kapur noted that both Majovski and male DCA-I George Sami were in similar positions and should be treated similarly. Majovski did not allege gender discrimination at that time. Majovski was not provided parking at City Hall East (CHE), the ELD workplace. Under a Special Parking MOU, parking priority was given to "Upper Management" (DCA-IIIs and above), electric vehicle owners, and employees with seniority. As a DCA-I without an electric vehicle and without sufficient seniority, Majovski did not qualify. All female attorneys in ELD at that time had parking because they were DCA-IIIs. Male DCA-I George Sami was seen parking at CHE, but undisputed evidence showed he had an electric vehicle, which gave him priority. Female DCA-II Susan Rim, hired in July 2017, was also not provided parking. In spring 2018, Majovski first complained that she and Rim were underpaid compared to others in ELD - both male and female - and requested promotions to DCA-III for both of them. In July 2018, the City promoted Rim from DCA-II to DCA-III but promoted Majovski only from DCA-I to DCA-II. Kapur explained that promoting an attorney with only about four years of practice and a year and a half of civil litigation experience from DCA-I directly to DCA-III would have been "highly irregular." No evidence in the record identified any employee who had ever received a DCA-I to DCA-III promotion. Majovski then asked to keep her original salary anniversary date rather than resetting it to the promotion date, but Kapur denied that request as contrary to standard practice. Peters forwarded Majovski's request to Kapur with the comment "Chutzpah," to which Kapur responded, "Yup there is a word for it." In September 2018, before Majovski's voluntary transfer from ELD to the Los Angeles World Airports Division (LAWA), Peters initially told her she would be promoted to DCA-III regardless of whether she transferred. After discussing with Kapur, Peters reversed himself and said she would be promoted only if she stayed in ELD. Chief Assistant City Attorney Jim Clark then told Majovski she would be promoted regardless of her decision. Majovski chose to transfer to LAWA in November 2018. She was not promoted at that time. In October 2019, Majovski applied for a promotion through an office-wide PRP. Of 364 applicants (190 female, 174 male), 93 received promotions or step advancements. Female applicants were selected at a slightly higher rate (26.3%) than male applicants (24.7%). Majovski was among 271 applicants who were not selected. Kapur, whose recommendations the City Attorney always followed, testified that she did not recommend Majovski for several reasons: Majovski had received recent promotion, had relatively short tenure, her division had received a fair number of promotions, and her promotion would not necessarily have advanced the office's goals for racial and ethnic diversity. In January 2020, a DCA-III in LAWA resigned, and Majovski took over most of her duties. In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a hiring and promotion freeze. LAWA's CFO, Tatiana Starostina, determined that LAWA would not fund the vacant DCA-III position because of the freeze. In September 2020, Majovski again requested the promotion, but Kapur declined to seek an exception to the freeze, explaining that the office's limited exceptions were prioritized for new hires rather than promotions. Majovski then emailed her supervisors stating she believed the front office was intentionally declining to adjust her pay for "personal, retaliatory, and gender related reasons." An HR investigation found no evidence supporting her complaint. In March 2021, Majovski filed suit against the City, alleging gender discrimination, associational discrimination, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination under FEHA, as well as claims under the Equal Pay Act (Lab. Code, § 1197.5) and the whistleblower protection statute (Lab. Code, § 1102.5). In August 2021, after the hiring freeze was lifted, the City granted Majovski a discretionary step advancement to bring her into pay parity with a similarly experienced individual being brought into the office (whose gender was not identified in the record). In June 2022, through a second PRP, Majovski was promoted to DCA-III. Between 2016 and 2022, the City's statistical evidence showed that of 240 discretionary promotions, 52.5% went to women and 47.5% to men. For promotions specifically from DCA-II to DCA-III, 55.5% went to women. The City moved for summary judgment. The trial court sustained 31 of the City's 55 evidentiary objections, including an objection to an undated draft gender equity report by the former City Controller. After a hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on all claims. The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment in its entirety in the unpublished case Majovski v. City of Los Angeles, No. B335739 (February 2026). The court held that Majovski forfeited her challenge to the trial court's evidentiary rulings by raising it for the first time in her reply brief without adequate citations or argument, relying on High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, 111, fn. 2, and Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721. This meant that key evidence, including the former City Controller's draft gender equity report, was properly excluded from consideration. The court applied the framework from Hall v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 318, 324–325, which requires a plaintiff to show she was paid less than a male comparator for substantially similar work. Majovski failed to identify any proper male comparator with less experience who was promoted or classified higher. The court found that George Sami's parking at CHE was explained by his electric vehicle priority under the Special Parking MOU, not gender. The court also found that the City's 2021 discretionary step advancement did not constitute an admission of gender-based pay disparity, as there was no evidence the individual with whom Majovski was brought into parity was male. Three comparators raised for the first time in the reply brief were rejected as forfeited and, in any event, insufficient - one was female, and the other two had demonstrably more experience. With regard to her FEHA discrimination claims the court applied the three-stage burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, as applied in California under Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334, and Arnold v. Dignity Health (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 424–425. The City met its second-stage burden by producing evidence that Majovski's level of experience explained the promotion decisions, and that women received discretionary promotions at equal or higher rates than men. Majovski failed to meet her third-stage burden to show pretext. Because all underlying discrimination and retaliation claims failed, the derivative failure-to-prevent claim under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k) necessarily failed as well, consistent with Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. M&N Financing Corp. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 434, 444 ...

In April 2021, John Goshorn hired Aqua Blue Construction, Inc. to build a swimming pool, spa, and barbeque at his home for $109,475. Aqua Blue drafted the contract, which included an arbitration clause stating that any disputes would be resolved through arbitration and that Goshorn's agreement to arbitrate was "voluntary." Aqua Blue's owner, Julien Britton, signed the contract on behalf of the company. A dispute arose over unpaid balances and alleged construction defects. In May 2022, Aqua Blue sued Goshorn for breach of contract, seeking $32,305 in damages and alleging fraud related to change orders. Goshorn denied the allegations and filed a cross-complaint raising claims including breach of contract, fraud, negligence, and contracting without a license, asserting that Aqua Blue had deviated from the agreed plans and produced defective, unfinished work. In September 2022, Goshorn moved to compel arbitration based on the contract's arbitration clause. Aqua Blue filed limited opposition but the trial court granted the motion. The parties then agreed to arbitrate before retired Justice Richard Aldrich of JAMS, whose rate was $9,000 per day - an arbitrator Aqua Blue itself had suggested. In April 2023, JAMS designated the case a "consumer arbitration" under its rules, which meant Aqua Blue, as the drafting party, would bear all arbitration fees. Aqua Blue's counsel acknowledged JAMS's determination and indicated the issue could be raised with the arbitrator. JAMS issued an initial invoice of $9,000, which Aqua Blue paid late but did pay. A preliminary conference set a ten-day hearing, and JAMS then issued retainer invoices totaling approximately $174,700. Aqua Blue protested the fees as unconscionable for a $32,305 dispute, questioned the ten-day estimate, and asked JAMS for guidance on how to challenge the consumer designation. No hearing on the challenge was ever set. By September 2023, Aqua Blue had not paid the retainer invoices, and JAMS administratively stayed the arbitration. In March 2024, Goshorn filed a motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which allows a consumer to withdraw from arbitration and recover fees and costs when the drafting party fails to timely pay arbitration fees. Aqua Blue opposed the motion, arguing that this was not a consumer arbitration and that it should not be solely responsible for the fees. In April 2024, the trial court granted Goshorn's motion. Relying on Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1319 and Williams v. West Coast Hospitals, Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1054 - both of which were later overruled - the court held that once Aqua Blue was more than 30 days past due on the JAMS invoices, it was in material breach regardless of any good-faith basis for disputing the fees. The court lifted the arbitration stay, ordered the matter to proceed in the trial court, and awarded Goshorn $36,974.79 in sanctions. However, the court declined to impose evidentiary or terminating sanctions, finding that the law was unclear on how to challenge a consumer arbitration designation and that such harsher sanctions would be unjust. The court also denied Aqua Blue's cross-motions for contempt and sanctions against Goshorn. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded in the unpublished case of Aqua Blue Construction, Inc. v. Goshorn, No. B338632 (February 2026). While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, which fundamentally changed the arbitration legal framework. The Supreme Court held that under section 1281.98, a drafting party's nonpayment of arbitration fees results in forfeiture of arbitral rights only when the nonpayment was "willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent." This interpretation was adopted to avoid preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act and was grounded in the long-standing contract principle that one party's nonperformance automatically extinguishes the other's duties only when culpability is present. The Hohenshelt court overruled the Court of Appeal decisions the trial court had relied upon. On the threshold question of whether this was a consumer arbitration at all, the appellate court held that it was. Goshorn fit the statutory definition of a "consumer" under section 1280, subdivision (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure because he hired Aqua Blue for personal, household purposes. The court noted that although Williams was overruled by Hohenshelt on the culpability issue, the Supreme Court did not disturb Williams's analysis on this particular point. Turning to the central issue, the appellate court found clear error in the trial court's failure to evaluate Aqua Blue's culpability. The record contained competing evidence: Aqua Blue argued it could not afford the fees, had actively sought review of JAMS's consumer designation, and that paying $164,000 to arbitrate a $32,305 dispute was unreasonable. Goshorn countered that Aqua Blue had itself chosen the expensive arbitrator, had agreed to JAMS's rules, and should have foreseen the costs. Because the trial court made no factual findings on whether the nonpayment was willful, strategic, grossly negligent, or excusable, the appellate court remanded for a new determination under the Hohenshelt standard. The court distinguished Wilson v. Tap Worldwide, LLC (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1077, where remand was unnecessary because the trial court had already made findings establishing that the late payment was not culpable ...

The Postal Service added a new section (DMM 608.11) to the Domestic Mail Manual that formally defines the postmark for the first time in a regulation and explains what information it does and doesn't convey. It took effect December 24, 2025. A postmark confirms USPS had possession of a mailpiece on the stamped date, but the postmark date does not necessarily match the date USPS first received the mailpiece. Most postmarks are applied by automated machines at processing facilities, and the date reflects when the mail was processed at that facility - not when it was initially deposited. This discrepancy has grown more common under USPS's Regional Transportation Optimization (RTO) initiative, which adds flexibility between collection and processing schedules. This is a significant practical problem with perhaps significant legal consequences, even though USPS insists the rule is "just clarification." For example Internal Revenue Code § 7502, also known as the “mailbox rule.” IRC § 7502 says that if a tax return or payment arrives at the IRS after the deadline, it's still considered timely if the USPS postmark date is on or before the due date. Courts interpret this strictly - the postmark date controls, regardless of when the taxpayer actually deposited the document. The problem is that § 7502 and its regulations never actually defined "postmark." As a result, the USPS's new DMM 608.11 effectively supplies the operative definition for § 7502 purposes. And that definition now makes clear that a machine-applied postmark reflects the date of first automated processing at a regional facility - not when you dropped it in the mailbox or handed it to a postal carrier. Tax professionals have been calling for the IRS to address this, but nothing had been issued as of the most recent reporting. And it's just now getting attention from employment and benefits lawyers. Here's how the new postmark rule ripples into employer notice obligations. Under federal laws like ERISA, COBRA, HIPAA, and the ACA, employers are required to send a variety of notices to employees concerning health insurance coverage, retirement benefits, and other employee benefits. Some key examples of these deadlines: - - General COBRA notices must be sent to new plan participants within 90 days of health coverage starting. COBRA election notices must be sent within 14 days after an employer notifies the plan administrator about a qualifying event, such as a layoff, discharge, divorce, or reduction in hours. - - Health plans must send HIPAA notices of privacy practices to enrollees within 60 days of any substantial change. - - HIPAA-covered entities must notify affected individuals without unreasonable delay, or no later than 60 calendar days after discovering a security breach. - - Other ERISA-required communications include summary plan descriptions (SPDs), summaries of benefits and coverage (SBCs), formulary notices, and annual disclosures - all with their own timing requirements. - - COBRA regulations specifically say that the initial notice, election notice, and notice of unavailability are considered "provided" on the date they are postmarked. So if the postmark date is delayed by a day or two at a regional processing center, a notice that was mailed on time could be deemed late Some options to avoid this problem include requesting a free manual (local) postmark at any Post Office retail counter. This stamp will align with the date the customer hands over the mail. Registered Mail and Certified Mail also provide mailing receipts. The Postal Service claims this rule does not change any actual postmarking operations or procedures. USPS says it's purely an educational/transparency measure codifying longstanding practices. The era of dropping a deadline-sensitive document in a blue mailbox on the last day and trusting the postmark is effectively over. It would be wise for employers to take affirmative steps to secure proof of the actual mailing date ...

Generative artificial intelligence tools have become increasingly prevalent across various domains of human activity. It has reliably been estimated, for instance that more than half of United States households have adapted AI in some form. Only three years after its release, one prominent AI platform is being used by more than 800 million people worldwide every week. Yet the implications of AI for the law are only beginning to be explored. A ruling by Judge Jed S. Rakoff in United States v. Heppner (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 2026) appears to be the first federal decision addressing whether a criminal defendant's conversations with a generative AI platform are protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. The answer on both counts according to this ruling was "no." Most published decisions involving generative artificial intelligence have had to do with attorneys' misuse of that technology. That set of concerns is plainly net present here. Bradley Heppner was indicted on securities fraud and related charges stemming from an alleged $150+ million scheme involving GWG Holdings. After receiving a grand jury subpoena and learning he was a target, Heppner - on his own initiative, without his lawyer's direction - used Claude to prepare roughly 31 documents outlining potential defense strategies and legal arguments. The FBI seized these "AI Documents" during a search of his home. Heppner's counsel claimed privilege over them. Heppner, through his counsel asserted privilege over these documents arguing that (1) Heppner had inputted into Claude, among other things,information that Heppner had learned from counsel; (2) Heppner had created the AI Documents for the purpose of speaking with counsel to obtain legal advice; and (3) Heppner had subsequently shared the contents of the AI Documents with counsel. Heppner' s counsel conceded, however, that counsel "did net direct [Heppner] to run Claude searches." The trial court noted that it is well established that the attorney-client privilege attaches to, and protects from disclosure, "communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice." United States V. Mejia 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011). Courts construe the attorney-client privilege narrowly because it operates as an exception to the rule that "all relevant proof is essential" for a complete record and for "confidence in the fair administration of justice." On attorney-client privilege, the court found the documents failed on multiple independent grounds. First, Claude is not an attorney, so there was no attorney-client relationship. Second, the communications were not confidential — Anthropic's privacy policy explicitly permits collecting user inputs and outputs, using them for training, and disclosing data to third parties including government authorities. Third, Heppner was not seeking legal advice from Claude; Claude itself disclaims the ability to give legal advice. The court noted that even though Heppner later shared the outputs with his lawyer, non-privileged communications don't become privileged simply by being passed along to counsel. On work product doctrine, the court held that even assuming the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation, they were not prepared "by or at the behest of counsel." Heppner acted entirely on his own. The documents didn't reflect defense counsel's strategy at the time they were created. The court distinguished a prior S.D.N.Y. magistrate decision (Shih v. Petal Card) that took a broader view, respectfully disagreeing and emphasizing that the doctrine's core purpose is protecting lawyers' mental processes, not a client's independent research with an AI tool. "Thus, the communications between Heppner and Claude were not privileged at the time they took place. Moreover, even assuming that Heppner intended to share these communications with his counsel and eventually did so, it is black-letter law that non-privileged communications are not somehow alchemically changed into privileged ones upon being shared with counsel. Thus, because the AI Documents would not be privileged if they remained in [Heppner's] hands they did not acquire protection merely because they were transferred to counsel." The court concluded that AI's novelty doesn't exempt it from longstanding legal principles. The ruling has obvious implications for the millions of people using AI platforms to think through legal problems - those conversations are likely discoverable ...

A federal jury convicted a Texas laboratory owner and former NFL player for his role in a $328 million cardiovascular genetic testing fraud scheme. According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, Keith J. Gray, 39, of McKinney, Texas, orchestrated a scheme to bill Medicare for medically unnecessary genetic tests designed to evaluate the risk of various cardiovascular diseases and conditions. Gray, the owner and operator of two clinical laboratories, Axis Professional Labs LLC, and Kingdom Health Laboratory LLC, offered and paid kickbacks to marketers in exchange for their referral of Medicare beneficiaries’ DNA samples, personally identifiable information (including Medicare numbers) and signed test orders from medical providers authorizing the medically unnecessary genetic tests. As part of the scheme, the marketers engaged other companies to solicit Medicare beneficiaries through telemarketing and to engage in “doctor chase,” to obtain the identity of beneficiaries’ primary care physicians and pressure them into approving genetic testing orders for patients who purportedly had already been “qualified” for the testing during telephone calls conducted by non-medical personnel at one of the companies retained by the marketers - not by their physicians. In an effort to conceal the kickback payments, Gray used sham contracts and invoices that purported to charge for “marketing” hours but that in reality were reverse-engineered to match the amounts agreed to under the illegal per-sample kickback arrangement. Gray also sought to conceal the scheme by referring to the payments as being for “software” and loans that never existed. Evidence at trial included text messages between Gray and his co-conspirator becoming giddy over the amount of money they were making from Medicare. Axis and Kingdom billed Medicare approximately $328 million for the false, fraudulent and kickback-tainted genetic testing claims, of which Medicare paid approximately $54 million. Gray laundered some of the proceeds by purchasing expensive luxury vehicles, including a Dodge Ram truck worth more than $142,000 and a Mercedes Benz SUV worth more than $145,000. The jury convicted Gray of conspiracy to defraud the United States and to pay and receive health care kickbacks, five counts of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute and three counts of money laundering. He is scheduled to be sentenced at a later date. Gray faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison on each count. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors. The FBI, HHS-OIG, MFCU and VA-OIG investigated the case.Trial Attorneys Ethan Womble and Adam Tisdall of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section are prosecuting the case. The Fraud Section leads the Criminal Division’s efforts to combat health care fraud through the Health Care Fraud Strike Force Program. Since March 2007, this program, currently comprised of eight strike forces operating in federal districts across the country, has charged more than 6,200 defendants who collectively billed federal health care programs and private insurers more than $45 billion. In addition, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, working in conjunction with the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services, are taking steps to hold providers accountable for their involvement in health care fraud schemes ...

Jose Vicente Badillo, the owner and operator of two towing companies, was sentenced to 60 months in federal prison for his involvement in a scheme to burn tow trucks throughout the Bay Area in 2023. U.S. District Judge Rita F. Lin handed down the sentence on Feb. 12, 2026. Badillo, 29, of San Francisco, was also sentenced on Feb. 13, 2026, in an unrelated case to 27 months in federal prison for his role in a conspiracy to submit fraudulent auto insurance claims from at least 2017 until at least 2021. U.S. District Judge Trina L. Thompson handed down the sentence, which will run concurrently with the 60-month sentence imposed by Judge Lin. Badillo was indicted by a federal grand jury in March 2025 for his involvement in the arson conspiracy. In October 2025, he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit arson. According to the plea agreement, Badillo admitted to devising, orchestrating, and overseeing a scheme to set fire to tow trucks in the San Francisco Bay Area. The principal goals of Badillo’s scheme were to drive more business to his own towing companies, Auto Towing and Specialty Towing, by impeding competitor towing companies’ business prospects and to exact revenge against competitor towing companies and their owners for perceived wrongs. To accomplish those goals, Badillo recruited, agreed with, and directed others to execute the scheme by torching six tow trucks belonging to four competitor companies in April, July, and October of 2023. Separately, Badillo was twice indicted by a federal grand jury in 2024 for his involvement in the automobile insurance fraud schemes. In October 2025, Badillo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud in the second-charged insurance fraud case. According to the plea agreement, Badillo conspired with others to defraud automobile insurance companies by submitting fraudulent insurance claims. In furtherance of the scheme to defraud, Badillo staged an accident on Guadalupe Canyon Parkway in San Mateo County involving a Sterling tow truck and a vehicle carrier carrying four vehicles. Badillo also generated fake tow records concerning at least 18 vehicles involved in iterations of the scheme to defraud and orchestrated at least another nine iterations of the scheme to defraud, causing victim insurance companies hundreds of thousands of dollars in losses. In another fraud case, Badillo and Abigail Fuentes were charged with multiple felonies in October 2023 by the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office. The charges stem from an alleged welfare fraud scheme. Fuentes, who worked as a Senior Eligibility Worker at the Human Services Agency, is accused of improperly approving Badillo’s application for public welfare programs without disclosing their personal relationship. Both individuals allegedly misrepresented their income and assets to qualify for benefits they were not eligible for, including Medi-Cal, CalFresh, and CalWORKs. Authorities say Badillo and Fuentes are in a relationship and have children. At the time the application was filed, investigators said the pair had been operating three towing companies – Auto Towing, Jose’s Towing and Specialty Towing – which generated more than $2 million in gross annual income. Both Fuentes and Badillo allegedly lied about their substantial income and assets in order to receive public benefits they were not eligible for. The case led to more scrutiny of the pair’s business practices by San Francisco authorities, specifically from San Francisco City Atty. David Chiu, whose office later alleged that one of the couple’s companies was profiting from illegal tows. In August 2023, the City Attorney initiated debarment proceedings against Auto Towing after the company violated multiple state and local laws by illegally towing vehicles from private property. Between February and May 2023, Auto Towing employees illegally towed several cars from a bank parking lot in the Portola neighborhood without the permission of the property owner. It is unlawful for a tow company to tow a car from private property without the consent of the property owner. In February 2024, Chiu moved to suspend the company. Auto Towing, and its affiliates, which included Specialty Towing, from receiving contracts from the city. The perpetrator also made it difficult for vehicle owners to retrieve their vehicles, restricted the hours when vehicles could be retrieved, and pressured vehicle owners to pay in cash. Under the California Vehicle Code, vehicle owners have the right to retrieve their vehicles 24 hours a day, any day of the year, and have the right to pay with cash or major credit card. The victims whose cars were towed were primarily Spanish- and Cantonese-speaking residents, who are especially vulnerable to predatory tows. Specialty Towing came under public scrutiny two months later when a bystander recorded one of its trucks trying to tow a woman’s car as she was driving in San Francisco. “We were freaking out calling and basically rolling down our window and saying, ‘Hey what you are doing? You can’t be doing that,’ ” the driver, identified only as Joanne, told ABC 7 News in an interview. “He started backing up and his lever came down and basically he was just backing up trying to latch onto our car.” The video of this incident was horrifying. the driver was waiting on a public street behind a tow truck stopped for a red light. The two truck driver then dropped his towing apparatus hoping to hook onto Joanne’s car while she was in it with the motor running. She backed up, and the tow truck driver backed up chasing her backward down the street. Had the tow truck driver been successful he would have towed her car away with the motor running, while kidnapping her inside ...

The City of San Diego leased several floors of a downtown high-rise office building in 2017 where it stationed many employees. The City knew the building contained asbestos. That July, the building owner began a window renovation project that would involve the removal of approximately 40 tons of asbestos-containing materials. The City notified employees by email about the project, explained that air quality would be monitored daily, and designated Karen Johnson, a manager in its Real Estate Asset Department, as the liaison between employees and the building owner and renovation contractors. Within days, employees began expressing concerns. Over the following months, they reported to Johnson and other City officials that they were experiencing respiratory problems. Employees also reported that renovation workers were wearing protective masks, that plastic barriers meant to contain dust and debris were failing, and that a ventilator for a sealed asbestos-containing area was blowing exhaust into the employee parking structure. Johnson relayed these complaints to the building owner, the contractors, and Ronald Villa, the City's deputy chief operating officer. Despite the ongoing complaints, the City decided not to relocate employees because it had no legal grounds to break its lease and no alternative space available. That changed on January 25, 2018, when the San Diego County Air Pollution Control District received a complaint and took samples from multiple floors of the building. The samples tested positive for asbestos the following day. On January 26, the City notified its employees of the results and instructed them to stay out of the building. Over the next several weeks, the District confirmed widespread asbestos contamination throughout the building and found that air samples collected between February 1 and 5 contained asbestos fibers exceeding permissible levels. On March 2, 2018, City officials held a meeting with affected employees. Villa told them the asbestos found on January 25 was not airborne and that prior air testing had shown levels within EPA tolerances. George Katsikaris of the City's Environmental Services Department similarly told employees that air samples collected before the evacuation were within safe, breathable levels and that dust samples had come back clean. A toxicologist told employees they should not worry about adverse health effects. Nevertheless, Villa acknowledged employees' concerns and encouraged anyone worried about cancer to take whatever steps they needed, and a workers' compensation manager explained how to file claims. Alina Cadena and other City employees who had worked in the building during the renovations sued the City and Villa in his official capacity. They alleged the City intentionally exposed them to asbestos and concealed the extent of the exposure because it determined their health and safety were not worth the cost of breaking the lease. They asserted causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraudulent concealment, sought compensatory damages, costs, and attorney fees, and sought punitive damages against Villa. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that workers' compensation was the employees' exclusive remedy under Labor Code section 3602, subdivision (a), and that the employees could not establish the fraudulent concealment exception to that exclusivity rule under subdivision (b)(2). The City alternatively sought summary adjudication of the emotional distress claim and the punitive damages claim against Villa. In support, the City submitted declarations from Johnson and Villa stating they had no knowledge of loose or uncontrolled asbestos before January 26, 2018, and that the renovation project manager had regularly reported air samples at normal background levels. The City also submitted deposition testimony, including from employees themselves, who admitted they had no evidence the City knew of loose asbestos debris before that date. The court granted summary judgment, finding the fraudulent concealment exception did not apply and workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in its entirety, reviewing the summary judgment de novo in the unpublished case of Cadena v. City of San Diego, - D084784 (February, 2026). The court explained that under the workers' compensation exclusivity rule, when an employee suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, workers' compensation is the sole and exclusive remedy against the employer. (Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 812–813.) The fraudulent concealment exception in Labor Code section 3602, subdivision (b)(2), requires the employee to prove three elements: the employer knew of the employee's work-related injury, the employer concealed that knowledge, and the concealment aggravated the injury. The court found the employees failed to raise a triable issue on the first element - actual prior knowledge of their injuries. Citing Ashdown v. Ameron Internat. Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 868, 880, and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1797, the court emphasized that constructive or imputed knowledge is insufficient; only actual knowledge will do. The City's evidence showed it did not know about loose asbestos debris until January 26, 2018, the same day it notified employees. The employees themselves admitted they had no evidence the City knew earlier. Moreover, since employees had the same information the City did, the fraudulent concealment exception did not apply, because the exception requires the employer to have known of the injury before the employee. The employees argued their emotional distress claim should proceed to trial because the City's conduct in knowingly exposing them to a known carcinogen was not a normal part of the employment relationship. The court disagreed, surveying a line of California Supreme Court decisions holding that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against employers. The court further relied on Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465, 474–475, where the California Supreme Court held that even if an employer knowingly concealed asbestos dangers from employees, workers' compensation was the only remedy ...

Rayan Zarrabi graduated from Scripps Ranch High School, part of the San Diego Unified School District, in 2019. In the years that followed, he engaged in an escalating pattern of hostility directed at two school employees - M.L., a vice principal, and D.L., one of his former teachers. A few months after graduating, Zarrabi attended an SRHS football game where he shouted profanity and raised his middle finger at D.L. In December 2022, he entered the campus without permission, was told to leave, and was then caught sneaking back in through a rear gate, after which M.L. instructed him never to return. In May 2023, Zarrabi attended an off-campus SRHS volleyball game at Southwestern Community College, where he sent disturbing electronic messages to students that included references to graves and tombstone emojis. When M.L. told him to leave, campus police had to escort him out while he shouted vulgar insults at M.L. In June 2023, he yelled profanity at M.L. from his car as M.L. sat on a restaurant patio. Around the same time, he tracked down D.L.'s family members on Facebook and sent them hateful, profanity-laden messages attacking D.L.'s appearance and character. In February 2024, Zarrabi contacted a coworker of M.L. and D.L. on Facebook, repeating the same type of messages and adding lengthy, hostile commentary about both men. Then, in May 2024, a witness flagged down police to report that Zarrabi had been speaking rapidly and intensely about his hatred for M.L. and D.L., stating that he hoped they would die, that they did not deserve to live, that it was all he could think about, and that he was going to get his revenge. Police prepared a crime report, a suspicious activity report, and a psychiatric emergency response team referral, and an officer advised M.L. to seek a restraining order. Zarrabi reportedly continued telling third parties, including current students, that he intended to "go after" the two employees. In October 2024, the District filed a petition for a workplace violence restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 on behalf of M.L. and D.L., also requesting that M.L.'s immediate family members be included as protected persons. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order based on a credible threat of violence or stalking and set a hearing. Zarrabi filed a written response denying the allegations. Following a hearing in November 2024, the trial court granted the petition, ordering Zarrabi to stay at least 100 yards from the employees' workplaces, homes, and vehicles, as well as from SRHS events held off campus. The Court of Appeal affirmed the restraining order in its entirety in the unpublished case of San Diego Unified School District v. Zarrabi, No. D085415 (February 2026). The court addressed Zarrabi's arguments on four grounds. First, on sufficiency of the evidence, the court held that Zarrabi had forfeited this argument by failing to include a reporter's transcript or an agreed or settled statement from the hearing.The court went on to find that even setting aside the forfeiture, the record - including declarations from M.L. and D.L., copies of Zarrabi's electronic messages, and a police report - contained substantial evidence supporting the order. Second, regarding the First Amendment, the court found that Zarrabi failed to present a cogent argument supported by relevant authority. It noted that the cases he cited were inapposite. Relying on City of San Jose v. Garbett (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 526, 537, the court explained that speech constituting a credible threat of violence under section 527.8 is not constitutionally protected and may properly be enjoined. Third, on due process, Zarrabi complained that a police officer's declaration was filed shortly before the hearing and that he did not receive it in time. The court found he provided no evidence to support this claim, no evidence the trial court even considered the declaration, and no showing that the outcome would have been different without it, since the declarations of M.L. and D.L. alone were sufficient. The court cited City of Los Angeles v. Herman (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 97, 105, where a similar due process argument was rejected because the defendant had the opportunity to question witnesses and present his own evidence. Fourth, the court rejected Zarrabi's claim that the restraining order caused him disproportionate reputational and employment harm. It found he supported this argument with neither citations to the record nor relevant legal authority.Even considering the argument on its merits, the court found that the record did not establish any harm to Zarrabi that was disproportionate to the need for protection ...

Douglas A. Bagby is an attorney who represented clients in the Los Angeles, California area, primarily in family law and general litigation. Joseph Daniel Davis:is a Pasadena/Los Angeles, California attorney whose practice included personal injury and products liability. He has also been involved in toxic tort, legal malpractice, and medical malpractice work. This new published appellate case arises from a long-running dispute between these two Southern California attorneys. The conflict began in July 2013 when Bagby was involved in a motor vehicle collision in which he lost one leg below the knee. He hired Davis to represent him in a personal injury action, which went to trial in June 2016 and resulted in a jury verdict of more than $5 million in Bagby's favor. In May 2017, Bagby sued Davis for breach of contract and malpractice. Davis defaulted, then successfully moved to set aside the default. Bagby petitioned for a writ of mandate, which the Court of Appeal granted, ordering the trial court to reinstate the default. (Bagby v. Superior Court (Apr. 16, 2018) B287188 [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court entered judgment for $27 million, but Davis appealed, arguing Bagby was limited to the $5 million demanded in his complaint. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed, directing the trial court to let Bagby choose between accepting a $5 million default judgment or vacating the default and filing an amended complaint. (Bagby v. Davis (Jan. 24, 2020) B294081 [nonpub. opn.].) Bagby chose the $5 million default judgment, which was entered in July 2020. Bagby then attempted to enforce the judgment by seeking an order for sale of a residence Davis owned in Indian Wells and an order directing Davis to repatriate $3.5 million he had transferred to a limited liability company located in Nevis. The trial court denied those requests, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, explaining that the Indian Wells property sale had to be pursued in Riverside County and that unwinding the transfer required a separate fraudulent transfer action. (Bagby v. Davis (Dec. 13, 2022) B320533 [nonpub. opn.].) There was also a related appeal involving property in Idaho, which the Idaho Supreme Court resolved in 2023. (Bagby v. Davis (2023) 173 Idaho 903.) In early 2023, Bagby obtained a writ of execution and sought to levy on two Individual Retirement Accounts belonging to Davis, held by LPL Financial Holdings Inc. The funds in those IRAs originated from an insurance policy held in a pension and profit-sharing plan established by Davis's former law firm, Davis & Thomas. The insurance policy had been cashed out and the proceeds rolled over into the IRAs. Davis filed a claim of exemption, arguing the IRAs could not be collected upon for two reasons: first, because he had moved to Florida and Florida exemption law should govern; and second, because the IRAs were funded by proceeds traceable to exempt sources - specifically, an unmatured life insurance policy and a private retirement plan - both of which are exempt under California law. The trial court held multiple hearings and issued several tentative rulings. Initially, the court considered applying Florida law but ultimately concluded that a claim of exemption must be determined under the law of the forum state - California - regardless of where the judgment debtor resides. The court relied on In re Marriage of DeLotel (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 21, which held that exemption laws govern the remedies available in each state's courts rather than creating substantive rights that follow the debtor. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order in its entirety in this new published case of Bagby v. Davis -B333649 (February 2026). The court addressed Davis's arguments in four categories: jurisdiction, choice of law, the merits under California law, and taxes. Jurisdiction. Davis argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the IRA funds were physically located in South Carolina. The court rejected this, explaining that funds held in an account are intangible and have no physical location; they are deemed to be wherever personal jurisdiction exists over the custodian of the account, citing Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107- 1108. Since Davis never challenged California's personal jurisdiction over LPL Financial, the funds were properly subject to the court's jurisdiction. Choice of Law.The court held that claims of exemption are governed by the law of the forum state, directly following In re Marriage of DeLotel. That case established that exemption laws do not create substantive defenses but instead govern the remedies available in each state's courts. Davis's attempt to distinguish DeLotel on its facts was unpersuasive. California Law - Life Insurance Exemption.The court addressed whether the proceeds from a voluntarily surrendered life insurance policy retain the exemption granted to unmatured policies under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.100, subdivision (a). The court held they do not. It reasoned that the purpose of the unmatured policy exemption is to prevent creditors from forcing a debtor to surrender a policy for its cash value, thereby preserving the policy as a source of future support. When the debtor voluntarily surrenders the policy, that protective purpose is fulfilled. The court further reasoned that treating a surrendered policy as still unmatured would produce an absurd result: there would be no loan value to collect and no procedural mechanism to collect it, effectively rendering the statutory provisions allowing partial collection a nullity, contrary to Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1037. Instead, the court held that a voluntarily surrendered policy should be treated as matured, meaning the funds are exempt only to the extent they are reasonably necessary for the debtor's support under section 704.100, subdivision (c). Davis made no attempt to prove the funds were necessary for his support. California Law - Private Retirement Plan Exemption. The court found that Davis failed to prove the pension and profit-sharing plan qualified as a "private retirement plan" under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.115. While there is no statutory definition of the term, case law establishes that such a plan must be principally designed and used for retirement purposes, citing O'Brien v. AMBS Diagnostics, LLC (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 553, 560 and Yaesu Electronics Corp. v. Tamura (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 8, 13-14. The evidence showed that Davis controlled the plan, its sole asset was a single insurance policy, and he had borrowed heavily against it without explanation and allowed substantial interest to accumulate. None of this indicated a plan designed and used for retirement. California Law - IRA Exemption. The court noted that IRAs are exempt under section 704.115, subdivision (e) only to the extent the funds are necessary to support the debtor in retirement, taking into account all available resources. Since Davis was already retired and reported income exceeding $500,000 per year, and since he offered no evidence that the IRA funds were necessary for his support, the exemption did not apply. Taxes.Davis argued for the first time on appeal that the trial court should have allowed him to hold back funds to pay taxes and penalties on the IRA withdrawal, as contemplated by section 704.115, subdivision (e)(3). The court held this argument was forfeited because Davis never raised it below, again citing Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1074 ...

In 2015, the World Health Organization's International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classified glyphosate - the active ingredient in Roundup - as "probably carcinogenic to humans." This finding became a catalyst for litigation. The IARC report initiated an avalanche of lawsuits American Council on Science and Health, even as the U.S. EPA and other regulators maintained that glyphosate was safe. Federal lawsuits were consolidated into multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. As of early 2026, the Roundup MDL in the Northern District of California had about 4,511 pending cases out of 5,240 total. On Tuesday, Bayer and attorneys for cancer patients announced a proposed $7.25 billion settlement to resolve thousands of U.S. lawsuits alleging the company failed to warn people that Roundup could cause cancer. The settlement was filed in St. Louis Circuit Court in Missouri. It is not clear at this time what effect this development will have on cases pending across the nation, and particularly cases pending here in California. All three of the first Roundup trials took place in California, and all three resulted in massive plaintiff verdicts. - - Johnson v. Monsanto (2018) — San Francisco Superior Court The first ever Roundup cancer lawsuit to proceed to trial was for Dewayne "Lee" Johnson, a groundskeeper for the Benicia Unified School District in the San Francisco Bay Area. Wisner Baum Johnson, 46, applied Roundup weedkiller 20 to 30 times per year while working as a groundskeeper for a school district near San Francisco. He testified that during his work, he had two accidents in which he was soaked with the product. He was diagnosed with terminal non-Hodgkin lymphoma in 2014. His case went first because in California, dying plaintiffs can be granted expedited trials. On August 10, 2018, a San Francisco jury ordered Monsanto to pay $39.25 million in compensatory damages and $250 million in punitive damages - a total of $289 million. The trial judge later reduced the total to $78.5 million, and an appellate court slashed it a second time. Johnson finally got paid late in 2020: $20.5 million, a fraction of the initial jury award. - - Hardeman v. Monsanto (2019) — U.S. District Court, Northern District of California Edwin Hardeman, 70, and his wife spent decades living in Sonoma County, California, on 56 acres of land. He started using Monsanto herbicides to treat poison oak, overgrowth, and weeds on his property in 1986 and continued using Roundup through 2012. He was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma in February 2015. This case served as a federal "bellwether" trial - a test case for the thousands of cases in the MDL. In 2019, a six-person jury awarded Hardeman $75 million in punitive damages and $5 million in compensatory damages. The judge later reduced the total to $25 million. In May 2021, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury's finding that Roundup caused Hardeman's cancer - the first federal appellate decision in the country on this issue. In June 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Bayer's appeal of the Hardeman verdict. - - Pilliod v. Monsanto (2019) — Alameda County Superior Court Alva and Alberta Pilliod, a Bay Area couple, began using Roundup on their properties in 1982. Alva was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma in 2011, and Alberta was diagnosed in 2015. On May 13, 2019, jurors returned a verdict awarding the Pilliods $2 billion in punitive damages and $55 million in compensatory damages - the largest Roundup verdict at that time. The judge later reduced their award to $87 million. Monsanto appealed, but the California Court of Appeal denied the appeal in August 2021, and the California Supreme Court denied review in November 2021. The U.S. Supreme Court also declined to take up the case in June 2022. It wasn't all losses for Bayer. In October 2021, a jury in the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles ruled in Bayer's favor in the Clark trial, finding that Roundup did not cause the plaintiff's child's illness. In December 2021, a jury in San Bernardino County ruled in Bayer's favor in the Stephens trial. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit's rejection of Bayer's federal preemption argument in Hardeman was a critical setback. In May 2021, the Ninth Circuit held that EPA's approval of a pesticide label does not immunize a manufacturer from liability in the tort system. However, Bayer continued to push the preemption argument, and the U.S. Supreme Court has now agreed to hear a different case (Durnell) on this question, with oral arguments scheduled for late April 2026. Although there are still over 4,500 cases pending in the California MDL, there is not a lot of focus on it at this point. Most new lawsuits are being filed in Pennsylvania, Missouri, or California, The litigation's center of gravity has shifted toward the state courts, the Supreme Court preemption case, and now the proposed $7.25 billion settlement filed in Missouri ...