For those of us who handle workers' compensation claims involving knee injuries, there's a new medical technology we need to know about - because it's going to start showing up in our cases if it hasn't already. It's called the "smart knee" implant, and the leading device right now is the Zimmer Biomet Persona IQ - the first and currently only FDA-approved knee replacement with built-in sensor technology. From the outside, it looks and functions like any standard total knee replacement. But embedded inside the tibial stem is a tiny wireless sensor that continuously tracks the patient's recovery in real time. The implant measures range of motion, step count, walking speed, stride length, and pressure distribution across the joint. That data is wirelessly transmitted to a small base station plugged into the patient's home Wi-Fi, and from there it uploads to a secure, HIPAA-compliant cloud platform. The treating surgeon can log in and review the data remotely. The patient can see their own progress through a smartphone app, and even compare their recovery metrics against national benchmarks for patients of the same age and stage of recovery. This isn't experimental. It's being used right now at major orthopedic centers across the country, including Mayo Clinic, the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York, UChicago Medicine, and Lee Health in Florida. And adoption is expanding rapidly into smaller community hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers. As recently as June 2025, UP Health System in Michigan's Upper Peninsula began offering the device for the first time. So why should workers' comp practitioners care? Several reasons. First, this technology replaces subjective recovery assessments with objective data. Historically, post-operative knee recovery has been tracked through periodic office visits and patient self-reports - the surgeon asks patients how they feel, watches them walk across the room, and measures their range of motion with a goniometer. One Mayo Clinic surgeon described the traditional approach as "very, very subjective." The smart knee changes that equation entirely. Now the surgeon has daily biomechanical data showing exactly how the knee is performing between visits. For attorneys and adjusters, this means disputes about whether a claimant has reached maximum medical improvement, whether recovery is progressing on schedule, or whether functional limitations are consistent with the objective findings could increasingly be resolved by implant data rather than dueling medical opinions. Second, the technology enables earlier intervention when recovery stalls. Orthopedic surgeons at UChicago Medicine have emphasized that the first three months after knee replacement are critical - if patients don't regain adequate strength and range of motion during that window, those losses can be very difficult to make up later. With the smart implant, a surgeon who sees a sudden drop in step count or a plateau in range of motion can reach out to the patient immediately and adjust the rehabilitation plan. That kind of early intervention could shorten disability durations and reduce overall claim costs. Third, smart implants reduce the need for frequent in-person follow-up visits. The remote monitoring capability means patients who live far from their treating surgeon may not need to travel as often for routine post-operative checks - a meaningful consideration in workers' comp, where mileage reimbursement, time off work for medical appointments, and delays in scheduling all add friction and cost to the system. Fourth, consider the long-term implications. The sensor battery is designed to last at least 10 years, and the device can help detect early signs of implant loosening, abnormal wear patterns, or biomechanical changes that might signal a problem before the patient even notices symptoms. Since workers' comp carriers often remain responsible for future medical treatment related to the original injury - including revision surgery - early detection of developing problems could mean smaller, less invasive, and less expensive interventions down the road. Finally - and perhaps most significantly for litigators - think about the evidentiary implications. These implants generate a continuous, objective record of the patient's functional capacity. Daily step counts. Walking speed. Stride length. Range of motion trends over weeks and months. That data could become powerful evidence in disputes over functional limitations, compliance with prescribed physical therapy, and readiness to return to work. It cuts both ways: it could support a claimant who is doing everything right but still struggling, or it could undermine a claim where the reported limitations don't match the biomechanical data. The smart knee is not yet the standard of care for every total knee replacement — cost, patient comfort with the technology, and the need for home Wi-Fi are still limiting factors. But adoption is growing quickly, and as it does, workers' comp professionals on both sides of the aisle will need to understand what this data means, how to obtain it, and how to use it. This is one worth watching ...

The United States Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division filed an 81 page lawsuit against the University of California alleging it engaged in a hostile work environment against Jewish and Israeli faculty and staff at its University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. According to the complaint, after the Hamas-led massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023, antisemitic acts pervaded UCLA. The suit alleges the university engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII against Jewish and Israeli employees at UCLA by failing to prevent and correct discriminatory and harassing conduct. The lawsuit further alleges the university negligently permitted a hostile work environment against two charging parties and other aggrieved Jewish and Israeli employees. In 2024, the university allowed antisemitic harassment to continue unabated for days in front of its iconic Royce Hall: among other acts, Jews were not permitted on portions of the main quad, Jewish professors were assaulted, and swastikas were graffitied on university buildings. The university has ignored, and continues to ignore, gross and repeated violations of viewpoint-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions involving these and other actions directed against Jewish and Israeli employees. Jewish and Israeli faculty have been physically threatened, had their classrooms disrupted, and had their workplaces papered with disturbing images. Jewish professors have been, and continue to be, subjected to ostracism and harassment by their colleagues and students, while their colleagues and supervisors not only have failed to report those acts as required but have even participated in them. Numerous Jewish and Israeli employees have been forced to take leave, work from home, and even leave their jobs to avoid the hostile work environment. “UCLA failed to live up to its systemwide commitment to diversity and equal opportunity when it stood by as Jewish employees were subjected to harassment,” said First Assistant United States Attorney Bill Essayli. “The federal government has an obligation to step in and ensure a discrimination-free environment at our universities.” “Based on our investigation, UCLA administrators allegedly allowed virulent anti-Semitism to flourish on campus, harming students and staff alike,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Today’s lawsuit underscores that this Department of Justice stands strong against hate and anti-Semitism in all its vile forms.” “The litany of vile acts of antisemitism that allegedly took place, and continue to take place, at UCLA are, if found to be true, a mark of shame against the University of California,” said Assistant Attorney General Harmeet K. Dhillon of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. “The Justice Department will ensure that UCLA maintains an environment for its employees free from antisemitic harassment.” The lawsuit stems from a Commissioner’s Charge filed by then-Commissioner Andrea Lucas of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in June 2024. The EEOC was instrumental in investigating the allegations of harassment at UCLA and in identifying the university’s poor complaint system. “The EEOC is committed to eradicating antisemitism at work,” said EEOC Chair Andrea Lucas. “If a university will not investigate and remedy repeated allegations of antisemitism against its employees, then EEOC will.” DOJ attorneys allege "Until the United States Department of Justice issued its notice of investigation letter to UCLA in March 2025, not a single one of the dozens of civil rights complaints filed by Jewish and Israeli employees since October 7 was properly investigated. UCLA’s Office of Equity, Diversity, & Inclusion (EDI Office), tasked with oversight of all discrimination complaints, routinely ignored complaints of antisemitism. And UCLA continues to mishandle them. Then-interim Chancellor Darnell Hunt testified to the Regents of the University of California (Regents or UC) that UCLA received “hundreds” of antisemitism complaints after October 7 and that “all those cases were taken up” for investigation. Yet not a single student, staff member, or faculty member was ultimately formally disciplined for antisemitic behavior - including those who were arrested for illegal conduct." ...

Karen Majovski is a deputy city attorney (DCA) in the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office. The office uses a classification system - DCA-I through DCA-IV - with pay steps within each classification, all governed by memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the City and DCA labor unions. Within each classification, DCAs automatically advance one step per year. Promotions from DCA-I to DCA-II and from DCA-II to DCA-III could be automatic under certain conditions, but promotions from DCA-III upward were never automatic and were typically granted through competitive Performance Recognition Programs (PRPs) or, more rarely, by discretionary action. Majovski obtained her law degree in 2013 and was admitted to the State Bar in December 2013. In May 2014, with only five months of legal experience and no employment litigation background, the City hired her as a DCA-I in the Workers' Compensation Division (WCD). She advanced through automatic pay steps over the next two years. In November 2016, Majovski transferred to the Employment Litigation Division (ELD). At the time of the transfer, she asked Chief Assistant City Attorney Thom Peters to promote her to DCA-III, pointing to another female attorney who had been hired at that level. Peters escalated the request to Chief of Staff Leela Kapur, who declined, explaining that Majovski had come in with no experience and that her workers' compensation background was not comparable to employment litigation. Kapur noted that both Majovski and male DCA-I George Sami were in similar positions and should be treated similarly. Majovski did not allege gender discrimination at that time. Majovski was not provided parking at City Hall East (CHE), the ELD workplace. Under a Special Parking MOU, parking priority was given to "Upper Management" (DCA-IIIs and above), electric vehicle owners, and employees with seniority. As a DCA-I without an electric vehicle and without sufficient seniority, Majovski did not qualify. All female attorneys in ELD at that time had parking because they were DCA-IIIs. Male DCA-I George Sami was seen parking at CHE, but undisputed evidence showed he had an electric vehicle, which gave him priority. Female DCA-II Susan Rim, hired in July 2017, was also not provided parking. In spring 2018, Majovski first complained that she and Rim were underpaid compared to others in ELD - both male and female - and requested promotions to DCA-III for both of them. In July 2018, the City promoted Rim from DCA-II to DCA-III but promoted Majovski only from DCA-I to DCA-II. Kapur explained that promoting an attorney with only about four years of practice and a year and a half of civil litigation experience from DCA-I directly to DCA-III would have been "highly irregular." No evidence in the record identified any employee who had ever received a DCA-I to DCA-III promotion. Majovski then asked to keep her original salary anniversary date rather than resetting it to the promotion date, but Kapur denied that request as contrary to standard practice. Peters forwarded Majovski's request to Kapur with the comment "Chutzpah," to which Kapur responded, "Yup there is a word for it." In September 2018, before Majovski's voluntary transfer from ELD to the Los Angeles World Airports Division (LAWA), Peters initially told her she would be promoted to DCA-III regardless of whether she transferred. After discussing with Kapur, Peters reversed himself and said she would be promoted only if she stayed in ELD. Chief Assistant City Attorney Jim Clark then told Majovski she would be promoted regardless of her decision. Majovski chose to transfer to LAWA in November 2018. She was not promoted at that time. In October 2019, Majovski applied for a promotion through an office-wide PRP. Of 364 applicants (190 female, 174 male), 93 received promotions or step advancements. Female applicants were selected at a slightly higher rate (26.3%) than male applicants (24.7%). Majovski was among 271 applicants who were not selected. Kapur, whose recommendations the City Attorney always followed, testified that she did not recommend Majovski for several reasons: Majovski had received recent promotion, had relatively short tenure, her division had received a fair number of promotions, and her promotion would not necessarily have advanced the office's goals for racial and ethnic diversity. In January 2020, a DCA-III in LAWA resigned, and Majovski took over most of her duties. In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a hiring and promotion freeze. LAWA's CFO, Tatiana Starostina, determined that LAWA would not fund the vacant DCA-III position because of the freeze. In September 2020, Majovski again requested the promotion, but Kapur declined to seek an exception to the freeze, explaining that the office's limited exceptions were prioritized for new hires rather than promotions. Majovski then emailed her supervisors stating she believed the front office was intentionally declining to adjust her pay for "personal, retaliatory, and gender related reasons." An HR investigation found no evidence supporting her complaint. In March 2021, Majovski filed suit against the City, alleging gender discrimination, associational discrimination, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination under FEHA, as well as claims under the Equal Pay Act (Lab. Code, § 1197.5) and the whistleblower protection statute (Lab. Code, § 1102.5). In August 2021, after the hiring freeze was lifted, the City granted Majovski a discretionary step advancement to bring her into pay parity with a similarly experienced individual being brought into the office (whose gender was not identified in the record). In June 2022, through a second PRP, Majovski was promoted to DCA-III. Between 2016 and 2022, the City's statistical evidence showed that of 240 discretionary promotions, 52.5% went to women and 47.5% to men. For promotions specifically from DCA-II to DCA-III, 55.5% went to women. The City moved for summary judgment. The trial court sustained 31 of the City's 55 evidentiary objections, including an objection to an undated draft gender equity report by the former City Controller. After a hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on all claims. The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment in its entirety in the unpublished case Majovski v. City of Los Angeles, No. B335739 (February 2026). The court held that Majovski forfeited her challenge to the trial court's evidentiary rulings by raising it for the first time in her reply brief without adequate citations or argument, relying on High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, 111, fn. 2, and Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721. This meant that key evidence, including the former City Controller's draft gender equity report, was properly excluded from consideration. The court applied the framework from Hall v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 318, 324–325, which requires a plaintiff to show she was paid less than a male comparator for substantially similar work. Majovski failed to identify any proper male comparator with less experience who was promoted or classified higher. The court found that George Sami's parking at CHE was explained by his electric vehicle priority under the Special Parking MOU, not gender. The court also found that the City's 2021 discretionary step advancement did not constitute an admission of gender-based pay disparity, as there was no evidence the individual with whom Majovski was brought into parity was male. Three comparators raised for the first time in the reply brief were rejected as forfeited and, in any event, insufficient - one was female, and the other two had demonstrably more experience. With regard to her FEHA discrimination claims the court applied the three-stage burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, as applied in California under Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334, and Arnold v. Dignity Health (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 424–425. The City met its second-stage burden by producing evidence that Majovski's level of experience explained the promotion decisions, and that women received discretionary promotions at equal or higher rates than men. Majovski failed to meet her third-stage burden to show pretext. Because all underlying discrimination and retaliation claims failed, the derivative failure-to-prevent claim under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k) necessarily failed as well, consistent with Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. M&N Financing Corp. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 434, 444 ...

In April 2021, John Goshorn hired Aqua Blue Construction, Inc. to build a swimming pool, spa, and barbeque at his home for $109,475. Aqua Blue drafted the contract, which included an arbitration clause stating that any disputes would be resolved through arbitration and that Goshorn's agreement to arbitrate was "voluntary." Aqua Blue's owner, Julien Britton, signed the contract on behalf of the company. A dispute arose over unpaid balances and alleged construction defects. In May 2022, Aqua Blue sued Goshorn for breach of contract, seeking $32,305 in damages and alleging fraud related to change orders. Goshorn denied the allegations and filed a cross-complaint raising claims including breach of contract, fraud, negligence, and contracting without a license, asserting that Aqua Blue had deviated from the agreed plans and produced defective, unfinished work. In September 2022, Goshorn moved to compel arbitration based on the contract's arbitration clause. Aqua Blue filed limited opposition but the trial court granted the motion. The parties then agreed to arbitrate before retired Justice Richard Aldrich of JAMS, whose rate was $9,000 per day - an arbitrator Aqua Blue itself had suggested. In April 2023, JAMS designated the case a "consumer arbitration" under its rules, which meant Aqua Blue, as the drafting party, would bear all arbitration fees. Aqua Blue's counsel acknowledged JAMS's determination and indicated the issue could be raised with the arbitrator. JAMS issued an initial invoice of $9,000, which Aqua Blue paid late but did pay. A preliminary conference set a ten-day hearing, and JAMS then issued retainer invoices totaling approximately $174,700. Aqua Blue protested the fees as unconscionable for a $32,305 dispute, questioned the ten-day estimate, and asked JAMS for guidance on how to challenge the consumer designation. No hearing on the challenge was ever set. By September 2023, Aqua Blue had not paid the retainer invoices, and JAMS administratively stayed the arbitration. In March 2024, Goshorn filed a motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which allows a consumer to withdraw from arbitration and recover fees and costs when the drafting party fails to timely pay arbitration fees. Aqua Blue opposed the motion, arguing that this was not a consumer arbitration and that it should not be solely responsible for the fees. In April 2024, the trial court granted Goshorn's motion. Relying on Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1319 and Williams v. West Coast Hospitals, Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1054 - both of which were later overruled - the court held that once Aqua Blue was more than 30 days past due on the JAMS invoices, it was in material breach regardless of any good-faith basis for disputing the fees. The court lifted the arbitration stay, ordered the matter to proceed in the trial court, and awarded Goshorn $36,974.79 in sanctions. However, the court declined to impose evidentiary or terminating sanctions, finding that the law was unclear on how to challenge a consumer arbitration designation and that such harsher sanctions would be unjust. The court also denied Aqua Blue's cross-motions for contempt and sanctions against Goshorn. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded in the unpublished case of Aqua Blue Construction, Inc. v. Goshorn, No. B338632 (February 2026). While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, which fundamentally changed the arbitration legal framework. The Supreme Court held that under section 1281.98, a drafting party's nonpayment of arbitration fees results in forfeiture of arbitral rights only when the nonpayment was "willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent." This interpretation was adopted to avoid preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act and was grounded in the long-standing contract principle that one party's nonperformance automatically extinguishes the other's duties only when culpability is present. The Hohenshelt court overruled the Court of Appeal decisions the trial court had relied upon. On the threshold question of whether this was a consumer arbitration at all, the appellate court held that it was. Goshorn fit the statutory definition of a "consumer" under section 1280, subdivision (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure because he hired Aqua Blue for personal, household purposes. The court noted that although Williams was overruled by Hohenshelt on the culpability issue, the Supreme Court did not disturb Williams's analysis on this particular point. Turning to the central issue, the appellate court found clear error in the trial court's failure to evaluate Aqua Blue's culpability. The record contained competing evidence: Aqua Blue argued it could not afford the fees, had actively sought review of JAMS's consumer designation, and that paying $164,000 to arbitrate a $32,305 dispute was unreasonable. Goshorn countered that Aqua Blue had itself chosen the expensive arbitrator, had agreed to JAMS's rules, and should have foreseen the costs. Because the trial court made no factual findings on whether the nonpayment was willful, strategic, grossly negligent, or excusable, the appellate court remanded for a new determination under the Hohenshelt standard. The court distinguished Wilson v. Tap Worldwide, LLC (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1077, where remand was unnecessary because the trial court had already made findings establishing that the late payment was not culpable ...

The Postal Service added a new section (DMM 608.11) to the Domestic Mail Manual that formally defines the postmark for the first time in a regulation and explains what information it does and doesn't convey. It took effect December 24, 2025. A postmark confirms USPS had possession of a mailpiece on the stamped date, but the postmark date does not necessarily match the date USPS first received the mailpiece. Most postmarks are applied by automated machines at processing facilities, and the date reflects when the mail was processed at that facility - not when it was initially deposited. This discrepancy has grown more common under USPS's Regional Transportation Optimization (RTO) initiative, which adds flexibility between collection and processing schedules. This is a significant practical problem with perhaps significant legal consequences, even though USPS insists the rule is "just clarification." For example Internal Revenue Code § 7502, also known as the “mailbox rule.” IRC § 7502 says that if a tax return or payment arrives at the IRS after the deadline, it's still considered timely if the USPS postmark date is on or before the due date. Courts interpret this strictly - the postmark date controls, regardless of when the taxpayer actually deposited the document. The problem is that § 7502 and its regulations never actually defined "postmark." As a result, the USPS's new DMM 608.11 effectively supplies the operative definition for § 7502 purposes. And that definition now makes clear that a machine-applied postmark reflects the date of first automated processing at a regional facility - not when you dropped it in the mailbox or handed it to a postal carrier. Tax professionals have been calling for the IRS to address this, but nothing had been issued as of the most recent reporting. And it's just now getting attention from employment and benefits lawyers. Here's how the new postmark rule ripples into employer notice obligations. Under federal laws like ERISA, COBRA, HIPAA, and the ACA, employers are required to send a variety of notices to employees concerning health insurance coverage, retirement benefits, and other employee benefits. Some key examples of these deadlines: - - General COBRA notices must be sent to new plan participants within 90 days of health coverage starting. COBRA election notices must be sent within 14 days after an employer notifies the plan administrator about a qualifying event, such as a layoff, discharge, divorce, or reduction in hours. - - Health plans must send HIPAA notices of privacy practices to enrollees within 60 days of any substantial change. - - HIPAA-covered entities must notify affected individuals without unreasonable delay, or no later than 60 calendar days after discovering a security breach. - - Other ERISA-required communications include summary plan descriptions (SPDs), summaries of benefits and coverage (SBCs), formulary notices, and annual disclosures - all with their own timing requirements. - - COBRA regulations specifically say that the initial notice, election notice, and notice of unavailability are considered "provided" on the date they are postmarked. So if the postmark date is delayed by a day or two at a regional processing center, a notice that was mailed on time could be deemed late Some options to avoid this problem include requesting a free manual (local) postmark at any Post Office retail counter. This stamp will align with the date the customer hands over the mail. Registered Mail and Certified Mail also provide mailing receipts. The Postal Service claims this rule does not change any actual postmarking operations or procedures. USPS says it's purely an educational/transparency measure codifying longstanding practices. The era of dropping a deadline-sensitive document in a blue mailbox on the last day and trusting the postmark is effectively over. It would be wise for employers to take affirmative steps to secure proof of the actual mailing date ...

Generative artificial intelligence tools have become increasingly prevalent across various domains of human activity. It has reliably been estimated, for instance that more than half of United States households have adapted AI in some form. Only three years after its release, one prominent AI platform is being used by more than 800 million people worldwide every week. Yet the implications of AI for the law are only beginning to be explored. A ruling by Judge Jed S. Rakoff in United States v. Heppner (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 2026) appears to be the first federal decision addressing whether a criminal defendant's conversations with a generative AI platform are protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. The answer on both counts according to this ruling was "no." Most published decisions involving generative artificial intelligence have had to do with attorneys' misuse of that technology. That set of concerns is plainly net present here. Bradley Heppner was indicted on securities fraud and related charges stemming from an alleged $150+ million scheme involving GWG Holdings. After receiving a grand jury subpoena and learning he was a target, Heppner - on his own initiative, without his lawyer's direction - used Claude to prepare roughly 31 documents outlining potential defense strategies and legal arguments. The FBI seized these "AI Documents" during a search of his home. Heppner's counsel claimed privilege over them. Heppner, through his counsel asserted privilege over these documents arguing that (1) Heppner had inputted into Claude, among other things,information that Heppner had learned from counsel; (2) Heppner had created the AI Documents for the purpose of speaking with counsel to obtain legal advice; and (3) Heppner had subsequently shared the contents of the AI Documents with counsel. Heppner' s counsel conceded, however, that counsel "did net direct [Heppner] to run Claude searches." The trial court noted that it is well established that the attorney-client privilege attaches to, and protects from disclosure, "communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice." United States V. Mejia 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011). Courts construe the attorney-client privilege narrowly because it operates as an exception to the rule that "all relevant proof is essential" for a complete record and for "confidence in the fair administration of justice." On attorney-client privilege, the court found the documents failed on multiple independent grounds. First, Claude is not an attorney, so there was no attorney-client relationship. Second, the communications were not confidential — Anthropic's privacy policy explicitly permits collecting user inputs and outputs, using them for training, and disclosing data to third parties including government authorities. Third, Heppner was not seeking legal advice from Claude; Claude itself disclaims the ability to give legal advice. The court noted that even though Heppner later shared the outputs with his lawyer, non-privileged communications don't become privileged simply by being passed along to counsel. On work product doctrine, the court held that even assuming the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation, they were not prepared "by or at the behest of counsel." Heppner acted entirely on his own. The documents didn't reflect defense counsel's strategy at the time they were created. The court distinguished a prior S.D.N.Y. magistrate decision (Shih v. Petal Card) that took a broader view, respectfully disagreeing and emphasizing that the doctrine's core purpose is protecting lawyers' mental processes, not a client's independent research with an AI tool. "Thus, the communications between Heppner and Claude were not privileged at the time they took place. Moreover, even assuming that Heppner intended to share these communications with his counsel and eventually did so, it is black-letter law that non-privileged communications are not somehow alchemically changed into privileged ones upon being shared with counsel. Thus, because the AI Documents would not be privileged if they remained in [Heppner's] hands they did not acquire protection merely because they were transferred to counsel." The court concluded that AI's novelty doesn't exempt it from longstanding legal principles. The ruling has obvious implications for the millions of people using AI platforms to think through legal problems - those conversations are likely discoverable ...

A federal jury convicted a Texas laboratory owner and former NFL player for his role in a $328 million cardiovascular genetic testing fraud scheme. According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, Keith J. Gray, 39, of McKinney, Texas, orchestrated a scheme to bill Medicare for medically unnecessary genetic tests designed to evaluate the risk of various cardiovascular diseases and conditions. Gray, the owner and operator of two clinical laboratories, Axis Professional Labs LLC, and Kingdom Health Laboratory LLC, offered and paid kickbacks to marketers in exchange for their referral of Medicare beneficiaries’ DNA samples, personally identifiable information (including Medicare numbers) and signed test orders from medical providers authorizing the medically unnecessary genetic tests. As part of the scheme, the marketers engaged other companies to solicit Medicare beneficiaries through telemarketing and to engage in “doctor chase,” to obtain the identity of beneficiaries’ primary care physicians and pressure them into approving genetic testing orders for patients who purportedly had already been “qualified” for the testing during telephone calls conducted by non-medical personnel at one of the companies retained by the marketers - not by their physicians. In an effort to conceal the kickback payments, Gray used sham contracts and invoices that purported to charge for “marketing” hours but that in reality were reverse-engineered to match the amounts agreed to under the illegal per-sample kickback arrangement. Gray also sought to conceal the scheme by referring to the payments as being for “software” and loans that never existed. Evidence at trial included text messages between Gray and his co-conspirator becoming giddy over the amount of money they were making from Medicare. Axis and Kingdom billed Medicare approximately $328 million for the false, fraudulent and kickback-tainted genetic testing claims, of which Medicare paid approximately $54 million. Gray laundered some of the proceeds by purchasing expensive luxury vehicles, including a Dodge Ram truck worth more than $142,000 and a Mercedes Benz SUV worth more than $145,000. The jury convicted Gray of conspiracy to defraud the United States and to pay and receive health care kickbacks, five counts of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute and three counts of money laundering. He is scheduled to be sentenced at a later date. Gray faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison on each count. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors. The FBI, HHS-OIG, MFCU and VA-OIG investigated the case.Trial Attorneys Ethan Womble and Adam Tisdall of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section are prosecuting the case. The Fraud Section leads the Criminal Division’s efforts to combat health care fraud through the Health Care Fraud Strike Force Program. Since March 2007, this program, currently comprised of eight strike forces operating in federal districts across the country, has charged more than 6,200 defendants who collectively billed federal health care programs and private insurers more than $45 billion. In addition, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, working in conjunction with the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services, are taking steps to hold providers accountable for their involvement in health care fraud schemes ...

Jose Vicente Badillo, the owner and operator of two towing companies, was sentenced to 60 months in federal prison for his involvement in a scheme to burn tow trucks throughout the Bay Area in 2023. U.S. District Judge Rita F. Lin handed down the sentence on Feb. 12, 2026. Badillo, 29, of San Francisco, was also sentenced on Feb. 13, 2026, in an unrelated case to 27 months in federal prison for his role in a conspiracy to submit fraudulent auto insurance claims from at least 2017 until at least 2021. U.S. District Judge Trina L. Thompson handed down the sentence, which will run concurrently with the 60-month sentence imposed by Judge Lin. Badillo was indicted by a federal grand jury in March 2025 for his involvement in the arson conspiracy. In October 2025, he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit arson. According to the plea agreement, Badillo admitted to devising, orchestrating, and overseeing a scheme to set fire to tow trucks in the San Francisco Bay Area. The principal goals of Badillo’s scheme were to drive more business to his own towing companies, Auto Towing and Specialty Towing, by impeding competitor towing companies’ business prospects and to exact revenge against competitor towing companies and their owners for perceived wrongs. To accomplish those goals, Badillo recruited, agreed with, and directed others to execute the scheme by torching six tow trucks belonging to four competitor companies in April, July, and October of 2023. Separately, Badillo was twice indicted by a federal grand jury in 2024 for his involvement in the automobile insurance fraud schemes. In October 2025, Badillo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud in the second-charged insurance fraud case. According to the plea agreement, Badillo conspired with others to defraud automobile insurance companies by submitting fraudulent insurance claims. In furtherance of the scheme to defraud, Badillo staged an accident on Guadalupe Canyon Parkway in San Mateo County involving a Sterling tow truck and a vehicle carrier carrying four vehicles. Badillo also generated fake tow records concerning at least 18 vehicles involved in iterations of the scheme to defraud and orchestrated at least another nine iterations of the scheme to defraud, causing victim insurance companies hundreds of thousands of dollars in losses. In another fraud case, Badillo and Abigail Fuentes were charged with multiple felonies in October 2023 by the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office. The charges stem from an alleged welfare fraud scheme. Fuentes, who worked as a Senior Eligibility Worker at the Human Services Agency, is accused of improperly approving Badillo’s application for public welfare programs without disclosing their personal relationship. Both individuals allegedly misrepresented their income and assets to qualify for benefits they were not eligible for, including Medi-Cal, CalFresh, and CalWORKs. Authorities say Badillo and Fuentes are in a relationship and have children. At the time the application was filed, investigators said the pair had been operating three towing companies – Auto Towing, Jose’s Towing and Specialty Towing – which generated more than $2 million in gross annual income. Both Fuentes and Badillo allegedly lied about their substantial income and assets in order to receive public benefits they were not eligible for. The case led to more scrutiny of the pair’s business practices by San Francisco authorities, specifically from San Francisco City Atty. David Chiu, whose office later alleged that one of the couple’s companies was profiting from illegal tows. In August 2023, the City Attorney initiated debarment proceedings against Auto Towing after the company violated multiple state and local laws by illegally towing vehicles from private property. Between February and May 2023, Auto Towing employees illegally towed several cars from a bank parking lot in the Portola neighborhood without the permission of the property owner. It is unlawful for a tow company to tow a car from private property without the consent of the property owner. In February 2024, Chiu moved to suspend the company. Auto Towing, and its affiliates, which included Specialty Towing, from receiving contracts from the city. The perpetrator also made it difficult for vehicle owners to retrieve their vehicles, restricted the hours when vehicles could be retrieved, and pressured vehicle owners to pay in cash. Under the California Vehicle Code, vehicle owners have the right to retrieve their vehicles 24 hours a day, any day of the year, and have the right to pay with cash or major credit card. The victims whose cars were towed were primarily Spanish- and Cantonese-speaking residents, who are especially vulnerable to predatory tows. Specialty Towing came under public scrutiny two months later when a bystander recorded one of its trucks trying to tow a woman’s car as she was driving in San Francisco. “We were freaking out calling and basically rolling down our window and saying, ‘Hey what you are doing? You can’t be doing that,’ ” the driver, identified only as Joanne, told ABC 7 News in an interview. “He started backing up and his lever came down and basically he was just backing up trying to latch onto our car.” The video of this incident was horrifying. the driver was waiting on a public street behind a tow truck stopped for a red light. The two truck driver then dropped his towing apparatus hoping to hook onto Joanne’s car while she was in it with the motor running. She backed up, and the tow truck driver backed up chasing her backward down the street. Had the tow truck driver been successful he would have towed her car away with the motor running, while kidnapping her inside ...

The City of San Diego leased several floors of a downtown high-rise office building in 2017 where it stationed many employees. The City knew the building contained asbestos. That July, the building owner began a window renovation project that would involve the removal of approximately 40 tons of asbestos-containing materials. The City notified employees by email about the project, explained that air quality would be monitored daily, and designated Karen Johnson, a manager in its Real Estate Asset Department, as the liaison between employees and the building owner and renovation contractors. Within days, employees began expressing concerns. Over the following months, they reported to Johnson and other City officials that they were experiencing respiratory problems. Employees also reported that renovation workers were wearing protective masks, that plastic barriers meant to contain dust and debris were failing, and that a ventilator for a sealed asbestos-containing area was blowing exhaust into the employee parking structure. Johnson relayed these complaints to the building owner, the contractors, and Ronald Villa, the City's deputy chief operating officer. Despite the ongoing complaints, the City decided not to relocate employees because it had no legal grounds to break its lease and no alternative space available. That changed on January 25, 2018, when the San Diego County Air Pollution Control District received a complaint and took samples from multiple floors of the building. The samples tested positive for asbestos the following day. On January 26, the City notified its employees of the results and instructed them to stay out of the building. Over the next several weeks, the District confirmed widespread asbestos contamination throughout the building and found that air samples collected between February 1 and 5 contained asbestos fibers exceeding permissible levels. On March 2, 2018, City officials held a meeting with affected employees. Villa told them the asbestos found on January 25 was not airborne and that prior air testing had shown levels within EPA tolerances. George Katsikaris of the City's Environmental Services Department similarly told employees that air samples collected before the evacuation were within safe, breathable levels and that dust samples had come back clean. A toxicologist told employees they should not worry about adverse health effects. Nevertheless, Villa acknowledged employees' concerns and encouraged anyone worried about cancer to take whatever steps they needed, and a workers' compensation manager explained how to file claims. Alina Cadena and other City employees who had worked in the building during the renovations sued the City and Villa in his official capacity. They alleged the City intentionally exposed them to asbestos and concealed the extent of the exposure because it determined their health and safety were not worth the cost of breaking the lease. They asserted causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraudulent concealment, sought compensatory damages, costs, and attorney fees, and sought punitive damages against Villa. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that workers' compensation was the employees' exclusive remedy under Labor Code section 3602, subdivision (a), and that the employees could not establish the fraudulent concealment exception to that exclusivity rule under subdivision (b)(2). The City alternatively sought summary adjudication of the emotional distress claim and the punitive damages claim against Villa. In support, the City submitted declarations from Johnson and Villa stating they had no knowledge of loose or uncontrolled asbestos before January 26, 2018, and that the renovation project manager had regularly reported air samples at normal background levels. The City also submitted deposition testimony, including from employees themselves, who admitted they had no evidence the City knew of loose asbestos debris before that date. The court granted summary judgment, finding the fraudulent concealment exception did not apply and workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in its entirety, reviewing the summary judgment de novo in the unpublished case of Cadena v. City of San Diego, - D084784 (February, 2026). The court explained that under the workers' compensation exclusivity rule, when an employee suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, workers' compensation is the sole and exclusive remedy against the employer. (Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 812–813.) The fraudulent concealment exception in Labor Code section 3602, subdivision (b)(2), requires the employee to prove three elements: the employer knew of the employee's work-related injury, the employer concealed that knowledge, and the concealment aggravated the injury. The court found the employees failed to raise a triable issue on the first element - actual prior knowledge of their injuries. Citing Ashdown v. Ameron Internat. Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 868, 880, and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1797, the court emphasized that constructive or imputed knowledge is insufficient; only actual knowledge will do. The City's evidence showed it did not know about loose asbestos debris until January 26, 2018, the same day it notified employees. The employees themselves admitted they had no evidence the City knew earlier. Moreover, since employees had the same information the City did, the fraudulent concealment exception did not apply, because the exception requires the employer to have known of the injury before the employee. The employees argued their emotional distress claim should proceed to trial because the City's conduct in knowingly exposing them to a known carcinogen was not a normal part of the employment relationship. The court disagreed, surveying a line of California Supreme Court decisions holding that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against employers. The court further relied on Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465, 474–475, where the California Supreme Court held that even if an employer knowingly concealed asbestos dangers from employees, workers' compensation was the only remedy ...

Rayan Zarrabi graduated from Scripps Ranch High School, part of the San Diego Unified School District, in 2019. In the years that followed, he engaged in an escalating pattern of hostility directed at two school employees - M.L., a vice principal, and D.L., one of his former teachers. A few months after graduating, Zarrabi attended an SRHS football game where he shouted profanity and raised his middle finger at D.L. In December 2022, he entered the campus without permission, was told to leave, and was then caught sneaking back in through a rear gate, after which M.L. instructed him never to return. In May 2023, Zarrabi attended an off-campus SRHS volleyball game at Southwestern Community College, where he sent disturbing electronic messages to students that included references to graves and tombstone emojis. When M.L. told him to leave, campus police had to escort him out while he shouted vulgar insults at M.L. In June 2023, he yelled profanity at M.L. from his car as M.L. sat on a restaurant patio. Around the same time, he tracked down D.L.'s family members on Facebook and sent them hateful, profanity-laden messages attacking D.L.'s appearance and character. In February 2024, Zarrabi contacted a coworker of M.L. and D.L. on Facebook, repeating the same type of messages and adding lengthy, hostile commentary about both men. Then, in May 2024, a witness flagged down police to report that Zarrabi had been speaking rapidly and intensely about his hatred for M.L. and D.L., stating that he hoped they would die, that they did not deserve to live, that it was all he could think about, and that he was going to get his revenge. Police prepared a crime report, a suspicious activity report, and a psychiatric emergency response team referral, and an officer advised M.L. to seek a restraining order. Zarrabi reportedly continued telling third parties, including current students, that he intended to "go after" the two employees. In October 2024, the District filed a petition for a workplace violence restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 on behalf of M.L. and D.L., also requesting that M.L.'s immediate family members be included as protected persons. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order based on a credible threat of violence or stalking and set a hearing. Zarrabi filed a written response denying the allegations. Following a hearing in November 2024, the trial court granted the petition, ordering Zarrabi to stay at least 100 yards from the employees' workplaces, homes, and vehicles, as well as from SRHS events held off campus. The Court of Appeal affirmed the restraining order in its entirety in the unpublished case of San Diego Unified School District v. Zarrabi, No. D085415 (February 2026). The court addressed Zarrabi's arguments on four grounds. First, on sufficiency of the evidence, the court held that Zarrabi had forfeited this argument by failing to include a reporter's transcript or an agreed or settled statement from the hearing.The court went on to find that even setting aside the forfeiture, the record - including declarations from M.L. and D.L., copies of Zarrabi's electronic messages, and a police report - contained substantial evidence supporting the order. Second, regarding the First Amendment, the court found that Zarrabi failed to present a cogent argument supported by relevant authority. It noted that the cases he cited were inapposite. Relying on City of San Jose v. Garbett (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 526, 537, the court explained that speech constituting a credible threat of violence under section 527.8 is not constitutionally protected and may properly be enjoined. Third, on due process, Zarrabi complained that a police officer's declaration was filed shortly before the hearing and that he did not receive it in time. The court found he provided no evidence to support this claim, no evidence the trial court even considered the declaration, and no showing that the outcome would have been different without it, since the declarations of M.L. and D.L. alone were sufficient. The court cited City of Los Angeles v. Herman (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 97, 105, where a similar due process argument was rejected because the defendant had the opportunity to question witnesses and present his own evidence. Fourth, the court rejected Zarrabi's claim that the restraining order caused him disproportionate reputational and employment harm. It found he supported this argument with neither citations to the record nor relevant legal authority.Even considering the argument on its merits, the court found that the record did not establish any harm to Zarrabi that was disproportionate to the need for protection ...

Douglas A. Bagby is an attorney who represented clients in the Los Angeles, California area, primarily in family law and general litigation. Joseph Daniel Davis:is a Pasadena/Los Angeles, California attorney whose practice included personal injury and products liability. He has also been involved in toxic tort, legal malpractice, and medical malpractice work. This new published appellate case arises from a long-running dispute between these two Southern California attorneys. The conflict began in July 2013 when Bagby was involved in a motor vehicle collision in which he lost one leg below the knee. He hired Davis to represent him in a personal injury action, which went to trial in June 2016 and resulted in a jury verdict of more than $5 million in Bagby's favor. In May 2017, Bagby sued Davis for breach of contract and malpractice. Davis defaulted, then successfully moved to set aside the default. Bagby petitioned for a writ of mandate, which the Court of Appeal granted, ordering the trial court to reinstate the default. (Bagby v. Superior Court (Apr. 16, 2018) B287188 [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court entered judgment for $27 million, but Davis appealed, arguing Bagby was limited to the $5 million demanded in his complaint. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed, directing the trial court to let Bagby choose between accepting a $5 million default judgment or vacating the default and filing an amended complaint. (Bagby v. Davis (Jan. 24, 2020) B294081 [nonpub. opn.].) Bagby chose the $5 million default judgment, which was entered in July 2020. Bagby then attempted to enforce the judgment by seeking an order for sale of a residence Davis owned in Indian Wells and an order directing Davis to repatriate $3.5 million he had transferred to a limited liability company located in Nevis. The trial court denied those requests, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, explaining that the Indian Wells property sale had to be pursued in Riverside County and that unwinding the transfer required a separate fraudulent transfer action. (Bagby v. Davis (Dec. 13, 2022) B320533 [nonpub. opn.].) There was also a related appeal involving property in Idaho, which the Idaho Supreme Court resolved in 2023. (Bagby v. Davis (2023) 173 Idaho 903.) In early 2023, Bagby obtained a writ of execution and sought to levy on two Individual Retirement Accounts belonging to Davis, held by LPL Financial Holdings Inc. The funds in those IRAs originated from an insurance policy held in a pension and profit-sharing plan established by Davis's former law firm, Davis & Thomas. The insurance policy had been cashed out and the proceeds rolled over into the IRAs. Davis filed a claim of exemption, arguing the IRAs could not be collected upon for two reasons: first, because he had moved to Florida and Florida exemption law should govern; and second, because the IRAs were funded by proceeds traceable to exempt sources - specifically, an unmatured life insurance policy and a private retirement plan - both of which are exempt under California law. The trial court held multiple hearings and issued several tentative rulings. Initially, the court considered applying Florida law but ultimately concluded that a claim of exemption must be determined under the law of the forum state - California - regardless of where the judgment debtor resides. The court relied on In re Marriage of DeLotel (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 21, which held that exemption laws govern the remedies available in each state's courts rather than creating substantive rights that follow the debtor. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order in its entirety in this new published case of Bagby v. Davis -B333649 (February 2026). The court addressed Davis's arguments in four categories: jurisdiction, choice of law, the merits under California law, and taxes. Jurisdiction. Davis argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the IRA funds were physically located in South Carolina. The court rejected this, explaining that funds held in an account are intangible and have no physical location; they are deemed to be wherever personal jurisdiction exists over the custodian of the account, citing Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107- 1108. Since Davis never challenged California's personal jurisdiction over LPL Financial, the funds were properly subject to the court's jurisdiction. Choice of Law.The court held that claims of exemption are governed by the law of the forum state, directly following In re Marriage of DeLotel. That case established that exemption laws do not create substantive defenses but instead govern the remedies available in each state's courts. Davis's attempt to distinguish DeLotel on its facts was unpersuasive. California Law - Life Insurance Exemption.The court addressed whether the proceeds from a voluntarily surrendered life insurance policy retain the exemption granted to unmatured policies under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.100, subdivision (a). The court held they do not. It reasoned that the purpose of the unmatured policy exemption is to prevent creditors from forcing a debtor to surrender a policy for its cash value, thereby preserving the policy as a source of future support. When the debtor voluntarily surrenders the policy, that protective purpose is fulfilled. The court further reasoned that treating a surrendered policy as still unmatured would produce an absurd result: there would be no loan value to collect and no procedural mechanism to collect it, effectively rendering the statutory provisions allowing partial collection a nullity, contrary to Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1037. Instead, the court held that a voluntarily surrendered policy should be treated as matured, meaning the funds are exempt only to the extent they are reasonably necessary for the debtor's support under section 704.100, subdivision (c). Davis made no attempt to prove the funds were necessary for his support. California Law - Private Retirement Plan Exemption. The court found that Davis failed to prove the pension and profit-sharing plan qualified as a "private retirement plan" under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.115. While there is no statutory definition of the term, case law establishes that such a plan must be principally designed and used for retirement purposes, citing O'Brien v. AMBS Diagnostics, LLC (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 553, 560 and Yaesu Electronics Corp. v. Tamura (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 8, 13-14. The evidence showed that Davis controlled the plan, its sole asset was a single insurance policy, and he had borrowed heavily against it without explanation and allowed substantial interest to accumulate. None of this indicated a plan designed and used for retirement. California Law - IRA Exemption. The court noted that IRAs are exempt under section 704.115, subdivision (e) only to the extent the funds are necessary to support the debtor in retirement, taking into account all available resources. Since Davis was already retired and reported income exceeding $500,000 per year, and since he offered no evidence that the IRA funds were necessary for his support, the exemption did not apply. Taxes.Davis argued for the first time on appeal that the trial court should have allowed him to hold back funds to pay taxes and penalties on the IRA withdrawal, as contemplated by section 704.115, subdivision (e)(3). The court held this argument was forfeited because Davis never raised it below, again citing Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1074 ...

In 2015, the World Health Organization's International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classified glyphosate - the active ingredient in Roundup - as "probably carcinogenic to humans." This finding became a catalyst for litigation. The IARC report initiated an avalanche of lawsuits American Council on Science and Health, even as the U.S. EPA and other regulators maintained that glyphosate was safe. Federal lawsuits were consolidated into multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. As of early 2026, the Roundup MDL in the Northern District of California had about 4,511 pending cases out of 5,240 total. On Tuesday, Bayer and attorneys for cancer patients announced a proposed $7.25 billion settlement to resolve thousands of U.S. lawsuits alleging the company failed to warn people that Roundup could cause cancer. The settlement was filed in St. Louis Circuit Court in Missouri. It is not clear at this time what effect this development will have on cases pending across the nation, and particularly cases pending here in California. All three of the first Roundup trials took place in California, and all three resulted in massive plaintiff verdicts. - - Johnson v. Monsanto (2018) — San Francisco Superior Court The first ever Roundup cancer lawsuit to proceed to trial was for Dewayne "Lee" Johnson, a groundskeeper for the Benicia Unified School District in the San Francisco Bay Area. Wisner Baum Johnson, 46, applied Roundup weedkiller 20 to 30 times per year while working as a groundskeeper for a school district near San Francisco. He testified that during his work, he had two accidents in which he was soaked with the product. He was diagnosed with terminal non-Hodgkin lymphoma in 2014. His case went first because in California, dying plaintiffs can be granted expedited trials. On August 10, 2018, a San Francisco jury ordered Monsanto to pay $39.25 million in compensatory damages and $250 million in punitive damages - a total of $289 million. The trial judge later reduced the total to $78.5 million, and an appellate court slashed it a second time. Johnson finally got paid late in 2020: $20.5 million, a fraction of the initial jury award. - - Hardeman v. Monsanto (2019) — U.S. District Court, Northern District of California Edwin Hardeman, 70, and his wife spent decades living in Sonoma County, California, on 56 acres of land. He started using Monsanto herbicides to treat poison oak, overgrowth, and weeds on his property in 1986 and continued using Roundup through 2012. He was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma in February 2015. This case served as a federal "bellwether" trial - a test case for the thousands of cases in the MDL. In 2019, a six-person jury awarded Hardeman $75 million in punitive damages and $5 million in compensatory damages. The judge later reduced the total to $25 million. In May 2021, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury's finding that Roundup caused Hardeman's cancer - the first federal appellate decision in the country on this issue. In June 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Bayer's appeal of the Hardeman verdict. - - Pilliod v. Monsanto (2019) — Alameda County Superior Court Alva and Alberta Pilliod, a Bay Area couple, began using Roundup on their properties in 1982. Alva was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma in 2011, and Alberta was diagnosed in 2015. On May 13, 2019, jurors returned a verdict awarding the Pilliods $2 billion in punitive damages and $55 million in compensatory damages - the largest Roundup verdict at that time. The judge later reduced their award to $87 million. Monsanto appealed, but the California Court of Appeal denied the appeal in August 2021, and the California Supreme Court denied review in November 2021. The U.S. Supreme Court also declined to take up the case in June 2022. It wasn't all losses for Bayer. In October 2021, a jury in the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles ruled in Bayer's favor in the Clark trial, finding that Roundup did not cause the plaintiff's child's illness. In December 2021, a jury in San Bernardino County ruled in Bayer's favor in the Stephens trial. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit's rejection of Bayer's federal preemption argument in Hardeman was a critical setback. In May 2021, the Ninth Circuit held that EPA's approval of a pesticide label does not immunize a manufacturer from liability in the tort system. However, Bayer continued to push the preemption argument, and the U.S. Supreme Court has now agreed to hear a different case (Durnell) on this question, with oral arguments scheduled for late April 2026. Although there are still over 4,500 cases pending in the California MDL, there is not a lot of focus on it at this point. Most new lawsuits are being filed in Pennsylvania, Missouri, or California, The litigation's center of gravity has shifted toward the state courts, the Supreme Court preemption case, and now the proposed $7.25 billion settlement filed in Missouri ...

Jenny-Ashley Colon-Perez brought a claim against her employer, Security Industry Specialists, Inc., which was subject to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. During the arbitration process, the employer was required to pay arbitration fees by certain statutory deadlines under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. The employer had timely paid all prior arbitration invoices, but missed one payment deadline because defense counsel was dealing with a natural disaster that caused extensive property damage and forced her and her family to evacuate their home. The overdue invoice was paid within six days of the statutory deadline. After the employer missed the payment deadline, Colon-Perez moved under section 1281.98 to withdraw from arbitration, arguing the late payment triggered her right to return to court litigation. The trial court granted that motion, allowing her to withdraw from arbitration. The employer then filed a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), seeking equitable relief from the withdrawal order on grounds of excusable neglect. The trial court denied that motion as well, effectively ending the employer's ability to enforce the arbitration agreement. On the initial appeal, the First Appellate District affirmed the trial court, holding that section 1281.98 imposed a rigid, inflexible deadline and that section 473, subdivision (b) could not be used to excuse a failure to comply with that deadline, regardless of the reason for the late payment or how quickly payment was made afterward. That opinion was published as Colon-Perez v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 403. The California Supreme Court granted review and held the case pending its decision in Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310. In Hohenshelt, the Supreme Court rejected the rigid construction that several Courts of Appeal, including this one, had applied to section 1281.98. The Supreme Court held that equitable relief statutes - specifically section 473, subdivision (b), Civil Code section 3275, and Civil Code section 1511 - remain available to excuse late arbitration fee payments. It also concluded that, construed in harmony with these background equitable relief statutes, section 1281.98 does not impermissibly burden arbitration contracts and is therefore not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. Following Hohenshelt, the Supreme Court transferred Colon-Perez back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the prior opinion and reconsider in light of the new ruling. On remand, the Court of Appeal in the unpublished case of Colon-Perez v. Security Industry Specialists -A168297 (February 2026) reversed the trial court's denial of the employer's section 473, subdivision (b) motion. Rather than simply sending the case back for further proceedings, the court concluded that the record compelled granting the employer relief outright. The court found there was no suggestion whatsoever of strategic or willful nonpayment - the exact conduct section 1281.98 was designed to address. To the contrary, the employer had a consistent track record of timely payments, missed only one deadline due to a natural disaster, and cured the late payment within six days. The court noted that the Supreme Court itself had cited this very case in Hohenshelt as an example of a non-deliberate late payment that should not result in forfeiture of arbitral rights. Given the six-day delay, the court also found no basis for any claim of prejudice to Colon-Perez. The court reversed the order denying relief under section 473, subdivision (b) and remanded with directions to grant the employer's motion and vacate the order that had allowed Colon-Perez to withdraw from arbitration. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal ...

OSHA's 2024 Walkaround Rule published on April 1, 2024, and effective May 31, 2024, amends 29 C.F.R. § 1903.8(c) to clarify that employees may designate a non-employee third party as their representative during an OSHA inspection. Prior to the rule, the existing standard required that an employees' designee had to be an employee of the business being investigated, unless the OSHA inspector saw good cause to designate an outside party. The rule also removed the suggestion that non-employee representatives should be limited to individuals with formal credentials such as safety engineers or industrial hygienists. The rule largely reinstated an OSHA policy from 2013 known as the "Fairfax Memo," which the Trump administration rescinded in 2017. A coalition of business groups including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers filed a lawsuit in a Texas federal court claiming OSHA exceeded its authority. The 2024 rule's ultimate fate has been subject to ongoing litigation and the change in administration. Pursuant to the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 USC § 651 et seq.), all states with occupational safety and health “state plans” must maintain workplace inspection rights and procedures that are at least as effective as those provided under federal law. (29 USC § 667(c)(3).) California is a state with its own approved occupational safety and health state plan. The Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health (“Division”) is the agency responsible for administering and enforcing California’s state plan. California has adopted its own similar law. Labor Code Section 6314 provides that during an investigation by the Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH or Cal/OSHA, also referred to as “the Division”), a representative of the employer and a representative authorized by the employees shall have the opportunity to accompany the Division’s representative during the inspection of a workplace. Currently, there is no equivalent to 29 CFR § 1903.8 within Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations. To ensure that California’s state inspection process is as effective as the federal process, which the law requires, the DIR just issued a Notice of Proposed Title 8 regulation that defines who can be considered an authorized representative of employees and does so in such a way as to make the Division’s worksite inspections at least as effective as those of OSHA. The proposed rule will enhance the Division’s ability to conduct effective workplace inspections by permitting a broader array of experts to serve as employee representatives and to accompany the Division during the workplace inspection when they are needed. The proposed rule would mirror the federal rule and grant the Division the same ability as federal OSHA to rely on a broader array of employee representatives. And according to the Initial Statement of Reasons for the proposed regulations "Some employers refuse to consent to the Division’s inspection of their workplace. These denials may become even more common if the employer objects to the presence of the authorized representative of the employees. When an employer refuses access to the Division, the Division must seek a search warrant from the Superior Court. By codifying these rules, the Division will have stronger grounds for obtaining search warrants that allow for workplace access with the necessary representatives. Absent a rule that defines the representative authorized by employees, courts may be reluctant to issue a warrant which would permit the Division’s representative and third-party representative to access a workplace for purposes of conducting an inspection." A public hearing has been scheduled to give all interested persons the opportunity to present statements or arguments, oral or in writing, with respect to the proposed amendments, on April 1, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. Pacific Time (US and Canada). Participants may use a Zoom link to join the meeting ...

Bilhah Lopez worked for the City of Santa Ana beginning in 1998, initially part-time and later as a full-time public works dispatcher. In January 2021, Lopez notified the City she had COVID-19 and would be absent from work. She was hospitalized and provided disability certificates excusing her from work, with her leave extended through June 1, 2021. On June 1, 2021, the City contacted Lopez requesting either an updated doctor's note or her return to work, but she did not respond. On August 3, 2021, Lopez forwarded two work status forms to the City indicating she could return to work with specific accommodations, including no prolonged sitting or standing, and working in a low-stress environment with frequent breaks. The City responded requesting clarification from Lopez's doctor and sending her a supplemental medical questionnaire to complete. The City asked Lopez to return the completed questionnaire within 14 days. Despite this request and follow-up letters, Lopez never responded or returned the questionnaire. After receiving no response, the City sent Lopez a final letter stating that her extensive absence without approved leave was deemed a resignation, and she was separated from her position effective October 22, 2021. Lopez filed suit in September 2022, alleging six causes of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA): (1) disability discrimination, (2) failure to accommodate disability, (3) failure to engage in the interactive process, (4) age discrimination, (5) failure to prevent discrimination, and (6) retaliation. The City filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted, entering judgment in favor of the City in August 2024. The trial court found the City had met its initial burden of showing the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors - specifically, that Lopez had abandoned her employment. The court found Lopez failed to raise a triable issue of material fact showing her termination resulted from discrimination or pretext. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in its entirety in the unpublished case of Lopez v. City of Santa Ana -G064787 (February 2026). The appellate court concluded the City met its initial burden by presenting evidence that Lopez was terminated because she abandoned her job. Lopez failed to respond to any subsequent communications, including requests for a completed medical questionnaire. The court rejected each of Lopez's arguments for pretext. Lopez argued the City's risk management department already had her work status forms, but the court found she provided no evidence her doctor or workers' compensation attorney actually sent those documents to the City when issued. The court was not persuaded that the City's decision to contact Lopez directly, rather than through her workers' compensation attorney, supported an inference of pretext, citing California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 11069, subdivision (d)(4), which provides that direct communications are preferred but not required. The court held the interactive process and failure to accommodate claims failed because the evidence showed Lopez was responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process, citing Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 54. After receiving Lopez's work status forms, the City promptly sent a questionnaire requesting additional information from her doctor. Lopez failed to respond to the questionnaire or follow-up communications, and the court found no triable issue existed as to whether the City failed to act in good faith. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in its entirety, with the City to recover its costs on appeal. The City's request for sanctions was denied, citing Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 907, 919, which holds that sanctions cannot be sought in the respondent's brief ...

Proposition 103, passed by California voters in 1988, established a prior approval system for property and casualty insurance rates. This requires insurers to obtain approval from the California Insurance Commissioner before implementing rate changes. It includes mechanisms for public participation, notably through intervenors and formal hearings often conducted by the Administrative Hearing Bureau (AHB) within the California Department of Insurance (CDI). The intervenor process allows members of the public (typically consumer advocacy groups or representatives) to participate in rate review proceedings. This is authorized under Proposition 103 to ensure consumer interests are represented in rate-setting. This process promotes transparency and public oversight but has been debated, with some viewing it as delaying approvals or adding costs, while supporters see it as essential for consumer protection. Recent reforms (proposed in 2025 and amended in early 2026) aim to increase transparency, streamline procedures, clarify compensation standards (e.g., shifting from subjective "vexatious" to objective "wasteful" criteria), impose timelines, and enhance oversight. Consequently, the California Insurance Commissioner just released the amended text of proposed regulations, first proposed in 2025, to modernizing California’s intervenor and Administrative Hearing Bureau processes under Proposition 103 - reforms designed to increase transparency, improve efficiency, and ensure that every dollar in the rate review process serves the public interest. The amended text is now available for public comment. The amended text reflects months of stakeholder engagement and public input. Pursuant to state law, the amended text is now available for an additional 15-day public comment period. All changes are clearly identified, and supporting materials have been added to the rulemaking file to ensure full transparency. The updated regulations: - - Clarify prospective application so new rules apply moving forward, ensuring fairness and consistency in current ongoing proceedings. - - Replace the prior “vexatious” standard with an objective “wasteful” standard for fee determinations focusing on whether work advances the issues in a proceeding, rather than subjective intent. - - Strengthen scrutiny of excessive billing on a task-by-task basis. - - Increase public access to rate proceeding documents by requiring timely online posting of pleadings, hearing calendars, and decisions. - - Establish firm timelines and regular status updates from administrative law judges to reduce unnecessary delays. - - Clarify definitions and procedural rules to streamline hearings and reinforce the Commissioner’s authority under Prop. 103. These reforms are designed to uphold one of the core purposes of Prop. 103 – meaningful public participation – while ensuring that the process remains efficient, balanced, and focused squarely on consumer and ratepayer benefits. These reforms are part of the Commissioner Sustainable Insurance Strategy - what he claims is "the most comprehensive overhaul of California’s insurance regulations in over 30 years - aimed at stabilizing the market, expanding availability, and ensuring a modern, resilient insurance system that works for all Californians." ...

A federal jury convicted Joel Rufus French, 47, of Amory, Mississippi, the owner of a marketing company, and former NFL player, for his role in a yearslong scheme to bilk Medicare and the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs (CHAMPVA) out of nearly $200 million by selling patient information and sham doctors’ orders for orthotic braces that patients did not want or need. French had a brief and limited NFL career after a standout college tenure at Ole Miss.He signed as an undrafted free agent with the Seattle Seahawks in 1999. A knee injury sidelined him for the entire 2000 season, leading to his release from the team. He later signed with the Green Bay Packers in 2002 but never appeared in a regular-season game (likely on the practice squad or released without playing). According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, French worked with overseas call centers that pressured elderly Americans to provide their personal and health insurance information and agree to accept medically unnecessary orthotic braces. Some of the individuals who agreed to the braces suffered from Alzheimer’s and dementia. In certain instances, the call centers altered call recordings to make it seem like Medicare patients agreed to the braces when they did not. French paid sham telemedicine companies to obtain signed orders from doctors and nurse practitioners who never examined, and often never even spoke to, the patients. He sold the orders to marketers and medical supply companies, which then submitted claims to Medicare. French also defrauded Medicare and CHAMPVA, the health care program for spouses and children of veterans who have or had a permanent and total service-connected disability or who died from a service-connected condition, by billing the programs for orthotic braces through eight durable medical equipment supply companies that he owned and managed, using false documents to hide his connection to the companies from Medicare. The evidence at trial showed that French and his co-conspirators caused Medicare to be billed for braces for amputees for limbs they did not have and for deceased beneficiaries. Also during the conspiracy, French withdrew approximately $225,000 in cash from a bank in Mississippi, over $10,000 of which was placed in a bag and driven to Orlando to pay accomplices who sold him beneficiaries’ personal and insurance information. The jury convicted French of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and conspiracy to offer, pay, solicit, and receive kickbacks. French faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for conspiracy to commit health care fraud and wire fraud, 10 years in prison for conspiracy to commit money laundering, and five years in prison for conspiracy to defraud the United States. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors. A sentencing date has not been set. “This scheme built on sham operations exploited seniors and corrupted the federal health care system. By falsifying doctors’ orders and selling patient information, the defendant sought to turn Medicare into their own personal ATM machine,” said Acting Deputy Inspector General for Investigations Scott J. Lampert of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG). “HHS-OIG will stop and catch anyone who exploits vulnerable patients to bilk federal healthcare programs and hold them accountable to the full extent of the law.” This case was similar to Operation Brace Yourself, a major 2019 Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement action (also called the "Telemedicine and Durable Medical Equipment Takedown") that charged dozens of individuals across multiple states for schemes involving kickbacks, bribes, sham telemedicine consultations, and fraudulent billing to Medicare for medically unnecessary braces (like back, knee, shoulder, and wrist braces). It resulted in charges related to over $1.7 billion in false claims, with significant cost avoidance for Medicare in the following years. HHS-OIG, FBI, and VA-OIG investigated the case. Acting Assistant Chief Catherine Wagner and Trial Attorney William Hochul III of the Justice Department’s Fraud Section are prosecuting the case ...

The Workplace Overdose Reversal Kits (WORK) to Save Lives Act is a bipartisan, bicameral piece of U.S. legislation aimed at addressing opioid overdoses in workplace settings by improving access to overdose reversal medications like naloxone (commonly known as Narcan). It was most recently reintroduced on February 10, 2026. The bill directs the Secretary of Labor, through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), to issue non-mandatory guidance for private-sector employers on acquiring and maintaining opioid overdose reversal medications (such as naloxone kits). And offering voluntary annual training to employees on how to use such medications. The goal is to integrate overdose response into workplace emergency preparedness plans, similar to how workplaces prepare for fires, cardiac events, or other emergencies. It emphasizes that overdose incidents can happen anywhere, including on the job, and quick access to naloxone can be lifesaving while waiting for emergency services. Organizations like the National Safety Council (NSC) have publicly applauded the bill, noting rising workplace overdose deaths and the need for such tools. Other supporters, including overdose prevention advocates, highlight it as a practical, non-burdensome way to equip workplaces without imposing heavy new mandates on private employers (guidance is voluntary for them). The bill was first introduced in the 118th Congress (2023-2024). Even strong bipartisan bills like this one often fail to become law due to systemic factors in Congress, rather than outright opposition such as: - - Low Priority in a Crowded Agenda — Congress handles thousands of bills each session. Broader opioid crisis legislation (e.g., major funding packages, enforcement bills, or comprehensive reforms) often takes precedence over narrower, targeted measures like workplace-specific guidance. This bill is relatively modest (mostly non-mandatory guidance for private employers, with requirements only for federal agencies), so it doesn't generate the same urgency or media attention as bigger spending or regulatory fights. - - Committee Bottlenecks — Labor and workplace safety bills go through committees like Education and the Workforce (House) or HELP (Senate), which have heavy workloads. Without strong leadership push, a dedicated champion on the committee, or external pressure (e.g., a major incident spotlighting the issue), bills can sit without hearings. Reports note that the 2023 versions "neither advanced out of committee," which is a classic sign of this. - - No Major Opposition, But Also No Strong Momentum — There's little evidence of active resistance (e.g., from business groups or conservatives worried about mandates. But it hasn't built a groundswell of lobbying or public pressure to force movement. Bipartisanship helps avoid filibusters or veto threats, but it doesn't guarantee floor time. - - Congressional Dysfunction and Timing — The 118th Congress saw gridlock on many issues due to divided government, narrow majorities, debt ceiling fights, and other priorities. Bills introduced late in a session (like this one in fall 2023) often expire without action. Reintroductions in new Congresses reset the clock, which is why it's back now. In short, bipartisanship is a plus - it reduces partisan roadblocks - but it's not sufficient on its own. Many well-intentioned, low-controversy bills languish for years (or forever) unless they get attached to must-pass legislation, gain a powerful sponsor's priority, or ride a wave of public attention (e.g., a high-profile workplace overdose event). This one fits that pattern: sensible, supported, but not yet prioritized enough to move. Its recent reintroduction means there's still a window in the current session, especially with ongoing opioid crisis awareness ...

The U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has issued a letter of interpretation clarifying whether injuries resulting from the use of personal rechargeable lithium-ion batteries in the workplace should be recorded as work-related on the OSHA Forms 300, 301, and 300-A or equivalent forms. The letter addressed a scenario in which employees bring rechargeable lithium-ion batteries from home to the workplace for use in e-cigarettes, and that are not used in any equipment or device related to employee work duties. In this scenario, the battery terminals are unprotected and the employee or employees improperly carry these batteries in their pants pocket, a fire is sparked by the batteries, and that the fire results in employee injury. If a work-related injury caused by a lithium-ion battery meets one or more of the general recording criteria in Section 1904.7 of the Recording and Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses standard, it must be recorded on the OSHA logs. OSHA's Response: "No, section 1904.5(b)(3) of OSHA's recordkeeping regulation does not apply in this scenario, assuming that the employee was at your workplace during assigned work hours and present as a condition of employment." However the Notice of Interpretation letter addresses recordkeeping requirements and highlights the growing need for awareness of safety risks associated with lithium-ion batteries in workplace environments. These batteries can pose safety and health risks to workers during manufacturing, usage, emergency response, disposal, and recycling. Potential risks include fires, explosions, and exposure to harmful chemicals. Safety measures employers can take include implementing hazard controls during battery design and production; ensuring proper ventilation; storing batteries in cool, dry locations; monitoring storage areas for flammable and toxic gases; using designated recycling facilities for disposal; and providing safety showers and eyewash stations when handling battery materials. A Letter of Interpretation is OSHA's official response to questions about how its requirements apply to specific workplace situations or hazards. They cannot create additional employer obligations. Each letter constitutes OSHA's interpretation of the requirements discussed. These letters can help stakeholders understand how to comply with Federal OSHA standards, regulations, and section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in specific workplace situations. In June, the Department of Labor launched its opinion letter program, which expands the department's longstanding commitment to providing meaningful compliance assistance that helps workers, employers, and other stakeholders understand how federal labor laws apply in specific workplace situations. The public is encouraged to use the division's new opinion letters page to explore past guidance and submit new requests. The division will exercise discretion in determining whether and how it will respond to each request, which will focus primarily on attempting to address issues of broad-based concern. Learn more about OSHA and safety practices related to lithium-ion batteries. Note however that California is regulated by Cal/OSHA, which operates under an OSHA-approved state plan (approved in 1973). This means Cal/OSHA has primary authority to enforce occupational safety and health standards for both private-sector and public-sector (state and local government) workplaces in the state. Under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), state plans like California's must be "at least as effective" as federal OSHA standards. Federal OSHA standards serve as a floor (minimum baseline): Cal/OSHA must cover all the same issues addressed by federal standards and cannot be less protective. Cal/OSHA can (and often does) adopt more stringent or additional standards. California frequently issues rules that exceed federal requirements (e.g., stricter permissible exposure limits for chemicals, more comprehensive heat illness prevention, workplace violence prevention measures, or shorter injury reporting deadlines). In these cases, the more protective Cal/OSHA rule prevails for California employers. Employers in California must comply with a stricter Cal/OSHA provision if there is one. Federal OSHA does not preempt or override a state plan's more stringent rules once the plan is approved ...

The phrase "sitting is the new smoking" is a popular health slogan that highlights the serious health risks of prolonged sedentary behavior (especially sitting for extended periods), comparing them to the well-established dangers of smoking cigarettes. It emphasizes how modern lifestyles - desk jobs, screen time, commuting - lead to excessive sitting, which is linked to increased risks of obesity, type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease, certain cancers, metabolic issues, and even premature death, independent of regular exercise. The phrase is widely attributed to Dr. James A. Levine, an endocrinologist and professor of medicine formerly at the Mayo Clinic (now associated with initiatives like the Mayo Clinic-Arizona State University Obesity Solutions). He is credited with coining or popularizing it in the early 2010s as part of his research on non-exercise activity thermogenesis (NEAT) and the metabolic impacts of sedentary time. A key early mention appeared in a 2014 Los Angeles Times article titled "'Get Up!' or lose hours of your life every day, scientist says," where Levine is quoted saying things like: “Sitting is more dangerous than smoking, kills more people than HIV and is more treacherous than parachuting. We are sitting ourselves to death.” This tied into his book Get Up!: Why Your Chair Is Killing You and What You Can Do About It (published around that time). And perhaps concerns about the health hazards of excessive sitting influenced researchers to conduct a new study, published ahead of print in the Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. Researchers decided to explore how workplace design influences office workers' sitting behaviors, which are linked to health risks like cardiovascular disease and reduced productivity. The research draws on affordance theory and ecological models, emphasizing that environments can "invite" sitting or standing. Cluster analysis identified 7 office types. Workers stood longer in large shared offices with trash cans out of reach and few decorations. They stood shorter in small shared offices with screens/boards,but this was explained by lower worktime control in those offices. Individual features were studied. Longer standing took place in offices with two workstations compared to one, or additional chairs. Shorter sitting (quicker stand-ups) with trash cans or waste paper bins within arm's reach, and small under-desk cabinets. The study concluded that workplace design is associated with sitting patterns to some extent, but primarily indirectly - through the work tasks, goals, and collegial interactions it affords (e.g., focused desk work in offices promotes sitting; interactions in shared spaces encourage standing). Key principles: (1) Office designs as wholes may impact sitting differently than isolated features (per Gestalt theory); (2) Design influences sitting via enabled behaviors, not just physical cues. To reduce prolonged sitting (~70-80% of work time), designs should promote task variety and interactions (e.g., shared offices, out-of-reach bins to encourage movement). However, work characteristics like time control may be more influential than design alone. This supports holistic interventions combining environmental changes with behavioral strategies ...