Category: Daily News

In March 2017, Kelly Rose, a former employee of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., notified the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and Hobby Lobby that she intended to seek civil penalties under PAGA on behalf of herself, the State of California, and other hourly-paid individuals who were employed by Hobby Lobby in California as cashiers or who were assigned cashier duties. Rose’s claims were based on allegations that Hobby Lobby violated the so-called “suitable seating” provisions of Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 7-2001 by not providing seats for cashiers. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070, subds. 1, 14.)

After the statutory deadline for the LWDA to respond to the notice had passed, Rose filed a civil action against Hobby Lobby alleging two causes of action based on the facts and theories alleged in her PAGA notice. The litigation proceeded for several years, and eventually a bench trial was held that resulted in a judgment for Hobby Lobby on both causes of action.

In a separate appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. (Rose v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (March 25, 2025, A168301) [nonpub. opn.].) After judgment was entered, Hobby Lobby filed a memorandum of costs totaling $474,707.80.

The trial court issued an order inviting the LWDA, which had not participated in the litigation, to file an amicus brief addressing its liability for an award of costs to a prevailing defendant in a PAGA action. At the trial court’s direction, Hobby Lobby served the order on the LWDA, at which point the LWDA first learned of Hobby Lobby’s attempt to recover its costs. The LWDA then filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court granted.

The trial court concluded that the LWDA is responsible for costs incurred by defendants who prevail on PAGA claims, but struck certain cost items that Rose had challenged, resulting in an award of costs against the LWDA in the amount of $124,585.24. The LWDA timely appealed from the costs order. The trial court did not award Hobby Lobby any costs against Rose, and Rose is not a party to this appeal.

The LWDA appealed, raising an issue of first impression: Is the LWDA liable for the litigation costs incurred by a prevailing defendant in an action filed under PAGA?

The Court of Appeal concluded that costs are not recoverable against the LWDA where it did not participate in the litigation. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court costs order in the published case of Rose v. Hobby Lobby Stores CA1/2 – A169640 (May 2025).

In seeking costs from the LWDA, Hobby Lobby relied on Code of Civil Procedure §1032(b), the general cost-recovery statute, which provides that a prevailing party is entitled to recover its costs “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute,” and Code of Civil Procedure section 1028, which provides that when the State is a party to an action costs are “awarded against it on the same basis as against any other party.”

PAGA provides that “[a]ny employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs” (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (k)(1)), but says nothing about prevailing employers. Hobby Lobby argues that in view of the guidance provided by our Supreme Court in Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 989 for interpreting so-called “one-way” fee and cost shifting statutes like the one in PAGA, the Court of Appeal should conclude that PAGA does not contain an express exception to section 1032(b) and therefore as a prevailing defendant Hobby Lobby is entitled to recover its costs.

In Murillo, the Supreme Court construed a fee and cost shifting provision in the Song-Beverly Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq), California’s automobile “lemon law,” which expressly permits a prevailing plaintiff-buyer to recover costs and attorney fees but is silent with respect to a prevailing defendant-seller. Murillo held that silence does not create an express exception to section 1032(b); therefore, a prevailing defendant-seller in a case brought under the Song-Beverly Act is entitled to recover its costs under section 1032(b). (Id. at p. 991.)

The LWDA argues that legislative history shows that Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (k)(1) was intended to displace the general cost recovery rule of section 1032(b), and that Murillo, which concerns a consumer protection statute rather than a provision of the Labor Code, is inapposite.

Hobby Lobby argued unpersuasively that the LWDA was nevertheless a party to Rose’s action from its commencement because Rose filed her PAGA suit as the LWDA’s agent, and that under Civil Code section 2330 the LWDA, as principal, is responsible for the acts and liabilities of its agent.

“The LWDA did not sue Hobby Lobby. The LWDA was not a party to Rose’s lawsuit, nor did it take any action in the lawsuit until it moved to intervene, which it did only after it got word that Hobby Lobby sought to impose its costs on the LWDA. Accordingly, Hobby Lobby cannot recover its costs from the LWDA.”

“Because we conclude that the LWDA was not a party to Rose’s PAGA action, Code of Civil Procedure section 1028, which provides that when the State is a party costs are to be awarded against it on the same basis as against any other party, has no application here.”

“Hobby Lobby also argues that even if the LWDA was not a party to Rose’s PAGA action, it is liable for costs as the real party in interest. This argument is unpersuasive because Hobby Lobby cites no case in which litigation costs were imposed against a real party in interest that did not participate in the litigation.”

Community Health System and its affiliate Physician Network Advantage Inc. have agreed to pay $31.5 million to the United States to resolve allegations that they violated the False Claims Act based on financial benefits provided to referring physicians.  Community Health System operates in Fresno County and includes hospitals Community Regional Medical Center and Clovis Community Medical Center.

The civil settlement resolves allegations that Community Health System and Physician Network Advantage Inc. (PNA) provided several types of extravagant benefits to induce physicians in the Fresno area to refer their patients to Community facilities for medical services, in violation of the False Claims Act. PNA is a health care technology business formed and funded by Community to support Fresno-area physicians’ adoption of the electronic health records platform used by Community. The United States contends that PNA also played a key role in securing business for Community by unlawful means. In a custom-built lounge located on premises at PNA’s offices, known as HQ2, PNA provided expensive wine, liquor, cigars, and meals to referring physicians, with the knowledge and funding of Community.

The settlement also resolves allegations that Community and PNA provided financial subsidies for electronic health records technology and equipment used by certain physicians in their private offices in return for the referral of governmental health care program patients to Community. Further, the settlement resolves allegations that Community paid bonuses to certain physicians ostensibly for participation in clinical integration activities, when the real purpose of the bonuses was to reward referrals.

The United States contends that these financial benefits violated the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, resulting in false claims for the medical services referred by physicians receiving the benefits, that were submitted to governmental health care programs. The United States also contends that the conduct described above created financial relationships with referring physicians under the Physician Self-Referral Law (known as the “Stark Law”). The Stark Law seeks to safeguard the integrity of the Medicare program by prohibiting a hospital from billing for certain services referred by physicians with whom the hospital has a financial relationship, unless that relationship satisfies one of the law’s statutory or regulatory exceptions, which the United States contends were not met.

In connection with the settlement, Community entered into a five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement with HHS-OIG that requires, among other conditions, the implementation of a risk assessment and internal review process designed to identify and address evolving compliance risks. The Corporate Integrity Agreement also requires an independent review organization to annually assess the policies and systems to track arrangements with some referral sources.

The settlement includes the resolution of claims brought under the qui tam or whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act by relator Michael Terpening. Under those provisions, a private party can file an action on behalf of the United States and receive a portion of any recovery from that action. The qui tam case is captioned United States ex rel. Terpening v. Fresno Community Hospital and Medical Center, et al., 1:19-CV-01699 (E.D. Cal.). As part of the settlement announced today, Mr. Terpening will receive approximately $5 million.

The resolution obtained in this matter was the result of a coordinated effort between the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of California and HHS-OIG with assistance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General. Assistant U.S. Attorney David Thiess handled the case for the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

The claims resolved by this settlement are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.

Plaintiff Theresa Brooke is a woman with disabilities who uses a wheelchair. Along with her husband, she frequents California hotels to test their compliance with disability access laws. On one such testing trip in August 2023, Brooke and her husband visited the Ramada by Wyndham Burbank Airport, a hotel in Burbank, California. When they arrived, however, architectural barriers allegedly deterred Brooke from entering.

Brooke sued the hotel’s owner, Defendant Tsay JBR, LLC, asserting violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq. (West 2025).

The California The Unruh Act similarly creates a private right of action for people with disabilities, along with other enumerated groups, who are denied “full and equal” access to California businesses. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). As part of those protections, the Unruh Act provides that any violation of the ADA is also a violation of its provisions. See id. § 51(f).

Although private parties can obtain only injunctive relief under the ADA, they can recover actual and statutory damages under the Unruh Act. Id. § 52(a); see Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that the Unruh Act effectively creates a state-law “damages remedy that is not available under the ADA”).

Accordingly, Brooke sought injunctive relief under the ADA, statutory damages under the Unruh Act, and declaratory relief and attorney’s fees under both.

The district court granted in part and denied in part a motion for summary judgment brought by Brooke. The court concluded that Tsay JBR had violated the ADA because the hotel’s passenger loading zone – an area for vehicle pickup and drop-off – lacked an access aisle for disabled guests. As a remedy, the court ordered Tsay JBR to paint a blue access aisle in front of the loading zone.

Because Brooke established an ADA violation, she also necessarily established an Unruh Act violation. But not all Unruh Act violations automatically entitle a plaintiff to statutory damages. When a violation is construction-related, the Unruh Act only permits statutory damages if the plaintiff personally encountered the violation or was deterred by it. Id. § 55.56(a)–(b). The district court determined that Brooke had not established that fact on summary judgment.

With only that factual issue left, the court converted the scheduled jury trial to a bench trial, concluding that the jury- trial right did not attach to claims for statutory damages under section 52(a) of the Unruh Act.

Tsay JBR petitioned the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit for a writ of mandamus, asking it to direct the district court to conduct a jury trial on the issue of Brooke’s entitlement to statutory damages. The panel held that the Seventh Amendment entitles parties in federal court to a jury trial on a claim for statutory damages under § 52(a) of the Unruh Act in the published case of Tsay JBR LLC v United States District Court for the Central District of California – 24-5234 (May 2025).

The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in “[s]uits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” In this case the Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant in an action for statutory damages under section 52(a) of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act is entitled to a jury trial.

“So long as a case involves a legal claim, the right to a jury trial attaches, even if the case also seeks equitable relief. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.11 (1974) (“The [jury-trial] right cannot be abridged by characterizing the legal claim as ‘incidental’ to the equitable relief sought.”); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 n.8 (1962).”

“The statutory damages in section 52(a) of the Unruh Act are thus a legal remedy. Because both the historical analog and the nature of the remedy reveal that Brooke’s claim is legal, the Court of Appeals held that the Seventh Amendment entitles parties in federal court to a jury trial on a claim for statutory damages under section 52(a) of the Unruh Act.”

Stephen Hofer is a licensed attorney who founded Aerlex Law Group (the Group), which specializes in aviation law. In 2008, Hofer was the sole partner of the Group and hired Vicky Boladian as a part-time contract attorney. Hofer and Boladian dispute whether their professional relationship became a romantic relationship between 2011 and 2017.

In 2013, Hofer and Boladian formed Aerlex Tax Services, LLC (the tax LLC), which would provide “tax-related services” to the Group’s clients and “others within the aviation industry.” Hofer had a 55 percent equity interest in the tax LLC; Boladian, a 45 percent interest. In 2017 and 2018, Hofer and Boladian had a falling out, which resulted in litigation. In September 2020, they agreed to settle the pending litigation by executing three agreements: 1) Settlement Agreement, 2) Amended and Restated Operating Agreement for the tax LLC and 3) Amended and Restated Buy-Sell Agreement of the tax LLC. These agreements contained provisions to arbitrate disputes.

In March 2023, Boladian asked Hofer to change the business form of the tax LLC to an LLP to avoid the potential of having a limited liability company engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. In August 2023, Hofer and Boladian dissolved the tax LLC and shifted its assets to Aerlex Tax Services, LLP (the tax LLP)—with the same 55/45 percent split of ownership. Two weeks later, Boladian formed the Boladian Aviation Law Group, APC (BALG). She then withdrew from the tax LLP, removing what she represented to be 45 percent of the physical office furniture and nearly all of the tax LLP’s clients.

On September 19, 2023, Hofer sent Boladian a letter exploring a possible settlement before “commencing formal litigation” and asserting his “free[dom] to seek a judicial resolution” of their disputes. The parties discussed mediation, but could not agree on a mediator.

On October 16, 2023, Hofer, the Group, the tax LLC and the tax LLP (collectively, the Hofer plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit against Boladian and BALG. The Hofer plaintiffs alleged 13 causes of action and sought compensatory damages, injunctive and equitable relief, treble damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Although Hofer had, prior to filing the complaint, “agree[d] to file in arbitration” if Boladian consented to BALG participating in arbitration, the Hofer plaintiffs in the complaint nowhere mentioned arbitration under any of the three agreements and did not pray for an order compelling arbitration.

On October 31, 2023, the Hofer plaintiffs applied ex parte for a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking to prevent Boladian and BALG from performing any work for the clients of the tax LLP or the Group, from using any of the tax LLP’s employees, and from removing or using any tangible property or data taken from the tax LLP. Nowhere in the application did they mention arbitration under any of the agreements. The trial court denied the application

On November 16, 2023, the Hofer plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, trying to remedy the defects with their earlier TRO application. Once again, the Hofer plaintiffs argued their lawsuit had merit and nowhere mentioned arbitration.

In the midst of these motions, the Hofer plaintiffs inquired whether Boladian and BALG would “be seeking to move this case into arbitration”; counsel responded that they had “no plans” to do so and this communication shed no light on the Hofer plaintiffs’ intent to do so.

On December 8, 2024 (while the Hofer plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction was still pending), Boladian and BALG demurred to nine of the 13 causes of action. On January 29, 2024, the Hofer plaintiffs propounded a total of 734 discovery requests to Boladian and BALG. The Hofer plaintiffs also subpoenaed a number of third- party witnesses for depositions in February 2024. They also noticed the deposition of Boladian for March 2024.

In anticipation of the case management conference, the Hofer plaintiffs on March 14, 2024, filed a case management statement. In some respects, the Hofer plaintiffs’ case management statement acknowledged the possibility arbitrating the dispute. The Hofer plaintiffs also posted their jury fees.

On April 23, 2024, Boladian filed a cross-complaint against Hofer and the Group, alleging five causes of action. On April 26, 2024—more than six months after filing their complaint and more than four months after the denial of the preliminary injunction, but just three days after the filing of the cross-complaint – the Hofer plaintiffs filed a motion to compel arbitration, invoking the arbitration clauses in the settlement agreement, amended operating agreement, and amended buy-sell agreement.

The trial court denied the motion to arbitrate ruling that the Hofer plaintiffs had waived their right to compel arbitration. Applying the waiver standard articulated in St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, the court found “that [the Hofer plaintiffs] waived the right to arbitrate by filing suit in this court and substantially and vigorously litigating it for over seven months,” concluding that this conduct was “fundamentally incompatible with the expediency, efficiency, and cost- effectiveness associated with utilizing arbitration” and that this conduct “prejudiced” Boladian and BALG.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order in the published case of Hofer v. Boladian CA2/5 – B339542 (May 2025).

Under the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.) (the Act), a party with a contractual “right to compel arbitration” of a dispute may “waive[]” that right. (§ 1281.2, subd. (a).) In Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562 (Quach), – decided a month after the trial court’s ruling – the Supreme Court overruled the arbitration-specific definition of waiver embraced in St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187 (St. Agnes) in favor of the “generally applicable” definition of waiver. (Quach, at p. 578.)

St. Agnes’s arbitration-specific definition of waiver called upon trial courts to evaluate six different factors – namely, “‘“(1) whether the party’s actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether ‘the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked’ and the parties ‘were well into preparation of a lawsuit’ before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) ‘whether important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration] had taken place’; and (6) whether the delay ‘affected, misled or prejudiced’ the opposing party.”’” (Id. at p. 1196.)

“Quach applies retroactively to this direct appeal.” Quach held that a waiver occurs under the Act if, by clear and convincing evidence, it is shown that a party has “intentionally relinquished or abandoned” its known right to compel arbitration. (Id. at pp. 569, 584.)

“In this case, the litigants seeking to compel arbitration initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint in court and, while in the judicial forum, sought two forms of preliminary injunctive relief, opposed a demurrer, propounded more than 700 discovery requests, demanded a jury trial in their case management conference statement and represented they would be litigating substantive motions, and posted jury fees. It was not until the opposing party filed a cross-complaint that the litigants filed the motion to compel arbitration – more than six months into the litigation in court.”

The litigants’ conduct in this case constitute a waiver under Quach.

George Zeber filed a workers’ compensation claim for cumulative injury sustained during his employment with the New York Yankees from 1968 through 1978. Whether the New York Yankees had workers’ compensation coverage during this time was disputed by Travelers Indemnity Company.

After a three day trial, The WCJ found Zeber, while employed from June 1, 1968 through September 1, 1978 with the New York Yankees, sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The WCJ, however, deferred any finding of permanent disability, apportionment or attorney fees pending development of the medical record.

The WCJ also found the New York Yankees had coverage provided by an insurer, now administered by Travelers. In light of that finding, the WCJ noted that disputes between the parties involving a right of contribution under section 5500.5 must be sent to arbitration pursuant to section 5275, subdivision (a)(2).

Travelers filed a petition for reconsideration, arguing (1) the “New York Yankees failed to prove the existence of workers’ compensation coverage from the period of April 5, 1977 to September 1, 1978,” and (2) Zeber’s “[s]ubmitted medical reports were not substantial medical evidence.” Subsequently, the WCAB partially granted the petition for reconsideration. On September 13, 2022, it amended the WCJ’s decision to (1) “defer the issue of insurance coverage which is subject to mandatory arbitration”; and to “[a]mend the award to clarify that it is against Travelers.”

On October 28, 2022, Travelers filed its first Petition for Writ of Review with the Court of Appeal. The petition argued the WCAB erred in deferring the issue of insurance coverage to mandatory arbitration because mandatory arbitration under section 5275, subdivision (a) applies only to injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1994 and Zeber’s injuries occurred long before 1994. It further argued that the New York Yankees failed to satisfy their burden of proof at trial that the New York Yankees were insured during Zeber’s last injurious year.

The WCAB filed an informal letter responding to the petition. It stated that after further review of the administrative record, it concluded no award could be issued against Travelers until the deferred insurance coverage issues are finally adjudicated. The WCAB asserted “the issue of whether the insurance coverage in this case is subject to mandatory arbitration under . . . section 5275 has not yet been raised or adjudicated below.” It requested this court annul the decision and remand the matter for the WCAB to issue a corrected reward.

On February 9, 2023, the Court of Appeal issued an order vacating the WCAB’s decision and remanding the matter for further proceedings. At that time it declined to address any issue raised in the petition.

Following remand, on March 1, 2024, the WCAB issued an opinion and decision. It reinstated and affirmed its September 13, 2022 decision but rescinded and deleted the award pending further proceedings. The WCAB returned the matter “to the trial level for further proceedings, including but not limited to mandatory arbitration of insurance coverage . . . .” (Zeber v. New York Yankees (Mar. 1, 2024, ADJ10857121.)

On April 15, 2024, Travelers filed its second Petition for Writ of Review, arguing arguing section 5275, subdivision (a)(1) applies only to cases involving injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1994. Because Zeber admitted he sustained his cumulative injury no later than 1978, Travelers argues the insurance coverage dispute must be determined by a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ), and not by an arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal annulled the WCAB’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a finding of the date of injury for purposes of mandatory arbitration in the unpublished case of Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd. CA4/3 – G064030 (May, 2025).

The WCJ never made a finding on the date of injury for purposes of section 5275. The WCAB suggests the Court of Appeal annul the challenged decision and remand for further proceedings, including a finding of the date of injury for purposes of section 5275.

“Travelers’ argument is based on its request for judicial notice of a stipulation by the parties. We deny the request because we cannot consider evidence outside of the certified record. (See § 5951 [“No new or additional evidence shall be introduced in [the reviewing] court, but the cause shall be heard on the record of the appeals board, as certified to by it”].) Nevertheless, the certified record contains a copy of the stipulation, so we consider Travelers’ argument.”

“By using ‘date of injury’ as described in section 5275, subdivision (b), it can be inferred that the Legislature intended ‘date of injury’ to mean the same for section 5275, subdivision (a)(1). In sum, the ‘date of injury’ for purposes of mandatory arbitration in cases involving cumulative injury is the “date of injury” set forth in section 5412.”

“As the WCAB and Travelers both noted, the WCJ never made a finding of the “date of injury” under section 5412 for the purposes of section 5275, subdivision (a)(1). Rather, the WCJ discussed the “date of injury” for statute of limitations purposes only, and found that “without appropriate knowledge, the claim cannot be barred pursuant to [section] 5412.” Because the “date of injury” is a factual question and a prerequisite for mandatory arbitration, we conclude the WCAB acted in excess of its authority to send the insurance coverage dispute to mandatory arbitration.”