Jane Doe worked as a guest reception manager at The Maybourne Beverly Hills hotel from May 2015 until January 2024. In June 2020, she signed an arbitration agreement requiring that employment-related disputes be arbitrated under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
According to her complaint, after she disclosed her first pregnancy in October 2020, she heard comments that she could not keep working after having a baby, or remain a “career woman” once she had children. In November 2021, after returning from maternity leave, she applied for a director position but was never interviewed; the position was closed and later filled by a man. After a second maternity leave ended in May 2023, she was told there was no room for her to grow professionally. In December 2023, a regional director told her that her children would always be her first priority and suggested she stop seeking promotions or raises.
Doe alleges that the hotel’s human resources director then accused her, falsely, of having a sexual relationship with a coworker. She was suspended without pay and fired five days later. She contends the termination was retaliation for her requests for pay equity.
In March 2024, Doe sued Maybourne and related entities in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Her claims included hostile work environment harassment based on sex, gender, and pregnancy; sex discrimination and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Maybourne moved to compel arbitration. Doe opposed the motion, invoking the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), Pub. L. No. 117-90, 136 Stat. 26.
Judge Lynne M. Hobbs denied the motion as to Maybourne. The court concluded that Doe’s claims amounted to sexual harassment under California law, which covers harassment based on pregnancy and does not require sexual desire. Maybourne appealed the order denying arbitration.
In the published case of Doe v. The Maybourne Beverly Hills Operator, LLC, No. B341400 (November 2026), the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Seven, affirmed the trial court’s order denying Maybourne’s motion to compel arbitration. The court held that a “sexual harassment dispute” under the EFAA is not limited to sexual misconduct and can include a FEHA hostile work environment claim based on gender or pregnancy, even without any lascivious conduct. It further held that Doe’s complaint adequately alleged such a dispute, so the entire case may proceed in court. Justice Stone wrote the opinion, joined by Presiding Justice Martinez and Justice Feuer. Doe was awarded her costs on appeal.
The parties agreed the FAA governed the arbitration agreement. Section 2 of the FAA (9 U.S.C. § 2) makes arbitration agreements enforceable except as provided in “chapter 4,” which is the EFAA. Under 9 U.S.C. § 402, a predispute arbitration agreement is unenforceable, at the plaintiff’s election, in a case relating to a sexual assault or sexual harassment dispute. Reviewing that question of statutory interpretation de novo, the court noted that no California court had yet decided it.
The court began with the text. The EFAA defines a sexual harassment dispute as one relating to conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment “under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law” (9 U.S.C. § 401(4)). The statute therefore borrows the definition of sexual harassment from whatever law the plaintiff invokes. Because the text is clear, the court found no need to rely on legislative history or the #MeToo context in which Congress acted. Citing Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) 590 U.S. 644, the court observed that statutory text controls even when its drafters may not have anticipated a particular application.
Turning to California law, the court explained that FEHA prohibits harassment because of sex, which includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy. FEHA expressly provides that sexually harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire (Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C)), and “sex” and “gender” are used interchangeably. Courts have long recognized that hostility toward women, not sexual attraction, can drive a sexual harassment claim. A FEHA hostile work environment claim based on gender or pregnancy is therefore a sexual harassment dispute within the meaning of the EFAA.
The court next addressed what a plaintiff must plead to invoke the EFAA. Federal courts have split on the question, with standards ranging from the plausibility test of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662 to a more lenient “nonfrivolous” standard. A divided Ninth Circuit panel in Holland-Thielen v. SpaceX (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2026, No. 25-4811) recently adopted a looser standard under which the conduct need only be asserted, but the state court noted it is not bound by that decision. The court concluded that California’s own pleading rules do not apply, because the EFAA directs that federal law determines its applicability and because state rules could undermine uniform application of federal law. It ultimately found it unnecessary to choose a standard, because Doe’s complaint satisfies even the demanding Twombly/Iqbal test.
Doe alleged unwelcome comments based on her gender and pregnancy, a false accusation of sexual misconduct, and a broad pattern of excluding women from advancement. Relying on Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, the court explained that personnel decisions can themselves communicate a hostile message when they form a widespread pattern. Read together and in Doe’s favor, the allegations plausibly describe an objectively hostile work environment. The court cautioned that a trier of fact may ultimately find the conduct was not severe or pervasive, but that question does not prevent the claim from triggering the EFAA at this stage. Because the EFAA applies to the “case,” the denial of arbitration extends to all of Doe’s claims.