Category: Daily News

When a state safety regulator wants records to figure out whether a dead gig-economy worker was an employee at all, does it have to win that question first – in a separate lawsuit – before it can even ask? In this new published decision, the Court of Appeal says no. California’s workplace-safety agency can subpoena the records it needs to establish its own jurisdiction. But the court also reined in a trial-court order that had handed the agency everything it asked for, sending the case back to trim overbroad requests.

In this case Dino Park fell down a flight of stairs after making a delivery for Uber Eats on May 26, 2023, and died several days later from his injuries. The Los Angeles County Coroner’s Office notified the Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) of the death on June 7, 2023. Park’s widow had limited information but provided tax returns showing he had been paid by Uber Technologies, Inc. Cal/OSHA tried to arrange a meeting with Uber to discuss Park’s employment status and the circumstances of his death; Uber declined.

On September 5, 2023, the agency served Uber with an administrative subpoena under Government Code section 11181, subdivision (e), and Labor Code section 6314, subdivision (c), seeking 20 categories of records bearing on whether Park was an employee or independent contractor, the circumstances of his death, and records about other similarly situated drivers. Uber produced nothing, raising only objections: that the agency lacked jurisdiction because Park was an independent contractor under Proposition 22 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7448 et seq.); that it had no consent or inspection warrant; that the requests sought confidential business information, invaded third-party privacy, and were overbroad and irrelevant.

Cal/OSHA petitioned to compel compliance (Gov. Code, § 11187). While that petition was pending, the agency issued a citation to Uber under Labor Code section 6317—$5,000 for failing to immediately report the death and $1,350 for failing to maintain an effective injury and illness prevention program—which Uber did not appeal. After a June 2024 hearing, the trial court granted the petition and ordered Uber to produce all 20 categories of documents within 30 days, without limiting or modifying any request. Uber appealed, and  the Court of Appeal granted a writ of supersedeas staying the order pending the appeal.

In the published case of Division of Occupational Safety and Health v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. B340734 (June 2026), the Court of Appeal affirmed the order compelling production but reversed it to the extent it required production of all requested documents without limitation, and remanded for the trial court to reconsider the scope of the requests. In short: the agency’s power to subpoena was upheld at every turn, but the unbounded breadth of the order was not.

The court grounded its analysis in the California Supreme Court case of  Brovelli v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 524, which holds that an administrative subpoena is valid so long as it (1) inquires into matters the agency is authorized to investigate, (2) is not too indefinite, and (3) seeks information reasonably relevant to the inquiry – agencies may investigate, like a grand jury, on mere suspicion the law is being violated “or even just because it wants assurance that it is not” (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co. (1950) 338 U.S. 632).

But the order’s scope swept too far. The court found the record underdeveloped on the relevance of several requests, particularly Nos. 8 through 20, whose breadth was magnified by expansive definitions. The subpoena defined “DRIVER(S)” and “USER(S)” to include any “person” who uses Uber’s platform – language broad enough to reach customers – yet nothing explained how records about platform users or customers bore on Park’s employment status, the circumstances of his death, or Uber’s training and prevention practices.

On remand, the trial court must reconsider the scope of the requests under Brovelli and issue a new, appropriately tailored production order.

A data breach at an education-technology company gave the California Supreme Court its first occasion to define how far two privacy statutes reach. The decision is a split outcome: the company escapes these particular claims because the plaintiff did not adequately plead that it was a covered entity, but in getting there the Court rejected a defense-friendly rule that had governed medical-privacy breach cases for over a decade – holding that a plaintiff need not prove anyone “actually viewed” the stolen data.

Illuminate Education, Inc. is an education-technology company that maintains a nationwide platform storing K–12 student data – including medical information such as diagnoses and treatment plans – to help educators evaluate students, monitor progress, and build educational plans. It contracts with the Ventura County Office of Education, which serves plaintiff J.M.’s school district. J.M. provided his medical information to the district, which in turn passed it to Illuminate.

In January 2022, Illuminate discovered suspicious activity and later confirmed that databases containing student information had been subject to unauthorized access. It notified families in June 2022, stating there was no evidence of actual or attempted misuse. J.M. alleged he subsequently received solicitations at an address he had given only to Illuminate, plus odd calls about “phantom Amazon accounts.” Through his guardian ad litem, he brought a putative class action under two statutes: the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA; Civ. Code, § 56 et seq.) and the Customer Records Act (CRA; Civ. Code, § 1798.80 et seq.).

The Trial court sustained Illuminate’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding J.M. failed to adequately allege that Illuminate was a “provider of health care,” “contractor,” or “administrator” under the CMIA, failed to allege a qualifying “disclosure” or “release,” and could not sue under the CRA because Illuminate’s customer was the County Office of Education, not J.M.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Illuminate fell within both statutes, that J.M. had stated causes of action, and that denying leave to amend was an abuse of discretion. It treated students like J.M. as the “ultimate ‘customers,’ consumers, and beneficiaries” of Illuminate’s services and found a five-month notice delay supported the CRA claim.

The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded in the case of J.M. v. Illuminate Education, Inc, No. S286699 (May 2026) reaching three holdings. J.M. did not sufficiently allege that Illuminate is a “provider of health care” under section 56.06, so his Confidentiality of Medical Information Act claims fail. A plaintiff need not allege that medical information was actually viewed by an unauthorized party. Confidentiality is breached when information is exposed to a significant risk of unauthorized access or use. J.M. did not sufficiently allege that he is Illuminate’s “customer,” so his Customer Records Act claim fails. The Supreme Court left it to the lower courts to decide whether J.M. may amend his complaint in light of these holdings.

Section 56.06 of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act covers businesses that maintain medical information in order to make it available to an individual or health care provider upon request, for the purpose of letting the individual manage that information or for diagnosis and treatment. J.M.’s allegations described a tool for educators to assess and plan – not a service that lets individuals manage their own records or that supplies information to clinicians for diagnosis. The Court noted the Legislature has specified that school dyslexia screening is “a flag for potential risk,” not a diagnosis (Ed. Code, § 53008, subd. (l)). Legislative history confirmed the reading: the statute was built around services like MedicAlert and personal-health-record companies (e.g., WebMD-style tools that let consumers build and share their own records), which Illuminate is not. The Court stressed the statute is broad and technology-adaptive but still has limits – it does not sweep in any entity that stores medical information.

The Court took aim at a line of authority requiring proof that an unauthorized person actually viewed the data – Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549, Sutter Health v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1546, and Vigil v. Muir Medical Group IPA, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 197. Reading section 56.101 together with section 56.36, subdivision (b) – which allows $1,000 in nominal damages even when a plaintiff suffered no actual or threatened harm – the Court concluded liability turns on the entity’s negligent conduct, not on whether harm materialized.

An “actually viewed” rule would be nearly impossible to plead or prove (breach victims rarely know what a hacker did, and AI-driven cybercrime can misuse data without anyone reading it), and would gut a remedial statute that must be construed broadly (Pulliam v. HNL Automotive Inc. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 127). The proper test, the Court held, is whether information was exposed to a significant risk of unauthorized access or use – a flexible standard that distinguishes “smash-and-grab” hardware theft from data-targeted breaches and accounts for factors like the form, duration, and extent of the breach and any mitigation. Loss of possession is relevant but neither necessary nor automatically sufficient. The Court disapproved Regents, Sutter Health, and Vigil to the extent inconsistent.

The Customer Records Act (CRA) authorizes suit only by a “customer” – defined as someone who provides personal information to a business to purchase, lease, or obtain a service from that business (§ 1798.80, subd. (c)). The County Office of Education, not J.M., bought Illuminate’s services; J.M. sought educational services from his school district. The Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s “intended beneficiary” theory, noting the Legislature deliberately limited suit to an injured “customer” rather than any “consumer” or “individual” (Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 858), and observed that other laws (e.g., the California Consumer Privacy Act) offer broader avenues for residents.

California’s workers’ compensation fee schedules continue to hold the line on inflation for most scheduled medical services, but a new California Workers’ Compensation Institute (CWCI) study finds that a growing share of treatment rendered to injured workers in the state is billed under unlisted codes that fall outside fee schedule pricing controls, creating a new and increasingly important source of medical cost growth.

The new CWCI study, the second in a series on workers’ comp medical inflation, uses data from the Institute’s Industry Research Information System (IRIS) database to examine medical payments from 2017 through 2024. The results show that while professional services and facility fees consistently accounted for about 70% of all California workers’ comp medical spending, the strongest inflationary pressures came from professional services billed under codes that are not listed in the state’s Official Medical Fee Schedule (OMFS), where prices often grew far faster than applicable fee schedule benchmarks. Among the key findings:

– – The average payment per professional service transaction increased 33.2% between 2017 and 2024, exceeding the 25.9% growth in the Medicare Economic Index (MEI).
– – Total reimbursements for unlisted professional service codes more than doubled during the 8-year study period, as average payments rose 106.7%, while their share of professional service payments increased from 5.6% to 14.4%.
– – A single code, 97799 (unlisted physical medicine and rehabilitation), accounted for nearly half of all unlisted professional service payments in 2024, with an average payment of $1,663 per transaction.
– – Unlisted codes for durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) increased from 41.9% of DMEPOS payments in 2017 to 50.1% in 2024, surpassing scheduled DMEPOS codes for the first time.
– – Medical-legal costs surged following the 2021 Medical-Legal Fee Schedule revision, with average payments increasing 35.1% above 2017 levels by the first full year of implementation.
– – Medical interpreter expenses were driven primarily by utilization rather than price, as the percentage of claims involving interpreter services nearly tripled between 2017 and 2024.
– – Pharmacy was the only major medical category to show sustained spending declines, largely due to reduced utilization following adoption of the MTUS Drug Formulary and opioid prescribing reforms.
– – Inpatient hospital utilization continued a long-term decline as inpatient discharges fell 33.8% from 2017 to 2024.

The analysis noted that the scheduled professional services generally behaved as intended under the OMFS, with price growth closely tracking established inflation benchmarks. In contrast, the unlisted professional service codes experienced substantially higher price growth and increased utilization, while in DMEPOS, the growing use of unlisted codes was the key cost driver. Thus, the report concludes that while the OMFS remains effective at controlling payments for scheduled services, its influence is diminishing as more treatment is billed under unlisted codes. Given the growing use of multidisciplinary pain programs, platelet-rich plasma injections, specialized medical equipment, and other unlisted medical services, policymakers and system stakeholders are likely to face growing pressure to address the widening gap between fee schedule-governed and market-rate pricing.

CWCI has issued its study, Medical Inflation and Cost Drivers in California Workers’ Compensation as a Report to the Industry, available free to CWCI members and subscribers. Others may purchase a copy for $23 by calling 510-251-9470.

One Year In: Public Views of a Changing Public Health Landscape is a national poll by Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and the de Beaumont Foundation’s Public Health Listening Lab. The poll was conducted March 19 – April 1, 2026, among a probability-based, nationally representative sample of 2205 U.S. adults ages 18 and older, to better understand people’s views about the changing public health landscape one year into the new federal administration.

It was fielded online and via telephone (cell phone and landline) by SSRS, an independent research company. This survey is nationally representative of U.S. adults. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish, March 19 – April 1, 2026, among a sample of 2205 adults ages 18 or older in the United States. Republicans include adults who lean Republican, Democrats include adults who lean Democrat, and Independents includes adults who identify as “other” or are unaffiliated. The margin of error at the 95% confidence interval is +/- 2.0 percentage points.

For decades, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was one of the most trusted institutions in American life. Trust in the CDC remained relatively stable in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, hovering around 75% from 2022 to 2025. These new national poll findings show concerning declines in the American public’s trust in federal health agencies one year into the new federal administration. One year into new leadership of the U.S. public health system, trust in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other federal health institutions has dropped dramatically. Only 50% of the public says they now trust health recommendations from the CDC, compared to 77% in spring 2025.

This decline in trust is driven by deep partisan divides. From 2025 to 2026, trust in CDC health recommendations has fallen from 92% to 34% among Democrats and from 77% to 47% among Independents, (92% to 34%) and 30 percentage points among Independents (77% to 47%), while trust among Republicans has increased very slightly from 63% to 67%.

The steep drop in public trust also translates to losses in trust across many demographic groups. Trust in the CDC has fallen more than 30 percentage points among women (80% to 48%); Black and Hispanic adults (77% to 43% and 81% to 50% respectively); those living in urban areas (80% to 48%); and those with a college degree (80% to 46%).

When examining public trust across prominent leaders and groups, the top trusted sources for health recommendations in 2026 are clinicians – nurses (89%), doctors (88%), and pharmacists (85%) – followed by friends and family (81%), nonprofit health and healthcare groups (79% – 80%), and researchers (78%).

State and local public health agencies are now substantially more trusted than the CDC. Trust in state and local public health agencies has also fallen in the last year, but not by as much. A majority of the public still trusts health recommendations from their local (70%) and state (66%) public health agencies.

A slim majority disapproves of federal public health agency actions in the past year, with a high level of concern about the influence of leaders’ personal beliefs, misplaced priorities, and budget cuts. With 55% public disapproval of federal health agencies’ actions in the past year, top concerns about their actions under new leadership include wide agreement that their recommendations have been influenced too much by leaders’ personal beliefs (68%), leaders are focused on the wrong priorities (66%), and programs have been cut or scaled back too much (61%).

Public support for routine childhood vaccination policies remains strong, though a substantial minority supports reductions to the routine vaccine schedule. More than three-quarters (77%) of the public – including majorities across party lines – say that parents should be required to vaccinate their children in order to attend school. A majority (58%) also oppose reducing the childhood vaccine schedule, which forms the basis of childhood vaccine requirements, but there is substantial minority support (42%) for this change.

Views of vaccine safety have dropped closer to pre-COVID-19 levels. As another indication that support for vaccines may be softening, the fraction of the public saying childhood vaccines are “very safe” has dipped from 63% in 2025 to 57% in 2026, trending back to pre-pandemic levels (54% in 2019) from a high of 70% during COVID-19 (2022).

A majority of the public supports federal changes to the Dietary Guidelines for Americans, with higher support for individual recommendations on less sugar and more protein. Six in ten (60%) support the recent changes to the food pyramid and dietary guidelines, and even stronger majorities support specific measures, like recommendations to avoid or sharply limit sugar and highly-processed food (90%) and to increase protein intake (85%). A much smaller majority (62%) supports recommendations to increase beef and whole milk consumption.

Support is bipartisan for limiting sugar and highly-processed food (Republicans: 94%, Democrats: 89%) and for increasing protein intake (Republicans: 92%, Democrats: 79%).

However, there is more division when considering overall support for changes, with 83% of Republicans saying they support the overall changes, compared to only 37% of Democrats. Support for recommendations to increase beef and whole milk consumption is also divided, with 80% support among Republicans and 44% support among Democrats.

Kenneth Doss worked for Tesla, Inc. at the company’s Fremont distribution center, first as a materials handler and then as a “yard hostler.” Yard hostlers drive tractor trucks to move, position, and park 53-foot trailers around Tesla’s factory grounds. The trailers contained auto parts — including, by Doss’s account, battery parts shipped in from Nevada — that had arrived from out of state and would be unloaded into a warehouse and eventually used to assemble Tesla vehicles. Doss never crossed state lines or physically left the factory grounds; his job was to reposition the still-loaded trailers from the parking and docking area to the warehouse dock so the parts could be unloaded.

Doss filed a putative class action against Tesla in Alameda County Superior Court, alleging eight causes of action for wage-and-hour violations under the Labor Code and the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), covering unpaid wages, overtime, meal and rest periods, wage statements, final-pay timing, and business-expense reimbursement. When he was hired, Doss had electronically signed an offer letter containing an arbitration provision with both a class action waiver and a clause stripping the arbitrator of authority to consolidate employee claims or award class-wide relief. Tesla moved to compel individual arbitration.

The central legal question was whether the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governed the agreement. The FAA exempts from its coverage the employment contracts of transportation workers “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” (9 U.S.C. § 1). If that exemption applied, the FAA would not preempt California law that could defeat or limit arbitration.

The trial court denied Tesla’s motion to compel arbitration in its entirety. The court found that (1) the yard hostlers were transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce, so the arbitration agreement was exempt from the FAA under section 1 — reasoning that “the flow of commerce does not stop at the loading dock door”; (2) Labor Code section 229 (which lets courts disregard arbitration agreements in certain wage actions) rendered the agreement ineffective as to seven of Doss’s eight causes of action; (3) the class waiver was invalid under the four-factor test of Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 443 (2007); and (4) severance of the class waiver was inappropriate because the agreement was tainted with illegality.

The Court of Appeal issued a mixed disposition: affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in the partially published case of Doss v. Tesla, Inc., No. A173210 (June, 2026). It affirmed the core holding that Doss and the putative class are exempt from the FAA under section 1. It reversed the trial court’s application of Labor Code section 229 to four of the causes of action, and it found legal error in the trial court’s severance analysis, remanding for the trial court to decide unconscionability issues it had not yet reached. The court affirmed the trial court’s Gentry ruling in the unpublished portion of the opinion.

The FAA section 1 exemption (affirmed — published). Reviewing the legal question de novo, the court held the yard hostlers are exempt “transportation workers.” Drawing on Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), and Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022), the court explained that the inquiry focuses on the actual work performed, that a worker need not be in the transportation industry (Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U.S. 246 (2024)) and need not personally cross state lines. Saxon held that loading and unloading cargo from vehicles in interstate transit is activity within the flow of commerce; the Ninth Circuit extended that logic to a warehouse worker in Ortiz v. Randstad Inhouse Services, LLC, 95 F.4th 1152 (9th Cir. 2024). The court placed the yard hostlers along this continuum: because their handling of the trailers was “a necessary step” in completing the interstate journey of the auto parts, they fell within the exemption.

Labor Code section 229 (reversed in part — published). Section 229 applies only to actions “for the collection of due and unpaid wages” arising from Labor Code sections 200–244. Applying Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC, 224 Cal. App. 4th 676 (2014), and Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc., 53 Cal. 4th 1244 (2012), the court held that Doss’s second (overtime), third (meal periods), fourth (rest periods), and fifth (wage statements) causes of action are not collection-of-wages actions within section 229 — the second and third because they arise outside sections 200–244, and the fourth and fifth because their underlying legal violation is the denial of breaks or accurate statements, not the nonpayment of wages. The court rejected Doss’s argument that Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc., 13 Cal. 5th 93 (2022), superseded Lane, reading Naranjo to reaffirm that characterization turns on the nature of the violation, not the remedy. But the court affirmed application of section 229 to the first (unpaid wages) and sixth (final pay under sections 201–203) causes of action, plus the derivative UCL claim — disagreeing with Lane to the extent it suggested a section 203 waiting-time-penalty claim falls outside section 229, and aligning with Villalobos v. Maersk, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 5th 1170 (2025).

The Gentry factors (affirmed — unpublished). Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the court upheld the finding that the class waiver was invalid. Counsel’s declaration adequately supported a modest individual recovery (~$25,000), consistent with figures accepted in Garrido v. Air Liquide Industrial U.S. LP, 241 Cal. App. 4th 833 (2015), and Betancourt v. Transportation Brokerage Specialists, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 5th 552 (2021). The court found the trial court could reasonably infer real-world obstacles to individual arbitration, and noted that not all four Gentry factors must point the same way to support invalidation.

Severance (reversed for legal error; remanded — unpublished). The court agreed with Tesla that the trial court’s refusal to sever was based on legal error. Under Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc., 16 Cal. 5th 478 (2024), severance is the strongly preferred course unless the agreement is “permeated” by unconscionability. The trial court wrongly treated the presence of a class waiver as itself evidence of a systematic effort to disadvantage employees, contrary to Gentry, which says severance is “particularly appropriate” for class-waiver provisions. Because Doss had argued other provisions were substantively unconscionable and the trial court never ruled on them, the appellate court remanded for the trial court to decide those unconscionability issues in the first instance.