John McInerney had a series of drug convictions in 2005 and 2007, including felony possession for sale, and served a two-year prison term after the 2007 conviction. In fall 2020, at age 65, he enrolled as a student at UCLA. In September 2021 he applied for an office assistant job in UCLA’s Graduate Student Resource Center, a student-facing clerical position that involved greeting visitors, answering inquiries, and staffing events. He received a conditional offer on October 5, 2021, and worked about 23.5 hours before he was taken off the schedule pending completion of his criminal background check.
While the check was pending, McInerney sent a series of angry emails to UCLA staff objecting to the use of his old convictions. Among other things, he described an HR employee as a “witch hunter,” and said he would seek legal help or contact a state agency.
UCLA received the background results on January 4, 2022. On January 5, HR sent him a pre-adverse action letter giving him five business days to respond with evidence of rehabilitation or mitigating circumstances, as California’s Fair Chance Act (Gov. Code, § 12952) requires. McInerney submitted no rehabilitation evidence. But on January 7, 2022—before the five-business-day window had closed—UCLA notified him that he was ineligible for the job. UCLA’s witnesses later testified that the main reasons were his failure to respond substantively to the letter and his unprofessional, alarming emails.
McInerney sued the Regents, alleging a Fair Chance Act violation, retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h)), and failure to prevent retaliation (§ 12940, subd. (k)). He later dismissed an age discrimination claim.
The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted summary adjudication for UCLA on the retaliation and failure-to-prevent claims, finding no protected activity and no causal link. It also ruled that UCLA had performed the individualized assessment the Fair Chance Act requires, and had complied with the statute in every respect except one: it did not give McInerney the full five business days to respond. The court ruled that McInerney still had to show that this violation harmed him, meaning it cost him the job.
That question went to a jury. By special verdict, the jury found that UCLA’s decision was not based solely on McInerney’s criminal history, and that his criminal history was not a substantial factor in the decision. UCLA did not prove that McInerney would have failed to submit rehabilitation evidence had he received the full five days. But the jury found that UCLA would have made the same decision even if he had submitted that evidence. Judgment was entered for the Regents, and McInerney appealed.
In the published case of McInerney v. Regents of the University of California, No. B339467 (September 2026), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the judgment in favor of the Regents. The opinion was filed September 18, 2026, as unpublished. On October 13, 2026, the court ordered it certified for publication, with no change in the judgment, so it is now citable precedent.
No damages without harm. The central holding is that an applicant who proves an employer violated a Fair Chance Act procedure must also prove that the violation caused him harm. The court applied the general rule that a plaintiff suing over a statutory violation must show injury, and noted that when the Legislature wants to allow recovery without proof of actual harm it says so expressly, as it did with statutory damages in Civil Code § 1786.50 for investigative consumer reports. The Fair Chance Act contains no such provision. The court rejected McInerney’s argument that he was entitled to at least nominal damages. It found Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570 inapposite because it did not address nominal damages or whether harm is required. It also found Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021) 592 U.S. 279 inapplicable, because that case concerns federal Article III standing rather than the elements of a state statutory claim, and McInerney raised it for the first time in his reply brief. Because the jury found UCLA would have reached the same decision regardless, McInerney could not show the shortened response window cost him the job.
The court agreed that UCLA performed the required individualized assessment. Testimony from UCLA’s HR staff, its written policy, and contemporaneous emails showed the assessment took place, and McInerney’s points about an incomplete form, blank checkboxes, and the timing of a job-description request did not create a triable issue. The court stressed that the statute mandates a process, not a particular hiring outcome, and declined to second-guess UCLA’s judgment about how his convictions related to the job. It also rejected his reliance on a seven-year rebuttable presumption in a former Civil Rights Council regulation (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11017.1, former subd. (g)(2)), holding that the presumption applied only to disparate impact claims. The statute itself has no seven-year limit, and the court noted that the Legislature removed such a limit before enacting the law.
The court held McInerney did not engage in protected activity. FEHA and the Fair Chance Act both permit employers to consider conviction history after a conditional offer, so objecting to UCLA’s reliance on a 14-year-old conviction was not opposing an unlawful practice, and no reasonable person could have believed it was. His emails did not complain that UCLA was violating the background-check procedures. Drawing on federal Title VII decisions, the court also held that his insulting, hostile emails went beyond the kind of reasonable opposition the law protects, and it found National Labor Relations Board authorities unpersuasive. UCLA had told him he was free to seek outside help, and there was no evidence his threats of legal action played a role. In any event, UCLA’s legitimate reasons—his failure to respond substantively and his unprofessional conduct—defeated any inference of causation from timing alone. Without an underlying retaliation violation, the failure-to-prevent claim also failed.