Justin W. Webster was a San Francisco police officer who was injured in the course of his employment. After a full evidentiary hearing, the administrative law judge denied Mr. Webster’s application for Industrial Disability Retirement (IDR). The administrative law judge found the retirement system’s medical expert more persuasive than Mr. Webster’s medical expert. Specifically, the administrative law judge found Mr. Webster’s medical expert did not rely on “objective evidence.” After the decision, Mr. Webster filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate.
Additionally, Mr. Webster sought to return to work as a police officer. Before Mr. Webster could return to work, he was required to complete a medical examination. After completing this examination, the medical doctor found Mr. Webster was “not fit for duty.”
In a companion workers’ compensation case, another medical doctor found Mr. Webster was not capable of performing his job duties. Mr. Webster filed a second IDR application. The retirement system declined to process his second IDR application.
The superior court granted in part Mr. Webster’s petition for writ of mandate, setting aside the denial of his IDR application. The court rejected the retirement system’s argument that Mr. Webster had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. The court ruled that requesting a rehearing based upon the same facts and law would have been futile. Finally, the court, relying on the two new medical reports, remanded the case for reconsideration.
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court in the unpublished case of Webster v. S.F. Employees’ Retirement System -A168995 (September 2024).
San Francisco Employees’ Retirement System appeals from the superior court order setting aside an administrative agency’s denial of respondent’s Industrial Disability Retirement (IDR) application and remanding the case to be reconsidered in light of new evidence pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (e). It argues the superior court erred in finding that respondent’s writ was not barred by failing to exhaust all administrative remedies and admitting two new medical reports.
“While it is true the superior court did not reverse or affirm the agency’s decision, the court decided all issues presented to it. The court set aside the agency’s decision denying respondent’s IDR application. Under section 1094.5, the court exercised its discretion to consider the two new medical reports and remand the case back to the agency to reconsider its decision in light of the new evidence. At that point there was nothing left for the superior court to do. Moreover, dismissing the appeal now could moot the issue of whether respondent had exhausted all administrative remedies before he sought a petition of writ of administrative mandate. We therefore conclude the challenged order is appealable.”
“Because the two additional medical reports were not available within 30 days after the hearing officer’s decision had been served, both sides appear to agree the only basis respondent had for requesting a new hearing was ‘that the evidence did not justify the decision.’ “
“Here, the applicable charter section designates the review hearing as permissive not mandatory. Respondent had no new evidence or legal arguments to present at a review hearing where the same judicial officer would be presiding. Requesting a duplicative hearing on the same facts and law would have been meaningless, costly, and inefficient.“
Appellant also contends the superior court erred by admitting two additional medical reports and remanding the matter back to the agency to consider the new reports.
When the Legislature granted the superior court the discretion to receive “relevant evidence which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been produced at the administrative hearing,” it reasonably may be inferred that it meant to authorize the receipt of evidence of events which took place after the administrative hearing. (Curtis v. Board of Retirement (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 293, 299 (Curtis).)
“Here, the court did not err by considering the two medical reports that were prepared after the hearing. Moreover, section 1094.5 gives the court the option to remand the case in light of the new evidence or admit the evidence and proceed with the court’s independent review.”
“Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the court here merely considered the new medical reports in deciding to remand the matter back to the agency; the court did not admit the medical reports into the record.”
“The superior court made a reasonable determination that the new evidence was sufficient to require the agency to reconsider its decision. Indeed, it is preferred ” ‘that the administrative agency should have the first opportunity to decide the case on the basis of all the evidence’ ” and that the better practice is to remand the action in light of the new evidence.
