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Michael Sargent worked as a City of Gardena police officer for about 20 years beginning in 2002. As president of the Gardena Police Officers’ Association, he came to know city manager Clint Osorio. Sargent alleged that after his March 2021 promotion to lieutenant, Osorio began asking him for improper favors, including running vehicle VIN numbers and helping speed up a concealed carry weapons license. Sargent declined.

In November 2021, Sargent filed a workers’ compensation stress claim and was placed off work with an industrial injury. While on leave, he learned he would likely have permanent restrictions and would not return to duty. He told Osorio that he had Parkinson’s disease and that City Resolution No. 6475 would shut him out of “Tier 1” employer-paid retiree health coverage. That resolution, effective August 2020, gives paid retiree health benefits only to employees who are at least 50 years old and elect a service retirement with at least 15 years of service. Employees who retire on industrial disability without meeting those minimums may stay in the City’s group health plan, but at their own cost.

Sargent alleged that he and Osorio reached a verbal agreement in early 2022 to amend the resolution or otherwise get him paid benefits, and he sent Osorio proposed amendments in January 2022. Around the same time, Osorio again raised the concealed carry license, and Sargent reported that to the police chief. In July 2022, Osorio texted Sargent that he was disappointed Sargent had told the chief, then blocked Sargent’s number and stopped pursuing the amendment. Sargent took an industrial disability retirement in October 2022, before turning 50, and received no Tier 1 benefits.

Sargent sued the City and Osorio under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12940), alleging age and disability discrimination under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, disability harassment, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination. He claimed the resolution targeted officers aged 40 to 49 and disabled retirees, and that Osorio used his age and disability as leverage when he refused to do personal favors.

The Los Angeles County Superior Court sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend. The court reasoned that the resolution actually favors older employees, that its plain language does not exclude disabled employees from Tier 1 benefits, and that none of Osorio’s alleged conduct was based on age or disability. It also found no facts showing protected activity or a causal link for the retaliation claim, and dismissed the failure-to-prevent claim because no underlying discrimination or harassment had been pleaded. Sargent appealed from the resulting judgment.

In the unpublished case of Sargent v. City of Gardena, No. B347293 (October 2026), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, affirmed the judgment entered after the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. The opinion, filed October 12, 2026, is not certified for publication, so under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115 it generally may not be cited or relied on by courts or parties in other actions.

Age discrimination. FEHA protects workers who have reached age 40 (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (b)). Sargent argued that this text plainly lets any worker over 40 sue when an employer favors workers 50 and older. The court disagreed, reading the statute in light of its purpose of protecting older workers from stereotyping, and noting that the California Supreme Court in Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317 framed age bias in terms of favoring significantly younger workers. Sargent cited no California authority recognizing the reverse claim. The panel found persuasive General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline (2004) 540 U.S. 581, where the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a nearly identical challenge to the elimination of retiree health benefits for everyone except workers 50 and over, holding that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (see 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)) bars only discrimination preferring young to old. Because FEHA and the ADEA share the same objective, and because Sargent offered no reasoned textual or legislative-history argument for departing from Cline (or for following other states’ differently worded statutes), the court followed Cline. In a footnote, it observed that accepting Sargent’s theory would undermine traditional retirement plans with minimum-age requirements. His age-based disparate impact claim failed for the same reason, and he forfeited his disability-based disparate impact claim by never arguing it.

Disability discrimination and the resolution. The court held the resolution does not treat employees differently because of disability. Eligibility for paid Tier 1 benefits turns on age and years of service; had Sargent been 50 with 15 years of service, he would have qualified even if he retired for disability-related reasons. The court agreed with the trial court’s reliance on Brown v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2008) 521 F.3d 1238, which held that separate service and disability pension programs need not provide identical benefits. Sargent never alleged that he received less than a similarly situated non-disabled employee who retired before 50. If anything, the resolution gives disability retirees under 50 something non-disabled early retirees do not get: the option of continued, self-paid group coverage.

Disability discrimination based on Osorio’s conduct. The court accepted that Sargent adequately alleged a disability, given his stress-related condition and Parkinson’s diagnosis. But even assuming an adverse action and that he was qualified, he pleaded no facts suggesting discriminatory motive. Relying on Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092, the panel explained that Sargent’s own allegations attributed Osorio’s change of heart to Sargent’s refusal to do personal favors, not to bias against him as a disabled person. Osorio’s knowledge of the disability, standing alone, does not support an inference of discriminatory intent, and FEHA is not a remedy for harsh or unfair treatment as such.