In 2022, Kevin Wrenne was a crew member at a Taco Bell at 1220 Market Street in Redding, operated by J.A. Sutherland, Inc. and Andrew Hennan, Sr. Nielsen Motor Co. owned the property and leased it to the franchisee. On the evening of March 28, 2022, Wrenne clocked out for a 30-minute unpaid meal break, walked to the restaurant’s parking lot, and sat down on the curb. A transient named Brent Close approached and stabbed him five times in the neck and chest. Wrenne died; Close was arrested and convicted of murder.

In March 2024, Wrenne’s parents and his estate sued J.A. Sutherland, Nielsen Motor Co., Taco Bell Corp., and Hennan, pleading two causes of action, premises liability (dangerous and defective condition of property) and negligence. The theory was that the attack was foreseeable and preventable: the restaurant sat in a high-crime area, and defendants allegedly failed to provide adequate lighting, security guards, surveillance cameras, and safe resting areas for staff. The complaint alleged more than 1,000 calls for service to the Redding Police Department over the prior decade, including 282 in the preceding three years, 99 of them placed by Taco Bell employees.

The defendants demurred. J.A. Sutherland and Hennan argued the claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation system because Wrenne was killed on his employer’s premises during the course and scope of his employment; Taco Bell Corp. and Taco Bell Franchisor, LLC filed a parallel demurrer on the same ground. Both leaned on the “premises line rule.” After the court struck the punitive damages allegations against Nielsen Motor and plaintiffs declined to amend, the demurrers were refiled and opposed.

In October 2024, the trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. It found the case factually analogous to Jones v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 502, where a university employee’s tort claims were barred after she was injured on campus shortly after leaving her workstation. Like the plaintiff in Jones, the court reasoned, Wrenne had begun his workday, remained on his employer’s premises without leaving, and was uncompensated when the incident occurred. The exclusivity rule therefore barred the tort claims, and judgment was entered for defendants.

The Court of Appeal Affirmed in the unpublished case of Wrenne v. JA Sutherland, Inc. -C102531 (June 2026) Reviewing the demurrer ruling de novo, the Court of Appeal “saw no error” and upheld dismissal of the entire complaint. It also affirmed the denial of leave to amend, and awarded respondents their costs on appeal.

The injury was work-related. Under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.), workers’ compensation is the sole remedy for injuries – including death – “arising out of and in the course of” employment. The court emphasized the Act’s unusually forgiving causation standard: employment need only be a contributing cause, not the sole one. Because Wrenne would not have been in the parking lot but for his shift at Taco Bell, his death was causally linked to the employment.

The claims were derivative. Drawing on Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 993, the court explained that a third party’s claim – such as an heir’s wrongful death action – is barred when it is “collateral to or derivative of” the employee’s workplace injury. The family’s claims derived directly from Wrenne’s compensable injury and thus fell inside the compensation bargain.

The premises line rule applied. This rule draws a “sharp, objective” line: employment begins when the employee enters the employer’s premises and continues until departure, and the premises include the parking lot (General Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 595; Schultz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1126). Wrenne was indisputably on those premises when he was killed.

The unpaid break did not change the result. Relying on Gutierrez v. Petoseed Co. (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 766, the court reaffirmed that injuries on the employer’s premises during a regular lunch break arise in the course of employment as incidental to it – even when the break is unpaid and the employee is not under the employer’s control. That the WCA must be liberally construed in favor of awarding compensation (not permitting civil litigation) reinforced the outcome.

Plaintiffs’ authorities were distinguished. The court rejected the argument that Wrenne was merely an “off duty” employee “loitering” for personal reasons – noting that word never appeared in the complaint. Makins v. Industrial Accident Com. (1926) 198 Cal. 698 and McIvor v. Savage (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 128 were inapposite because they concern employees commuting to or from work who unreasonably delay or loiter; Wrenne was neither arriving nor leaving. The court likewise found plaintiffs’ remaining cases materially distinguishable, as each involved off-premises injuries or off-duty conduct (such as voluntary recreation) not present here.

No abuse of discretion in denying amendment. Because plaintiffs never sought leave to amend below and offered no showing on appeal of facts that could cure the defect, the court found no abuse of discretion in dismissing without leave to amend (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311; Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074).