Robert Toothman was hired by Apex Life Sciences, LLC, a temporary staffing agency, which placed him on assignment at Redwood Toxicology Laboratory, Inc. As a condition of that placement, Toothman signed both an Employment Agreement and a companion Arbitration Agreement with Apex. The Arbitration Agreement bound “Employee” (Toothman) and “Company” — defined as Apex and “its affiliates, subsidiaries and parent companies” — to arbitrate any dispute “arising out of or related to” Toothman’s employment with, or termination from, Company. It also waived class and representative claims.
Toothman’s Apex assignment ended in April 2018. Two days later, Redwood hired him directly — without any new arbitration agreement and without any reference to the Apex documents. Toothman worked for Redwood until June 2022. In September 2022, he filed a class action against Redwood alleging Labor Code violations covering the period of his direct employment, starting no earlier than September 26, 2018 — well after his Apex tenure had ended.
After Redwood subpoenaed Apex and obtained a copy of the Arbitration Agreement, Toothman filed an amended complaint that redefined the proposed class to exclude workers staffed by third parties while on assignment, but retained individuals like Toothman himself who had transitioned from staffed to direct employment.
Redwood moved to compel arbitration of Toothman’s individual claims and to dismiss his class claims, arguing three alternative theories: (1) it was a party to the Arbitration Agreement as an “affiliate” of Apex; (2) it could enforce the agreement as a third-party beneficiary; and (3) Toothman was equitably estopped from resisting arbitration. The Sonoma County Superior Court denied the motion in its entirety.
The First Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration in the published case of Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology Laboratory, Inc. Case No. A171567 (May 2026). The court reviewed the matter de novo, as the material facts were undisputed.
The court first addressed who bore the burden of proof. Because Redwood was not a signatory to the Arbitration Agreement, it could not simply produce the agreement and shift the burden to Toothman to defeat it. Relying on Jones v. Jacobson (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1, the court held that a nonsignatory moving party must affirmatively establish its entitlement to enforce the agreement as part of its own initial burden — whether proceeding as a party, a third-party beneficiary, or under equitable estoppel.
Redwood argued it qualified as an “affiliate” of Apex and was therefore a “Company” party to the agreement. The court rejected this, applying standard California contract interpretation principles. The term “affiliates,” appearing alongside “subsidiaries and parent companies,” plainly connoted relationships of common ownership or corporate control — not arms-length commercial arrangements. The companion Employment Agreement used the separate term “Clients” to describe businesses like Redwood, and the parties never incorporated that term into the Arbitration Agreement’s definition of “Company.” Accepted dictionary definitions — including Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) at page 69 — confirmed that “affiliate” in a corporate context means entities related “by shareholdings or other means of control.” The court also noted the practical absurdity of Redwood’s theory: it would mean that Apex unilaterally prescribed dispute resolution procedures for its clients’ own direct-hire employees without those clients’ knowledge or consent.
Even assuming Redwood could qualify as a third-party beneficiary, the court held that Toothman’s claims still fell outside the Arbitration Agreement’s substantive scope. The agreement covered only disputes “arising out of or related to” employment with “Company” — i.e., Apex. Toothman’s claims arose entirely from his direct employment with Redwood, which began after his Apex employment ended. The court cited Vazquez v. SaniSure, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 139 for the principle that an arbitration agreement from one period of employment does not automatically govern disputes arising in a separate, subsequent period.
Finally, the court rejected Redwood’s argument that Toothman was equitably estopped from contesting arbitration. Equitable estoppel applies when a plaintiff’s claims are “dependent upon, or founded in and inextricably intertwined with” the underlying agreement containing the arbitration clause — as articulated in Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209. Here, Toothman’s Labor Code claims depended entirely on his employment agreement with Redwood, not on the Apex Arbitration Agreement. The court also rejected Redwood’s contention that Toothman’s amendment of the class definition was an implicit admission that his claims were intertwined with the Arbitration Agreement, finding no authority to support that proposition and noting that a plaintiff’s decision to narrow or limit claims does not constitute the kind of “artful pleading” that triggers estoppel.