Jessie Walton enrolled as a postsecondary nursing student at Victor Valley Community College District in 2017. Her coursework required her to complete clinical rotations at two local hospitals under the supervision of District faculty. Her supervisor during the spring 2018 rotations was Diego Garcia, the District’s nursing program director.
Walton alleged that Garcia subjected her to extensive verbal and physical sexual harassment, attempting to coerce her into a sexual relationship in exchange for better grades. When she rejected his advances, Garcia allegedly retaliated by giving her a failing grade and refusing to discuss it with her.
In June 2018, Walton sent a formal complaint letter to the District. The District placed Garcia on administrative leave and hired a third-party firm to investigate. In August 2018, the District denied Walton’s request for a grade correction. She withdrew from the program in September 2018 and eventually completed her nursing degree out of state. By November 2018, the third-party investigator issued a 79-page report confirming Garcia had engaged in “highly inappropriate behavior” and harassed at least one other female student. District HR recommended his removal from his tenured position, and Garcia never returned.
In December 2018, Walton’s attorney sent the District a detailed 13-page letter outlining Garcia’s misconduct and Walton’s estimated damages, warning of potential litigation. After failed mediation, Walton filed suit asserting five claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for sex discrimination, sexual harassment, failure to prevent, retaliation, and injunctive relief; Civil Code violations; Education Code violations; and negligence.
The District moved for summary judgment, arguing Walton lacked FEHA standing, failed to comply with the Government Claims Act, and could not show deliberate indifference under Education Code section 66270.
At the hearing, the trial court excluded Walton’s attorney’s declaration because it lacked a penalty-of-perjury subscription and omitted the place of execution — a technical deficiency counsel acknowledged on the spot as an oversight. Less than an hour after the hearing, counsel filed a corrected declaration curing both defects. The court ignored the corrected filing and sustained the objection. Without the declaration, key opposition evidence — including deposition excerpts showing the District had prior knowledge of Garcia’s harassment of other students — was stripped from the record.
The trial court then granted summary judgment for the District on all claims, finding: (1) Walton lacked FEHA standing because she was a student, not an unpaid intern; (2) the December 2018 attorney letter did not satisfy Government Claims Act notice requirements; and (3) the District’s investigation demonstrated it was not deliberately indifferent to Walton’s complaints.
The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment on all claims except Walton’s Civil Code cause of action, which she did not contest on appeal in the published case of Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District Case No. G064668 (April 2026). The District was granted summary adjudication on that single claim only.
On the excluded declaration, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a cure of a plainly technical defect. The court emphasized that granting summary judgment based on a curable procedural default deprives a party of a decision on the merits. Here, counsel was present in the courtroom, offered to fix the error immediately, and in fact filed a corrected declaration within the hour. The District identified no prejudice from allowing the cure.
On FEHA standing, the court rejected the notion that “student” and “unpaid intern” are mutually exclusive categories. The Legislature’s 2015 amendment to FEHA explicitly extended protections to unpaid interns, and the legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1443 (2013–2014 Regular Session) specifically identified nursing clinical rotations as the type of internship the amendment was designed to cover. California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 11008(m) further defines an unpaid intern as “any individual (often a student or trainee)” working without pay in a limited-duration program. Walton therefore had standing.
On Government Claims Act notice, the court found Walton’s attorney’s detailed December 2018 letter substantially satisfied the statutory requirements. The court reiterated that a claim is sufficient if it discloses enough information for the public entity to investigate and potentially settle. The District could not even identify which required element the letter allegedly omitted. A claimant’s subjective intent in labeling a letter a confidential settlement communication is irrelevant — what matters is whether the letter disclosed a claim that, if unresolved, would result in litigation. It did.
On deliberate indifference, the court found triable issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. While the District pointed to its investigation as proof of responsiveness, the court noted the investigation concluded only after Walton had already been forced out of the program — it conferred no benefit on her. A reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference from the District’s refusal to address her grade while she was still enrolled. The excluded deposition evidence — showing the District had prior complaints about Garcia harassing other students — reinforced that a genuine factual dispute existed.
On negligence, the court rejected the District’s reliance on Thomas v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, which held that colleges have no duty to protect students from purely nonphysical harassment. Because Walton alleged unwanted physical touching, Thomas was inapplicable, and her negligence claim survived.