Roy Payan and Portia Mason are blind individuals who enrolled as students at Los Angeles City College, a campus of the Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD), in 2015. Both registered with the college’s Office of Special Services and were approved for accommodations – including recorded lectures, preferential seating, access to electronic text materials, and test-taking accommodations – beginning in the Spring 2016 semester. Both students relied on JAWS screen-reading software to access electronic text.
Despite their approved accommodations, Payan and Mason encountered pervasive accessibility barriers. Payan received textbook chapters only after they had already been covered in class. Classroom software platforms such as MyMathLab and Etudes were inaccessible, forcing Payan to complete homework through limited tutoring sessions rather than independently like his peers. Library databases, campus computers, and the LACCD and LACC websites were also inaccessible, hampering his ability to register for courses, apply for financial aid, or stay informed about campus life. Both students had difficulty securing test-taking accommodations, and their accommodation letters were provided only in inaccessible print format. Payan was also steered away from a single-semester math course and directed into a slower two-semester sequence because of his disability.
The plaintiffs – joined by the National Federation of the Blind and its California chapter – sued LACCD under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in March 2017.
After the first trial in 2019, the jury awarded $40,000 to Payan and $0 to Mason. All parties appealed, and the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded in Payan v. Los Angeles Community College District, 11 F.4th 729 (9th Cir. 2021). On retrial, the jury found LACCD liable on fourteen of nineteen factual allegations and determined that LACCD had intentionally violated Title II on nine of them. The jury awarded $218,500 plus attorney’s fees to Payan and $24,000 plus attorney’s fees to Mason.
LACCD then moved for remittitur. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212 (2022) – which held that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Spending Clause antidiscrimination statutes – the district court granted the motion and slashed the awards to $1,650 for Payan and $0 for Mason. The court reasoned that the jury’s verdicts could only be attributed to either emotional distress damages or lost educational opportunities, both of which the court deemed impermissible.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the remittitur, remanding with instructions to reinstate the original jury awards of $218,500 to Payan and $24,000 to Mason in the published case of Payan v. Los Angeles Community College District, No. 24-1809 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2026)
The panel addressed three issues. First, it found no forfeiture, concluding that LACCD was not barred from challenging emotional distress damages on remand because the issue had not been decided in the prior appeal.
Second, the panel agreed with the district court that emotional distress damages are unavailable under Title II of the ADA. Although Title II was enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause rather than the Spending Clause, its statutory text defines its remedies as those of the Rehabilitation Act, which in turn incorporates Title VI’s remedial framework. Under Cummings, 596 U.S. at 221–22, and Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2002), this chain of statutory incorporation means Title II’s remedies are coextensive with those available under contract-law principles – and emotional distress damages are generally not compensable in contract.
Third – and critically – the panel held that the district court erred by failing to recognize that the jury’s award could reflect compensatory damages for lost educational opportunities, a form of relief that remains available after Cummings. Agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in A.W. by & Through J.W. v. Coweta County School District, 110 F.4th 1309, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2024), the court held that plaintiffs who prove intentional discrimination may recover compensation for the educational benefits they were denied. Because the trial evidence showed that Payan and Mason were effectively barred from meaningful participation in their courses, and because the jury instructions allowed compensation for “any injury” caused by LACCD’s violations, the jury’s award was consistent with the record. The district court abused its discretion by granting remittitur without considering this legally viable basis for the damages.
Judge Lee dissented in part. He agreed that emotional distress damages are barred and that lost-opportunity damages remain available in theory, but he concluded that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient concrete evidence of lost educational opportunities to justify awards exceeding $200,000. In his view, the testimony amounted to generalized descriptions of diminished educational experiences rather than quantifiable economic losses, and the district court’s remittitur should have been affirmed.