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On August 1, 2022, Cal/OSHA issued a citation to Uber Technologies Inc., pursuant to Labor Code section 6317, subdivision (a), identifying three alleged regulatory violations during the period April 29, 2022 to August 1, 2022: (1) failure to establish an effective injury and illness prevention program (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 3203, subd. (a)); (2) failure to maintain records (id.,§ 3203, subd. (b)); and (3) failure to establish an effective Covid-19 prevention program for its drivers (id., § 3205, subd. (c)). Uber appealed the citation to the Appeals Board (the Uber Cal/OSHA appeal) and asserted affirmative defenses challenging Cal/OSHA’s jurisdiction on the theory that, under Business and Professions Code section 7451, subdivisions (a)–(d), the drivers working for Uber were independent contractors, not employees.

On March 17, 2023, four Uber drivers, LaShon Hicks, James Jordan, Robert Moreno, and Karen VanDenBerg (collectively, the Uber Drivers), moved for party status in the Uber Cal/OSHA appeal, asserting they were “affected employees.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 354, subd. (b).) Uber objected to the motion on the same ground asserted in its affirmative defenses, i.e., Cal/OSHA did not have jurisdiction to issue the citation because, under Business and Professions Code section 7451, the Uber Drivers were independent contractors, not employees.

The Appeals Board granted the Uber Drivers’ motion to be made parties to the Uber Cal/OSHA appeal. Uber asked the Appeals Board to reconsider that decision, again asserting the Uber Drivers could not be “‘affected employees’” because they were independent contractors, not employees.

The same day it filed its petition for reconsideration, Uber filed a complaint for declaratory relief in Orange County Superior Court against Cal/OSHA, the chief of Cal/OSHA, and the Uber Drivers. The complaint asked the court to “enter a declaratory judgment, declaring that the [Uber Drivers] are independent contractors, and not Uber’s employees, under [section 7451’s] standard,” as well as “a declaratory judgment, declaring that Cal/OSHA is exceeding its jurisdiction in investigating and issuing its citation to Uber.”

Cal/OSHA and the Uber Drivers demurred to Uber’s complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend on the ground Uber had not exhausted its administrative remedies because the question of the drivers’ employment status – and the related question of Cal/OSHA’s jurisdiction – were still pending in the Uber Cal/OSHA appeal. A judgment of dismissal was entered against Uber, which appealed to the Callifornia Court of Appeal.

The facts regarding Lyft are similar. On August 1, 2022, Cal/OSHA issued a citation to Lyft identifying the same three alleged regulatory violations as those set forth in the Uber citation, for the same three-month period. Plaintiffs’ appeals for all purposes.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court dismissal on the ground that the Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies in the unpublished case of Uber Technologies v. Cal. Dept. of Industrial Relations -G064372 (October 2025).

Generally, ‘a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. [Citations.] Under this rule, an administrative remedy is exhausted only upon “termination of all available, nonduplicative administrative review procedures.”’ [Citations.] ‘The rule “is not a matter of judicial discretion, but is a fundamental rule of procedure . . . binding upon all courts.”’ [¶] The exhaustion doctrine is primarily grounded on policy concerns related to administrative autonomy and judicial efficiency. [Citation.] The doctrine favors administrative autonomy by allowing an agency to reach a final decision without interference from the courts. [Citation.] Unless circumstances warrant judicial involvement, allowing a court to intervene before an agency has fully resolved the matter would ‘constitute an interference with the jurisdiction of another tribunal.’ [Citation.]

Further, creating an agency with particular expertise to administer a specific legislative scheme would be frustrated if a litigant could bypass the agency in the hope of seeking a different decision in court. [¶] As to judicial efficiency, the doctrine allows an administrative agency to provide relief without requiring resort to costly litigation. [Citation.] Even when an administrative remedy does not resolve all issues or provide complete relief, it still may reduce the scope of litigation. [Citation.] Requiring a party to pursue an available administrative remedy aids judicial review by allowing the agency to draw upon its expertise and develop a factual record for the court’s consideration.” (Plantier v. Ramona Municipal Water Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 372, 382–383.)

In short, as our Supreme Court has underscored, “courts should not interfere with an agency determination until the agency has reached a final decision” and “overworked courts should decline to intervene in an administrative dispute unless absolutely necessary.” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 391, italics added, cited with approval in Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080 (Coachella).)

“This fundamental principle is fully applicable here.” This undoubtedly is just one of many court battles that will be fought over the Cal/OSHA jurisdiction over Uber/Lyft and potentially other gig economy employees.