Edgar Osuna worked for Spectrum Security Services, Inc., from October 2011 to February 2022. During his tenure Spectrum allegedly committed Labor Code violations against Osuna and other employees. The violations against other employees purportedly continued after Osuna’s employment terminated.
In August 2023, Osuna notified the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) of Spectrum’s alleged failure to comply with the Labor Code. After the LWDA failed to respond within the statutory period Osuna filed a representative PAGA claim based on the underlying violations identified in Osuna’s LWDA notice, and individual and class claims based on the same allegedly unlawful conduct.
Spectrum demurred to the PAGA claim. It argued the applicable one-year statute of limitations bars the claim because Osuna did not provide the LWDA with notice of the alleged Labor Code violations until 18 months after his employment ended. Spectrum also argued Osuna lacks standing to bring his PAGA claim because he was not employed during the time he sought to represent other aggrieved employees. (Citing Robinson v. Southern Counties Oil Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 476 (Robinson).) It urged the trial court to sustain the demurrer without granting leave to amend.
The trial court agreed with Spectrum’s argument and dismissed Osuna’s class claims, sent his individual claims to arbitration, and sustained Spectrum’s demurrer to his representative PAGA claim without granting leave to amend. It concluded that Osuna lacked standing to bring the PAGA claim because he did not suffer a Labor Code violation during the one-year statute of limitations period for recovering civil penalties.
The Court of Appeal reversed the portion of the order sustaining Spectrum’s demurrer to Osuna’s representative PAGA claim in the published case of Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. CA2/6 – B338047 – (May 2025).
Before turning to the issue of representative PAGA standing, the Court of Appeal resolve the threshold issue of appealability. Spectrum contended that it should dismiss Osuna’s appeal because “an order sustaining a demurrer to [fewer] than all of the [claims in a complaint is not immediately appealable.” It also contends the “death knell” doctrine – an exception to this general rule – is inapplicable here because Osuna has not shown that the trial court’s order was “a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs.”
The Court of Appeal concluded “the Miranda rule applies here.” (citing Miranda v. Anderson Enterprises, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 196) The order dismissing the representative PAGA claim without leave to amend operates as “a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 759) and is appealable”
Due to the systemic underenforcement of the Labor Code, the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Labor Code,1 § 2698 et seq.; PAGA) deputizes employees to stand in the shoes of the state to pursue civil penalties on behalf of themselves and other “aggrieved employees.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 (Arias).) So long as they were employed by the alleged violator and personally suffered at least one Labor Code violation, aggrieved employees have standing to bring representative PAGA actions.
The Legislature recently adopted Assembly Bill No. 2288 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.), which amended portions of Labor Code § 2699. Among other changes, Assembly Bill No. 2288 “requir[es] an aggrieved employee to have personally suffered the alleged violations within [PAGA’s] one-year statute of limitations.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2288 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 21, 2024, pp. 15-16.) Because those amendments apply only to lawsuits filed on or after June 19, 2024, they are inapplicable here. (See Stats. 2024, ch. 44, § 1.)
If after notification the LWDA does not investigate, does not issue a citation, or fails to respond to the notice within 65 days, the employee may sue. But not every private citizen can maintain such a suit. Only an “aggrieved employee” has PAGA standing.The Labor Code defines such an employee as “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” The issue here is whether Osuna meets that definition. The Court of Appeal concluded that he did.
“The words of section 2699, former subdivision (c) are clear and unambiguous: To have standing to bring a PAGA action, “[t]he plaintiff must be an aggrieved employee, that is, someone ‘who was employed by the alleged violator’ and ‘against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.”