Sam Sarkis Solakyan appealed his jury conviction and restitution order arising from a workers’ compensation fraud that generated $263 million in claims – one of the largest workers’ compensation bribery schemes ever uncovered in San Diego County.
Solakyan was the CEO of several medical-imaging companies, including the Glendale-based Vital Imaging Inc., and San Diego MRI Institute. Solakyan operated diagnostic imaging facilities throughout California, including the Bay Area, Los Angeles and Orange counties, and San Diego.
From no later than mid-2013 to November 2016, Solakyan conspired with physicians and others to perpetrate a scheme in which physicians were paid bribes and kickbacks in exchange for the referral of workers’ compensation patients. The compensation offered to the corrupt doctors consisted of either cash or referrals of new patients in what is known as a “cross-referral” scheme.
After a seven-day jury trial and less than a day of deliberation, the jury found Solakyan guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced Solakyan to 60 months in prison and ordered him to pay $27,937,175 in restitution to the nine largest insurers affected by the kickback scheme. Solakyan filed multiple pre- and post-trial motions challenging the indictment, jury instructions, and restitution proceedings. His appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals followed.
In the published case of U.S.A. v Sam Solakyan -22-50023 (Sept 2024) the 9th Circuit panel (1) affirmed Sam Sarkis Solakyan’s conviction for (a) conspiracy to commit honest-services mail fraud and health-care fraud and (b) honest-services mail fraud and aiding and abetting; (2) vacated the district court’s restitution order; and (3) remanded for further proceedings, in a case arising from a workers’ compensation fraud that generated $263 million in claims.
Solakyan contended that the indictment failed to allege the requisite willfulness for health-care fraud as an object of the charged conspiracy. The panel did not resolve a dispute as to the applicable standard of review, concluding that even under de novo review, the indictment, which signaled that Solakyan acted with a bad purpose, sufficiently informed Solakyan of the conspiracy charge predicated on health-care fraud as one of the objects of the conspiracy.
The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the formulation of its jury instructions regarding the health-care object of the conspiracy. A general mens rea instruction was not misleading or inadequate to guide the jury’s deliberations because the jury was separately instructed on each object of the conspiracy, each with its own delineated mens rea requirement. The jury would have understood that it should apply the “willfully” instruction to the health-care fraud object and apply “knowingly” as to the honest-services mail fraud object. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by including a “reasonably foreseeable” standard for use of the mails in its conspiracy instruction.
The panel reviewed for plain error Solakyan’s claim that the district court’s inclusion of an attempt instruction constituted a “constructive amendment” to the charges and created a duplicity error that deprived him of his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. The panel held that even assuming the district court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction, Solakyan did not demonstrate that such error affected his substantial rights or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.
The panel held that the district court did not err in ordering a restitution amount that is distinct from the loss amount calculated for purposes of sentencing. A court’s leniency on the loss calculation for sentencing purposes does not hamstring its discretion to impose a larger restitution order in an amount fully borne by a defendant’s victims.
The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in failing to make specific findings as to why it did not deduct from the $27,937,175 restitution amount payments the insurers would have made for medically necessary MRIs in the absence of fraud. The panel therefore vacated the restitution order and remanded for the district court to determine whether the total loss amount should be reduced, at least in part, by the cost of reimbursement for medically necessary MRIs the insurers would have incurred had Solakyan acted lawfully.