Farzana Chaudhry worked for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) beginning in 2007. Most recently she was a dental assistant at the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, which provides dental care to inmates. Starting in April 2018, she raised safety concerns about contaminated protective equipment and sterilization practices, both internally and in a series of complaints to Cal/OSHA. One of those complaints led to a Cal/OSHA inspection and a $450 fine.

Chaudhry alleged that management retaliated against her over the next several years. According to her complaint, a supervisor gave her a critical letter of instruction in July 2018, and she was passed over for an acting supervisory role. She was suspended without pay for a month from December 2019 to January 2020. In 2020, she received a counseling record over her sterilization practices, was twice asked for doctor’s notes for sick days, and was accused of wearing a mask incorrectly.

In September 2020, Chaudhry presented a claim to the State under the Government Claims Act, and the State rejected it. CDCR fired her in November 2020, and she sued in April 2021. The State Personnel Board (SPB) overturned the firing, and she returned to work in January 2022. Chaudhry alleged that after her return, her supervisor obstructed her work. CDCR then fired her again in February 2022, withdrew that dismissal, and reinstated her effective August 29, 2022. She resigned on her first day back. She presented a second government claim covering the resignation in January 2023 and amended her lawsuit in May 2023.

Separately, in the fall of 2021, Chaudhry filed a retaliation complaint with the SPB under the California Whistleblower Protection Act (Gov. Code, § 8547 et seq.). She exhausted that administrative process in March 2022. She then added a Whistleblower Protection Act claim to her lawsuit in May 2022.

Chaudhry sued the State, CDCR, and three individual supervisors. Her operative complaint alleged retaliation under Labor Code § 1102.5, retaliation under the Whistleblower Protection Act, and constructive discharge in violation of public policy. In December 2024, weeks before the scheduled trial, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The Solano County Superior Court granted the motion in full, dismissed every claim without leave to amend, and entered judgment for all defendants.

In the published case of Chaudhry v. State of California, No. A173501 (September 2026). The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the judgment in favor of the three individual supervisors on every claim. As to the State and CDCR, it affirmed the dismissal of the Whistleblower Protection Act claim and the constructive discharge claim, which Chaudhry did not challenge on appeal. It reversed the judgment on the § 1102.5 retaliation claim against the State and CDCR, which will go forward on a constructive discharge theory.

The court first addressed whether Chaudhry had met the claim presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act. The court held that her September 2020 claim was untimely as to the conduct it described. The acts within the six-month window before that claim were too minor to count as adverse employment actions. These included the doctor’s note requests, the mask accusation, and a counseling record with no alleged consequences.

The court also rejected Chaudhry’s argument that the earlier conduct formed a continuing violation extending into that window. Applying the test from Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, the court found two problems. First, the acts were not reasonably frequent: more than a year passed between July 2018 and October 2019 with no alleged retaliation. Second, the unpaid suspension, which ended in January 2020, was a permanent, completed act. It should have made clear that informal efforts to stop the retaliation were futile. Her claim accrued at that point, so a claim presented in September 2020 came too late. The court rejected her argument that a temporary suspension lacks permanence. It reasoned that on that view, only outright termination would ever qualify.

Her January 2023 claim was a different matter. The court held that Chaudhry adequately alleged a constructive discharge in August 2022, within six months of that claim. A jury could find that the sequence of events would compel a reasonable employee to resign. That sequence was the November 2020 firing, obstruction after her reinstatement, a second firing less than a month later, and a later rescission of that firing. The court observed that no employee should have to endure repeated baseless retaliatory terminations combined with efforts to sabotage her work.

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that constructive discharge was a backdoor way to revive time-barred terminations. A constructive discharge is the employer’s own act, and it occurs when the employee resigns, even if the conditions that caused it began earlier. The theory also does not strip employers of their defense under Labor Code § 1102.6. On remand, the State and CDCR can still try to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they had legitimate, independent reasons for the firings and other actions.

Next, the court resolved the open question of individual liability. Section 1102.5(b) bars retaliation by an employer “or any person acting on behalf of the employer.” That language was added in 2013. Chaudhry argued that it reaches individual supervisors. The court agreed that the words alone could support her reading. But it found the statute ambiguous when read alongside related provisions. Section 1104 makes the employer responsible for its managers’ acts. Section 1105 speaks of recovering damages from the employer. Section 1102.6 gives the burden-shifting defense only to employers, which would make little sense if supervisors could be sued too.

To resolve the ambiguity, the court looked to legislative history. The 2013 amendments were aimed at employers and their attorneys who threatened to report workers to immigration authorities, and nothing in the history mentions suing supervisors personally. The court then relied on Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158. There, the Supreme Court held that similar “person” language in FEHA’s anti-retaliation provision does not create individual liability. Jones built on Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, which reached the same result for discrimination claims.

The panel found most of those decisions’ policy concerns equally applicable to § 1102.5. Supervisors must make personnel decisions as part of their jobs, and personal liability would add little to plaintiffs’ recovery. It would also chill management and create conflicts between supervisors and employers. The panel noted that its holding matches the view of more than 30 federal district court decisions. It declined to follow the two federal cases that went the other way.

On the Whistleblower Protection Act claim, the court held that Chaudhry had not properly exhausted her administrative remedies. Under Government Code § 8547.8(c), a damages action is not available unless the employee has first filed a complaint with the SPB. Chaudhry filed her lawsuit in April 2021, based on the same facts, before she went to the SPB. She could not satisfy the requirement by filing what the court called a placeholder complaint, going to the SPB, and then amending to add the claim. Relying on Bjorndal v. Superior Court (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1100, the court explained that allowing this would defeat the point of the administrative process. That process exists to resolve disputes before litigation begins. The court noted that employees can avoid this trap by filing with the SPB at the same time as, or promptly after, presenting their Government Claims Act claim. Because Chaudhry identified no facts that could cure the defect, the court denied leave to amend.