This case is a class action brought by homeless veterans with serious mental illness or traumatic brain injuries against the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), centered on the VA’s West Los Angeles campus. The named plaintiffs, along with the National Veterans Foundation, alleged that the VA’s failure to build permanent supportive housing on or near the campus discriminates against disabled veterans in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, because without such housing they cannot meaningfully access the medical care the VA otherwise provides. They pressed two theories: a “meaningful access” claim (housing as a necessary accommodation to reach VA healthcare) and an “Olmstead” claim, drawing on Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), that the lack of housing places veterans at risk of institutionalization.

Following an August 2024 bench trial, the district court (Judge David O. Carter, C.D. Cal.) ruled for the plaintiffs on both § 504 theories and ruled that the land-use leases the VA had with the Regents of the University of California, Los Angeles, Brentwood School, and Bridgeland Resources, LLC, were unlawful; voided these leases; and enjoined the VA from renegotiating them.and requiring the VA to develop, within six months, a plan to construct 1,800 additional units of permanent supportive housing on the campus, to be built and operational within six years — a project both dissents peg at over $100 million.

On appeal, a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the judgment and injunction against the VA based on the meaningful-access and Olmstead theories, vacated the judgment as to a co-defendant (HUD) for lack of legal basis, and upheld certification of the veteran class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). See Powers v. McDonough, 163 F.4th 1162 (9th Cir. 2025). The VA petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing the panel’s decision conflicts with Supreme Court and circuit precedent limiting § 504 claims and misapplied the class-certification commonality requirement.

In the 2026 ruling in Powers, et al. v. McDonough, et al., No. 24-6576 (9th Cir. Sept. 2026), the full court, by vote of the non-recused active judges, denied the petition for rehearing en banc; no further petitions for rehearing would be entertained. Two judges did not participate. The panel’s 2025 decision therefore stands as circuit precedent. Judge Collins and Judge Bumatay each filed a dissent from the denial, but a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc is not a ruling and does not alter the panel’s judgment.

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Collins argued the panel’s “meaningful access” holding cannot be squared with Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that § 504 requires only “reasonable” modifications to a federal program, not ones that “fundamentally alter” it. In his view, ordering the VA to build an entirely new, $100-million-plus housing program to accompany its medical-care program is a fundamental alteration by any measure, and the panel could not evade that conclusion by treating the VA’s separate, statutorily distinct housing initiatives on the campus as part of the same “program.”

He also argued the panel misapplied Olmstead, which addresses the risk of institutionalization inherent in how an agency delivers its own services, not the general risk that homelessness exposes someone to jail or hospitalization by other actors. And he argued both theories independently fail because § 504 requires that a plaintiff be denied a benefit “solely by reason of” disability, whereas the veterans’ inability to access campus healthcare stems from many intersecting circumstances, not disability alone. On class certification, Judge Collins argued individualized differences among class members’ diagnoses, housing situations, and proximity to other VA facilities defeat the commonality required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), as construed in, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 564 U.S. 338 (2011).

Judge Bumatay’s dissent pressed two further points. First, he argued the Rehabilitation Act contains no private right of action, express or implied, against a federal agency operating its own programs (as opposed to acting as a grant-maker), and that the panel’s contrary position rests on outdated Ninth Circuit precedent he says should be overruled, citing a split with the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits on the question. Second, he argued the class certified here lacks the “glue” Wal-Mart requires: because many class members may not be injured by the VA’s housing policy at all — some already live on or near the campus, some receive vouchers, some may not seek care there — certifying them together conflicts with Article III standing principles as well as Rule 23(a)(2).

Because this is an order denying en banc rehearing rather than a merits ruling, the panel’s 2025 opinion continues to bind the district court on remand, and the dissents’ criticisms carry no immediate legal effect beyond flagging the issue for possible Supreme Court review.