In February 2016, Jennifer Slamer was working for Southern California Permanente Medical Group (SCPMG) when she suffered disabling respiratory injuries from exposure to a disinfectant made by Ecolab, Inc. SCPMG resolved her workers’ compensation claim in the administrative system. In May 2017, Slamer and her husband sued Ecolab, SCPMG, and related entities in San Bernardino County Superior Court. SCPMG and its affiliates were dismissed from the civil case with prejudice after a series of demurrers and summary judgment motions. The judgment dismissing SCPMG was entered on April 11, 2022.
The Slamers went to trial against Ecolab alone. Before the case went to the jury, they reached a confidential settlement with Ecolab on April 19, 2023. On June 1, 2023, they voluntarily dismissed the entire action with prejudice.
While the case was pending, SCPMG continued paying benefits. It filed several notices of lien against any recovery under Labor Code § 3856(b). After the settlement, the Slamers refused SCPMG’s requests for reimbursement, and mediation failed. On February 16, 2024, more than eight months after the dismissal, SCPMG filed a motion for reimbursement.
The Slamers opposed the motion on several grounds. They argued the lien had to be reduced by SCPMG’s comparative fault and by an equitable share of their attorney fees and costs. They declined to disclose the settlement amount, but they stipulated that it exceeded the lien plus their fees and costs. On April 18, 2025, the trial court granted SCPMG’s motion. It ordered the Slamers to reimburse the full lien amount plus interest.
In the unpublished case of Slamer v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, No. D086908 (September 2026) the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. It directed the trial court to enter a new order denying SCPMG’s reimbursement motion for lack of jurisdiction. The Slamers were awarded their costs on appeal.
The Slamers raised several challenges on appeal: that the motion came too late, that SCPMG’s comparative fault was never decided, that fees were not properly allocated, and that pre-order interest was awarded in error. While the appeal was pending, the panel identified a threshold problem on its own and asked the parties for supplemental briefing. The question was whether the trial court had any jurisdiction to act after the entire case had been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. The court concluded it did not. Because that answer resolved the appeal, the panel did not reach the other issues.
The court began with the statutory framework. An injured worker’s remedy against the employer is generally limited to workers’ compensation, but the worker may sue a third-party tortfeasor. To prevent double recovery, the employer may assert a lien on the worker’s judgment or settlement. That lien may be reduced for the employer’s own comparative negligence, and for a share of fees and costs under Labor Code § 3860(c) when the recovery was obtained solely through the employee’s attorney. The panel emphasized the timing requirement: the employer must apply for an order paying the lien before the judgment is satisfied or the action is dismissed. It cited Labor Code § 3857 and Abdala v. Aziz (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 369, among other authorities. SCPMG did not meet that deadline. Once the Slamers filed their dismissal, the action ended and the court lost jurisdiction, except for limited matters such as costs and statutory fees (Harris v. Billings (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1396). An order entered without jurisdiction is void.
The panel rejected each of SCPMG’s four counterarguments. First, SCPMG argued the Slamers forfeited the timeliness issue by not raising it in the trial court. The panel disagreed. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. SCPMG also pointed to a possible factual dispute over whether the settlement funds had been fully disbursed. The court found that dispute irrelevant, because no one disputed that the dismissal came first.
Second, SCPMG argued the Slamers had acknowledged its lien efforts and agreed the court could keep jurisdiction. The panel held that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel. It quoted Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200 for the rule that a court “cannot ‘retain’ jurisdiction it has lost.” SCPMG also relied on the lien-motion provision in Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6(f)(1). The court found that provision inapplicable for two reasons. It did not take effect until January 1, 2025, and it does not apply retroactively. And even if it did apply, it covers dismissals without prejudice, not dismissals with prejudice like this one.
Third, SCPMG argued the trial court had expressly retained jurisdiction under § 664.6 to enforce the settlement. Under Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, a request to retain jurisdiction must meet three conditions. It must be made while the case is pending. It must be in a signed writing or stated orally before the court. And it must be express, clear, and unambiguous. The courtroom exchanges and minute-order entry SCPMG cited did not meet that standard. Separately, SCPMG could not use § 664.6 in any event. It had been dismissed from the case in 2022, which made it a stranger to the action, and only a party to a settlement may invoke that statute.
Fourth, SCPMG argued that the Enforcement of Judgments Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.410 et seq.) applied through Labor Code § 3862. Under that law, a lienholder is treated as a party, and the debtor cannot dismiss without the creditor’s consent. The panel explained that § 3862 reaches only a lien that has been allowed and perfected. A lien is not “allowed” until the court grants the employer’s application, which may require deciding comparative fault and fee allocation first. Here, the order allowing the lien did not issue until April 2025, nearly two years after the dismissal. By then the action was no longer pending: the time to appeal the dismissal had expired in November 2023. The court cited Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2026) 20 Cal.5th 91 for the principle that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice terminates the action. Because SCPMG never perfected its lien before the dismissal, the Slamers did not need its consent to dismiss.
The panel expressly took no position on whether any other remedy remains available to SCPMG. For employers and carriers, the case is a reminder that a filed notice of lien is not enough. The employer must obtain a court order allowing the lien, or a properly made request for the court to retain jurisdiction, before the employee’s third-party action is dismissed. This is especially important once the employer has been dismissed from the case as a defendant.
This is an unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeal, under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), courts and parties generally may not cite it or rely on it. It is not a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. It is however relevant to the Worker’s Compensation community as illustrative of existing law.