Sudarshan b in Fremont, California. The policy’s “Suit Against Us” provision, tracking the standard fire policy language in Insurance Code section 2071, required that any lawsuit on the policy be brought within one year of the loss, extended to two years for losses related to a declared state of emergency.
In January 2021, after a tenant vacated the property, Kumar discovered water damage and mold in the garage, apparently caused by a leaking water heater, and reported the loss to Mid-Century on February 3, 2021. On February 10, Mid-Century mailed a letter denying coverage for the mold and wear-and-tear damage, but continued investigating potential coverage for related water damage; on February 16, following a follow-up inspection, Mid-Century mailed Kumar a second letter along with a $5,010.93 payment for covered drywall damage, again stating that it had “completed the adjustment” and was “closing” the claim, and that the claim would not be reopened absent written notice.
Over the following two years, Kumar intermittently submitted additional information and a $555,700 rebuild estimate, and Mid-Century responded in writing each time — requesting supporting documentation, quoting the one-year suit provision, and in an April 2021 letter stating it would “be happy to reopen” the claim if Kumar provided the requested materials within the policy deadline. Kumar never provided that documentation, and Mid-Century’s contractor-verification efforts and a July 2021 engineering inspection both confirmed no additional coverage existed.
On January 18, 2023, one day after his last email exchange with Mid-Century, Kumar, representing himself, sued for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, fraud, and unfair competition, seeking repair costs and loss-of-use damages.
Mid-Century moved for summary judgment on the ground that Kumar’s suit was barred by the policy’s one-year limitations period. Kumar opposed, arguing Mid-Century never issued an “unequivocal” denial sufficient to end the tolling period, and alternatively that the limitations period was equitably tolled, that Mid-Century was estopped from asserting the defense, and that the COVID-19 state of emergency extended the deadline to two years. In support, Kumar submitted a declaration stating that unidentified Mid-Century representatives told him orally in early 2021 that he had two years to sue, and that his limited English proficiency required him to rely on those oral statements over the written notices.
The Alameda County Superior Court granted summary judgment, finding Mid-Century’s February 2021 correspondence an unequivocal denial that started the one-year clock, making Kumar’s January 2023 complaint untimely, and entered judgment for Mid-Century in March 2025.
In the published case of Kumar v. Mid-Century Insurance Company, No. A173097 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Div. 2, July 2026) — the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Mid-Century. This opinion was originally filed on June 30, 2026 and was not initially certified for publication; on July 22, 2026, the First Appellate District, Division Two, ordered it published in the Official Reports. It is now citable authority.
The summary judgment was reviewed de novo, applying the settled rule that an insurance policy’s limitations period is tolled “from the time the insured files a timely notice … to the time the insurer formally denies the claim in writing,” citing Hydro-Mill Co., Inc. v. Hayward, Tilton & Rolapp Ins. Associates, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1145 and Prudential-LMI Com. Insurance v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674. That formal-denial requirement means an “unequivocal” written denial, and neither an insurer’s invitation for further information nor an insured’s request for reconsideration reopens the tolling period, citing Migliore v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 592 and Singh v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 135.
Applying that framework, the panel held Mid-Century’s February 16, 2021 letter — which stated the adjustment was complete, the claim was closed, and it would not be reopened absent written notice, while accompanying a settlement payment — was an unequivocal denial as a matter of law, eliminating any pending claim to which tolling could still apply. The court rejected Kumar’s argument that Mid-Century’s repeated invitations for additional information created ambiguity, explaining that Migliore squarely rejected the identical argument on nearly identical facts, and that Kumar’s own subjective understanding of the correspondence was not a basis for finding a denial equivocal. Because the record showed at least five separate written statements from Mid-Century that the claim was closed, each accompanied by the “Suit Against Us” language, the court found no triable issue on this point.
The panel likewise rejected Kumar’s remaining defenses. His estoppel argument failed both because he never pleaded estoppel in his complaint, foreclosing it as a basis to oppose summary judgment, and because Mid-Century’s invitations to submit further information, made only in response to Kumar’s own requests and paired with repeated disclosure of the limitations period, could not support the intent-to-mislead element estoppel requires. Finally, the panel held Kumar’s fraud, misrepresentation, and unfair competition claims were, at their core, claims seeking policy benefits and therefore governed by the same one-year period, since “the applicable limitations period is determined by the gravamen of the complaint rather than the named cause of action,” citing Jang v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1291 — and that Kumar had, in any event, forfeited any argument for treating those claims as independent torts by failing to raise it in the trial court.