Maria Lopez Rodriguez worked as a medical receptionist for Kern County Hospital Authority, permissibly self-insured and administered by Adminsure, Inc. She claimed a psychiatric injury arising out of and in the course of her employment on November 15, 2017, attributing her symptoms to ongoing conduct by her supervisor, Marie Ruffin.
A qualified medical evaluator (QME), Dr. Greg Hirokawa, took a history in which applicant described her supervisor searching for reasons to reprimand her, denying her a requested transfer, standing over her while giving instructions, and asking coworkers how often applicant used the restroom, among other incidents she said had gone on for roughly 18 to 24 months. Dr. Hirokawa diagnosed an anxiety disorder and opined that work stress was the predominant (greater than 50%) cause of applicant’s psychological symptoms, and that personnel actions by her supervisor accounted for roughly 80% of that work stress — but he left it to the trier of fact to determine whether the supervisor’s actions were lawful, nondiscriminatory, and in good faith
The workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) found that applicant sustained a psychiatric injury arising out of and in the course of employment, and that her claim was not barred by the good faith personnel action defense under Labor Code section 3208.3(h). In the accompanying Opinion on Decision, the WCJ identified four incidents — the shoulder grab, the shortened lunch, the church-toys directive, and the yelling — and stated that, while defense witnesses had described other incidents that were good faith personnel actions, the incidents applicant testified to were not, and so did not bar her claim. The WCJ adopted Dr. Hirokawa’s causation opinion in full. Kern County Hospital Authority filed a timely petition for reconsideration, arguing the WCJ misapplied the good faith personnel action defense and that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
In the appended Opinion on Decision (Opinion), the WCJ addressed the good faith personnel action defense by simply stating “While Defendant witnesses discussed other incidents that were good-faith personnel actions, those discussed by Applicant were are (sic) not good-faith- personnel actions. This defense does not bar the claim of Applicant based on the incidents Applicant testified to.”
The WCJ adopted Dr. Hirokawa’s opinion on causation, stating: AOE/COE – Parts of the Body Injured “Dr. Hirokawa stated that the predominant cause of Applicant’s symptoms were from work stress. Approximately 80 percent of that stress was due to personnel actions by Applicant’s supervisor. Dr. Hirokawa left it to the trier of fact to determine if the supervisor’s actions were legal, non-discriminatory, and non-retaliatory. These actions are being found not to be good-faith-personnel actions. Based on Dr. Hirokawa’s report, Applicant has suffered industrial injury to the psyche.”
In the panel decision of Rodriguez v. Kern County Hospital Authority, ADJ11141161 (Cal. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., July 2026) — the WCAB granted reconsideration and rescinded the WCJ’s Findings and Orders in their entirety, returning the matter to the trial level for further proceedings.
The panel applied the four-step framework the Board adopted in its en banc decision in Rolda v. Pitney Bowes, Inc. (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 241, for evaluating a psychiatric injury claim once an employer raises the good faith personnel action defense under Labor Code section 3208.3. Under Rolda, the WCJ must determine, in sequence: whether the claimed injury involves actual events of employment; whether those events were the predominant (over 50%) cause of the injury; whether any of those events were personnel actions that were lawful, nondiscriminatory, and in good faith; and, if so, whether those good faith personnel actions were a “substantial cause” — 35% to 40% of all causation — of the injury. The first two steps are applicant’s burden; the latter two are the employer’s. The panel found the first two steps effectively conceded, since defendant did not dispute that applicant’s described incidents were actual events of employment or that Dr. Hirokawa had found predominant industrial causation.
The problem, the panel explained, arose at the third step. The point of that step is to sort the actual events of employment into those that were good faith personnel actions and those that were not, but the WCJ’s Opinion on Decision never made clear which of applicant’s described incidents — which the panel noted seemed to include more than the four specifically discussed — the WCJ was treating as the operative events, or why. Citing the Board’s en banc decision in Hamilton v. Lockheed Corporation (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473, and Labor Code section 5313, the panel explained that a WCJ’s opinion must refer with specificity to the evidence relied upon and clearly set out the reasons for the decision on each issue, so that the parties and the Board can meaningfully evaluate it on reconsideration; a decision must be based on admitted evidence in the record and supported by substantial evidence, citing Hegglin v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 162, among other cases.
That gap mattered because of what the fourth Rolda step requires. Unlike the “predominant cause” inquiry, which looks only at causation as to all events combined, the “substantial cause” inquiry requires the evaluating physician to parse out the individual events found to be good faith personnel actions and assign a percentage of causation to each. Dr. Hirokawa’s report discussed several potential contributing factors but did not analyze each one individually or assign percentages, and the panel reasoned that any such breakdown would necessarily be unreliable if the physician did not know, because the WCJ had never clearly said, which events actually qualified as good faith personnel actions. The panel also noted, in a footnote, that whether a given event is a “personnel action” taken in “good faith” is a factual and legal determination for the WCJ to make, not the QME — so Dr. Hirokawa’s own use of that label in his report, offered before the WCJ made any such finding, could not substitute for the missing determination, citing County of Sacramento v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Brooks) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 785.
Concluding that the record could not currently support a finding either way on whether the good faith personnel action defense barred the claim, the panel held the correct course was to develop the record further rather than resolve the issue on an incomplete record, citing the Board’s en banc decision in McDuffie v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority (2002) 67 Cal.Comp.Cases 138 and a recent panel decision reaching the same conclusion on similar facts, Silva v. Department of Transportation Headquarters Operations (2025, ADJ13014565). The Board directed that, on remand, the parties return to Dr. Hirokawa for supplemental reporting under Labor Code section 5701, or that the WCJ appoint a regular physician if his further reporting does not constitute substantial evidence, while noting the parties always retain the option of proceeding by agreed medical evaluator instead. On that basis, the panel rescinded the WCJ’s Findings and Orders and returned the matter to the trial level.