This en banc decision gathered twenty-four individual cases (some carrying multiple case numbers) that shared a common thread: each involved a Compromise and Release (“C&R”) agreement submitted for approval at the Van Nuys District Office, and each was handled by the same workers’ compensation administrative law judge (“WCJ”), Karinneh Aslanian.
The underlying claims were varied but followed recognizable patterns. Many were cumulative-injury or psychiatric claims premised on a “hostile work environment” – filed by ramp scrubbers, warehouse and delivery workers, nursing assistants, laborers, and others against employers including ABM, Amazon, Lyft, FedEx, and NBC Universal. The proposed settlements ranged from roughly $4,000 to $37,500. A recurring feature was that the parties wished to settle a denied claim quickly – often expressly to “buy their peace” – and frequently without any medical reporting on file, sometimes before any discovery or qualified medical evaluator (“QME”) examination had occurred. In several cases the defendants’ own cover letters acknowledged that no medical reports existed to support an injury.
Importantly, none of these matters had proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on the merits before reaching the Appeals Board.
In each case, rather than approving or formally disapproving the settlement, the WCJ issued an Order Suspending Action (“OSA”) on the C&R. Across the cases, the OSAs went well beyond requesting minor corrections. The WCJ generally:
– – demanded supporting medical documentation to test adequacy, treating the absence of medical evidence as fatal;
– – directed applicants, in the text of the OSA, to either obtain a medical evaluation or dismiss the claim with prejudice;
– – requested witness statements, information about related civil lawsuits, and the source of any benefits paid; and
– – required applicants’ attorneys to justify the requested 15% attorney’s fee.
The OSAs issued without first giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. In the accompanying Reports to the Board, the WCJ used pointed language – referring to a “free cash money handout system,” asserting that an applicant who would not attend even one medical exam “is clearly not injured,” and describing the Van Nuys venue as a “haven” for a “get rich quick” scheme in which the WCJ “will no longer participate.”
The applicants Petitioned for Removal, arguing the OSAs improperly compelled additional discovery, that the WCJ exceeded the permissible scope of review, and that a WCJ may review only whether a settlement is adequate.
The Appeals Board, sitting en banc by unanimous vote, granted consolidated and granted 24 Petitions for Removal from various Orders Suspending Action, all issued by the same WCJ and issued an en banc decision in the captioned case of Calvin Gaines, et al. v. ABM Aviation, Inc., Adj. Nos. ADJ20216367 et al. (Van Nuys District Office) (June 2026). As its Decision After Removal, the Board rescinded every OSA, disqualified WCJ Aslanian from all twenty-four cases, and returned each matter to the Presiding WCJ for reassignment to a new judge.
Although the Applicants’ Petition was granted, this case was not an affirmance. It a reversal of the WCJ’s orders – though a nuanced one. The Board did not adopt the applicants’ broadest position. It held that a WCJ’s authority to scrutinize settlements is real and substantial: a WCJ may demand relevant medical records, may seek additional information bearing on valuation, and may delay approval until adequacy can be assessed. What the WCJ could not do was use an OSA to compel evaluations, dismissals, or fee reductions without notice, due process, and a record – and could not bring open hostility to the bench.
A workers’ compensation settlement is enforceable only after WCAB approval; in approving it, the WCJ must determine the agreement is valid and adequate to protect the injured worker and the public interest.
Where a settlement’s terms are inconsistent, non-compliant with the Labor Code, or inadequate, the WCJ may investigate through an OSA – and, if the parties do not supply sufficient information, may hold a hearing to create an evidentiary record establishing adequacy.
Due process drove the removal. Settlement review proceeds by stipulation, and there is ordinarily no due-process problem when a WCJ approves a joint request. But once a WCJ intends to reject a settlement or condition its approval, the parties are owed notice and an opportunity to be heard. The OSAs here delivered ultimatums – get evaluated or dismiss with prejudice – without any hearing. Because Appeals Board decisions must rest on an admitted evidentiary record (Hamilton v. Lockheed Corp. (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473 (Appeals Board en banc)) and a WCJ cannot enter judgment on the pleadings, the proper path when adequacy is genuinely in doubt is to set a hearing and build a record, not to coerce the parties by order.
The Board emphasized that substantial medical evidence is not required to support a stipulation. Stipulations exist precisely to obviate the need for proof and narrow the issues (County of Sacramento v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Weatherall) (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1114 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 1]). The only requirement is that sufficient information exist in the formal record to support the adequacy finding. The WCJ erred by treating missing medicals as disqualifying and by, in effect, ordering medical evaluations inside an OSA – an order that may issue only after proper notice, and a medical-legal evaluation that may be compelled only after an evidentiary hearing establishes a basis for it.
The Board grounded the WCJ’s review power in the purpose of approval: protecting workers who might accept “unfortunate compromises because of economic pressure or lack of competent advice” (Johnson v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 964 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 362], quoting Chavez v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 701 [321 P.2d 449]), and protecting the public interest by ensuring benefits are not improperly shifted onto public programs such as Medicare, Medi-Cal, EDD, and Social Security (Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281 [68 Cal.Comp.Cases 831]). The Board also reaffirmed that the WCAB’s jurisdiction reaches only Labor Code benefits, and mere execution of a preprinted form does not release claims outside workers’ compensation (Camacho v. Target (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 291 [83 Cal.Comp.Cases 1014]).
Protecting insurers from “overpaying” is not within adequacy review – if anything, evidence that a carrier is overvaluing a claim suggests the settlement is adequate. Inquiry into civil suits is permissible only to the limited extent it bears on a possible third-party credit, and must occur on the record. And while requesting documentation to justify the 15% attorney’s fee was proper (the WCAB is the final arbiter of fee reasonableness under Vierra v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1128 [72 Cal.Comp.Cases 1128]), the remedy for a disputed fee is a hearing – the C&R may be approved with the fee held in trust – not a coercive order.
Finally, under Labor Code section 5311 and Code of Civil Procedure section 641(f)–(g), a WCJ may be disqualified for having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion on the merits or for a state of mind evincing bias. The Board found the WCJ’s “free cash money handout” and “get rich quick scheme” commentary plainly demonstrated both, reminded the WCJ of her obligations under the Code of Judicial Ethics, and ordered reassignment of all twenty-four cases to new judges.