Arturo Vela was hired by Harbor Rail Services of California, Inc. (Harbor) as a railcar repairman and was terminated five months later in October 2021. Before beginning work, Vela signed a mutual arbitration agreement covering all employment-related claims. The agreement also contained a class and representative action waiver, meaning Vela gave up his right to pursue claims on behalf of other workers.

Harbor was not itself a railroad, it was a repair and inspection contractor working under a service agreement with Pacific Harbor Line (PHL), a short-line railroad operating a train yard in Wilmington, California. Larger railroads Burlington Northern Santa Fe and Union Pacific would deliver freight cars to PHL’s yard, where the cars were disconnected from locomotives, taken out of service, and left for inspection and repair. Vela’s work consisted of changing wheels and brake pads, disassembling and reassembling train cars, and welding and fabricating metal components — all performed on decommissioned cars sitting in the yard. Once repaired, the cars were returned to PHL and eventually back to the freight railroads.

In October 2023, Vela filed suit in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Harbor, asserting a slate of California Labor Code violations — unpaid overtime, missed meal and rest period premiums, unpaid minimum wages, late final wages, noncompliant wage statements, and unreimbursed business expenses — along with an Unfair Competition Law claim. Vela brought these claims on his own behalf and on behalf of a proposed class of current and former Harbor employees.

Harbor moved to compel Vela’s individual claims to arbitration and to dismiss his class claims. The trial court held multiple rounds of briefing and, after receiving supplemental evidence and argument, granted Harbor’s motion in February 2025. The court ordered Vela’s individual claims to arbitration and dismissed and struck his class claims, finding the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., governed the parties’ agreement and that no exemption removed it from the FAA’s reach.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal and striking of Vela’s class claims in the published case of Vela v. Harbor Rail Services of California, Inc., Case No. B344723 (May, 2026).

Railroad Employee. Section 1 of the FAA exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Vela argued he qualified as a “railroad employee” because his work was performed for PHL under Harbor’s service contract with that entity. The court rejected this theory on a threshold ground: a “contract of employment” under Section 1 must have the qualifying worker as one of its parties. Vela had no contract with PHL. Citing Fli-Lo Falcon, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 97 F.4th 1190, 1196–1197 (9th Cir. 2024), and Amos v. Amazon Logistics, Inc., 74 F.4th 591, 596 (4th Cir. 2023), the court held that the Harbor–PHL service agreement — a business-to-business contract — could not qualify. The court also rejected Vela’s reliance on the Railway Labor Act’s definition of “employee,” finding no evidence that PHL supervised or directed Vela’s work; Harbor, by contract, retained exclusive control over its workers.

The FAA Exemption — Transportation Worker. The Supreme Court’s decision in Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022), requires courts to (1) identify the class of workers to which the individual belongs based on the work they typically perform, and then (2) determine whether that class is “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Under Saxon, workers who are “directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders” fall within the exemption. For workers whose duties are more removed from that activity, they must play a “direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders” to qualify. The Ninth Circuit subsequently applied Saxon in Ortiz v. Randstad Inhouse Services, LLC, 95 F.4th 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2024), requiring that a worker’s relationship to the movement of goods be “sufficiently close enough” to play “a tangible and meaningful role” in interstate commerce, and in Lopez v. Aircraft Service International, Inc., 107 F.4th 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2024), which found an airplane fuel technician qualified because refueling was a “vital component” of an aircraft’s ability to engage in interstate transportation.

Applying this framework, the court held that Vela’s class — workers who inspect and repair freight cars that have been removed from service and placed in a maintenance yard — is too far removed from actual transportation to qualify. The cars were decommissioned and unusable until Vela and his coworkers finished their tasks. It was only after repairs were completed that the cars re-entered service and resumed a role in moving goods. The court also noted the absence of any evidence that Vela’s class typically worked on cars that still contained freight. Cases Vela cited in support, including Betancourt v. Transportation Brokerage Specialists, Inc., 62 Cal.App.5th 552 (2021) (package delivery driver), and Nieto v. Fresno Beverage Co., Inc., 33 Cal.App.5th 274 (2019) (delivery truck driver), were distinguished because those workers played active roles in moving goods — Vela did not.

Because the FAA applied and no exemption saved Vela from it, the class action waiver in his arbitration agreement was enforceable under federal law, which preempts California doctrine that would otherwise void such waivers. See Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348, 359 (2014).