Jazmin Ayala-Ventura worked as a janitor for CCS Facility Services–Fresno Inc., a commercial janitorial company, from June 2021 to March 2022.
When she was hired, CCS emailed her links to an online onboarding system where she reviewed and electronically signed several company policies, including a five-page “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate.” The system required employees to scroll through each document before they could click “yes” to agree, and offered the option to view the agreement in English or Spanish. The agreement covered “all claims, disputes, and/or controversies … whether or not arising out of Employee’s employment or the termination of employment,” contained a class action waiver, survived termination of employment, and could only be revoked by a writing signed by both the employee and a CCS human resources representative. CCS agreed to bear all arbitration costs except each party’s own legal fees.
In August 2024, Ayala-Ventura filed a putative class action against CCS alleging a battery of wage-and-hour violations under the California Labor Code – including unpaid wages, missed meal and rest breaks, failure to reimburse expenses, and unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200.
CCS moved to compel individual arbitration and dismiss the class claims. Ayala-Ventura opposed, arguing the agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable – specifically that its scope was overbroad, it lacked mutuality, and it was indefinite in duration. She relied heavily on Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, a Second District opinion that struck down a similar-looking arbitration agreement with USC.
The Fresno County Superior Court granted CCS’s motion. The court found procedural unconscionability was minimal, distinguished Cook on the facts, and concluded the agreement was not substantively unconscionable. It ordered arbitration of Ayala-Ventura’s individual claims, dismissed the class claims, and stayed the case pending arbitration.
Because an order compelling arbitration is generally not directly appealable, the Fifth District Court of Appeal treated the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate and denied the petition on the merits in the published case of Ayala-Ventura v. Superior Court –F089695 (March 2024).
On procedural unconscionability, the court agreed with the trial court that the degree was minimal. The agreement was adhesive in form, and an employee might reasonably fear losing a job offer by declining it. But the agreement was a clearly labeled standalone document (not a buried clause), was available in two languages, used legible formatting, and there was no evidence of deception or time pressure.
On substantive unconscionability, the court addressed each of Ayala-Ventura’s arguments. First, on overbreadth, the court acknowledged the agreement’s language could be read to reach claims unrelated to employment, but applied Civil Code section 1643 to construe the ambiguity in a way that rendered the agreement lawful – limiting it to employment-related claims. Even under Ayala-Ventura’s broader reading, the court found the agreement distinguishable from Cook because CCS is a janitorial services company, not a sprawling university with hospitals and stadiums, making the prospect of wide-ranging non-employment claims far less realistic.
Second, on duration, the court found that the agreement’s survival clause was not unconscionable in context, again because CCS’s limited operations made the concern about perpetual exposure largely speculative.
Third, on mutuality, the court found the agreement sufficiently bilateral: unlike the Cook agreement, CCS’s version expressly bound the company’s related entities and limited claims against employees and agents to acts taken in their capacity as such. Both employer and employee were subject to arbitration on equivalent terms.
Finally, the court addressed stare decisis. It clarified that all published Court of Appeal decisions bind all superior courts statewide – the trial court was wrong to suggest Cook was not binding simply because the Fifth District had not yet cited it. However, the court confirmed that trial courts may fairly distinguish binding precedent on the facts, and the Fifth District itself found Cook factually distinguishable for the reasons discussed above.