Kathleen Charles, a dementia patient who was otherwise in good health, was admitted to the memory care wing of WellQuest Elk Grove, a residential care facility in Sacramento County. Her family informed staff that Kathleen was a “wanderer” who needed monitoring, and WellQuest’s own service plan noted she required frequent supervision. Three days after admission, Kathleen was found sitting unattended in an outdoor courtyard in direct sunlight on a day when the temperature reached 102 degrees. She had burns covering roughly a quarter of her body and an internal temperature of about 105 degrees. She fell into a coma and died four days later.
When Kathleen was admitted, her niece Erika Wright – acting under a durable power of attorney for Kathleen’s health care – signed an arbitration agreement on Kathleen’s behalf. The agreement provided that “any and all claims or disputes arising from or related to this Agreement or to your rights, obligations, care, or services at WellQuest of Elk Grove shall be resolved by submission to neutral, binding arbitration in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act.” It also contained a delegation clause stating that “an arbitrator will decide any question about whether a claim or dispute must be arbitrated.” The agreement designated JAMS as the arbitration administrator but did not reference any specific JAMS rules or provide a link to them.
Eight months after Kathleen’s death, her family filed suit. On Kathleen’s behalf (as survivor claims), plaintiffs alleged elder neglect, negligence, fraud, and a criminal elder abuse tort. Her brother Raymond, niece Erika, and nephew Thomas also brought individual claims for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
WellQuest moved to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. The Superior Court Judge denied the motion on multiple grounds. First, the court found that the delegation clause did not “clearly and unmistakably” assign threshold arbitrability questions – including enforceability and unconscionability – to the arbitrator, so the court resolved those issues itself. Second, the court determined that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable. Third, it held that Raymond, Erika, and Thomas were not parties to the agreement, so their individual wrongful death and emotional distress claims were not arbitrable. Finally, turning to Kathleen’s survivor claims, the court exercised its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c), and declined to compel arbitration, finding that if those claims went to arbitration while the family’s individual claims proceeded in court, there was a risk of conflicting rulings on common factual and legal issues. The court also rejected WellQuest’s argument that the FAA’s procedural provisions governed the agreement, concluding that the phrase “in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act” did not expressly incorporate the FAA’s procedural rules.
The Third District affirmed the trial court on all issues in the published case of Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove -C105070 (March 2026)
On the delegation clause, the court held that the language – providing that “an arbitrator will decide any question about whether a claim or dispute must be arbitrated” – fell short of the “clear and unmistakable” standard required to delegate threshold arbitrability issues away from the court. The court contrasted the agreement with the provision upheld in Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 892, where the clause explicitly covered “the interpretation, validity, or enforceability” of the agreement and incorporated specific JAMS rules that expressly assigned arbitrability to the arbitrator. Here, the clause said nothing about enforceability, unconscionability, or interpretation of the agreement itself, and the JAMS reference included no link to or copy of the applicable rules. Drawing on the reasoning in Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 783, the court explained that when delegation language is susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations — one covering only substantive disputes and the other reaching threshold enforceability questions — the ambiguity cannot satisfy the heightened “clear and unmistakable” standard.
On the FAA preemption issue, the court held that the phrase “in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act” did not expressly designate the FAA’s procedural provisions as controlling. Relying on the California Supreme Court’s holdings in Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, Cable Connection, Inc v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, and most recently Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 582, the court reaffirmed that the California Arbitration Act’s procedural rules – including section 1281.2, subdivision (c) – apply by default in state court proceedings, and parties must use express language to opt out of them in favor of the FAA’s procedural framework. The court acknowledged the contrary result in Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, where the phrase “pursuant to the FAA” was found sufficient, but disagreed with that reasoning, finding it inconsistent with the principle that a departure from the default CAA framework requires more exacting language. Following Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 177, the court concluded the agreement implicitly incorporated the CAA’s procedural provisions, leaving the trial court free to apply section 1281.2, subdivision (c), to keep all claims together and avoid conflicting rulings.
Because these two holdings disposed of the appeal, the court did not reach the parties’ remaining arguments regarding unconscionability or whether Raymond’s statutory right to trial preference would independently override arbitration.