In June 2018, Tina Parsonage applied for a sales associate position at Wal-Mart. She accepted a conditional offer of employment, subject to passing a background check. As part of the process, she electronically acknowledged a “Background Report Disclosure” and signed a “Background Report Authorization” form. The disclosure document was 14 pages long, with the California-specific section starting on page 9.

This section informed her that Wal-Mart would obtain an investigative consumer report, which could include details about her character, reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living. However, instead of identifying a single investigative consumer reporting agency, it listed six possible agencies, along with their addresses, websites, and phone numbers. It instructed her to call Wal-Mart Global Security to determine which one was used. The document also summarized relevant provisions of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA, Civ. Code § 1786 et seq.), but Parsonage later alleged it violated ICRAA by not being a standalone disclosure, failing to clearly identify the specific agency, omitting a checkbox to request a copy of the report, and lacking proper certification to the agency.

Wal-Mart obtained the report from First Advantage Background Services Corp., one of the listed agencies, and mailed Parsonage a copy with a cover letter identifying the agency. Despite the alleged violations, Parsonage passed the check and began employment on June 15, 2018. In September 2021, she filed a lawsuit against Wal-Mart in San Diego Superior Court, asserting a single cause of action for ICRAA violations.

She claimed the disclosure was not clear and conspicuous, not standalone, and otherwise noncompliant. Parsonage sought statutory damages of $10,000 per violation (or actual damages if greater), attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages. She did not initially allege specific harm but later claimed the report contained inaccuracies (e.g., misstating offenses as involving a commercial vehicle, which could imply work-related misconduct), depriving her of the chance to correct them easily and potentially risking future job denials.

Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment solely on the ground that Parsonage lacked standing under ICRAA, arguing her claims involved mere “technical violations” without any concrete injury or harm, such as an adverse employment action. The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment in Wal-Mart’s favor. It reasoned that Parsonage suffered no injury because she was hired, received the report she authorized, and faced no adverse consequences from any inaccuracies. The court dismissed her concerns about potential lost opportunities as speculative and unmaterialized, emphasizing the absence of harm to her interest in a fair and accurate report.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment in the published case of Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates -D083831 (February 2026). It directed the trial court to vacate its order granting summary judgment to Wal-Mart, allowing Parsonage’s claim to proceed.

The appellate court held that ICRAA confers standing based solely on a violation of its requirements, without needing to show concrete injury or actual damages beyond the statutory breach. This conclusion stemmed from the statute’s plain language in Civil Code § 1786.50, which makes an employer or agency liable for failing to comply with any ICRAA provision regarding an investigative consumer report, allowing recovery of “[a]ny actual damages… or… ten thousand dollars ($10,000), whichever sum is greater.” The court interpreted this as authorizing the $10,000 sum as a remedy for the violation itself, emphasizing that California law – unlike federal Article III requirements – permits the Legislature to grant standing for statutory violations absent concrete harm, treating such breaches as invasions of legally protected interests.

The court distinguished California standing from federal “injury-in-fact” mandates, noting that ICRAA’s legislative history supports this view: enacted in 1975 to address shortcomings in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and prior state laws, ICRAA aimed to ensure stringent notice, consent, and accuracy in consumer reports for employment purposes, protecting privacy and enabling corrections. Amendments increasing the minimum recovery from $300 to $10,000 were intended to incentivize compliance and deter violations, not to compensate for proven harm. Comparisons to sister statutes like the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA) and FCRA highlighted ICRAA’s unique structure, which omits qualifiers like “damages as a result of” and focuses on noncompliance.

The court rejected Wal-Mart’s reliance on cases like Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc 84 Cal.App.5th 671 (2022) 300 Cal.Rptr.3d 572, and Muha v. Experian Information Solutions Inc.,106 Cal.App.5th 199 (2024) 326 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622 which required injury for FCRA/ICRAA standing in state court under a “beneficial interest” test (akin to federal injury-in-fact). It found this test inapplicable beyond writ of mandate contexts and inconsistent with ICRAA’s deterrent purpose. Since Parsonage alleged violations (e.g., non-standalone disclosure obscuring the agency), she had standing; Wal-Mart’s motion addressed only standing, not merits, warranting reversal.