Wayne Gandy spent 15 years – from 1994 to 2009 – as a professional football player with the National Football League (NFL). He played with the Los Angeles Rams (LA Rams) during the 1994 season, his first with the NFL. He played the next three years with the St. Louis Rams (STL Rams) under the contract he had signed in California with the LA Rams, but he never again played for a California team. He played for the Pittsburgh Steelers (Steelers) from April 1999 to February 2003, the New Orleans Saints (Saints) from March 2003 to April 2006, and finally, petitioner Atlanta Falcons (Falcons) from April 2006 until his retirement in February 2009.

Six years after he retired, Gandy filed a claim in California for workers’ compensation, claiming a cumulative injury to multiple body parts.

In June 2019, Gandy’s claim went to trial on three issues: (1) whether California has jurisdiction over Gandy’s claim; (2) whether jurisdiction should be exercised in light of the choice of law and forum selection clauses in Gandy’s contracts with the Falcons and the Saints (McKinley v. Arizona Cardinals (2013) 78 Cal.Comp.Cases 23); and (3) whether Gandy’s claim against the Falcons was barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.

The workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) who heard Gandy’s claim issued an opinion determining the Falcons were exempted from liability under California workers’ compensation law pursuant to Labor Code section 3600.5, subdivisions (c) and (d). The WCJ’s opinion also determined Gandy was exempted from coverage under the same provisions.

The WCAB issued an opinion and decision after reconsideration, that rescinded the WCJ’s order and found the WCAB had jurisdiction over Gandy’s claim. The WCAB took the position, in line with its previous decision in Hansell v. Arizona Diamondbacks (2022) 87 Cal.Comp.Cases 602, that it has jurisdiction under section 3600.5(a) over any athlete who ever signed a contract in California or with a California team, regardless of subdivisions (c) or (d), and it therefore had jurisdiction over Gandy’s claim because, during his first season in the NFL, he signed a contract with a California team. The WCAB also determined any choice of law/forum selection clause(s) should not be enforced. The WCAB opinion deferred deciding whether Gandy’s claim for compensation was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in section 5405.

After an appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the Falcons are exempted under sections 3600.5(c) and (d). The WCAB’s opinion and decision after reconsideration was therefore annulled and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion in the published case of Atlanta Falcons v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd. -G064622 (October 2025).

In 2013, the Legislature added sections 3600.5(c) and 3600.5(d) to section 3600.5, to explicitly address a specific subset of workers’ compensation claims: cumulative injury claims by professional athletes. (Stats. 2013, ch. 653, § 1.) Section 3600.5(c) reads, in pertinent part: “With respect to an occupational disease or cumulative injury, a professional athlete who has been hired outside of this state and his or her employer shall be exempted from the provisions of this division while the professional athlete is temporarily within this state doing work for his or her employer if” the employer provides workers’ compensation or its equivalent for the athlete under the laws of another state and that compensation covers the athlete’s employment in this state. (Id., subd. (c)(1).)

In such a case, “the benefits under the workers’ compensation insurance or similar laws of the other state, and other remedies under those laws, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer for any . . . cumulative injury . . . .” (Id., subd. (c)(2), italics added.) A professional athlete is “temporarily within” California if he or she “performs less than 20 percent of his or her duty days in California” “during the 365 consecutive days immediately preceding” the last day of work for that employer within California. (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

Gandy’s last day of work for the Falcons in California was a November 30, 2008 game against the San Diego Chargers. In the 365 days preceding that date, Gandy’s total duty days included four games and at least 250 practice days. None of the practices and only one of the games was in California – less than 20 percent of Gandy’s duty days during the relevant period. The Falcons are therefore exempt under the terms of section 3600.5(c).

But the Court of Appeal then noted “But that is not the end of the inquiry. As the WCAB recognized, Gandy was, in fact, hired as a professional football player in California (albeit by the LA Rams, not by the Falcons) at one point early in his 15-year NFL career. Therefore, section 3600.5(c) raises a question: what happens when a professional athlete is hired both by California and non-California teams over the course of his or her career and suffers a cumulative injury or occupational disease arising from that career?”

“Section 3600.5(d) provides a clear answer. It specifies that both a professional athlete claiming a cumulative injury and his or her employer are exempted when “all of the professional athlete’s employers in his or her last year of work as a professional athlete are exempt from this division pursuant to subdivision (c) or any other law, unless both the following conditions are satisfied”: (1) “[t]he professional athlete has, over the course of his or her professional athletic career, worked for two or more seasons for a California- based team” or “worked 20 percent or more of his or her duty days either in California or for a California-based team” and (2) the professional athlete has “worked for fewer than seven seasons for any team or teams other than a California-based team or teams.” (§ 3600.5, subd. (d)(1).)”

“In other words, if all the employers in the last year of an athlete’s career are exempt – under section 3600.5(c) or otherwise – the athlete’s career is not governed by California worker’s compensation law unless the athlete satisfies two conditions: (1) he or she spent either two or more seasons or 20 percent of his or her total career working in California or for a California- based team; and (2) he or she spent fewer than seven total seasons working for any non-California team or teams.”

“Gandy fails both tests. He was employed for 15 seasons, only one of which was in California with a California based team, and he worked fewer than 20 percent of his duty days in California or for a California-based team. Therefore, section 3600.5(d) exempts both Gandy and the Falcons from California worker’s compensation law.”

Looking at section 3600.5, the WCAB opinion found an ambiguity between section 3600.5(a) – which provides coverage for California employees injured while working outside of California – and sections 3600.5(c) and (d), which set forth exemptions from coverage for cumulative injuries suffered by professional athletes. Specifically, the WCAB opinion concluded: “the phrase ‘a professional athlete who has been hired outside of this state’ in section 3600.5, subdivision (c) is ambiguous as applied to a claim like [Gandy’s], where the applicant has California contracts of hire, but not with the particular employer that is asserted to be exempt pursuant to the subdivision.”

After examining the legislative history relating to sections 3600.5(c) and (d), the WCAB determined “the Legislature did not intend for [sections 3600.5(c) and (d)] to apply to athletes who have been hired in California by at least one employer during the cumulative trauma injury period.” The Court of Appeal ruled that the “WCAB’s interpretation is fundamentally flawed.”

To this the Court of Appeal said “The overriding problem with the WCAB’s interpretation is that it renders superfluous the plain language of section 3600.5(d), which specifically addresses professional athletes who ultimately suffer a cumulative injury after having been hired by one or more California-based teams at some point in their career.”

“Moreover, even if sections 3600.5(a), (c), and (d) were in conflict (and we do not find they are), sections 3600.5(c) and (d), as the later and more specific enactments, would take precedence over the earlier and more general section 3600.5(a).“