Hugo Osoy hired Pablo Arredondo Padron in 2019 to install two skylights in Osoy’s home, a project expected to take 10–12 days (80–96 hours). Padron, who lacked a contractor’s license, agreed to the job for $4,000.

On July 31, 2019, while working, Padron fell from a ladder held by Osoy, suffering serious injuries after less than 52 hours of work. Padron lost consciousness and could not recall the cause of the fall. He was unable to continue the project and was paid $1,000 for his work.

On May 21, 2020, Padron sued Osoy in Los Angeles Superior Court for negligence, premises liability, and labor code violations, alleging Osoy provided a defective ladder and failed to ensure safety.

Osoy moved for summary judgment, arguing workers’ compensation was Padron’s exclusive remedy, as he had a homeowners’ insurance policy with workers’ compensation coverage from the Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (AAA)

It was undisputed that Padron and Osoy contracted for Padron to perform residential work exceeding 52 hours (specifically, 80–96 hours for the skylight installation). The trial court concluded that the exclusion in Labor Code section 3352 (a)(8)(A) which applies to employment “was, or was contracted to be, for less than 52 hours” – did not apply because the contracted duration surpassed the 52-hour threshold, – regardless of Padron’s injury occurring after fewer hours.The trial court granted summary judgment for Osoy, and Padron appealed.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed a summary judgment in favor of defendant Hugo Osoy in the published case of Padron v. Osoy – B333512 (April 2025) – holding that plaintiff Pablo Padron’s exclusive remedy for injuries sustained while working on Osoy’s home was through workers’ compensation, not a civil lawsuit.

The central dispute involved interpreting Labor Code section 3352 (a)(8)(A), which excludes workers from workers’ compensation coverage if their employment “was, or was contracted to be, for less than 52 hours” in the 90 days before the injury. Padron argued that because he worked less than 52 hours before his injury, he was excluded from workers’ compensation and could sue in court.

The Court of Appeal disagreed. “When employment is contracted to be for more than 52 hours, the exclusion in section 3352(a)(8)(A) does not turn on the fortuity of how many hours into that employment a worker is when they are injured. Rather, section 3352(a)(8)(A) excludes from workers’ compensation (1) employment contracted to be for less than 52 hours, and (2) employment for less than 52 hours where no time period was contracted for.”

“Because Padron contracted to do more than 52 hours of work, section 3352(a)(8)(A) does not exclude him from workers’ compensation coverage regardless of his injury occurring in less than 52 hours of work.”

Padron also contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there is a triable issue whether Osoy should be estopped from relying on the exclusivity defense. As the factual predicate for this estoppel claim, Padron relies on evidence that Osoy and his insurer, a homeowners’ insurance policy from the Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (AAA), which included workers’ compensation coverage, delayed informing Padron that he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits and providing him with a claim form.

“Despite raising a claim of estoppel, Padron did not adduce any evidence to show that Osoy or AAA made any factual misrepresentations regarding Padron’s eligibility for workers’ compensation coverage. Even if Osoy and AAA remained silent as to whether Padron was eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, such inaction does not show a triable issue of affirmative conduct intended to convey facts to Padron regarding potential workers’ compensation coverage.”