Yukio Taira began working for Honeywell International, Inc. in November 2011. On May 14, 2015, Taira was on a flight to a trade show in Georgia when he suffered a “catastrophic stroke.” The flight was diverted and Taira was taken by ambulance to a hospital.
On June 29, 2015, Taira filed two applications for workers’ compensation benefits. One case listed a specific date of injury (May 14, 2015) – the date of his stroke. The other case listed an injury date of November 1, 2011, through May 14, 2015, the entire duration of Taira’s employment with Honeywell.
On September 11, 2018, Taira entered into a partial settlement agreement of $1,125,000 regarding both workers’ compensation cases. In October 2023, he settled the remaining issues in his cases for an additional $6 million, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board approved that settlement.
On September 6, 2018, Taira filed a lawsuit alleging that Honeywell violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by failing to provide him an accommodation for his disability (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (m))1 and failing to engage in the interactive process (§ 12940, subd. (n)). The third amended complaint, which is the operative pleading, alleges FEHA claims against Honeywell for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation (§ 12940, subd. (m)) and failure to engage in the interactive process (§ 12940, subd. (n)).
On June 16, 2022, Honeywell filed its motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted. Because the undisputed evidence establishes that Taira never requested a reasonable accommodation, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in the unpublished case of Taira v. Honeywell International -B328410 (February 2025).
At issue in this appeal is only the question of whether Honeywell failed to reasonably accommodate Taira’s assumed disability.
“‘[I]t is important to distinguish between an employer’s knowledge of an employee’s disability versus an employer’s knowledge of any limitations experienced by the employee as a result of the disability.’” (Scotch, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013.) Thus, FEHA “requires an employer to accommodate only a ‘known physical . . . disability.’” (Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1252.) “‘“Vague or conclusory statements revealing an unspecified incapacity are not sufficient to put an employer on notice of its obligations under the [FEHA].”’” (Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1167 (Featherstone).)
And, “the employee must request an accommodation.” (Gelfo, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 54.) “‘“Where the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable accommodations, are not open, obvious, and apparent to the employer,”’” the employee bears the burden “‘“to specifically identify the disability and resulting limitations, and to suggest the reasonable accommodations.”’” (Doe v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 721,738–739; see also Spitzer v. Good Guys, Inc. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1378; Raine v. City of Burbank (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1222 (Raine).)
In other words, “[a]n employee cannot demand clairvoyance of his employer. [Citation.] ‘“[T]he employee can’t expect the employer to read his mind and know he secretly wanted a particular accommodation and sue the employer for not providing it. . . .”’ ‘It is an employee’s responsibility to understand his or her own physical or mental condition well enough to present the employer at the earliest opportunity with a concise list of restrictions which must be met to accommodate the employee.’ [Citation.]” (King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 443 (King).)
There is no evidence that Taira informed Honeywell of specific work restrictions as a result of his disability or that he requested a reasonable accommodation. (See, e.g., Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 349 [affirming summary judgment to the employer because although it learned of the plaintiff’s symptoms, “those symptoms did not interfere with the performance of his job”]; King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 444 [given the plaintiff’s apparent ability to get the job done, “it was incumbent upon him to produce clear and unambiguous doctor’s orders restricting the hours he could work”].) Thus, Taira’s claim under section 12940, subdivision (m), fails.
For the same reason, Taira’s claim under section 12940, subdivision (n), fails. It is undisputed that Taira did not identify a specific, available reasonable accommodation while working at Honeywell. Absent this evidence, Honeywell is entitled to judgment.
The fact that Taira may have reported his medical symptoms to both Ocello and a member of the human resources team does not change the conclusion. While he may have made such reports, he did not request a reasonable accommodation for those symptoms. There was nothing “open, obvious, and apparent” to Honeywell about what limitations were required for those symptoms.
And his complaint about understaffing does not constitute a reasonable request to accommodate a disability. (See, e.g., Nadaf-Rahrov, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 975–976.)