Now that injured workers no longer have a formal Workers’ Compensation Rehabilitation Program, the California Department of Rehabilitation may fill some gaps in benefits. The DOR administers a program in cooperation with the Federal Government, aimed at assisting physically and/or mentally handicapped persons in achieving a maximum degree of support. (Welf. & Inst. Code sec. 19000.) This program is funded by 80 percent federal and 20 percent state funds.
The service may be provided only to disabled individuals who are of employable age or who may be expected to be of employable age upon completion of rehabilitation services, and for whom it has been determined vocational rehabilitation may be satisfactorily achieved. (Welf. & Inst. Code sec. 19018.). Although the Department may not be able to provide a living allowance while the person is in training, it may be able to assist the person financially in many other ways. Interested persons should contact the Department of Rehabilitation to determine if they are eligible to receive benefits.
Thus, this appellate case may be of interest to the Workers’ Compensation community, and it concerns the proper interpretation of the term “maintenance” under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (Pub.L. No. 93-112 (Sept. 26, 1973) 87 Stat. 355, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; the Act), and related California law.
Under the Act, the federal government provides grants to participating states, including California, to help fund vocational rehabilitation services for individuals with disabilities. In California, those services are provided by the Department of Rehabilitation. John Doe is a recipient of such services.
The Department agreed to cover Doe’s law school tuition and other expenses, but it refused to pay his rent while he attended a school that was outside of commuting distance from his home.
Doe argued rent qualified as “maintenance,” a covered expense under the Act and California law. But the Department, while interpreting the same statutes and regulations as Doe, determined the law prohibited it from paying Doe’s rent, which it deemed to be a non-covered “long-term everyday living expense.”
Doe testified that before law school he had been living with his mother and didn’t have to pay rent or utilities. In essence, Doe’s position was that because he had no housing or utility expenses, his rent while in law school was a cost in excess of his normal living expenses. Doe stated he didn’t have the financial ability to pay for rent and would have to drop out of school if the Department didn’t pay it.
An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the Department’s decision, and a trial court denied Doe’s petition for writ of mandate. Both the ALJ and the court found that rent was allowable as “maintenance” only for short-term shelter, and not for a term of three years, which was deemed to be long term.
The Court of Appeal reversed in the published case of Doe v Department of Rehabilitation -G062519 (August 2024).
The Department agreed to cover tuition less any scholarships or grants, the security deposit for an apartment, initial setup charges for utilities, monthly internet costs, and travel costs for “one way to school at the start of the semester, and at the end of the semester, one roundtrip mileage.” But the Department denied Doe’s request for rent for the anticipated three years of school attendance. About a week later, Doe signed a 13-month lease for an apartment near the non-commuter school. The monthly rent was $2,865. At that rate, three years of rent would cost $103,140. His request for reimbursement of this expense was denied, because “the Department doesn’t pay for housing.”
In deciding this dispute, the Court of Appeal noted that twenty specific categories of vocational rehabilitation services are enumerated in the Federal Act. (29 U.S.C. § 723(a).). Under the Federal Act, vocational rehabilitation services include “maintenance for additional costs incurred” while receiving such services. (29 U.S.C. § 723(a)(7).)
One example of maintenance is “[t]he cost of short-term shelter that is required in order for an individual to participate in vocational training at a site that is not within commuting distance of an individual’s home.” (34 C.F.R. § 361.5(b)(34) (2022).) As a catchall provision, the federal implementing regulations include a twenty-first category: “Other goods and services determined necessary for the individual with a disability to achieve an employment outcome.” (34 C.F.R. § 361.48(b)(21) (2022).)
As a participating state, California requires that its vocational rehabilitation program “be consistent with the national policy toward people with disabilities articulated in . . . [the Act].” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 19000, subd. (c).). California’s statute largely tracks the language of the Act and similarly provides for “[m]aintenance, not exceeding the additional costs incurred while participating in rehabilitation.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 19150, subd. (a)(8).)
A participating state need not accept all eligible individuals into its vocational rehabilitation program. (29 U.S.C. § 721(a)(5) [order of selection of eligible individuals for services].) But once an individual is accepted as a client, “the scope of [the state agency’s] discretion narrows considerably. The agency is required to provide the client at least with those services enumerated in the Act which are necessary to assist the [eligible] person to achieve his or her vocational goal.” (Schornstein v. New Jersey Division of Vocational Rehabilitation Services (D.N.J. 1981) 519 F. Supp. 773, 779; 29 U.S.C. § 723(a).)
The Court of Appeal concluded that to “determine if a cost can be covered as “maintenance,” the question is whether the cost is in excess of normal expenses and tied to receiving other vocational rehabilitation services – not whether the cost is short- or long-term.”
Accordingly, the matter was remanded so the Department can reconsider Doe’s request under the proper definition of “maintenance.”