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Miguel Pena claimed injury to the head, neck, back, shoulders and psyche. The employer disputed injury to his psyche, but not to the other body parts pied. An award found applicant needed future medical care, but did not decide AOE-COE to the psyche.

Later a psychological PQME diagnosed major depression, pain disorder and cognitive disorder that was 100% industrially-based. Future treatment recommendations were made for treatment.

Pena requested authorization for treatment with Dr. Lorant,.a secondary treater for psyche. Defendant responded asking “if there has been an RFA for sessions with Dr. Lorant..”

In response, applicant filed a Declaration of Readiness to Proceed on the issue of treatment for his psyche, as well as a Petition for Penalties under section 5814 and attorney’s fees under section 5814.5.

The issues at trial included injury AOE/COE to the psyche, a penalty for failure to promptly provide or authorize medical care to the psyche and fees under section 5814;5 if a penalty is assessed.

The WCJ found an unreasonable delay in authorizing medical care, and assessed a penalty of 25% of the first visit with Dr. Lorant, and found that applicant’s attorney was entitled to fees under section 5814.5 in an amount to be adjusted between the parties. The F&A did not contain a finding of fact regarding injury AOE/COE to applicant’s psyche. After reconsideration, a WCAB panel agreed with the penalty, and a split panel disagreed with the attorney fee award in the case of Pena v Agua Systems. Commissioner Sweeney wrote a dissenting Opinion.

Applicant’s psychiatric condition was found to be industrially caused by the PQME and treatment was recommended. The record does not reflect that defendant raised any issues with the PQME conclusions or attempted to conduct discovery to challenge those conclusions prior to or during the trial.

The record therefore does not support genuine doubt by defendant from a medical or legal standpoint for liability for benefits in relation to applicant’s psychiatric condition. Once applicant requested treatment for his psychiatric condition per his July 6, 2018 request, defendant was obligated to provide it.

Defendant fails to cite any authority for its contention that the mere selection of a physician to provide medical treatment itself constitutes a RF A for a “specific course of proposed medical treatment” subject to UR. There is no specific course of treatment being proposed by applicant’s selection of Dr. Lorant as a secondary treater; this is simply a request for an opportunity to be seen by a psychiatrist who can then report to applicant’s primary treating physician (PTP) on what treatment, if any, is necessary to cure or relieve from the effects of applicant’s psychiatric condition.

But fees under 5814.5 are only permissible where applicant has incurred fees in specifically enforcing a prior award. That did not occur here. There was no prior award for treatment to applicant’s psyche at the time of the trial.

In other words, the second trial was not conducted to enforce a prior award so there can be no award for attorney’s fees under section 5814.5.