Last fall, Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. signed SB 1300 (Jackson; D-Santa Barbara), a comprehensive bill that makes several changes in the law for making sexual harassment claims.

The bill also amends FEHA to specify that an employer may be responsible for the acts of nonemployees for all forms of harassment, rather than the responsibility being limited to sexual harassment, as it was before SB 1300 took effect.

Further, the bill prohibits a prevailing defendant from being awarded fees and costs unless specific conditions are met.

SB 1300 prohibits employers from requiring employees to sign a release of claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) in exchange for a raise or as a condition of employment.

These provisions took effect on January 1, but employers and defense counsel need to be aware of the bill’s “intent language.”

The broad “intent” language is likely inconsistent with canons of statutory construction and prior court precedent. As such, SB 1300’s intent language will surely increase employer costs as lawyers attempt to erroneously utilize the “findings and declarations” in SB 1300 to expand FEHA litigation.

The general rule of statutory construction is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, which basically requires the courts to give the statutory language its usual and ordinary meaning. A statute is changed by a material amendment to the statutory language itself, but not by “legislative intent” language.

One intent declaration concerns the Legislature’s view about whether a single harassment incident still could be considered a violation of FEHA. To quote SB 1300: “the Legislature hereby declares its rejection of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s [decision] and states that the opinion shall not be used in determining what kind of conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a violation of [FEHA].”

Yet, the author removed from her bill the statutory provisions that would have lowered the severe or pervasive standard.

Another declaration concerns the Legislature’s view that “harassment cases are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment.” However, SB 1300 does not amend Code of Civil Procedure Section 437(c), which sets forth the requirements regarding motions for summary judgment. However, SB 1300 does not amend Code of Civil Procedure Section 437(c), which sets forth the requirements regarding motions for summary judgment.

Additionally, the intent language of SB 1300 seeks to lower the legal standard for hostile work environment claims by referring to a single quote by a single justice’s concurring opinion in a U.S. Supreme Court 9-0 decision: :the Legislature affirms its approval of the standard set forth by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her concurrence that, in a workplace harassment suit, ‘the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment.’”

Given that SB 1300 did not change the statutory standards for summary judgment and hostile work environment, the superfluous intent language in SB 1300 does not serve to provide guidance regarding either of these standards. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, “We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.”