A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy (identified as John Doe) and the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) filed a complaint against the County of Los Angeles and other parties alleging that the defendants unlawfully accessed Doe’s medical information, and later discriminated and retaliated against him for asserting his right to keep that information confidential.

Doe has been a Sheriff’s Deputy since 1997. In 2009, he suffered a work-related injury to his back for which a physician prescribed narcotic pain medication. Doe became physically dependent on the medication. He received workers’ compensation benefits for both the back injury and his dependency. He entered a drug dependency treatment program. He completed the program successfully in June and was released to return to full time, unrestricted duty. From June 2011 until February 2012, Doe worked full time as a deputy sheriff. He had back surgery in February, then took a leave of absence until July 6, 2012.

In May 2012, while on leave, Doe filled several prescriptions he obtained from different physicians for pain medications. In August 2012, the County’s workers’ compensation administrator noticed that the number of prescriptions was “unusual” and informed the sheriff’s department about the prescriptions. When confronted Doe stated that he had decided to quit taking the medication and destroyed the remaining pills. The last time he took narcotic pain medication was in June 2012.

From August 6, 2012 until June 13, 2013, Doe worked full time without restrictions or problems. The sheriff’s department nevertheless placed him on a performance mentoring program. Doe was required to attend quarterly performance reviews and submit to drug tests. From August 2012 until June 2013, Doe provided the required information and passed all drug tests.

On December 6, 2012, someone in the sheriff’s department accessed Doe’s records within the County’s Prescription Medication Drug Database (PMDD) for the purpose of discovering the medications Doe had been prescribed. Employees of the County and the sheriff’s department reviewed the information. Doe had not authorized access or review, and did not learn of it until November 2013.

Later, five supervisors attempted to get Doe to authorize access to his prescription information, telling him that it would “save [his] job.” And three sheriff’s department officers asked him to voluntarily submit to a psychological fitness for duty evaluation. Doe declined both requests. Later he was “ordered to engage in a fitness for duty psychological re-evaluation.” The defendants were allegedly aware that Doe would be required to release this information as part of the fitness for duty evaluation.

Doe consented to the evaluation, but refused to authorize the release of his medical records. The psychologist was therefore unable to conduct the evaluation. The next day Doe was ordered to take a medical leave of absence. He complied, even though he was ready, willing, and able to perform his duties. He has been on leave of absence since that time.

Doe filed a civil complaint against the County alleged nine causes of action involving invasion of privacy and retaliation. The defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court granted the motion, dismissed the case and awarded $10,230 in attorneys’ fees to the defendants. The Court of Appeal reversed in the unpublished case of Assn. for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles.

Resolving an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-part inquiry. First, the defendants must make a prima facie showing that the challenged cause of action arises from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. If the defendants satisfy their burden of showing that the cause of action arises from protected activity, the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to make a prima facie showing of facts demonstrating a probability of prevailing on their claim.

The Court of Appeal determined that the plaintiff’s causes of action do not arise from activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, the trial court erred in granting defendants’ special motion to strike the complaint and in awarding defendants’ their attorneys’ fees. The order granting the defendants’ special motion to strike the complaint and the award of attorneys’ fees were reversed and his case will proceed.