Dennis Wallace was hired by the County of Stanislaus in 1997 as a deputy sheriff. He started in patrol and then worked in various positions with the sheriff’s department.

In October 2007, Wallace injured his left knee and filed a workers compensation claim. He later reinjured his left knee during a river sweep. He wore a knee brace at work until he had knee surgery in 2008. After the surgery Wallace took a Labor Code section 4850 paid leave of absence from time to time until he returned to light duty. After this leave, Wallace began to work a light duty assignment in the property and evidence room. His restrictions at the time were limited climbing, limited walking on uneven ground, and limited running.

Later, the The restrictions were clarified in a supplemental report to (1) no prolonged walking in excess of 30 to 45 minutes without a five-minute break, (2) no walking on uneven ground in excess of 30 minutes without a five-minute break, and (3) no prolonged standing in excess of 30 to 45 minutes without a five-minute break.

Wallace received and initialed a “NOTICE OF OFFER OF MODIFIED OR ALTERNATIVE WORK” on a preprinted workers compensation form. The County offered Wallace an assignment as a bailiff for at least 12 months at his pre-injury rate of pay. The cover letter referred to the position as a permanent modified duty assignment with the restrictions stated in the supplemental report. It also stated the restrictions “are to be considered ‘Permanent’ until your Agreed Medical Exam.” During the period that Wallace worked as a bailiff, the sergeants who supervised him had no issues with his performance.

The AME then issued a report that listed various “preclusions” including (1) no lifting more than 50 pounds, (2) no bilateral overhead work or repetitive right over shoulder work, (3) no forceful pushing, pulling, torqueing with the right upper extremity, (4) no weight bearing more than 75 percent of the time, (5) no more than occasional climbing, squatting, kneeling, crouching, crawling or pivoting, and (6) no walking on uneven ground more than 75 percent of the day. Wallace was removed from his bailiff position on the grounds that he could not perform the job with those restrictions. At a meeting called to discuss this decision Wallace stated that he could perform the functions of a bailiff and also mentioned working as a detective or school resource officer.

On May 20, 2011, a few days before his accruals for sick leave and vacation were exhausted, Wallace filed a civil complaint against County and the sheriff’s department alleging causes of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (§ 12900 et seq.) for (1) disability discrimination, (2) failure to accommodate his disability, (3) failure to engage in the interactive process, and (4) failure to prevent discrimination.

After a first jury trial, the jury was deadlocked on some of the causes of action. On January 30, 2013, over three months before the second trial, Wallace returned to full duty as a patrol office. After the second jury trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the County, and Wallace appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed in the partially published case of Wallace v Stanislaus.

An employer can violate the law by taking an adverse employment action against an employee “because of” the employee’s physical disability even if the employer harbored no animosity or ill will against the employee or the class of persons with that disability. This conclusion resolves how the jury should have been instructed on the County’s motivation or intent in connection with the disability discrimination claim. The trial court told counsel that it read the case law as requiring employee plaintiffs to “prove that the actions taken by the employer were done with the intent to discriminate,” which the court equated with “animus.” Thus, over plaintiff’s objection, the court modified the standard jury instruction (CACI No. 2540) accordingly. This was error, and the judgment reversed accordingly.

The court published its discussion of motive and animus to alert practitioners and other courts that “animus” is an imprecise term that can cause confusion when used in disability discrimination cases with direct evidence that the employer’s motive for taking an adverse employment decision was the plaintiff’s actual or perceived disability. To avoid this confusion, courts and practitioners would be better served by limiting their use of the terms “animus” and “ill will” to employment discrimination cases involving proof of an illegitimate motive by circumstantial evidence.