In this Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) case, Rick Carter injured his back and neck at work in 1991, and he has been permanently totally disabled since October 1, 1993. In 1996, the parties entered stipulations, and the ALJ awarded Carter disability and medical benefits based on those stipulations. In this protracted case, litigation has continued over disputes involving post award issues.

In the current dispute, Rick Carter appeals to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in California from the district court’s order awarding him $14,268.50 in attorneys’ fees and costs on his fee petition in the amount of $22,585.The district court’s selection of a blended hourly rate of $400, combined with its reduction in the number of compensable hours by almost half, from 60.9 to 35 hours, resulted in Carter receiving a 27 percent reduction in fees: from $22,585 to $14,268.50. Carter contends on appeal that the district court erred as a matter of law by reducing the fee award without sufficiently explaining its rationale for the reduction.

The panel in the published opinion of Carter v Caleb Brett LLC held that the district court erred as a matter of law by reducing the fee award without sufficiently explaining its rationale for the reduction. The panel vacated the district court’s order awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, and remanded for the district court to articulate the basis for its fee determination with greater specificity.

When determining a reasonable fee award under a federal fee-shifting statute such as the Longshore Act, a district court must first calculate the lodestar by multiplying the “number of hours reasonably expended . . . by [the] reasonable hourly rate.” This Circuit requires that courts reach attorneys’ fee decisions by considering some or all of twelve relevant criteria set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975). The Kerr factors are (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

A mere statement that a court has considered the Kerr guidelines does not make a decision within the court’s discretion. Rather, the court must “articulate with sufficient clarity the manner in which it makes its determination.” While detailed calculations are not mandated, “something more than a bald, unsupported amount is necessary” to affirm an award of attorneys’ fees. As a general rule, a fee-awarding court that makes a substantial reduction in either documented time or authenticated rates should offer reasonably explicit findings.” The district court must also “explain how it arrived at its determination with sufficient specificity to permit an appellate court to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in the way the analysis was undertaken.”

The district court’s selection of a blended hourly rate of $400, combined with its reduction in the number of compensable hours by almost half, from 60.9 to 35 hours, resulted in Carter receiving a 27 percent reduction in fees: from $22,585 to $14,268.50. In its fee order, the district court identified the twelve Kerr factors and mentioned two that it considered most relevant: (1) “the disproportionate relationship between the amount of fees incurred($22.585.00) and the amount at stake in the litigation ($3,220.20)”; and (2) that “Carter [did] not bear primary responsibility for the fact that this matter became considerably more protracted than the ‘quick and inexpensive mechanism’ envisioned by the statute.” Beyond that very brief discussion, however, the district court offered no other analysis before concluding that “[u]nder the circumstances here, for purposes of fee-shifting, 35 hours of attorney time at a blended hourly rate of $400 is reasonable.”

The Court concluded that the district court did not explain its decision to reduce Carter’s fee request with sufficient specificity to allow it to review the reasonableness of the fee award.